

The **POLITICS** of **GLOBAL** **GOVERNANCE**



**International
Organizations in an
Interdependent World**



edited by

Paul F. Diehl



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BOULDER
LONDON

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Part 1

INTRODUCTION

THERE are two predominant views of international organizations among the general public. The first is a cynical view that emphasizes the dramatic rhetoric and seeming inability to deal with vital problems that are said to characterize international organizations and the United Nations in particular. According to this view, international organizations should be treated as insignificant actors on the international stage. The other view is an idealistic one. Those who hold this view envisage global solutions to the major problems facing the world today, without recognition of the constraints imposed by state sovereignty. Most of the naive calls for world government are products of this view. An understanding of international organizations and global governance probably requires that neither view be accepted in its entirety, nor be wholly rejected. International organizations are neither irrelevant nor omnipotent in global politics. They play important roles in international relations, but their influence varies according to the issue area and situation confronted.

This book is designed to provide a balanced and realistic view of international organizations. Toward this end, the selections in this collection dispel a number of myths. Narrow views about how international organizations make decisions or respond to conflict are called into question. An understanding of international organizations requires knowledge of how, where, and why they operate. Only then can we learn to recognize their limitations as well as their possibilities. We begin the study of international organizations by briefly tracing the origins of the present United Nations system.

The League of Nations was formed following World War I, and it represented an attempt at international cooperative efforts to prevent war. The breakdown of the League system in the 1930s was the product of many factors, although the failure of will by the major powers of the era and the unwieldy requirements for concerted action certainly were the primary causes. As with most experiments, the initial results were far from ideal,

but the total effort gives some basis for optimism. In the case of the League of Nations, it was not able to prevent World War II, but it did provide a means for cooperation and consultation among states on a variety of issues not confined to security matters, although this was the major purpose for which it was created.

It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that world leaders sought to form another general international organization at the conclusion of World War II. The occurrence of war has generally had a stimulating effect on the development of international organizations in the modern era.¹ What may be surprising to some is the similarity between the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.² The Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations had comparable antecedents under the League system. Furthermore, the United Nations was also predicated on the assumption that continued cooperation among the victorious coalition in the previous war would insure global stability. One might think that given the League experience, the United Nations would suffer similar setbacks. Although the United Nations and its affiliated agencies have not achieved most of the goals set out in its charter, neither have they been insignificant in dealing with many of the most pressing problems in the world. This can be attributed to the radically differing environments faced by the League and the United Nations.

After 1945, the international system was structured in a bipolar fashion, with each superpower retaining an interest in maintaining its status. Consequently, there was little pressure from the rapid systemic upheaval that characterized the periods prior to the world wars. This does not imply that conflict has abated; rather, such conflict has been more limited and less threatening to the international system or the existence of the United Nations. Second, there seemed to be a greater recognition of a need for cooperation among states. The ideas behind the United Nations are not new ones, but the prospects of global devastation from nuclear war or environmental disaster were sufficient to prompt a greater commitment to international organizations. It has become clear that various problems, such as pollution, hunger, and nuclear proliferation, are not amenable to action by only one or several states.

Finally, the United Nations acquired a symbolic importance that the League of Nations lacked. States feel obligated to justify their actions before the main bodies of the United Nations, even when they may appear contrary to the charter principles. As the United States did during the Cuban missile crisis, states may use the United Nations as a means to legitimize their actions or policy positions.³ Most important, however, states are exceedingly hesitant to withdraw from membership in the United Nations, even when that organization's actions appear contrary to their national interests. Such reluctance prevents the debilitating loss of significant actors that plagued the League during most of its existence.

The end of the Cold War (now conventionally designated as 1989) signaled a new era for the United Nations and international organizations in general. On the one hand, the end of the superpower rivalry removed many of the barriers that had heretofore prevented the United Nations from taking action, especially in the security realm. The United Nations supported global military action against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, the first such global collective enforcement effort since the Korean War. The United Nations also authorized more peacekeeping operations in the five years that followed the end of the Cold War than in the forty-five years that preceded it; many of these new operations took on functions such as humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and election supervision that previously were not within the province of U.N. peacekeeping. On another front, the European Union took further notable steps toward complete economic integration, and other nascent regional economic blocs, such as the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) entity and that formed under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), began to take shape.

The prospects for expanding the roles, functions, and powers of international organizations in global governance seemed bright at the beginning of the 1990s. Yet a series of events underscored the problems and limitations of international organizations as they approached the twenty-first century. The enhanced ability of the UN Security Council to authorize new peacekeeping missions did not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness in halting armed conflict or promoting conflict resolution. The United Nations was largely ineffective in stopping the fighting in Bosnia, could not produce a political settlement in Somalia, and was too slow to prevent genocide in Rwanda. Despite its successes, the European Union stumbled badly in its peace efforts toward Bosnia, and attempts to create a common currency as well as other integration efforts promise significant domestic and foreign political controversy. Other organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), now struggle with the new environment and the redefinition of their roles as their original purposes have been significantly altered or rendered obsolete. As we approach the twenty-first century, international organizations play a greater role than they ever have in history. Yet we are still reminded that state sovereignty and lack of political will by members inhibit the long-term prospects of those organizations for creating effective structures of global governance.

The United Nations and its affiliates are the most significant international organizations, but they are hardly the only ones. In this century the number of international organizations has grown substantially. Although definitions and estimates may vary, the total number of all types of international organizations may exceed ten or twenty thousand. The list includes a wide range of memberships and purposes, and they vary in significance from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to the World Bank.

One method of classifying international organizations is according to their membership potential and scope of purpose.⁴ International organizations can either be designed for universal membership, potentially including all states in the world, or the membership may be limited, as are many regional organizations. We may also classify international organizations according to the breadth of their concerns. Specific purpose organizations may be confined to one problem, such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Medical Research Laboratory, or one issue area, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), whereas general purpose organizations are concerned with a variety of problems in several issue areas. Most international organizations are *nongovernmental entities in the limited membership, specific purpose category*.

The only universal, general purpose organization (and its affiliated agencies)—the United Nations—receives a disproportionate amount of attention in this volume. The United Nations and its agencies remain the centerpiece among international organizations in the security realm and play prominent roles in most other issue areas. Although the United Nations is centrally important, any treatment of international organizations and global governance would be incomplete without a consideration of the thousands of other international organizations throughout the world. Over the past decade, two other types of international organizations have played increasingly important roles in global governance: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Red Cross, and regional organizations, such as the European Union. Accordingly, included here are articles that demonstrate how NGOs and regional organizations form webs or networks that intersect, replace, or supplement those IO webs composed primarily of global intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.

Part 1 offers an overview of the creation and the termination of international governmental organizations. Richard Cupitt, Rodney Whitlock, and Lynn Williams Whitlock reveal that international organizations have enormous staying power in international relations. Their adaptability has apparently not slowed the creation of new, more specialized organizations, and trends for NGOs show a similar, almost exponential increase.⁵

Part 2 focuses on the various theoretical approaches to the study of international organizations. It is evident that the ways analysts have studied international organizations have changed dramatically over the last fifty or more years. The reader is especially advised to note the description and critique of regime analysis. This approach is currently the most prominent in the field, and accordingly, some of the subsequent articles in this book adopt that framework.

Part 3 details the decisionmaking processes of international organizations. The range of activities and the bureaucratic actors and processes that are often hidden from public view are revealed in these selections. Furthermore,

proposals to change the most visible aspect of decisionmaking—voting—are assessed. After the first three parts, the reader will have a broad view of the place of international organizations in the world system and the patterns of their activities. Armed with this understanding, the reader is directed to the actions of international organizations in three major issue areas: peace and security, economic, and social and humanitarian. In Parts 4 through 6, one can appreciate the number of organizations involved, the scope of activities undertaken, and the variation in effectiveness across organizations and issue areas. While the first three parts highlight common patterns in international organizations, the next three parts provide more details and reveal the diversity of these bodies.

Part 4 explores the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping operations, but also considers the changes that the end of the Cold War has wrought. That series of events has led peacekeeping strategy to evolve into its “second generation” and has also called into question the existence and purposes of NATO, the bedrock of deterrence and security in Europe over the past fifty years; one article addresses each of these concerns. The economic issue area, addressed in Part 5, is one of great importance especially to many underdeveloped countries. An article on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) shows how those Third World countries would like to change the current method of global governance with respect to economic issues. Articles on the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Bank for Development illustrate how those institutions have played a role in creating the structure of international finance and development, how they have adapted (or not) to changing demands, and how they paradoxically may both enhance and mitigate the dependence of poorer countries on their wealthier counterparts. Part 6, on humanitarian activities, shows the interface of many organizations in a variety of important concerns, including hunger, human rights, the status of women, environmental protection, and humanitarian relief.

Part 7 returns to the more general concerns addressed at the outset of the book: What roles can international organizations play in global governance? We conclude this collection with two differing perspectives, mirroring somewhat the idealist and cynical viewpoints noted above, on the promise and inherent limitations of international organizations in global society.

Notes

1. See J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, “International Government Organizations and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1964” *International Organization*, 24 (1970): 520–547.

2. For a definitive comparison, see Leland Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations” *International Organization*, 1 (1947): 3–21.

3. Ernst Haas, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations" *International Organization*, 20 (1966): 367–379.

4. Harold Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, 2nd edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 11–13.

5. John Boli and George Thomas, "Organizing the World Polity: INGOs Since 1875." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 1995.

The (Im)mortality of International Governmental Organizations

*Richard Cupitt, Rodney Whitlock
& Lynn Williams Whitlock*

Introduction

[Over] twenty-five years ago, Wallace and Singer (1970a) made the first systematic effort to describe change in the population of international governmental organizations (IGOs) in the modern state system. They found, after controlling for an increase in the number of countries in the system between 1815 and 1964, “the familiar linear relationship between the passage of time and the amount of intergovernmental organization in the system” (Wallace and Singer, 1970a, p. 282). In a concurrent study, they also found that the number of IGOs increased markedly after the world wars (Wallace and Singer, 1970b). More recently, Jacobson, et al. (1986) revealed that the growth in the number of conventional IGOs continued into the 1980s, though at a progressively slower pace.¹

International cooperation through multilateral institutions, such as IGOs, is not expected to be either extensive or durable from a realist or neo-realist viewpoint (Carr, 1964; Grieco, 1990; Morgenthau, 1978; Walt, 1987; and Waltz, 1979). Essentially, there is one argument: the constant pursuit of gains relative to other states diminishes their chances for lasting cooperation. Indeed, the mere existence of a large and growing population of IGOs implies an unexpected degree of cooperation in the international system from a neorealist perspective. This helps justify the realist view that IGOs are rarely more than “bit players” in international politics (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 25).

In contrast, neoliberals, both institutionalists and Grotians, claim that international cooperation is widespread (Adler and Haas, 1993; Keohane, 1984; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Murphy, 1994; Stein, 1990; and Young

Reprinted by permission of Gordon and Breach Publishers from *International Interactions*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1996, Richard Cupitt, Rodney Whitlock, and Lynn Williams Whitlock, “The (Im)mortality of International Governmental Organizations.”

1989). From these perspectives, multilateral institutions, especially IGOs, not only indicate and facilitate cooperation but also influence state behavior by agenda setting, compliance monitoring and other functions (Diehl, 1989; Jacobson, 1984; Murphy, 1994; and Keohane, 1988). Neoliberals also argue that the institutional basis for international cooperation will be very durable.

Studies of the number of IGOs in the international system, however, provide limited evidence about the more important theoretical issue—the *durability* of IGOs. Besides research on the League of Nations, few works examine the demise of IGOs. In one exception, Murphy (1994) concludes that “world organizations” have played crucial roles in economic development and the search for security since the Crimean War and that survival crises among those organizations are related to fundamental changes in world order.² Despite the lack of attention, evidence about the durability of IGOs would address a core problem in the study of international relations. Grieco (1988 and 1990), for example, asserts that the durability of institutional cooperation among nations is a central question in the debate between realists and neoliberals. Similarly, Powell (1994, p. 341) argues that whether multilateral institutional cooperation continues “in the face of a change in the underlying distribution of power” is one of the pure and unsettled research issues in the neorealist-neoliberal debate. In an effort to formalize the realist-liberal debate, Niou and Ordeshook (1991) raise the importance of durable international institutions to an even higher role, suggesting that such institutions are critical to international stability both for the realist vision of balance of power and the liberal vision of a collective security system.

In this article, the authors use standard population statistics to assess the durability of conventional IGOs in the international system for the years 1865–1989. Following a brief discussion of IGOs and institutional persistence (with examples from the literature on international relations, the U.S. bureaucracy, and international business), the authors examine the infant mortality, average age at death, median age, crude birth rates, and crude death rates for conventional IGOs. The authors then make a basic assessment of the durability of IGOs in the international system.

The Durability of International Cooperative Institutions

From a realist perspective, modern IGOs arose as a means for the status quo powers to preserve order and seek peace after the Napoleonic Wars, which so forcefully exposed the failure of both 18th century diplomacy and nationalism as paths to peace (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 392). IGOs reflected the common interests of the great powers, usually defined in terms of balancing military threats. Idealists or utopians were merely “clothing own interest in the guise of a universal interest,” so that international morality was really a function of power (Carr, 1964, p. 75).

The League of Nations was the first attempt to standardize universal security concerns, similar to what public international unions had done for the postal services, health services, telecommunications, and other government interests (Carr, 1964, p. 28). Established at a time of political and economic discord, realists argue that the League failed because its creators did not understand that security interests were not often held in common, leaving little room for cooperation. Realists claim to recognize:

... the undeniable fact that ... what the national government does or does not do is much more important for the satisfaction of individual wants than what an international functional agency does or does not do. ... The neglect with which the public treats international functional agencies is but the exaggerated reflection of the minor role these agencies play for the solution of important international issues (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 518).

This neglect stems from the realist belief that states are always more sensitive to relative than absolute gains (Grieco, 1990, pp. 46–47). In addition, the degree to which the importance of relative gains exceeds absolute gains increases when states face the prospect of great shifts in the balance of power, such as when a common challenger has been defeated. At those times, even former friends become suspect because of the “danger that relative gains from joint action may advantage partners and may thus foster the emergence of what at best might be a potentially more domineering friend and at worst could be a potentially more powerful future adversary” (Grieco, 1990, p. 45). The neorealist shift in focus to the system level of analysis does not greatly modify this view. Waltz (1979, p. 198), for example, asserts that states weigh relative gains more heavily than absolute gains and that states become more sensitive to relative gains when they confront a substantial change in the existing world order. Consequently, “institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation,” so IGOs become rudimentary facilitators of power politics (Grieco 1988, p. 485).

Clearly, the fluidity of the balance of power ensures that the fortunes of specific IGOs or other international institutions rise and fall in tune with the ephemeral interests of the powers of the time (Carr, 1964; Gilpin, 1981; Grieco, 1990). Neither realist nor neorealist theory allows much room for predictions about the rise or fall of specific coalitions of great military powers. While realists explain the demise of the League of Nations in terms of its failure to reflect the balance of power, it’s hard to predict exactly when the League would cease to function from their analyses. Waltz (1979, p. 124), for example, does not indicate when military coalitions will change in relationship to changes in the distribution of power, other than to assert that such changes will occur periodically.

In part, earlier findings are so challenging because conventional IGOs seem likely to be among the most durable forms of international cooperation.

In fact, though Wallace and Singer (1970a) emphasize their effort was only one of description, Jacobson, et al. (1986) explicitly challenge realist theory. Taking a neoliberal view, they suggest that the "complexity of modern life creates many pressures for states to establish additional IGOs," probably at a very rapid rate (Jacobson, et al. 1986, p. 157). According to Jacobson (1984), where technological and economic progress sparked the growth in the number of IGOs in the 19th century, two global wars and decolonization spawned an explosion of IGOs in the 20th century.

Generally, neoliberal scholars argue that cooperation should be very durable, even if the basic structural variables that lead to cooperation change substantially (Stein, 1990; Young, 1989). Young (1989, pp. 64–65), for example, concludes that even immoral and inefficient international institutions are likely to endure. Neoliberals argue that international institutions do more than merely reflect the distribution of power and serve as an alternative means for states to pursue power politics. From a neoliberal perspective, IGOs help coordinate state behavior, shape judgements about the interests and commitments of others, and influence state preferences (Keohane, 1989, pp. 5 and 161; Niou and Ordeshook, 1991, p. 510). Neoliberals contend that IGOs have some autonomy and as autonomous actors IGOs influence states through the use of oversight, majority rules, weighted voting, monitoring compliance, support for allies, support for specific international services (Murphy, 1994, pp. 219–221). While neorealists and neoliberals both see power in the international system as decentralized, neoliberals deny that anarchy is the key to understanding international relations. Instead, the extent of mutual interests and the degree of institutionalization are the most significant variables.

Neoliberals disagree among themselves, however, on the central role of the state and rationality in the behavior of IGOs (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Neoliberal rational institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane, Vinod Aggarwal, and Arthur Stein, retain states as the central focus of their work, but they argue that even under conditions of anarchy states will frequently engage in cooperative behavior, facilitated by international institutions that reduce uncertainty (especially about the behavior of others) and reduce transaction costs (Keohane, 1989; Niou and Ordeshook, 1991). To rational institutionalists, IGOs should persist only as long as their constituent states have an incentive to maintain them (Keohane, 1989, p. 167). Most rational institutionalists focus their research on the start or maintenance of cooperation, and only peripherally on the mortality of specific institutions (Keohane, 1989; Murphy, 1994). From a rational institutionalist perspective, however, there are many reasons to expect that IGOs should survive long after fundamental changes in the distribution of international power would lead one to expect from a realist or neorealist view. Among other reasons, Stein (1990, pp. 50–53) suggests that IGOs will prove persistent in the face of changes in the distribution of power and other fundamental determinants of international

relations because national governments only review their policies, including support for IGOs, periodically, while officials may wish to build a reputation for preserving tradition (and not breaking commitments). Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) indicate that institutional cooperation may prove durable if it acquires an orthodoxy among policy-makers and the public. They also claim that states may attempt to preserve the policy transparency associated with complying with IGO rules and procedures, even when other IGO functions and activities become less valuable (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Most importantly, rational institutionalists contend that states may have positive preferences, both instrumental and empathetic, for gains by other states. In those situations, international institutions can facilitate the spirit of "generalized reciprocity" among states (Keohane, 1989, pp. 231–232). As Keohane (1989, p. 167) admits, however, the predictions of institutionalists "about the demise of specific institutions are less clear" than their predictions about institutional origins and persistence.

Neoliberals in the Grotian tradition, in contrast, forgo the analysis of preferences and pay-off structures so prevalent in the institutionalist approach. Instead, they argue that the rise and fall of international institutions corresponds to critical internal contradictions or the grossest alterations in the fundamental world order, not mere shifts in either the distribution of military or economic power alone (Cox, 1977; Keohane, 1989; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Murphy, 1994; Young, 1982). To Grotian neoliberals, for example, the values of a "deeply embedded liberalism" in many levels of the international community seems a more robust explanation of international cooperation in the post-World War II era than calculated bargaining by various states (Ruggie, 1982). If IGOs correspond to the deeply embedded values of a world order, then they should survive at least as long as that order. Grotian neoliberals, especially those with a Gramscian view, also see world orders in an evolutionary context, so that an IGO that serves a value critical to succeeding world orders might very well survive in perpetuity. Robert Cox, for example, indicates that the International Labour Organization managed that feat (Cox, 1977). From this perspective, more and more IGOs emerge to construct and reinforce international rules and values in an incremental fashion, even when opposed by the dominant power of the age (Murphy, 1994, pp. 78–79).

When world orders have changed remains unsettled from this viewpoint. Murphy (1994), for example, argues that key transitions in global governance occur with the rise of public international unions in the late 1800s, with the League and UN systems in the mid-1900s, and with a new generation of IGOs in the 1970s. Treating the League and UN systems as a single strand of global governance conflicts with the view of Ruggie (1983, p. 208) that embedded liberalism did not emerge until after World War II.

Murphy (1994, p. 82) finds that most of the public international unions formed in the 19th century "faced moments of crisis when they could no

longer rely on their early sponsors and benefactors." Eleven of those organizations did not mobilize support among powerful constituencies, including nonstate, substate, and transnational actors, and were abolished before 1920 (Murphy, 1994, p. 83). This accounts for only one third of the world organizations of the time, suggesting that the majority proved very durable even with the pressures of global military conflict. Evidence from other fields, however, gives mixed portents for the likely durability of IGOs.

Historically, military alliances do not appear to be very durable, with defense pacts surviving an average of only ninety-four months for the period 1815–1965 (Bueno de Mesquita and Singer, 1973). A number of post–World War II alliances, however, have proven much more durable, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Military alliances, moreover, represent only a tiny fraction of the total forms of international cooperation, and rarely have the institutional basis of typical IGOs.

The evidence on international joint ventures (IJVs) also raises some questions regarding the durability of IGOs. In the private sector, IJVs are a common form of international commercial cooperation. Though no comprehensive study of the population of IJVs exists, research indicates that IJVs fail somewhere between 30 and 50% of the time (Berg and Friedman, 1978; Franko, 1971, pp. 3–4; Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1988; and Morris and Hergert, 1987).

The study of U.S. government agencies, in contrast, offers solace for neoliberals. In a seminal work, Kaufman (1976) discovers, from a population of 175 organizations in the U.S. government in existence in 1923, that only twenty-seven (15.4%) “died” by 1973.³ While not strictly comparable, many of the arguments Kaufman (1976) uses to explain the persistence of domestic government agencies are applicable to IGOs. National administrative agencies created by statute or with statutory recognition, for example, might endure because of the arduous process involved in changing legislation. As treaty obligations usually require national implementing legislation, this should hold true for IGOs. Other reasons Kaufman (1976) notes for the longevity of U.S. agencies that appear applicable in an international setting include complicated budget processes, personal or career motivations, organizational loyalties, defenders of the agency in the legislative or other branches of government, and interest group support (Jacobson, 1984; or Diehl, 1989). Finally, as Milner (1992), Powell (1994), and others have argued, international cooperation may be akin to a two-level game, one between states and one within each state. This implies that the durability of domestic bureaucracies could have a direct impact on the durability of associated multilateral institutions, following the “second image reversed” argument.

While relatively few U.S. agencies appeared to die between 1923 and 1973, births and deaths appear to take place in spurts. Most importantly, the overall number of agencies increases by 283 over the same time span (Kaufman, 1976).⁴ Because the increase in the number of new agencies

outweighs the increased age of persistent agencies, the median age of government organizations is twenty-seven years in both 1923 and 1973 (Kaufman, 1976, p. 34). Kaufman (1976, p. 34) concludes that the “government organizations examined do indeed display impressive powers of endurance.”

Methods

Wallace and Singer (1970a, pp. 245–246) defined IGOs as having two or more states as members, holding regular plenary sessions, and having some sort of permanent secretariat and headquarters. Using the criteria adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to distinguish IGOs from international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), IGOs must also have been created by a formal agreement between governments. These criteria are roughly similar to those used in more recent studies (Feld, Jordan, and Hurwitz, 1988; Jacobson, et al., 1986; Jacobson, 1984). Two differences between Wallace and Singer (1970a) and other studies should be noted. Wallace and Singer (1970a, p. 246) do not use the more standard membership criteria of three governments for an IGO, but do this largely to prevent some key organizations from being deleted when their membership temporarily fell to two states. Unlike the Jacobson studies (Jacobson, et al., 1986; Jacobson, 1984), they also excluded IGOs that were federations of other IGOs, whose membership is not in any part selected by another IGO, and does not have a distinct secretariat (Wallace and Singer, 1970a, p. 248).

For our study, we use the standard definition of IGOs as organizations created by three or more governments, based on a formal agreement, and having some permanent secretariat or headquarters. This definition fits with data on international organizations (IOs) from the Union of International Associations (UIA), which produces the most definitive dataset on IOs. We rely heavily on the data from the Union of International Associations presented in various issues of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*.⁵ The UIA relies first on self-reported characteristics of various bodies, but couples this information with editorial checks for accuracy against periodicals, official documents, and press sources (UIA, 1994/95, volume 1, pp. 1616–1634). The UN ECOSOC and other bodies officially recognize the UIA and its publications as an authoritative source for information on IOs. Wallace and Singer (1970a), Jacobson, et al. (1986), and Jacobson (1984) relied on the UIA *Yearbook* for their information.

We examine IGOs in five categories identified by the UIA. The first four groups, Class A through Class D, are conventional IOs, whose definition has remained standard throughout UIA publications. Class A, federations of international organizations, has dozens of INGOs but only one IGO, the United Nations. Class B, universal membership organizations, includes