


THE FOREIGN POLICY OF

RUSSIA

CHANGING SYSTEMS,
ENDURING INTERESTS



SECOND EDITION

Robert H. Donaldson • Joseph L. Noguee

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF

RUSSIA

CHANGING SYSTEMS,
ENDURING INTERESTS

SECOND EDITION

Robert H. Donaldson
Joseph L. Noguee

M.E. Sharpe

Armonk, New York
London, England

Copyright © 2002 by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Donaldson, Robert H.

The foreign policy of Russia : changing systems, enduring interests / by Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee.—2d ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-7656-0857-X (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-7656-0858-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Soviet Union—Foreign relations. 2. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. I. Noguee, Joseph L. II. Title.

DK266.45 .D66 2002

327.47—dc21

2001042659

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.



BM (c)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
BM (p)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	

———— Acknowledgments ————

We thank the following individuals who read all or part of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions: Daniel S. Papp, April Jones, Deborah Melikian, Brian Surratt, and Eric Wigginton. We alone are responsible for errors of fact or interpretation.

We also thank our respective institutions, the University of Tulsa and the University of Houston, for their support of our work.

Finally, we are grateful to our families for their encouragement and support, and for their tolerance of the many distractions from family life that writing a book entails.

— Acronyms and Abbreviations —

ABM	Anti-ballistic Missile
ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS	Commonwealth of Slavic States
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CTR	Comprehensive Threat Reduction
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FSB	Federal Security Service
G8	Group of 8 Industrial Nations (Canada, France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Russia)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GNP	Gross National Product
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
GRU	Soviet Military Intelligence Agency
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Committee for State Security
KPD	Communist Party of Germany

xii ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

MFN	Most Favored Nation
MIRV	Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles
MPLA	Movement for the People's Liberation of Angola
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTV	Independent Television
ORT	Public Radio and Television Broadcasting
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RSDLP	Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Germany)
SMF	Strategic Missile Forces
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

Contents

List of Maps and Tables	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	xi
1. Introduction	3
2. The Tsarist Roots of Russia's Foreign Policy	17
3. Soviet Foreign Policy: From Revolution to Cold War	37
4. Soviet Foreign Policy: The Cold War	75
5. Domestic Factors in the Making of Russia's Foreign Policy	120
6. Russia and the States of the Former Soviet Union	176
7. Russia and the West	218
8. Russia and the "Non-West"	269
9. Vladimir Putin and the Future	328
Notes	343
Index	369
About the Authors	380

———— **Maps and Tables** ————

Maps

Europe	110
Commonwealth of Independent States	180

Tables

5.1 Foreign Ministers During the Soviet Period	150
5.2 Departments of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as of mid-1995)	152

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
RUSSIA

Introduction

We attempt in this book to provide both a description and an explanation of the foreign policy of Russia. Our time frame is largely the twentieth century, although we include the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. Especially over such a broad expanse of time, it is easier to describe policy than to explain it, because causality in politics involves multiple factors that are constantly changing in value.

For that period of Russian politics dominated by the Soviet system, the basic character of foreign policy seemed simple. Marxist-Leninist doctrine appeared to dictate confrontation with the noncommunist world. In fact, however, foreign policy during the Soviet period was never so clear as it appeared to most contemporaries. Nonideological factors produced complex relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and other great powers: at times, cooperation with the West (détente), and at times, hostility to other communist regimes (Yugoslavia and China, for example).

The factors that shape foreign policy are multiple. Some are internal, such as the government and its political elites, the culture, economy, geography, and demography of a country. Others are external, such as foreign threats, political vacuums, and changes in the balance of power. These different factors are always changing in substance and weight, thus making it impossible to come up with a formula or model to explain or predict foreign policy. In short, foreign policy, like all politics, is dynamic.

One broad generalization about Russian foreign policy that we believe to be valid is that there are elements of both continuity and change always at work. Over the course of time, Russian foreign policy has exhibited many profound shifts in direction. Perhaps less obvious has been the continuity in behavior of governments headed by tsars, commissars, and presidents. In many respects, Russian foreign policy has been similar to that of other great powers, and in other respects it has been unique. We begin this survey of Russian foreign policy with a preliminary analysis of the continuity and change we will be describing in Russia's relations with the world, and of the degree to which that policy can be deemed distinctive.

Continuity and the International System

To begin with the continuities and similarities, we note that as a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance-of-power policies. (Admittedly, it has not always fared well in these, as evidenced by the disaster of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact,¹ but in that respect also, Russia has shared a characteristic with the other great powers in the world.) In principle, balance-of-power policies are the measures taken by governments whose interests or security is threatened, to enhance their power by whatever means are available.² The most common technique associated with the balance of power is forming or joining military alliances, but the balance of power may also entail, *inter alia*, military buildups, intervention in weaker countries, or resort to war. Essentially it involves the mobilization of power to countervail the power of an enemy or a potential adversary. Thus, tsarist Russia was a member of the Triple Entente (with Great Britain and France) in the period leading up to World War I, as a counter to the Triple Alliance headed by imperial Germany. In the Soviet period the Warsaw Pact served as a military counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Russian Federation differs from preceding regimes in not being a member of any military alliance. This is because post-Soviet Russia, unlike preceding regimes, has no major enemies or threats to its national security. Nevertheless, it does have rivals and competitors—for example, Iran and Turkey, to the south. Some aspects of Russia's foreign policy in central Asia are strikingly reminiscent of the "great game" of power politics played by European powers in that region in the nineteenth century.³ In Europe, an example of Moscow's continuing pursuit of balance-of-power policies is Russia's opposition to NATO expansion.

The enduring goals pursued by Russia through its foreign policy have placed primary emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic well-being of the country, and enhancing national prestige. In this respect, Russia's behavior is not markedly different from that of most great powers, but how these goals have been interpreted and achieved has changed with time and circumstances.

We can explain the similarities and continuities of Russian behavior in large part as a consequence of the *international system*, which conditions the foreign policies of all states. As the primary units or actors in international politics, states—though in some respects interdependent—operate from the premise that they are sovereign and independent entities. Their independence stems from the lack of a global political authority to govern all states. Thus, the international system is decentralized; each nation is free in principle to determine the range of policies it will pursue for itself, including at times the

use of force. Sometimes the term “anarchic” is used to describe this feature of the international system.⁴

In reality, foreign policy rarely expresses the principle of national sovereignty (or anarchy) in absolute terms. Just as states are not fully constrained by international norms, economic interdependence, or the power of other states, so they are never totally free of such constraints. But the larger and more powerful a state is, the greater is its freedom of action; small and weak states are more limited. Precisely because there is no world government or protective mechanism for nation-states, each must constantly be on guard to protect its security and interests from those states that periodically emerge on the world scene as a threat to others. In the words of Kenneth N. Waltz:

Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways that it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy.⁵

Of the many interests pursued by states, none is more important than survival—maintaining territorial integrity and political independence. Unlike the individual in domestic society, the sovereign state is unprotected by legal institutions (police, courts, militias, and so on) and must look instead to the tools of statecraft—diplomacy, armaments, and political and military alignments—for self-protection.

Explaining Variability in Foreign Policy Behavior

The international system defines the broad parameters of foreign policy behavior, but obviously it cannot explain the specific decisions that determine the behavior of states in the realm of international politics. While theory might have predicted that Moscow in 1939 would seek an alliance with some European power, it could not account for Stalin’s choice of Germany over Great Britain and France. Exactly a half-century later, theory also could not have predicted that the leaders of the Soviet Union would simply stand aside as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated before their eyes. Foreign policy cannot be predicted because it is the outcome of a large number of constantly changing variables.

Thus, for example, Soviet policy during the Cold War exhibited considerable variability, notwithstanding the fundamental antagonism between the communist world and the West. East-West relations were at times close to military confrontation, and at times cooperative. The arms race was interspersed with arms control agreements. Former friends became enemies, and

intervention gave way to “new thinking.” In a word, throughout the Soviet period there were multiple forces at play that constantly pushed Moscow in new directions.

In a study of Soviet foreign policy after World War II, the authors of this text identified seven general variables that we believe influenced the changing direction of Soviet foreign policy.⁶ These were not the only factors influencing Moscow, but they were among the most important. These variables are:

Factors Influencing Moscow

1. The change in the structure of the international system from multipolarity to bipolarity;
2. The growth of polycentrism in the international communist movement, followed by the collapse of the movement altogether;
3. The development of a military technology that makes possible the total destruction of an adversary;
4. The achievement of military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, followed by the collapse of the USSR as a superpower;
5. The transition of the Soviet regime from a totalitarian system to an authoritarian oligarchy and then to a fragmented polity;
6. The failure of the command economy;
7. The differences reflected in the leadership of different personalities, from Stalin to Khrushchev to Brezhnev to Gorbachev.

Some of these variables were of an external nature, reflecting changes in the international environment, and others were domestic or internal in nature. Together they reflect the fact that foreign policy has its roots in both domestic and foreign forces.

As we survey Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period, we can identify five broad underlying factors that collectively explain much of the change and variability in Russian foreign policy. These observations are necessarily preliminary; independent Russia has existed for slightly more than a decade, and it can be expected that over a longer period of time new determining forces will become evident. We consider the following particularly critical in explaining Russian foreign policy:

1. The change in the structure of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity;
2. The decline in Russian military capability;
3. Russia's transformation from a command economy to a market economy;
4. Russia's integration into the global economy and its increasing reliance on the global market;

5. Russia's political leadership and domestic politics, especially as manifested in the struggle between Yeltsin and Russian nationalists, followed by Putin's efforts to restore the power of the state and its central control.

We have noted above the general impact of the international system on foreign policy. But clearly, the international system does not possess a fixed or unchanging structure; the number and hierarchy of great powers changes over time. The term *polarity* is commonly used to describe the structure of the international system. A universe dominated by one great power would be designated "unipolar"; one dominated by two powers (or blocs) is "bipolar"; and one characterized by several powers (usually five or more) is "multipolar." What impact does the structure of the international system have upon foreign policy and international politics? While political scientists are in disagreement about the precise impact of polarity on international politics, most would agree that there is a connection.⁷

A bipolar system is characterized as one in which the two dominating powers are juxtaposed against each other in an unceasing struggle for power. Each side sees the other as a deadly adversary and both view international politics as a "zero-sum game." That is, each adversary views any gain for the other as a loss for itself. International politics in a bipolar system is characterized by continuous tension and frequent crisis. There are occasional military clashes, but more commonly (because of the power of the adversary) the struggle is fought by means of economic competition, propaganda, and subversion.

By contrast a multipolar system is more benign. There is a competitive feature to international politics, but the competition is moderated by the fact that each state views the others as potential allies as well as adversaries. Relations between states in a multipolar system are thus more fluid and less antagonistic.⁸ Most political scientists consider multipolarity to be more stable than bipolarity.⁹

"Bipolar world" comes closer to describing the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc (1945–90). There was no cold war between the Soviet Union and the West before 1945 for the basic reason that international politics was multipolar and not bipolar. Indeed, bipolarity on a global scale had never existed until the end of World War II. The only examples of bipolarity prior to the twentieth century were within geographic regions.¹⁰

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the international system was transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar one. (Though the United States became the most powerful state in the world, it did not dominate world politics in a way that would create a "unipolar" world.) Relations between post-Soviet Russia

and the West quickly began to resemble those normally engaged in between states in a multipolar world.

In 1992 there was marked improvement in Moscow's most important relationship in the West—that with the United States—with a new round of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) and American support for Russia's domestic reform. But Russia no longer treated the West as a monolith. Yeltsin moved to develop a differentiated relationship with the countries of Europe. Annual summits were planned between the presidents of Russia, Germany, and France, independently of those between Yeltsin and Clinton. Annual summits were also agreed upon between Yeltsin and China's Jiang Zemin. At one of these summits in the spring of 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang signed the Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order, in which the two presidents explicitly declared:

The cold war has ended. The bipolar system has disappeared. Positive trends toward the formation of a multipolar world are developing at an accelerated pace, and relations are changing among the major states, including former cold war adversaries. Regional organizations for economic cooperation are showing significant vitality. Diversity in the political, economic, and cultural development of all countries is becoming firmly established, and the role of forces that favor peace and broad international cooperation is growing.¹¹

In the new multipolar world of the 1990s, Russia could and did pursue a more flexible policy toward its friends and enemies.

Whatever the international structure, the ability of a state to play an active role in world politics is linked to its *military capability*. Military power is traditionally assumed to be a prime shaper of foreign policy because it is the most immediately employable power asset for protecting populations, controlling territory, and coercing others. To a degree, economic power can compensate for military weakness—Japan is a case in point—but traditionally a state's capacity to project force abroad has been a vital element in defining its status as a great power. There would have been no cold war without the power of the Red Army backed by a nuclear capability. That explains why the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1945 was not a superpower and why there was no cold war until the USSR emerged, following the defeat of Nazi Germany, as the strongest military power in Europe.

Eventually the Soviet Union achieved an overall relative military parity with the West. With combat forces numbering in excess of 4 million, the Red Army was twice the size of the U.S. army. By most quantitative measures, the Warsaw Pact had more weapons than NATO, though qualitatively the West was superior. Since exact comparisons of capability are difficult to

measure, it was assumed on both sides that a rough parity existed. Soviet military strength—both conventional and nuclear—continued to grow well into the Gorbachev era.

Militarily, the Russian Federation is another story. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Soviet and then Russian military capability has steadily declined. The Russian army is a hollow shell of its Soviet counterpart. At the heart of the problem is Russia's inability to finance a powerful fighting machine. Soldiers brought home from Eastern Europe were inadequately housed. The government's severe cash shortage led to the nonpayment of soldiers' wages. Equipment has not been maintained adequately. Russia's pilots and naval personnel have not been able to train adequately. Research and development of weapons have been sacrificed. As a consequence, morale has plummeted. Among Russian conscripts life has been so bleak that many have resorted to desertion or even suicide. If there were any doubt about the military collapse, the performance of Russian forces in Chechnia in 1994–96 removed it. A ragtag army of Chechen guerrillas and combat forces defeated the armed forces of a country enormously larger and richer. Even when Chechen guerrillas invaded Russia twice in 1995, Russian forces were unable to prevent the escape of their leaders. Further demonstration of the decline of Russia's military power came in the summer of 2000, with the sinking of the Russian submarine *Kursk*.

Yeltsin was bitterly condemned for the decline of the armed forces—of which he was constantly reminded. In the spring of 1997, when he fired Igor Rodionov as minister of defense, he exclaimed: "I am not merely dissatisfied. I am outraged . . . over the condition of the armed forces."¹² Yeltsin's proposed military reform contemplated substantial reductions in troop strength and ultimately the creation of a professional army without conscription. But at its root, the problem of military reform was economic. The president had been convinced of the need to reduce spending on defense, while many of his officers wanted an increase in military spending. Vladimir Putin, though he has increased spending, has made building a smaller but more effective military a high priority.

Russia's size, skilled population, resources, and nuclear weapons guarantee its ongoing status as a great power, but its military weakness, so long as it persists, will limit Russia's influence in world affairs. In relations with states of the former Soviet Union, Russian influence will be paramount, because these states are even weaker; but in Europe, Russia will have to concede when the West is united on political or security issues (as it was on NATO expansion and ultimately on Bosnia and Kosovo). From the perspective of its neighbors, Russia's military weakness can even create special problems. Russia's borders have become so porous that smuggling is widespread, and