PROMOTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AFRICA

The Roles and Responsibilities

of the United Nations,

African States, Institutions,

and Western Powers

SOLOMON HAILU

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Dedication

I dedicate this book to my father, Hailu Gema. Dad, you have made unselfish sacrifice to give me a dream education. This is the fulfilment of that dream. I thank you.

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I would like to extend my special thanks to my wife, Mulu and our daughters, Rhema, Yoana, and Aryam for their love and understanding while writing this book.

List of Abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CDA	Coalition for Defense Alternatives
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement Sudan
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)

DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAAR	Economists Allied for Arms Reduction
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
EO	Executive Outcomes
EU	European Union
EUPRD	European Union Reconstruction and Development
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centre
ICM	International Crisis Management Center
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IDASA	Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTF	Integrated Missions Task Force
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LDC	Liberal Congress for Democracy (Lesotho)

MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa)
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPRI	America's Military Professional Resources Incorporated
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIF	National Islamic Front
NOCPM	National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operations in the Congo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defense Force
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SANDF	South African National Defense Force

SAPS	South African Police Service
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPLA	Southern Sudan Liberation Army
SPLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
USC	United Somali Congress

Introduction

The idea that peace is indivisible has been influential in the theory and practice of security policies for hundreds of years. This has meant several things. The first is that peace and security are intimately linked. When states feel insecure, the individual steps they take to compensate for their perceived vulnerability to compromise the security of others and undermine the overall stability of the international system. The second is that the security of all states is undermined if aggression against any of their members is unchecked. The third is that no one state or group of states can combine the incentive, the capacity, and the moral authority to address the problems arising from the first two points. At its simplest, these three things combine to foster the belief in the theory and practice of international relations that security is a community concern and peace is indivisible.

Following this, states, whatever their individual security concerns or interests, have to address them in a multilateral context. They have an overriding interest in making contributions and sacrifices to express security as a community concern. That is, national security has to be addressed through contemporary international instruments and resources that express the international dimension of security policies. It is true that states differ on how they interpret the relationship between national and international security.

Among other things, states' interpretation of the idea of the indivisibility of peace has been influenced by ideologies and conceptions of national interest and in light of fluctuating views and contradictory

international contexts. Hence, the idea of indivisibility of peace has been cast in many forms, and institutional expressions having both military and non-military focuses. This in turn illustrates that the idea of the indivisibility of peace is adaptive, developmental, and perhaps elusive in dimensions.

This is to say that the belief in a multilateral dimension to peace and security issues in international relations and its development has always been incomplete and reflects a continuing uneasy blend of national and international security policies that threaten incoherence to the policy makers of both states and the multilateral institutions into which they form themselves. The changing institutional expressions of this belief focus on the development of peacekeeping as an increasingly subdivided doctrine at both global and regional levels. The changes and ramifications in multilateral security and order-keeping have in turn reflected altered material and ideological conditions in global politics, which in turn have been expressed in changing perceptions of the sources of threats to security and responses to them. In all of this however, the belief is constant that to one extent or another, peace is indivisible and that breaches of peace, whether caused by aggression or implosion, threaten more than the states directly involved.

In retrospect, the idea of the indivisibility of peace had become a virtually well established position in the discourse of international security by the end of the First World War. States have reached a general agreement on the indivisibility of peace that some sort of international body has to be established to mobilize and pool the resources of sovereign states to administer and lead a multinational force against aggressors. This idea was put into effect by the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations (UN) in 1945. The League of Nations was created as the first comprehensive international collective security institution in the hope of averting global war after the disaster of WWI.

The logic behind the formation of the League of Nations was to enforce collective security action to maintain international peace and order. However, the league could not perform its duties as set out in its covenant. The most important reason was a lack of genuine commitment on the side of its members to turn the text of the covenant into action against the lawbreakers. Similarly, the UN has suffered from the dilution of members' commitment to the success of its objectives of maintaining international peace and security though under different conditions.

In its almost six decades of existence, the UN has recorded both successes and failures. To illustrate this, UN peacekeeping operations

can be divided into two general categories. The first is traditional or classical peacekeeping, which evolved during the Cold War (1948-1989), principally as a substitute for the collective security provisions of the charter, which were rendered inoperable by the clash of superpower interests and the resulting institutional stalemate. In this context, the UN in most cases involved itself in inter-state conflicts. In cases of this sort, the UN widely implemented three principles of peacekeeping doctrine: consent, impartiality, and non or minimum use of force. Arguably, during its cold war interventions, these three main principles of intervention helped the UN play a constructive role and from time to time achieve significant successes.

The UN's post-Cold War intervention is labelled as modern peacekeeping. In this context, the nature of intervention has changed along with dramatic changes in the nature of conflicts. Most of the conflicts during this period have been intra-state. This has made it difficult for the UN to mount peacekeeping operations using its restricted principles of Cold War intervention. Applying consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force as preconditions for intervention became difficult in a new situation no matter how well they had served during the Cold War. Intervention can now be mounted without the consent of the warring parties, involving greater force than used to be the case. The post-Cold War conflicts brought the so-called failed or collapsed states to prominence in the international system. The UN had little experience in dealing with such deadly civil wars that caused total state emergencies.

The UN's sole experience in dealing with deadly civil wars and collapsed states was in the isolated case of the Congo as far back as the early 1960s in a different context than the Cold War. In dealing with these new developments, the UN has suffered from doctrinal restrictions. For example, Article 2(7) of its charter states that the UN should not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Despite this limitation, UN forces have intervened in zones of conflict without invitation to save the civilian victims. The UN intervention in Somalia (1993-1994) is a case in point. In response to new kinds of conflict, the UN has also added new ingredients to its post-Cold War peacekeeping profile. Among these are forceful humanitarian intervention, post-conflict state reconstruction, and treating the issue of sovereignty as being more flexible and picking up the rarely-used Article 53 of its charter (on partnership with regional and sub-regional bodies) to seek for collaborative efforts and common approach in addressing conflicts.

These things are discussed within the African context, where many of the incidences of contemporary failed states occur. Different approaches to conflict resolution and peacekeeping in African failed states take center stage in analysis. These approaches are based not merely on theory or doctrine but on the self-perceived interests of the stakeholders in peacekeeping inside Africa. The Western powers have repeatedly expressed the view that they will not commit their armed forces to resolve African conflicts. Instead they are prepared to provide logistical support, finance, and training. They argue that African problems need African solutions.

Significant emphasis is also placed on the policy divergences and tensions among Western powers such as the United States, France, Britain, and the Nordic countries. The argument is that the West's desire to place responsibility on African states, rather than sharing it, will not bring peace in Africa. The reason is that Africans are not ready to shoulder such heavy responsibility without direct Western military involvement in African conflicts. The Western efforts to build Africa's own capacity will take long time, while Africa is desperate for peacekeepers now.

As part of their vision to help Africa help itself, the West has put pressure on African states and regional bodies to take up more responsibility in peacekeeping. In response to this call, African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations have undertaken doctrinal and structural changes towards taking care of their own regional security problems. At the national level, African states have also formulated policies towards maintaining peace on the continent. South Africa is the best example of this movement. South Africa's own ambitions and the willingness of other parties to encourage it in leadership roles, make these evolving practices an important influence on South Africa's own policies. Since its re-entry to the official world of legitimate international relations, South Africa has been the somewhat ambivalent center of efforts to build Africa's peacekeeping capacity. This ambivalence is one of the focuses of this book. Against this background, several push-pull factors that conditioned South Africa's perception of the role of peacekeeping in its foreign and security policy are outlined. The West hopes to see South Africa as a partner that has the credibility in both developing and developed worlds to "punch above its weight" diplomatically and deliver African solutions to African problems in ways compatible with Western interests. South Africa's political stability, democratic outlook, hopes of sustained economic development, military capability, and commitment to African orientation in its foreign policy

make it, in the eyes of other stakeholders, the best hope for multilateral security options in Africa.

South Africa's peacekeeping policy has made quite encouraging progress in response to the peacekeeping demand in Africa. Among other things, South Africa has formulated its policy on international peacekeeping in steps that have been measured, even painstaking to a fault. It has been undertaking military and civilian capacity building unilaterally and within the framework of regional and international organizations. Its national defense force has been undertaking its own transformation process into a force capable of extensive involvement in regional and international peacekeeping training. South Africa has been involved in regional peacekeeping both military and non-military aspects (humanitarian assistance and diplomacy) in Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Angola, Ivory Coast, and Madagascar. These examples suggest that South Africa is developing a fairly encouraging involvement in conflict resolution in Africa. Nevertheless, South African has not yet done enough in peacekeeping in the continent despite these positive gestures. South Africa has declined desperate UN and African Union requests for peacekeepers a couple of times. The most recent example is its rejection of African Union's request for South African troops to join the ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This is disappointing evidence of South Africa's reluctance to play a prominent and influential role as a peace broker on the continent. However, chances will continue to arise, as Africa is host to a number of conflicts that demand South Africa's contribution to peacekeeping in Africa.

Contents

Chapter One

The Origin of Collective Security

The assumption that international peace and security can be achieved only through collective security measures was initially proposed in the beginning of the eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, no universal Leviathan was necessary; instead, a large federation of committed states could promote and maintain international peace.[1] He criticized the idea that peace can be preserved under a mere balance of power system based on the idea that each state is invested with an equal right to resort to war.[2]

The distinctions between the schools of balance of power and collective security as approaches to international security are confused by the various usages of the concept of balance of power in the theory and practice of international relations. The label has been attached to a wide range of practices, values, and prescriptions that has to do with maintaining order among sovereign states. However, two things in particular stand out as common features in these various usages. The first is that the balance of power, however understood, has as its principal objective the preservation of the system of sovereign states that enshrines the independence of all its members. It is not, then, a system (e.g., a policy, a prescription, or a universal law of state behavior) whose overriding goal is the preservation of peace. Indeed, it may well be a prescription for war against a rising power that threatens the overall system. In theory, at least, the balance of power does not require all acts of interstate violence to be deterred or punished, only those that threaten the overall integrity