INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The Changing Contours of Power

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International Relations

The Changing Contours of Power

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PREFACE

hen we began thinking about writing this book, our primary concern was the major events since the end of the Cold War. Patterns of behavior associated with the Cold War system had unraveled and had rendered much of the textbook literature of questionable relevance to understanding the world we face in the new millenium. It seemed to us that a book grounded explicitly in a post-Cold War framework would be of some value. The result is *International Relations* and its emphasis on the "changing contours of power."

We have tried to emphasize phenomena and trends that capture the important attributes of our post-Cold War world and are either missing or not so prominent in the older texts: the globalizing economy, the role of high technology in political and economic activity worldwide, the newer roles being played by traditional entities like the United Nations and newer entities like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and changing patterns of violence, like the Kosovo-style wars so common to the developing world. To deal with these changes, we propose a new and unique framework, a world of tiers, to help organize and think about how the new system works. The framework consists of two tiers: a First Tier composed of the most advanced market democracies, and a Second Tier of the developing world made up of a series of developmentally distinguished subtiers. We contend that the emerging system can only really be understood in terms of the dynamics of these two parallel tiers and the relationships within and between them. Our central theme, as reflected in the subtitle of the book, is that although power relationships remain the basis of the system, the way they operate is being altered, often at incredible speeds.

Ours is not the only post-Cold War text in the field, but the consciously student-oriented approach of this text sets it apart and better helps students to understand the complex field of international relations. A quick glance will reveal a number of features designed to enhance the comprehension and even enjoyment on the part of the student reader. Each chapter, for instance, begins with a preview of the chapter contents and a list of key concepts to be grasped, presented in the order in which they appear in the text. Each chapter ends with a brief review of what the student has read.

That is not all. Each chapter includes a number of "boxed" features presenting additional material within eight recurring categories. Summary boxes preview lists of materials covered in the text. Amplification boxes provide fuller explanations, rosters of members of organizations, and the like. Coming to Terms boxes elaborate on definition or conceptual matters. Cases in Point boxes are short case studies illustrating points made in the main text. The Impact of Technology boxes provide examples of how technological changes affect international relations. Views from Abroad boxes reflect non-American views of international matters as reflected in the foreign press. Contours of the Future boxes offer speculations on how events and trends may change in the future and, as such, parallel the "Changing Contours" sections that end most chapters. Finally, Web Sitings boxes direct students to Internet sources of additional material. At the end of each chapter, except the first, a longer case study explores a topic related to the main chapter subject.

We have also tried to make this a student-friendly text by making the text as readable and comprehensible as possible. Wherever possible, we have avoided technical language or

have tried carefully to explain terminology and ideas. We have purposely avoided footnotes and quotations that might detract from the flow of the text. Rather, we have provided selected readings at the end of each chapter and a bibliography at the end of the book appropriate for an introductory student to use for research or future inquiry. A glossary provides a ready resource and reminder of the definitions of key concepts throughout the book. An extensive program of maps and photographs serves as a further guide to aid student understanding and interest.

Supplements

Instructor's Manual/Test Bank

The Instructor's Manual includes chapter outlines, chapter glossaries, a list of key ideas and objectives for each chapter, and a variety of thought-provoking discussion questions and student projects. The Test Bank contains hundreds of challenging and throughly revised multiple choice, and essay questions.

Longman Atlas of War and Peace

Adapted from the work of Dan Smith, Director of the International Peace Institute, and introduced by James N. Rosenau of George Washington University, this series of pedagogical maps and explanations offers a nontraditional approach to cartography: how do nations compare to one another in such terms as military spending, ethnic strife, control of natural resources, and internal conflicts. FREE when packaged with the text.

A book of this length and complexity is a large task, and one that cannot be undertaken without the assistance of others who deserve acknowledgment. First, we want to thank our Addison Wesley Longman editor, Eric Stano, who inherited this work and has shepherded it to completion. Brooks Ellis at Electronic Publishing Services, Inc. and Gia Forakis at PhotoSearch, Inc. have done yeoman duty in bringing this to fruition. Very conscientious and helpful reviews have been provided by Gregory Hall of St. Mary's College of Maryland, Randy Kleff of Virginia Union University, Philip Meeks of Creighton University, Michael A. Preda of Midwestern State University, Renee Scherlin of Appalachian State University and Marc Simon of Bowling Green State University. We wish to thank our former editor and good friend, Don Reisman, who convinced us to undertake this work, and Paul Smith, who had faith in and directed it before the merger of Allyn & Bacon and AWL. Finally, thanks are due to our families for putting up with us while this was underway and to our home institutions, the University of Alabama and Lebanon Valley College, for the physical and moral support.

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INTRODUCTION

International Relations and You

hy should you care about international relations? The term, often abbreviated as IR, refers to the ways that the countries of the world and groups of people and even individuals within those countries interact with and affect one another. In a rapidly shrinking world, those interactions increasingly affect your life, often in ways of which you are unaware. An understanding of international relations thus has a personal and instrumental value in addition to its intrinsic value. In short, what happens in IR is important to you, and because of dynamics that will be explored in the pages that follow, that importance will almost certainly increase during your lifetime.

The personal relevance of IR to you needs to be demonstrated, not merely asserted, and hopefully the text will provide adequate evidence. To give you an initial exposure to how IR affects you, we will briefly present three examples of how international matters have ramifications for people around the globe, including the United States.

The NAFTA Agreement

The first example is the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) agreement among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. NAFTA was negotiated during the waning months of the Bush administration (1992) and then, over considerable opposition, shepherded by the Clinton administration through the two houses of Congress. It has two general goals.

First, it seeks to stimulate trade and economic growth among the three major North American countries by gradually removing tariffs (taxes or duties on imported goods) and other restrictions on trade among them. Thus, goods and services will flow freely across North American borders at prices not raised by imposed duties. Theoretically, U.S. goods will be cheaper in Canada and Mexico than they were before NAFTA, thus enticing Canadians and Mexicans to buy more of them. Similarly, Canadian and Mexican goods will cost less in the United States, allowing Americans to buy them more cheaply.

The second goal of NAFTA is to create a trading bloc to compete with other advanced economies such as Japan and economic groups such as the European Union. It does so by creating a common set of tariffs and restrictions on all goods and services entering the NAFTA area. The tariff on a German car, for instance, will be the same whether it enters a port in Canada, the United States, or Mexico. (Before the agreement, tariffs varied by country.) If Germany seeks to lower tariffs against its cars in one country, it will have to negotiate with all three, and those three presumably can drive a better bargain than any one of them could do on its own.

In theory, everyone—American, Canadian, or Mexican—will benefit from NAFTA because it will stimulate economies by creating more jobs and greater markets for goods, as well as lowering the prices to consumers of some imported items. Yet the agreement generated strong opposition that almost blocked congressional approval. Why?

The answer is that any economic change produces losers as well as winners. Most experts agree that in the broad sense all three countries (and others may join) will benefit

from NAFTA. That does not mean, especially in the short run, that every individual American, Canadian, or Mexican will benefit.

Some U.S. industries, for example, are in direct competition with counterparts in Mexico and depend on trade restrictions for their survival. A man's shirt may cost \$15 to produce in North Carolina, while lower labor costs allow the same shirt to be manufactured in Mexico for \$10. The North Carolina product, then, can compete in the U.S. market only with the aid of protective measures such as a \$5 tariff on Mexican shirts or a strict limit on the number of shirts imported from Mexico. NAFTA removes the ability to impose that restriction.

Is this a good deal for you? The answer is, of course, that it depends. If you are a consumer not associated with the North Carolina textile industry, it is a good effect because you can save \$5 on a shirt. If, however, you are part of that industry, the result may be disastrous. Either your company must find a way to lower costs, such as drastically lowering wages or moving to a lower labor cost location overseas, or it will go out of business. In the latter case, someone—you, the government, or private sources—would have to bear the cost to retrain you to produce something at a competitive price: for the sake of symmetry, something that Mexican textile workers will buy.

This kind of impact on you will increase with time. At the December 9–11, 1994, Summit of the Americas meeting held in Miami, Florida, the 34 democratically elected heads of government of the Western Hemisphere (only communist Cuba was not represented) agreed in principle to form a Free Trade Area of the Americas that will, if implemented, result in the gradual elimination of trade barriers among the countries of the hemisphere, a commitment



An anti-NAFTA rally in New York City in 1993. Although economists virtually all agree that the association will benefit Americans as a group, many individual workers know it will probably cost them their job.

Contours of the Future?

The Free Trade Area of the Americas

When the heads of government met in Miami for the Summit of the Americas, it was the first time such a large number of freely chosen Western hemisphere leaders had ever assembled. Anxious to reinforce the emergence of political democracy that had allowed the convocation, they sought to devise ways that would enhance and strengthen hemispheric democracy in the future.

They agreed that economic prosperity was a key element in legitimizing regimes and thus reinforcing democracy, and this position formed the rationale for the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative. As they put it in their joint declaration at the end of the conference, "A key to prosperity is trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair practices, and with an increasing stream of productive investments. Eliminating impediments to market access for goods and services among our countries will foster regional economic growth." Based on this assumption, they declared the "resolve to begin immediately to construct the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in which barriers



to trade will be progressively eliminated... no later than 2005."

This is an ambitious agenda, and one which, if carried out, could have huge consequences for the economies of the countries involved and the hemisphere that would make the effects of NAFTA seem minor. At this stage, however, the declaration is not a binding treaty or other obligation that will lead inexorably to a hemispherewide trading bloc. Rather, it instructs the member states, acting individually and collectively, to devise ways to move toward the common goal.

The barriers are complicated and formidable, and it may well be that FTAA will never come into being. Much the same, however, has been said about a number of other proposals over the past few years. If our experience in the globalizing economy, which we explore at length in Chapter 9, is any indication, the possibility cannot be ignored, and the consequences for you could be considerable.

Source: Summit of the Americas, Summit Documents. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1994.

reiterated at the second summit in 1998 in Santiago, Chile. Such an arrangement could dwarf the effects of NAFTA. The "Contours of the Future?" box examines the prospect.

Cutbacks in Defense

The end of the Cold War has reduced military threats to the United States and most other countries. As the threat of large-scale, systemic war involving the United States leading one coalition and the former Soviet Union the other has faded into memory, so too has the apparent need to maintain a large and expensive standing military establishment. During the Cold War, the need to spend on defense was rarely questioned; today it can be, and is. The end of the Cold War thus allows a redirection of resources to other needs. The long list of deserving candidates may include some you favor: debt and deficit reduction, repair of

a deteriorating infrastructure (e.g., roads and bridges), environmental cleanups, rehabilitation of the inner cities, housing for the homeless, tax credits for a college education, guaranteeing the future solvency of Social Security. Given these needs, the end of the Cold War provides a veritable bonanza. Or does it?

The problem is that scaling back on defense also has human and economic costs. People and places whose livelihoods were sustained by the Cold War competition are suddenly the victims of its end in ways not unlike those suffered by North Carolina textile workers. Three groups particularly bear the burden in ways that may be personal to you.

The first are military personnel. One consequence of a reduced military threat means the need for less military personnel. Cutbacks have thus been accompanied by a growing number of discharges from active and reserve forces, in some but not all cases voluntary. Many jobs have simply been eliminated, which carries a special irony: the efforts and diligence of those "downsized" contributed to the collapse of communism and "victory" in the Cold War, but their reward is to have their jobs eliminated and to have to pursue second careers they had not anticipated. For you personally, the opportunity for a military career may now be closed or sharply constricted.

The second group affected are those individuals and communities associated with defense industries. The need for newer and more weapons to confront the Soviet menace meant that military procurement and the contracts it produced became the backbone of those places where it occurred. The apex of that prosperity was the aerospace industry, feeding the apparently insatiable appetites of both military and civilian aviation and underwriting the prosperity of metropolitan areas as diverse as Seattle, Atlanta, and Long Beach, California.

The end of the military competition has put a damper on that prosperity, most dramatically, but not exclusively, within the aerospace industry. Why, some critics maintain, does the United States need any more B-2 bombers, designed as they were to penetrate Soviet antiaircraft defenses—then the most sophisticated in the world—that no longer exist. Similarly, does the United States need the highly sophisticated F-22 fighter when it already possesses the most capable fighter aircraft in the world in the F-15, F-16, and F-18A, especially to deal with likely contingencies in the developing world where the opponent probably has no air force at all? The same arguments can be made about army equipment (Abrams tanks) or naval vessels (a new generation of attack submarines). If the United States does not need new airplanes or other weapons, it also does not need the engineers who designed or the workers who built these weapons in those roles. If you plan an engineering career, you might think about the impact on the engineering field you are going to pursue.

The third group of Americans affected are civilians associated with military facilities. As the military becomes smaller, its physical needs for facilities, notably bases, becomes smaller as well (especially if one makes the argument, as many do, that there were excess bases even during the Cold War). A military that is two-thirds its former size—or even smaller—simply does not need as many bases and posts as it did previously.

This recognition has spawned a phenomenon that is the horror of many base towns: the base relocation and closing (BRAC) process. The series of BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995 will be followed with yet another in the near future. Each time, the possibility of having a base closed horrifies communities and brings about monumental efforts to save

"my" base from the cutter's axe. These communities know the consequences of being the victim of BRAC: civilian housing markets declining as military personnel living off-base are mustered out of service or moved to consolidated facilities; merchants losing the business of military customers; civilian employees being furloughed or fired; and local tax bases shrinking in response to all these developments. Many who cheered the fall of the Berlin Wall did not realize it would hit them directly in the pocketbook, but it has. While reductions in military spending may be beneficial to the economy as a whole, they can be very difficult for those directly affected.

Trading with China

Thanks to policies enacted in the latter 1970s (and discussed in more detail in Chapter 7), the Chinese economy has become one of the largest and fastest growing in the world, with some predictions that it will become the world's largest sometime in the early twenty-first century. As a result, how to interact economically with the People's Republic of China has become an important foreign policy consideration for all countries along the Pacific Rim, including the United States. The status of U.S.-China trade has become a particularly contentious issue between Congress and the Clinton White House over the renewal of something called *most-favored nation (MFN) status*.

This whole issue and how it is resolved has direct relevance to you because of the nature of trade between the countries. Between 1992 and 1995, imports of Chinese goods into the United States rose from \$25.7 billion to slightly over \$45.5 billion, an increase of about 80 percent, and the trend continues. This is important to you, because the vast bulk of American imports of Chinese goods is in consumer products, notably clothing, athletic shoes, toys, and the like. A quick inventory of the labels in your wardrobe will reveal the extent to which trade with China has a direct effect on you.

But trade with China has become politically volatile over the issue of MFN status. That arcane term refers to the trade conditions between trading partners: a country accorded MFN status (and almost all countries are) has its goods and services imported into a country at the lowest tariff rate charged against any country. A country that does not have MFN status with the United States (or anyone else) is thus at a tariff disadvantage selling its goods in the United States.

The renewal of MFN status for China has become politically controversial in the United States. Why? There are three basic reasons, only one of which is directly economic in content. The economic argument has to do with the trade balance between the two countries. By 1995, the United States had developed a trade deficit with China of over \$33 billion, making it the second largest (after Japan) in the world. In 1996, the China-U.S. trade imbalance topped \$50 billion.

The dynamics of this imbalance are simple enough. U.S. imports from China have grown rapidly, as Americans buy more and more cheaply produced Chinese consumer goods. Chinese imports of American-made goods, however, have grown much more slowly. In 1992, for instance, China imported \$7.4 billion in U.S. goods; for 1995, that figure had only risen to \$11.75 billion. This failure of the Chinese to import more American goods has become a source of contention between the governments of the two countries in



U.S. President Clinton addresses the Chinese people, June 1998.

trade negotiations; it was a major item on the agenda when President Clinton visited China in June 1998.

The second issue is China's human rights record, including its active and well-documented resistance to democratic reforms. Some observers describe the Chinese system as one of "market Leninism," with a fairly free market sector in an economy encased in a heavily authoritarian political regime. Political dissent is sometimes brutally suppressed, with the most dramatic symbol being the squashing of the pro-democratic movement in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989. Critics of American China policy argue that trade restrictions should be imposed to force the Chinese government to alter its human rights policies. Dissenters counter that such tactics will not work and that if the United States partially pulls out of China, others, notably the Japanese, will fill any void without demanding political changes by the Chinese. A major purpose of the Clinton mission to China was to publicize this problem, which it was allowed to do when the President spoke live on Chinese state television directly to the Chinese people.

The third issue has to do with Chinese arms sales throughout the developing world. Although China occasionally vigorously denies that it does so, there is a good bit of evidence that the Chinese sell weapons systems to a number of countries. These include deadly and highly sophisticated weapons that the most advanced countries are seeking to restrict, such as the ballistic missiles sold to countries like Pakistan, which is locked in a regional conflict with neighboring India that intensified in 1998 when both countries publicly detonated nuclear weapons.

How should trade with China be handled? Should it be restricted until such a time as China becomes a more "normal" country that honors human rights, democratizes, quits the clandestine sale of weapons, and buys more American goods? The decision to impose restrictions would have a direct influence on the things you buy. As an experiment, go to a shoe store specializing in athletic shoes, look at the displays, and calculate what those

racks would look like if all the shoes made in China were removed. Then calculate what prices might climb to if there were no Chinese shoes. The same kind of analysis can be applied to apparel and other consumer goods.

At the same time, the reason those goods are so cheap is because they are made by suppressed Chinese workers who are paid very little for their efforts. Is that right? What is more important to you, cheap consumer goods or a more responsible China in world politics? From a strictly individual standpoint, you may reach one conclusion. From a broader international perspective, you might reach another.

Conclusion

The purpose of this introduction has been to present a hint of the ways in which international relations has a direct impact on you. Two of the three examples were economic. This is not surprising in a post—Cold War world that is no longer inevitably obsessed with the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as was the Cold War system. Economic concerns are more central now; it was not a coincidence that the one security-related example was about the impact of the shrinking importance of military affairs.

These examples represent no more than a hint at how IR can have a direct impact on you, whether the study of the subject matter becomes a matter of central concern for you or not. In the pages that follow, we hope you will recognize both the fascinating and important nature of the dynamics of the international system.

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