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YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1975



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Foreword

This edition of the *Yearbook of the United Nations* records the activities and decisions of the Organization during its thirtieth anniversary year. The great changes in the world during those 30 years are faithfully reflected in the annual volumes of the *Yearbook*. Here too is recorded the evolution of the United Nations from a 51-nation association to a world body of almost 150 members.

Like its predecessors, this volume of the *Yearbook* provides an authoritative, objective and concise account of the events of the year. At the same time, it records the progress of the world community towards the goals of international peace and co-operation. It will serve well all who are engaged in this work.

KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

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PART ONE

The United Nations

Political and security questions

Chapter I

Disarmament and related matters

During 1975, discussions and debates on disarmament and related matters continued to be held under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (ccd) and in the United Nations General Assembly.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held two sessions at Geneva, Switzerland, during the year—from 4 March to 10 April and from 24 June to 28 August—at which it continued its discussion of matters related to nuclear disarmament, to non-nuclear and collateral measures and to general and complete disarmament. Under the auspices of ccd, a group of governmental experts prepared a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects; this study was the subject of a special report submitted by ccd to the General Assembly.

At its thirtieth session, which opened on 16 September 1975, the Assembly discussed these and other questions relating to disarmament. It adopted 25 resolutions concerning them.

A number of these resolutions were concerned with nuclear disarmament. Thus, the Assembly adopted two resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (see pp. 21-26). It adopted nine resolutions relating to nuclear-free zones (see pp. 38-44): these dealt with a study of nuclear-weapon-free zones, ratification of Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region, a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

The Assembly also adopted a resolution concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (see pp. 44-45). Another subject of an Assembly resolution was the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (see pp. 57-62).

Additional questions dealt with in resolutions were: the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (see pp. 62-64); chemical and biological weapons (see pp. 64-66); napalm and other incendiary weapons (see pp. 66-68); the banning of new weapons of mass destruction (see pp. 68-72); a convention to ban action to influence the environment for purposes incompatible with international security (see pp. 72-73); the economic and social consequences of the arms race (see pp. 73-75); reduction of military budgets (see pp. 75-77); the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade (see pp. 77-78); a world disarmament conference (see pp. 79-80); and general and complete disarmament (see pp. 17-21).

Also in 1975, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 5 to 30 May 1975 to review the operation of the Treaty. By a decision of 18 December 1973, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to render assistance and services for the Review Conference and its preparation.¹ The Final Declaration of the Review Conference, to which were annexed interpretative statements, was circulated as a document of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly (see pp. 27-36).

¹ See Y.U.N., 1973, p. 22, text of resolution 3184 B (XXVIII).

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (ccd) held two sessions in 1975, the first from 4 March to 10 April and the second from 24 June

to 28 August. Representatives of the following 25 States continued their participation in the work of ccd: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Can-

ada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. On the basis of agreement reached in the Committee in 1974, as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 3261 B (XXIX) on 9 December 1974,² five new members joined ccd in 1975: the German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iran, Peru and Zaire. As in previous years, France did not participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In a message to the opening meeting, the United Nations Secretary-General stated that the United Nations, since its inception, had dealt with disarmament issues and that, although certain results had been achieved, the proliferation of weapons and the expenditure on armaments had increased to unparalleled levels. Consequently, the chances of conflict grew and those of peaceful settlement receded. He emphasized the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ (the non-proliferation Treaty) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction⁴ (the biological weapons Convention), whose value would be augmented by universal adherence and full implementation. The Secretary-General noted that the development of binary nerve gases demonstrated the urgency of a ban on chemical weapons. He pointed to the danger arising from the proliferation of conventional weapons, but said that the greatest danger came from nuclear weapons. A comprehensive ban on testing nuclear weapons was urgent, the Secretary-General said. He also said he believed that the consideration by ccd of nuclear questions should take into account the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (known as SALT) between the USSR and the United States, and, in this connexion, felt that a more decisive and extended breakthrough on the limitation of strategic nuclear-delivery weapons was required. He also expressed the hope that ccd would achieve agreement on the text of a convention to prohibit environmental warfare and called for assurances that the advances of modern science would be employed constructively.

The Secretary-General referred as well to the danger to peace should nuclear energy be diverted from peaceful to military uses and noted the increasing interest in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. Finally, he considered that ccd could assist in providing new approaches to the question of the

relationship between the goals of disarmament and development.

During the year, ccd continued to work in accordance with its agenda on the following measures in the field of disarmament: (a) further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) non-nuclear measures; (c) other collateral measures; and (d) general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international controls.

Informal meetings of ccd with the participation of experts were held on the questions of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and prohibition of environmental warfare. Under the auspices of ccd, an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts studied the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Also, further efforts were made to clarify the problems connected with the ban on chemical weapons and with the question of the reduction of military budgets. The Committee discussed at formal and informal meetings procedural and organizational aspects of its work.

In its 1975 report to the General Assembly, the Committee provided a general account of its work within the four main areas. It also submitted a special report transmitting the study of the *ad hoc* group of experts on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nuclear disarmament

Special report on the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty

The question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement was addressed by many members of ccd, inasmuch as the General Assembly had requested that it be given the highest priority.⁵ A comprehensive test ban would extend to underground tests the existing ban on tests in all other environments contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed on 5 August 1963 in Moscow, USSR (the partial test-ban Treaty). Reporting to the General Assembly, ccd noted that during its discussions the view had been expressed that a comprehensive test-ban agreement was the single most important measure to contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms

² See Y.U.N., 1974, p. 52, text of resolution 3261 B (XXIX).

³ See Y.U.N., 1968, pp. 16-19, resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, annexing text of Treaty.

⁴ See Y.U.N., 1971, pp. 19-21, resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, annexing text of Convention.

⁵ See Y.U.N., 1974, p. 16, text of resolution 3257 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974.

race and to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Several ccdb members, among them India, Morocco, Sweden and Yugoslavia, expressed regret concerning the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban despite the wealth of background material; they pointed out that both the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty contained commitments to a comprehensive test ban.

The USSR reaffirmed its support for the cessation of all tests everywhere and by all. Hungary said that a comprehensive test ban could not be achieved without the full participation of all nuclear powers, while Poland expressed the view that the negative attitude of certain nuclear powers towards the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty was the major obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

Morocco, however, held that while a comprehensive test ban should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States, non-participation by some of them should not prevent achievement of the desired goal to which they had committed themselves by the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty.

The United States said it was firmly committed to an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. Canada suggested that the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban was the main cause of the public's lack of faith in disarmament negotiations; it called on the United States and the USSR to take a decision on that matter. Canada was convinced that, once the United States and the USSR agreed to such a ban, the international situation would be improved even if some countries refused to adhere to the agreement. India said that if nuclear tests were not stopped, any type of nuclear disarmament was unrealistic.

At the request of Mexico, the texts of draft additional protocols I and II to the non-proliferation Treaty regarding, respectively, the implementation of Treaty article VI (suspension of nuclear tests) and reduction of strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles—which were submitted by non-nuclear-weapon States at the Review Conference of the parties to that Treaty, held in May 1975 at Geneva—were circulated to ccdb members (see also pp. 32-33).

On the question of verification of a comprehensive test ban, Bulgaria maintained that national means were fully adequate, adding that this had been confirmed by the agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests (the threshold test-ban agreement) concluded at Moscow in July 1974 by the USSR and the United States (providing for a ban on nuclear weapon

tests above a yield of 150 kilotons by early 1976). Bulgaria hoped the United States would stop its insistence on on-site inspections. Mongolia, Poland and the USSR thought that a comprehensive test-ban verification procedure based on the approach used in the threshold test-ban agreement—which did not require international inspection—offered a solution to the problem.

Egypt continued to hold the view that, whatever the differences on verification, there was no valid reason for delaying a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Iran considered that advances in seismological technology as well as satellite observations had weakened the argument for on-site inspections for a comprehensive test ban. Canada, Japan and Sweden tabled a working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means, and the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on the use of seismic monitoring techniques to distinguish multiple explosions from earthquakes.

The USSR-United States threshold test-ban agreement, referred to during discussion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, was welcomed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia, which felt it was a step of great political significance towards a comprehensive test ban. The United Kingdom suggested that the threshold test ban could be supplemented by an agreement restricting the number and size of underground nuclear tests and progressively reducing them, and noted that it had first made such a proposal in 1968.

Japan urged the United States and the USSR to strive without delay to achieve a comprehensive test ban on the basis of the threshold test ban. Canada expressed interest in learning about further USSR-United States discussions on the testing issue and hoped that the two powers would exchange scientific data on nuclear tests with other interested countries. Pakistan thought that the threshold of the USSR-United States agreement was perhaps too high in view of the increased sophistication of verification methods, but nevertheless considered that the agreement was a step in the right direction and hoped it would be followed by a broad agreement to limit nuclear tests.

Iran and Morocco held that the threshold test ban was too weak because it permitted tests within a certain range and would not enter into force for some time; they urged the two powers concerned to strive towards a more effective ban. Yugoslavia said it failed to see how the threshold test ban could be a significant constraint on the nuclear

arms competition between the two major nuclear powers, even if it limited at some future stage the number as well as the size of nuclear weapon tests.

Mexico said that the following fundamental information with regard to the threshold test ban was essential to ccd in carrying out its work and should be supplied by the United States and the USSR:

(1) Why was it not possible to agree in the threshold test ban to a precise time-table for the total cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, which the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR had stated in June 1974 that the USSR was ready to set?

(2) Why was the threshold for the prohibition of tests set at 150 kilotons when all experts agreed that tests of over 20 kilotons could be detected and pin-pointed, and even this threshold should be considerably reduced as a result of the data-exchange agreed upon?

(3) Why did the agreement set a date for entry into force (31 March 1976) almost two years after its signature?

(4) Would the two signatory powers submit information on the number of tests carried out since the signing of the agreement to show compliance with its provisions, limiting testing to a minimum?

(5) How much time would the two super-powers feel was required to negotiate a total cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests?

The United Kingdom referred to the declaration issued on 17 February 1975 by the USSR and the United Kingdom by which both Governments expressed their aim of achieving the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests for all time and stated that, until the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose, they would work for agreements limiting the number of underground nuclear weapon tests.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR called for adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. Yugoslavia observed with regret that, since the signing of that Treaty, nuclear weapon testing had proceeded at a faster pace than previously. In this connexion, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Morocco and others welcomed the announcement by France of its discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

As requested by the General Assembly, ccd also discussed, in the context of a comprehensive test ban, the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. Working papers on the issue were submitted by Japan and the United States. In addition, a letter from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—

providing relevant facts from the Agency's annual report and other documents concerning its studies of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects—was circulated.

Reporting to the Assembly, ccd said that informal meetings, with the participation of experts, were held between 14 and 18 July 1975 to consider the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. Also, statements were made by several members.

Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden and the United States expressed the view that, because of common technical characteristics, all nuclear explosive devices, regardless of their particular design-features or intended application, could be used as nuclear weapons. They therefore maintained that it was not possible for a State previously not possessing a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a peaceful-nuclear-explosions programme without in the process achieving a nuclear weapons capability. A number of members supported the view that the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons was not compatible with carrying out a peaceful-nuclear-explosions programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State. In the light of these widely shared views, Japan appealed to all non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce their right to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

Yugoslavia, however, believed that to focus attention on the potential dangers of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by countries that had voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons was not the way to strengthen the non-proliferation régime: the only way was to ban the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, stop the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon tests, and start nuclear disarmament.

Members of ccd considered that the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions should not prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from receiving any benefits of the related technology that might be realized by the nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion, many of them believed that article V of the non-proliferation Treaty was the most appropriate basis for making widely available the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions without contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons. [Article V provides that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty shall obtain such benefits pursuant to a special international agreement through an appropriate international body.]

Several ccd members noted that the Declaration adopted at the Review Conference of the parties

to the non-proliferation Treaty indicated that the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State, whether or not party to the Treaty.

India disagreed with the view that peaceful nuclear explosions should not be permitted outside the framework of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. It held that if such a view were accepted it would mean the establishment of the monopoly of nuclear-weapon States in peaceful-nuclear-explosions technology for all time to come.

Other members supported the recommendation of the Review Conference that IAEA expedite work on identifying the legal issues involved and begin consideration of the structure and content of such an agreement or agreements. Most members considered IAEA to be the appropriate international body through which potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States. Sweden said it believed it was necessary to involve the General Assembly continuously in the performance of the essentially political task of arms control in an international régime of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The view was also expressed that adequate assurances were required so that the peaceful-nuclear-explosions programmes of nuclear-weapon States did not provide nuclear-weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to those States. Thus, constraints on nuclear weapon tests by the nuclear-weapon States would have to be accompanied by appropriate constraints on peaceful nuclear explosions and by verification procedures adequate to ensure that such constraints were being observed.

Sweden expressed the hope that the negotiations currently under way between the USSR and the United States towards an agreement that would ensure that any peaceful nuclear explosions carried out by them were consistent with the threshold test-ban agreement would lead to international observation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to an internationally open disclosure of relevant explosion data, before and after the events.

Canada, Japan and the United States pointed out that the objective of preventing the acquisition of weapon-related benefits from a peaceful-nuclear-explosions programme would be considerably more difficult to achieve under a comprehensive test-ban than under a threshold test-ban agreement since, in the absence of any authorized weapons testing, incentives for seeking military benefits in the course of a peaceful-nuclear-explosions programme would be much greater than under a threshold test-ban régime. Japan considered that it would not be possible to solve the question of a compre-

hensive test ban without solving in advance the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

In the view of the USSR, the main obstacle to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing was not the matter of peaceful nuclear explosions but rather the unwillingness of certain States to stop testing. The first priority should be a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests; once such an agreement was reached it would then be possible to settle the question of the feasibility of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in conditions of a total ban on nuclear weapon testing. Yugoslavia, also, maintained that prior achievement of a comprehensive test ban could provide the sole genuine basis for approaching international regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

India contended, on the other hand, that only nuclear weapon tests were relevant to the question of nuclear arms development and proliferation and that the question of regulating nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could only be taken up after achieving a comprehensive test ban.

Egypt, maintaining that States should in no way be prevented from enjoying the potential peaceful benefits of nuclear explosions, expressed the hope that ccd would adhere faithfully to the General Assembly's repeated directives to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and that a solution would be found to the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes within the already existing system of safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

Canada and Pakistan called for consideration of a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes until a solution could be found to the question of control of such explosions under a comprehensive test ban and until a thorough international examination of their economic value presented a more compelling case for their use.

India objected to this proposal, stating that a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would operate to the disadvantage of non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of economic development. It maintained, in addition, that such a moratorium would result in a highly discriminatory situation, leading to the same unacceptable monopoly concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as was sought to be established under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Netherlands—noting the recommendation by a number of participants at the Review Conference of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty enter into an agreement as soon as possible to halt nuclear weapon tests for a specified period