# IDEALS AND IDEOLOGIES

## A READER

THIRD EDITION



TERENCE BALL
RICHARD DAGGER

# IDEALS AND IDEOLOGIES

## *A READER*

Third Edition

**TERENCE BALL**
**RICHARD DAGGER**
*Arizona State University*

An imprint of Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

New York • Reading, Massachusetts • Menlo Park, California • Harlow, England
Don Mills, Ontario • Sydney • Mexico City • Madrid • Amsterdam

Associate Editor: Jessica Bayne
Marketing Manager: Megan Galvin
Project Coordination and Text Design: Electronic Publishing Services, Inc., NYC
Cover Design Manager: Nancy Danahy
Cover Photos: Adolf Hitler—Corbis; May 1989 China bike demonstration—Peter Turnley/Black Star; Malcolm X—John Launois/Black Star; Oklahoma City bombing—Lisa Hoke/Black Star
Full Service Production Manager: Valerie L. Zaborski
Senior Print Buyer: Hugh Crawford
Electronic Page Makeup: ComCom, an R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company
Printer and Binder: The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Cover Printer: Coral Graphic Services, Inc.



Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ideals and ideologies : a reader / [edited by] Terence Ball, Richard Dagger. — 3rd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references..
ISBN 0-321-00539-2
1. Democracy. 2. Ideology. 3. Right and left (Political science)
I. Ball, Terence. II. Dagger, Richard.
JA36.I32 1998
320.5—dc21 98-7258
CIP



ISBN 0-321-00539-2

345678910—MA—010099

# *PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION*

Many instructors either do not use textbooks at all, or supplement them with readings from original sources. And surely it is better for students to read the writings of Mill or Marx or Burke than merely to read about them in a textbook. Most textbooks in "modern political thought" and "contemporary ideologies" offer little more than predigested summaries, while the few available anthologies too often supply only a series of brief snippets from original sources. Neither is satisfactory, in our view.

Understandably dissatisfied, many instructors—and here we speak from long personal experience—have devised their own jerry-rigged packet of photocopied materials, which in the end satisfies neither them nor their students. And now, with copyright laws interpreted more strictly in the United States, photocopying these packets has become both expensive for students and time- and energy-consuming for faculty.

Having long felt the dissatisfaction and heard the complaints, we decided about a decade ago to edit an anthology that would meet instructors' standards while satisfying students' demands for a readable and reasonably accessible "reader." We knew that our choices—what to put in, what to leave out—would not satisfy everyone. But the fact that we are now issuing a third edition suggests that an anthology of this sort does indeed meet the needs of many instructors and students alike.

An ideal anthology or reader for this subject—which probably exists only in Plato's heaven—would combine four features. First, it would present a wide range of alternative ideological visions, right, left, middle, and unorthodox. Second, it would include a generous sampling of key thinkers in the different ideological traditions, old and new alike. Third, an ideal anthology would, when necessary, modernize the prose of thinkers long dead. Fourth, and finally, it would supply the student with some sense of the intellectual and political context within which these thinkers thought and wrote.

Although the anthology that follows is far from ideal, we have tried to satisfy the aforementioned criteria. First, we have attempted to cover the broad canvas of contemporary political ideologies, from the standard categories of liberalism-conservatism-socialism to a broader range of newly emerging ideological alternatives. Among these are the "liberation" ideologies, including indigenous or native people's liberation, the ecological or "green" ideology, and neo-Nazism. Second, we have tried to supply a fairly generous and reasonably representative sample of alternative ideological views, including those not represented in any other ideology. Third, we have, wherever possible, simplified the prose of older thinkers—in several instances providing our own translations of works not written in English. And finally, we have provided brief introductions to place these selections and their authors in their political and historical context.

We have, in short, tried to supply the student with an accessible and readable book of original sources. Even so, the end result does not necessarily make for easy reading. But then, as we remind our students, the axiom, "No pain, no gain," applies to the building not only of muscles, but of minds as well. We have merely attempted to remove some of the unnecessary strain from what is a sometimes painful but always profitable exercise.

This reader can be used in several ways. It can be used on its own as a source book of original readings from which instructors can assign the selections they think most important. Or it can be used in combination with an accompanying textbook, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal,* Third Edition, by Ball and Dagger, which contains references keyed to this reader. Either the textbook or reader, or both, may in turn be supplemented with a ten-part video series, "Contemporary Political Ideologies," written and narrated by Terence Ball. Instructors interested in using this series should write to:

The Director
Media Assisted Instruction
Department of Independent Study
45 Wesbrook Hall
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

In preparing this Third Edition, we had the benefit of detailed and thoughtful comments from the following scholars, whom we wish to thank here: Elizabeth Ann Bartlett, University of Minnesota-Duluth; Ellen Grigsby, University of New Mexico; Kristen Parris, Western Washington State University; David Freeman, Washburn University; Mark Weaver, College of Wooster; and Laurie Bagby, Kansas State University.

For help in securing permission to reprint material and in putting it all together, we are grateful to Barbara Dagger, I. E. "Eddie" Genna, Johannes Lauterborn, and Sue Miller.

We should also note, finally, that many of the readings included here easily fall under more than one heading. There are many combinations, and many ways to use this book. But whatever the preferred combination may be, the aim is always the same: to convey to the student-citizen a vivid sense of the centrality and ongoing importance of ideas, ideals, and ideologies in modern politics.

*Terence Ball*

*Richard Dagger*

# *INTRODUCTION*

The world in which we live has been, and continues to be, shaped by political ideologies. Indeed, the truth of the old saying that "ideas have consequences" must be evident to anyone who has not slept through the twentieth century. For better or worse, the century that is about to end has been a century of ideas—and particularly of those clusters or systems of ideas called "ideologies." These ideologies have raised hopes, inspired fear, and drawn blood from millions of human beings. Some heroes and, alas, many mass-murderers of this century have been inspired and motivated by ideas and ideals—in short, by ideologies. To study political ideologies, then, is not to undertake a merely academic study. It is to dissect and analyze the tissue of the twentieth century itself.

As we enter the twenty-first century, some ideologies, such as the Marxist-Leninist version of socialism, are clearly in eclipse, while others—such as a newly emerging ecological or "green" ideology—appear to be gaining in influence and importance. Yet, despite their differences, these ideologies are similar in at least one respect: All have their histories. All, that is, have emerged out of particular historical contexts and have changed in response to changing conditions and circumstances. And all have been formed from the ideas of thinkers old and new. Writing in the 1920s, in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and just as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were beginning to be heard in Germany and Italy, the economist John Maynard Keynes observed that "madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back."

This book is about, and by, those "academic scribblers"—and a number of those "madmen in authority" as well. Their ideas have formed the ideologies and fueled the conflicts that have shaped and reshaped the political landscape of the twentieth century. We live in the shadow, and under the influence, of these scribblers and madmen. To be ignorant of their influence is not to escape it. By tracing modern ideologies back to their original sources, we can see more clearly how our own outlooks—and those of our enemies—have been shaped by earlier thinkers. When one of the characters of Peter DeVries' novel *Reuben, Reuben* exclaims, "We must get Aristotle out of system!," another objects that Aristotle is not in *his* system because he has never even read Aristotle. "Oh, he's there, all right," says the first, "whether you know it or not." The same can be said of other thinkers long dead—Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Smith, Marx, Mill, and many others. To return to and read these authors is to gain some insight into the shaping of the modern political mind—or rather minds, plural, since ideological disagreement continues unabated.

Some modern commentators claim—wrongly, we believe—that ideological disagreements are at last coming to an end. "The age of ideology," they say, is over. As

evidence, they cite the ending of the Cold War, the emancipation of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the democratizing of former dictatorships. Important as they are, however, these events do not presage "the end of ideology." Rather, they suggest that ours is an age of important ideological realignments. Marxism-Leninism may be dead in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but other versions of it linger on in the politics of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. And, of course, conservatives continue to disagree with liberals, socialists disagree among themselves, animal liberationists fight for animal rights, gays for gay rights, and greens organize and act to protect the environment. Other movements, motivated by other ideologies, are no less active.

So ours is now, and is likely to remain, an age of ideological diversity and disagreement. The selections that follow include a generous sampling of some, though scarcely all, of the writings that have helped to form the ideologically varied political terrain of the small planet on which we dwell together, if not always in peace or harmony.

*T.B.*

*R.D.*

# *CONTENTS*

# *PART ONE*

# THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

That ideologies and ideological conflict have persisted throughout modern history should come as no surprise. Ideologies are born of crisis and feed on conflict. People need help to comprehend and cope with turbulent times and confusing circumstances, and ideologies provide this help. An ideology does this by performing four important and perhaps indispensable functions for those who subscribe to it. First, it *explains* political phenomena that would otherwise remain mysterious or puzzling. Why are there wars and rumors of war? Why are there conflicts between nations, between classes, and between races? What causes depressions? The answer that one gives to these, and to many other questions, depends to some degree on one's ideology. A Marxian socialist will answer one way, a fascist another, and a feminist yet another.

Second, an ideology provides its adherents with criteria and standards of *evaluation*—of deciding what is right and wrong, good and bad. Are class differences and vast disparities of wealth a good or a bad thing? Is interracial harmony possible, and, if so, is it desirable? Is censorship permissible, and, if so, under what conditions? Again, the answers one gives will depend on which ideology one accepts.

Third, an ideology *orients* its adherents, giving them a sense of who they are and where they belong—a social and cultural compass with which to define and affirm their individual and collective identity. A fascist, for example, will typically think of himself as a member of a superior nation or race. A communist will see herself as a defender of the working class against capitalist oppression and exploitation. An animal liberationist will identify herself as a defender of animals that are unable to defend themselves from human abuse and exploitation.

Fourth and finally, an ideology supplies its adherents with a rudimentary political *program.* This program provides an answer to the question posed by the Russian revolutionary Lenin, among many others: What is to be done? And, no less important: Who is to do it? With what means? A Marxist-Leninist, for instance, will answer these questions as follows: The working class must be emancipated from capitalist exploitation by means of a revolution led by a vanguard party. Fascists, feminists, greens, liberals, conservatives, and others will, of course, opt for other programs of political action.

To summarize, a political ideology is a more or less systematic set of ideas that performs four functions for those who hold it: The explanatory, the evaluative, the orientative, and the programmatic functions. An ideology, in short, serves as a guide and compass through the thicket of political life.

There are, as we shall see, many different political ideologies in the modern world. But what of democracy? Is it an ideology? In our view democracy is not an ideology, but an *idea* that different ideologies interpret in different ways. For the

ancient Greeks—and for modern Marxists—democracy (or "people's democracy") means rule by, and in the interest of, the common people. For liberals, democracy means "liberal democracy"—that is, majority rule, but with ample provision for the protection of minority rights. For modern greens, democracy means decentralized "participatory" or "grass-roots" democracy. Other ideologies interpret the democratic ideal in other ways. Democracy, then, is an *essentially contested concept* whose meaning is disputed and defined in different ways by different ideologies.

As with "democracy," so too with "freedom." Different ideologies conceive of freedom in different ways. "Freedom" means something quite different for liberals from what it means for fascists, for example. We can see this more clearly by thinking of freedom (or liberty) as a triadic or three-sided relation among an *agent,* a *goal,* and any *obstacle* standing between the agent and the goal that he, she, or they seek to achieve. We represent this relationship in the following diagram.




The Triadic Model of Freedom

Every ideology identifies the three elements of the triad in its own way. A liberal, for instance, will typically identify the agent as an individual, the goal as the satisfaction of an individual's own desires, and the obstacle as any unreasonable restraint or restriction on such "want-satisfaction." A Marxist, by contrast, will characteristically identify the agent as an entire class—the working class or "proletariat"—that struggles to overcome capitalist exploitation in order to achieve a classless communist society. A fascist will conceive of the agent as a whole nation or race attempting to overcome so-called inferior nations or races in a collective search for racial or national supremacy and purity. And other ideologies, of course, conceive of freedom in still other ways.

# 1

# *IDEOLOGY: THE CAREER OF A CONCEPT*

**TERRELL CARVER**

The concept of ideology has undergone dramatic changes in meaning since the term *ideologie* was first coined in eighteenth-century France. In an essay written expressly for *Ideals and Ideologies,* the Anglo-American political theorist Terrell Carver (1946– ) traces these changes, concluding with a critical consideration of the ways in which the term "ideology" is used today.

As a coined word, the term "ideology" has a precise origin in the era of the French Revolution. The decisive shifts in its meaning, moreover, have been associated with some of the most colorful and influential figures in modern history—Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), and V. I. Lenin (1870–1924). From its very inception, in fact, ideology has been associated with highly abstract philosophy and forceful, even brutal, political repression.

Behind the term "ideology" are the familiar features of politics—ideas and power. Philosophers have not been conspicuous for their participation in politics, but through the actions of others they have been influential at times. Improving the connection between philosopher and politician to extend this influence was one of the main concerns of Antoine Louis Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy (1754–1836), one of the Enlightenment *philosophes*. De Tracy coined the term "ideology" during the wild revolutionary decade in France when ideas inspired many thousands to test their powers in politics and to put their immediate material interests, even lives, at risk. Although the substance of de Tracy's thought drew on the specific philosophies of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780) and John Locke (1632–1704), among others, his work was explicitly directed toward political action. He assumed that criteria for the truth and falsity of ideas could be established and definitively employed, and that there was a point to doing so. That point was overtly political.

De Tracy and his colleagues aimed to promote progress in all areas of human endeavor, theoretical and practical, by reforming elite and middle-class opinion. Their Institut de France was established by the Convention in 1795 to disseminate higher learning as the *savants* of the revolution defined it. Their work began with three assumptions: that progress in social life is desirable; that progress comes only from correct ideas; and that incorrect ideas must be resisted, especially in the schools. In opposition to the traditions of the Catholic Church and to the personal authority of anointed monarchs, de Tracy and his colleagues in the Institut favored the ideals of the new science associated with Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Réné Descartes (1596–1650), and other thinkers who espoused rational inquiry into the natural and social world. The rationalism of the Institut was especially hostile to religious thought if conceived mystically.

In 1796 a British commentator reported that de Tracy had read a paper at the Institut in which he proposed to call the philosophy of mind "ideology." Five years later, in his *Elements of Ideology* (1801; translated into English by Thomas Jefferson for an edition of 1817), de Tracy summarized the results of his logic within a "plan of the elements of ideology . . . to give a complete knowledge of our intellectual faculties, and to deduce from that knowledge the first principles of all other branches of our knowledge." Without these first principles "our knowledge" could "never be founded on any other solid base."[1] With correct ideas would come a correct psychology or theory of human behavior, and with that the justification for such political prescriptions as intellectuals might devise and enlightened politicians might enforce.

De Tracy's system, while sweeping, was disarmingly simplistic, dismissive of scepticism, and surprisingly concise. Even at the time, it must have raised some strong doubts among philosophers. Indeed, the association of ideology with intellectual shortcuts, oversimplification, and distortion seems inherent in de Tracy's original conception. That de Tracy also associated his ideology with a political program and authoritarian politics provides further clues to the way the concept has functioned since his day.

There are three important features of de Tracy's conception of ideology: (1) the explicit linkage between logic, psychology, and politics, set down in a "table" of simple propositions and

backed up with more extensive observations; (2) the assumption that intellectuals discover the truth and that well-advised political authorities implement policies to match; and (3) the claim that logic, psychology, and politics, as linked, are coincident with science and history, properly understood.

In 1797 Napoleon Bonaparte, the leading general of the revolutionary army, became an honorary member of the Institut, and his fellow "ideologues" supported the coup d'état by which he seized power in 1799. With their boundless faith in reason, the "ideologues," de Tracy amongst them, expected to achieve the same success in psychology, morality, social and economic relations, and politics that the new "natural philosophers" had achieved in studying planetary and terrestrial motion, optics, and mathematics. Such was their certainty that they committed themselves to an administrative structure to promote their ideas and to discourage what they termed prejudices—and with that they necessarily engaged in politics. As their concept of truth presupposed the authority of the intellectual (validated by the "correct" assumptions and methods), so their politics created no great obstacles to authoritarian rule—provided, of course, that the authority had proper intellectual guidance. There was little in the doctrines of the "ideologues" to favor the unenlightened intellect or to afford it any great role in decisionmaking. Because politics was supposed to be subject to the new science, democracy with its popular decisionmaking would have little to recommend itself to the Enlightenment intellectual unless it were properly guided. Tutoring rulers was obviously the easier and more immediately efficacious task. With Napoleon a member of the Institut, furthermore, the "ideologues" could expect enlightenment and progress to spread all the more quickly throughout France and beyond its borders. The forces of reaction were to be swept away by the enlightened use of political power as the resources of the state were made available to the intellectual élite.

The crucial event in the development of the concept of ideology came when Napoleon turned against the "ideologues" and decisively reversed their interpretation of the proper relationship between intellectuals and rulers, philosophers and politicians. Around 1812, he dismissed de Tracy's work and the work of the Institut de France as "ideology, that sinister metaphysics." This hostility to the "ideologues" apparently reflected a shift in Napoleon's political tactics—from alliance with the rationalists of the Institut against religion and the Church, to the reverse. Eradicating what the "ideologues" saw as prejudice was politically costly, and Napoleon sought to increase his personal power by making peace with the Church and allying himself with other conservative forces.[2]

About thirty years later the German Communist Karl Marx seized on "ideology" as a term of abuse. He criticized German intellectuals whose philosophy and politics displeased him by dismissing them as "ideologists," proponents of "the German ideology." He and Friedrich Engels co-authored a manuscript of that name which remained unpublished as a whole until 1932, though sections of the large work appeared in excerpts from 1903 onwards.[3] In other published works that circulated during his lifetime and in his private correspondence, Marx used the term "ideology" in ways that drew on the more extensive airing he had given the concept in *The German Ideology*.

Ideologies and ideologists arise in class-divided societies, according to Marx. In particular, "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal consequently also controls the means of mental production." Thinkers are "producers of ideas," in other words, while ruling classes regulate "the production and distribution of the ideas of their age." Thus "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force."

Within the ruling class the division of labor divides mental from material tasks, so that:

> Inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptualizing ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the other's attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves.[4]

The German ideology was to be explained, Marx argued, "from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g., the illusions of the jurists, politicians (including practical statesmen), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows." All those illusions and distortions were "explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour."[5] In this realm of jobs and economic activity, Marx introduced a notion of material interest which made illusions demonstrably functional for some individuals and classes in societies as they pursued economic advantages for themselves at others' expense. Some of these useful illusions were dressed up as claims about nature or God—for example, "some people are slaves by nature," "God made woman to serve man"—and some were more elaborately cloaked in a universalism that Marx dismissed as spurious. He argued, for example, that the "rights of man and the citizen" proclaimed in the French Revolution ultimately worked for the benefit of owners of private property at the expense of workers, who had no property to sell but their own labor. Thus in Marx's analysis an ideology came to mean not just a body of ideas that conformed to certain formal characteristics, such as those of de Tracy's system, but any ideas, however unsophisticated, that gave apparent validity and assumed authority to the claims that members of different classes might make when they pursued their various interests. Those who characteristically made such claims were deemed "ideologists"; others merely repeated in their speech or reflected in their behavior an "ideology."

In Marx's view ideologies could be reactionary, conservative, reformist, or revolutionary, depending on the way that material interests (typically the use and control of resources, goods, and services) were pursued by individuals and then protected socially and politically. In keeping with his depiction of history as the history of class struggles—now hidden, now open—Marx defined ideologies as the "legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms" in which people become conscious of class conflict "and fight it out."[6] In that way, "the existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period," he wrote, "presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class."[7]

Marx thus extended de Tracy's term "ideology" to cover ideas that reflected, and were somehow useful in pursuing, the material interests of classes. But his own work was supposed to identify, explain, and promote working-class interests in current political struggles. It might seem, therefore, to be ideological itself. Marx did not refer to his work in those terms, however, nor to the pursuit of working-class politics as requiring an ideology. He identified the working class as a revolutionary class, but one distinguished from previous revolutionary classes in that it was becoming a majority and already expressed "the dissolution of all classes, nationalities etc., within present society."[8] A revolutionary class was to overthrow a ruling class, as had already happened many times, but with the *proletarian* revolution would come the abolition of class-society altogether. This could happen, Marx said, because the interest of the proletariat coincides with the interests of all individuals "as individuals."[9]

Marx's arguments for the proletariat's abolition of class-divided society are sketchy and unconvincing, but they are quite distinct from the views he described as ideological. His communism, and the theory behind it, were not ideologies on his definition, because the for-

mal properties and political reference were profoundly different. Instead, Marx considered his work to be scientific, taking due regard for the historical character of the social phenomena under investigation. It was also supposed to have political significance in the struggle for socialism. But it was not formally identical to the pattern for an "ideology" established by de Tracy because there was no Marxian logic and psychology from which his politics were deduced. Rather he worked from a less comprehensive conception, that of economic activity ("so-called material interests"), towards prescriptions that could be useful, so he argued, in proletarian politics.[10] The role of the theoretically informed individual or group was said, in the *Communist Manifesto* and elsewhere, to be advisory, not authoritative. Marx contemptuously dismissed sects and other ways in which ideals were supposed to be imposed on people so that reality could be created, in a sense, by ideas. Communism, he claimed, was a "real movement" already in existence, to which his science was intended to contribute.[11]

Friedrich Engels was the architect of a Marxism that fitted the formal requirements of an ideology, though he himself dismissed ideology all too simplistically as mere "false consciousness," a phrase not used by Marx.[12] While he did not term Marx's work an ideology, but a science—namely, "scientific socialism"—Engels elaborated a view that Marx's science had specified fundamental laws of dialectics in the realm of "thought" (presumably a proto-psychology), in the development of human behavior in history, and in the matter-in-motion of the universe itself. Engels's widely circulated *Anti-Dühring* (1878) advertised those pretensions, producing extended discussions of historical and contemporary economic development that were supposed to substantiate his claims for a materialistic dialectic in logic. These were repeated in his later *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1888) and the posthumously published *Dialectics of Nature* (1925), edited from notebooks largely contemporary with *Anti-Dühring*.

Whether Marx shared Engels's views is a matter of controversy.[13] There is no explicit endorsement of them in his works. Indeed, as I am arguing here, the way that Marx identified such logico-deductive constructions as "ideological" suggests that he could not have agreed with Engels's views without major inconsistency.

Thus Marx's followers did their best to make his ideas fit the formal and political definitions of ideology that Marx himself had applied to other systems of ideas. In doing so his followers seemed to undermine the pejorative connotations of the term. This introduced an obvious contradiction between Marx's own consistently pejorative usage with respect to German ideologists and other apologists for the ruling classes, on the one hand, and his followers' use of the term in an approving sense, on the other, to identify his work as a comprehensive system that promoted the interests of one particular class in society—the working class. This working-class or proletarian "ideology" was a science, Marx's followers said, precisely because it was a body of thought reflecting proletarian interests. As a result we have Marxism identified by Soviet philosophers and many others as a "scientific ideology"—a contradiction in terms from Marx's own point of view.

The Russian revolutionary Lenin (pseudonym for Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov) followed Engels in identifying Marxism as a comprehensive science derived from an abstract logic, thus accepting it formally as an ideology. While this identification was merely tacit in Engels's case, Lenin made it specific and went one stage further in his highly influential *What Is to Be Done?* (1902). Citing Engels on the necessity for political, economic, and theoretical struggle in pursuing working-class interests, Lenin concluded very generally and with particular reference to Russia that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice." "Modern socialist conscious-

ness," he wrote, "can only arise on the basis of profound scientific knowledge."[14]

Lenin identified this science as "socialist ideology" and claimed that the only political choice available in his time was between the bourgeois ideology and the socialist one. He thus defined ideologies as doctrines reflecting class interests that were in some sense products of theoretical thinking, not the commonplace consciousness of class members themselves. For the working class this was crucial in Lenin's eyes, because he viewed them as likely victims of bourgeois ideology (or unwitting servants of it via "trade union consciousness"), unless socialist intellectuals and party workers, using the "socialist ideology," awakened the workers to the "irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system."[15] On this view it was a matter of fact that science served proletarian interests because it revealed the true character of class antagonism in capitalist society, the very truth that bourgeois ideology had veiled in illusions, such as "self-help," "parliamentary democracy," "market forces," etc.

Presumably Lenin's use of "ideology" to include science, as well as the interest-serving mystifications Marx had loosely identified as ideologies, was a kind of shorthand. Lenin conceived of a "scientific ideology" opposed to unscientific ones, all serving different class interests. In that political sense—ideology as ideas serving class interests—Lenin made Marxism ideological. By the early twentieth century, then, ideology had wandered in meaning from a science of ideas, to a sinister metaphysics, to class-serving illusions, to false consciousness as opposed to scientific socialism, to scientific socialism as one ideology competing with others.

The "science" within the socialism of Engels and Lenin was very vulnerable to criticism, as the first principles of their dialectical materialism were incomplete and unconvincing. But the insight, derived ultimately from Marx, that ideas serve the interests of individuals, groups, and classes, and that individuals, groups, and classes often generate and defend the ideas that do this, has made a systematic sociology of consciousness possible. This project was set out by the German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), who explained that the principal thesis of his "sociology of knowledge" is that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured. In his view the study of these "ideologies" involves unmasking the more or less conscious deceptions and disguises of interest groups, particularly those of political parties.[16] For Mannheim "ideology" was a name for two related conceptions which he distinguished as "particular" and "total":

> The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests . . . .

"This conception of ideology," wrote Mannheim, "has only gradually become differentiated from the commonsense notion of the lie." It was "particular" by comparison with the more inclusive "total" conception of ideology: "Here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group."[17]

Mannheim argued that this total conception of ideology raised the problem of "false consciousness" as "the totally distorted mind which falsified everything." The possibility that our whole conception of reality might be systematically distorted and continuously distorting had "a special significance and relevance for the understanding of our social life." From the awareness of this possibility arose a "profound disquietude" which Mannheim felt very deeply.[18]

De Tracy confidently described his ideology, a general grammar and logic, as a science, about whose methods, truth and timelessness he had no doubts. Since the time of the