VALUES
AND
KNOWLEDGE

EDITED BY

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Values and Knowledge

Preface

David Hume pointed out long ago that values are simultaneously the easiest and the most difficult topic on which to reach agreement. He noted that everyone everywhere agrees that we should strive for good and avoid evil. That is the easy part. The difficult part is knowing what is good and what is evil. And what about those gray areas in between? Hume's truism still resonates for us, both concerning the politics of values and concerning our psychological or pedagogical theories of the role of valuation in development.

Whenever values are discussed at a general or abstract level, there is a tendency for *deceptive agreement*. For example, many in the United States had taken it for granted that the values of tolerance and respect for the rights of individuals were widely agreed to be a basic tenet of American life. Yet in the last few years, attempts to implement this set of values as an organizing principle for social studies education have met with considerable resistance from many Americans in any number of school districts across the country. Tolerance in general is one principle, it would seem, but specific kinds of tolerance —toward non-Christians, or non-heterosexuals, for example—are perceived as something else again. This political fact may be uncomfortable and distressing, but we must reach beyond our discomfort to see the psychological truth revealed by such phenomena.

This psychological truth has profound consequences. To state it simply— no doubt oversimply—we must come to understand that the "values" animating human behavior and thought are not only abstractions that are applied, with varying degrees of success, to different situations; values are also partic-

ularistic, emerge from particular, complex situations, and are often brought to bear on other, far less appropriate situations.

The rational principles we state in our attempts to describe a value system cannot be assumed to be the actual values by which others operate. Such an assumption leads to what William James called the *psychologist's fallacy:* the fallacy of taking our *hypothetical descriptions* of another's mental state as being completely equivalent to that mental state. The mental state that we hopefully describe as a belief in tolerance may be little more than a pragmatic maxim to try to be civil to others. To confront a person operating with such a pragmatic maxim and argue that he or she is being "intolerant" or "inconsistent" misses the point that "tolerance" was never a living value for that person in the first place. When we commit the psychologist's fallacy in this way, we lay the groundwork for far worse educational, social, and political fallacies.

To avoid such fallacies we must study values, not as they are represented in the idealized worlds of discourse, but as they live within and among communities of human beings. Values have an odd life cycle, one that transcends the dichotomy between the individual and the social. Values are never born solely within one person, but they can only thrive—or fail—within the development of individuals. The chapters in this book emerged from a set of concerns with values and developments articulated by the editors in the 23rd Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society in 1993, with guidance from the Society's Board of Directors. For the Symposium we brought together speakers covering a broad range of concerns, but whose work focused on the power values exert to organize psychological development. The questions we asked speakers to address were: Where do values come from, and how are they appropriated within individuals? What role do values play in the psychological adaptation of humans to their physical and social environments? Can some values be considered more or less rational? Why do values seem so often to come into conflict, even the values held by a single individual?

All of these questions were addressed by Piaget. As Terrance Brown explains in the concluding chapter of this volume, Piaget struggled with the difficult problem of how to construe values and their relation to knowledge. In two well-known books, Piaget presented analyses of *the moral judgment of the child* and of *intelligence and affectivity.* Beyond these two works, however, Piaget attempted to come to grips with issues revolving around the subjective and objective aspects of values, the relativity and universality of emotions and morality, and especially, relationships between values and the construction of knowledge. These are issues unresolved by Piaget, and they continue to animate research on the role of values in development.

In the context of those influences, Piaget's ideas have been extended, modified, and taken in new directions. In chapter 3, Larry Nucci takes a serious look at Piaget's insight that the development of concepts of self, autonomy, and personal freedom is linked to the development of moral judgments, and

especially judgments concerning the points of view and needs of others. Ina Užgiris (chapter 2) examines the earliest phases of value formation, highlighting representations in infancy and the social and affective nature of interactions in the earliest years of life. In chapter 5, Elliot Turiel takes the centrality of individual–environmental interactions in moral, social, and personal judgments as a challenge for theories of the role of culture in development. His focus is on variations within cultures, and the conflicts and struggles that can ensue from conflicting values.

Other contributors bring perspectives different from but closely allied to the developmental perspective. Susan Moller Okin, a political scientist and philosopher, discusses the role of the family as a site for the formation of values and the practice of moral judgment in chapter 4. She notes the gendered basis and biases of the institution of the family and shows how moral philosophers and psychologists have failed to pay sufficient attention to gender differences in how justice is manifest in daily life. She argues that, because families are sites within which all of us develop our values, it is imperative that a clear understanding of justice and injustice within families be developed. In chapter 6, Lee Ross and Andrew Ward bring the perspective of experimental social psychology to an understanding of values, subjective judgments, social contexts, and social conflict. They show how commonplace subjective inferences can produce "naive realism," or the assumption that others share one's attitudes and values, thus resulting in false beliefs and misleading consensus. The social consequences of naive realism are far-reaching, as it can give rise to misunderstandings, conflict, and make difficult the resolution of disputes.

Following Hume's advice, the contributors to this volume address questions of value not in general terms, but in the light of particular areas of development, thought, and judgment with which they have been concerned. A broad range of topics are covered, making the case that that valuation plays a role in many areas of human development.

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Selves, Values, Cultures

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A central concept in Piaget's theory is that behavior and thought function as parts of a regulatory system facilitating an individual's adaptation to his or her environment. From this perspective, *values* stand for the diverse patterns of regulation entered into by all persons in a given environment and incorporated into their thoughts and actions. Because our human environment is largely organized through interaction with other people, many—but not all—values emerge within a social context. Values thus mediate between self and world, including the social world, and any theory of value must necessarily tackle the extremely difficult problems of the growth of the self and the socialization of individuals. The attempt to formulate such ambitious theories is useful because it forces us to consider whole persons as agents and as recipients, a salutary change from the fragmentary view of the person so common in modern psychology. Although such ambitious theorizing is fraught with intellectual peril, contributors to this volume have been willing to at least point us in the direction of such a theory. Indeed, much of the research and thinking reported here derives from a small set of problems which—if one could ever solve them—would lead to such a general theory of development. This set of problems can be divided into three issues: (a) What role does valuation play in the growth of individuals into integrated persons, each with a unique suite of predilections and capacities? (b) How are values embodied in the activities, feelings, and thoughts of individuals? (c) How does self individuation and differentiation from others occur within a culture without loss of self-identification with that culture and its values?

This chapter cannot pretend to offer a theory of values and their role in human development, but it does try to set the stage for thinking about such a theory by discussing the last of these three issues in the light of the various contributions to this volume. This focus on self-development is of central importance for psychologists and developmentalists, and should also help to shed light on the other two issues. The goal of the chapter is to outline some of the major perspectives that have been taken concerning the relationship between selves and cultures, as well as to offer some suggestions about promising directions for coming to grips with some of these issues. This historical-conceptual review is enlightening because in many ways, developmental psychology is forced to recapitulate many of the foundational problems of the social sciences.

THE SELF:
AUTONOMOUS, CONSTRUCTED, OR GROWN

Developmental psychology is still fighting an old intellectual battle, one bequeathed to us by that self-described solitary dreamer, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It was Rousseau more than anyone else who pushed Western thinking about child development away from Christianity and toward modern science (Hendel, 1934; Riley, 1986). Like so many intellectual revolutionaries—and not unlike many of the subjects in Ross and Ward's (chapter 6, this volume) experiments—Rousseau was more influenced by those he opposed than he realized. Thus, in rejecting the idea that original sin has a central place in human development, Rousseau almost went to the other extreme. And, whether or not Rousseau himself truly propounded the doctrine that society is corrupt and the child pure and angelic, there is no question that many subsequent thinkers fell under the spell of this idyll and called their views Rousseauian.

Those who have argued for or against Rousseau's ideal of childhood have tended to focus on whether it is the child or society that carries the seeds of later corruption. Amidst all the noise generated in that debate it is easy to miss another difficulty bequeathed to us by Rousseau. If society is based on a "social contract" and the newborn is essentially outside of society, then all children must "enter" their societies, perhaps even by making some revised form of the original social contract themselves. Yet this implies that the child exists as a more or less complete self despite his or her independence from society. Rousseauians often treat the child as a virtually autonomous individual, engaging the society and others on his or her own terms. This confuses a state of autonomy—a highly differentiated and socialized personality—with a state of being outside of and independent of society. This notion of an unsocialized autochthonous self is one of those ideas that few would defend but nevertheless keeps surfacing as an assumption in many theories. Despite many at-

tempts, those of us interested in explaining how the self develops have not suc-
ceeded in overcoming this Rousseauian framework.

Several of the chapters in this book help us to move beyond a simplistic
Rousseauian perspective. Užgiris (chapter 2) shows how even the earliest
stages of selfhood emerge from a complex network of social relations within
the family. Nucci (chapter 3) offers a theory of how each person growing within
such networks strives to negotiate a domain of self-determination. Okin (chap-
ter 4) reminds us forcefully that many social ills and prejudices, such as unfair
treatment of females, reproduce themselves precisely because individuals be-
come selves within the context of real (and often imperfect) families. Other re-
cent work has also greatly facilitated our understanding of the development of
the self through early interaction. The work of Fogel (1993), Stern (1994), and
Trevarthen (1994) has shown that the newborn comes into the world not as a
full-fledged but unsocialized person—as a potential partner in some social con-
tract—but as an undifferentiated, yet social, agent. Through the intensely inter-
personal social developmental process of human infancy, neonates slowly be-
come selves, adapting to their environment, both natural and social.

The first great challenge to the notion of the autonomous self was Hegel's
attempt at a developmental account of the self, which he called a "phenome-
nology" (Hegel, 1807/1977; Pippin, 1989). Freed from the doctrine of an im-
mutable soul, Hegel emphasized that the self undergoes historical develop-
ment and change. However, in many ways he went to the opposite extreme
from Rousseau, arguing that the self is in fact a construction of the self. How
this self-creation ex nihilo might be accomplished is, as one might imagine, not
exactly clear. Worse, Hegel sometimes seems to have believed that only God is
a true self, and so applied this "dialectical" account to Him alone. At other
times, Hegel seems to have suggested that each of us shares some elements of
the Godhead and therefore somehow participates in this dialectical develop-
ment. However, when he came down from abstractions to discuss the events
of everyday life, Hegel gave an extremely prosaic account of the family and the
separate roles of its members (in his *Philosophy of Right*) that differed hardly
at all from *Burgerlich* common sense.

In an attempt to reconcile Rousseauian individualism with Hegel's mono-
lithic attempt to embed us all in a Godhead, the young Marx and Engels (1845/
1974; Reed, 1995a) suggested that we all make ourselves, but not under con-
ditions of our own choosing. In other words, they demythologized Hegel's the-
ological view of self-creation and at the same time emphasized Rousseau's in-
sight that becoming a member of a society is a key element of self-formation.
In many ways the young Marx and Engels thus enunciated the question that
stands at the intersection of all the social sciences: How does the human
neonate grow into being a unique personality, socialized into a specific culture,
according to specific rules and roles? This is not a matter of a pre-existing self
acknowledging the values of those around him and signing on (however power-

ful such myths are when we tell stories about ourselves). But neither is it a matter of self-creation, in which a creature that is somehow outside of the normal constraints of life organizes itself. Marx and Engels never even published this fundamental text for a new social science, *The German Ideology,* leaving it (as they said) for the mice to gnaw as they made themselves into revolutionary intellectuals not under conditions of their own choosing. Ultimately, of course, Marx and Engels came to have a very different kind of influence on anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists, an influence now quite tattered by the sharp teeth of the rats of history.

Early in the 20th century the American thinker John Dewey—under the influence of both Hegel and Marx—rethought this problem of the growth of the self. A self-described naturalist and pragmatist, Dewey (1938/1991; Westerbrook, 1992) emphasized that selves grow only in specific environing situations. Time and again Dewey used quasi-botanical metaphors to try to get across this perspective: The self begins as a seed that can grow only when nourished, but that will grow in certain ways (for good or ill) depending on the environing factors. As with Marx, it is not a matter of a Rousseauian self negotiating with a separate society, but of some kind of self-creation in which constraints come from both nature and culture. But these "constraints" are not merely negatives (as Užgiris emphasizes)—each constraint is equally an opportunity for growth and development under specific conditions. From this philosophy of development Dewey fashioned an educational theory that emphasized what he considered to be democratic self-development as a central value. For Dewey, education is a kind of sharing of the self-creation process, one that emphasizes opportunity and discovery more than mere transference of information. Dewey never abandoned the centrality of skill and information acquisition in education—as some of his detractors claimed—but he insisted these must be embedded in the process of self-creation, so that the skills and information are made part of the values of the growing individual, not artificially added on.

Although Dewey's influence on later thought in philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy is widespread, it has tended to be piecemeal, and his emphasis on self growth and valuation is one of the pieces that has tended to be lost. Yet it is clear that Dewey had a significant impact on Piaget's thinking and it may be that when one is attempting to sketch a general model of human development—as one is forced to do in discussions of values—Dewey's "garden" metaphor may be required to supplant Piagetian "construction zone" thinking. Nucci, echoing Habermas (1984), suggests that neither of these metaphors is adequate, insisting on the centrality of communication and negotiation in the differentiation of persons from their social contexts.

In Rousseauian theory the growth of the self is inevitably accompanied by conflict, but these are conflicts between the self and society. Hegel has a great deal to say about conflicts within the "Geist" but he seemed to be more inter-

ested in applying these to his speculative history than to a psychological account of individuals—a criticism one might equally aim at Marx and Engels. Dewey always emphasized the role of "tension" in individual development, but said little about it that went beyond the metaphorical. Piaget made the issue of "tension"—of contradiction and conflict—central to his account of the mechanisms of developmental change, an insight we would do well to follow when trying to understand the role of value in development.

PLURALITY, MORAL THEORY, AND DEVELOPMENT

Hegel, Marx, and Dewey notwithstanding, theorizing about the development of values has tended not to acknowledge the plurality and incoherence of real value systems. Indeed, this resistance to acknowledging inconsistency is a characteristic of nearly all Western ethical philosophy (Stocker, 1990). Consider Rawls' (1973, 1992) theory of justice, which, as Okin (chapter 4, this volume) notes, has been enormously influential. According to Rawls, the very concept of justice requires us to imagine what he called the *original position.* This is a hypothetical social arrangement in which individuals are all equal in power and prestige and in which information is shared equally. Decisions made by this hypothetical jury not only will be just, Rawls suggested, but *define* what we mean by justice.

Rawls' theory is thus, literally, idealistic, in the sense that it rests on what has been, still is, and probably always will be a totally hypothetical and idealized set of social arrangements. Not only that; these arrangements are so idealized that they do not include the kinds of internal conflicts of values so characteristic of difficult everyday decisions. It would seem to be one of the main points of Rawls' work (and that of so many other philosophers) to try to come up with a *mechanism* that would obviate the need for working through difficult decisions over which we are conflicted. As an ideal case and even as a thought experiment this can have considerable use, but it also has very real limitations. This is because many of the questions that we real people have about justice cannot be resolved mechanically; their resolution in part requires a process whereby they be deliberated on and debated by real people who can empathize with both sides of an issue.

Consider, for example, affirmative action, which is a topic of current concern and controversy. The problem stems from a conflict between the principle of seeking an individual most suited for a position and the principle of distributing good positions across different groups of individuals. When the number of positions is limited relative to the candidates then any attempt to follow both these principles necessarily runs into conflict. At least some of those opposed to affirmative action can nevertheless understand the back-

ground that makes this conflict poignant (viz., the benefits of good positions and the degradation of being a member of an "outgroup") even while arguing that the conflict is insufficient to warrant the kind of remediation called for by affirmative action policies. Conversely, some of those who support affirmative action may well find themselves conflicted about what would be the best method of resolving such conflicts. Much of the poignancy of this issue comes from genuine disagreement over concepts of fairness and especially judgments concerning the appropriateness of making reparations for previous wrongs. One group judges that remediation of past errors is of the highest value, whereas others hold that creation of a current fair situation is the highest value. Many others are caught in the middle. No one who grew up amidst the original position can have all the feelings and second thoughts such circumstances create in real people, and the concept of a single "just" solution to all situations tends to downplay the very real complexities that make the process of valuation what it is. It is fascinating to read Ross and Ward's chapter, in which they give evidence for social processes that tend to produce more extreme and less nuanced public positions on controversial topics (not unlike Rawls' people in the original position) and find, in the same subjects at the same time, considerable private ambivalence about such strong positions and an implicit interest in more flexible, nuanced thinking.

One response to the idealization inherent in Rawls' way of thinking about moral judgment is what I would call a "transcendental" approach, which is characteristic of Kohlberg (1983) and Habermas (1984; McCarthy, 1991). Instead of looking for the ideal case under which people would make just decisions, these thinkers try to ascertain the actual conditions that allow for moral debate and judgment to occur. Habermas in particular is very clear about this: He is searching for the actual conditions in actual society that facilitate moral thought and actions.

However, like Rousseau, Habermas and Kohlberg tend to think of this set of possibilities in terms of wholly formed individuals coming into contact with other individuals. Habermas' theory is based on a search for what might be called Kantian regulative ideals of communication. These assume persons who can make demands, statements, request information and, in general, assert themselves in a social context. Kohlberg of course is interested in how these communicative competencies might develop, but does so from what appears to be a Rousseauian perspective, in which the individual child at all its stages of development is considered essentially as a complete microcosm, even prior to socialization.

However, even the conditions of communication have to be created and undergo development. Nucci argues that this development is neither imposed on a child from society, nor does it emerge from some innate propensity on the part of human children. Instead, it is a negotiated, or dialectical process, in which concepts of self, autonomy, and respect for others emerge—or should

emerge—from basic everyday actions of children and parents. I would go further and argue that the child's acquisition of the ability to produce speech acts—statements, requests, questions, demands, promises, and so on—itself emerges from the dialectical interplay of children with their caretakers in the first 3 years of life. Dialogue inevitably involves some conflict, as anyone who has raised children can attest. It is only when children come to be able to assert their needs and point of view in contrast to the needs and perspectives of those around them that they master the production of speech acts (Reed, 1995b). One way, then, in which we become ourselves, is by learning to communicate our own unique viewpoint and concern to others, something that happens mostly when we do not immediately succeed in getting what we want. Piaget's fundamental insight about conflict as the motive force in development is especially relevant to the analysis of communication.

Again, the chapter by Ross and Ward perhaps most effectively undermines the abstractions of thinkers like Rawls, Kohlberg, or Habermas. All of these theorists treat communication about values as if it could be made unproblematic—something which is psychologically impossible. For example, Rawls' (1973) concept of the original position assumes not only that individuals have perfect information, but also that they acknowledge that others have such perfect information as well. Yet, as Ross and Ward show, such assumptions are unrealistic, to put it nicely. Communication about values is *intrinsically* fraught with opportunities for false attribution, bad faith, ill will, and worse. The philosophers' trick of "bracketing" these "merely" contingent facts and postulating some ideal community (Rawls) or a transcendental presupposition of charitable communication (Habermas) is unhelpful at best. As Ross and Ward suggest, what is really needed are strategies whereby real, fallible, social agents can nevertheless be encouraged to *develop* a kind of interpretive charity and openness. If social psychological research has demonstrated anything, it has shown that merely hoping that better communication will occur, or can occur under some ideal conditions, is wishful thinking.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
FROM AFFORDANCES TO VALUES

If it is true that we make ourselves but not under conditions of our own choosing, then one of the key aspects of any environment is whether some of the resources it contains are scarce relative to the needs or demands of the people living there. Where conditions of relative scarcity are found, there is opportunity for either conflict or cooperation. Consider an extreme case of scarcity, such as a famine. Under these circumstances there will be cases of direct and aggressive physical conflict, such as fighting over food; but there will also be cases in which groups of people organize themselves to make decisions about

who should get the available food, and how much (e.g., rationing, provisioning for the ill, triage). Although famine is an extreme example, it nevertheless serves to illustrate that human cultures function in large part as arenas for conflict among people and its resolution.

Throughout human history and across all known cultures there has been this pattern of both cooperation and conflict being elicited by changes in available resources. But resources for human beings are in part created by human beings. Wood has been available in the environment for millions of years, yet only in the past 400,000 years have humans turned wood into a resource for warmth, into *fuel* for fires (Perles, 1977). However, the modification of the environment is largely a product of groups of people: Tools and techniques can be used by individuals, but technologies and procedures are only maintained and developed by cultures (Basalla, 1989). Thus, to paraphrase Marx, individual humans assimilate their environments in part through the mediation of their cultures.

The resources used by individuals as they encounter their surroundings are what James Gibson (1979/1986; Adolph, Eppler, & E. Gibson, 1994; E. Gibson, 1982/1991; Reed, 1988; Rochat & Reed, 1987) called the *affordances* of the environment for behavior. Affordances are the *use values* of objects, places, and people. As such they are not merely properties of the environment, but properties of the environment as they relate to human use and abilities. A tree that may afford climbing for a small primate might not afford climbing for a human being. Notice that a use value need not be used: Although that tree may afford climbing to a human I might not be skilled enough or brave enough to climb it. Affordances, like resources in general, are *opportunities* for action, not causes of action. Affordances are the values available in an environment for an individual.

Yet to say that the tree affords fuel for my fire is to skip over an important set of facts: that without the technology for cutting wood and controlling fire, the tree would not afford fueling my fire. In general, my *capacities* for resource use as an individual human are greatly affected by my cultural milieu as well as my ecological niche. Each of us lives in a populated environment, and this significantly affects both what values are available to us and our ability to take advantage of those values (Reed, in press). The cutting down of trees to burn or to make houses and other things is something only groups of humans have done, but it has literally changed the face of the earth (Goudie, 1989; Goudsblom, 1994). The differences in affordances available from one culture to another may be as great, or greater, than the differences in affordances available from one primate species to the next. Moreover, because humans learn and develop within these cultural contexts, my *proclivities* of affordance usage— what affordances I am inclined to use, when and where I use them, and the skilled procedures I deploy in order to use them—are also greatly affected by my cultural milieu. To take a simple but powerful example, in a great number

of cultures, such as traditional Hindu India, the grasping of food must always be done with the right hand, because the left hand is reserved for personal hygiene. Obviously, food items afford being picked up with either hand (as we do in our culture), but people who grow up in certain places have a taboo on using the right hand for getting food.

As J. Gibson (1950) put it, cultures include both techniques and taboos. *Techniques* are socially developed (even when individually realized) ways of acquiring use values. *Taboos* are socially developed (even when individually realized) selected ways of applying those techniques. J. Gibson (1950; see Reed, 1988, ch. 10) suggested that individual behavior is thus divided into *expedient ways* and what he called *proper ways*. These are not separate behavioral acts, but often merely distinct facets of a given behavior. One may learn many expedient ways for using affordances, but one must also learn the proprieties of one's own culture, which constitute selected constraints on affordance use—on what one uses, when one uses it, and where and how one does so.

Thus there are at least *two kinds of conflict* experienced by children growing into their cultures: conflicts over resources and conflicts over mores—or, to use the terms given earlier, conflicts over expediencies versus conflict over proprieties. That is, the child's behavior can fail to be adaptive (in Piaget's sense of the term) in two quite different ways. First, the child's behavior can fail to meet the needs that were the goal of that activity. The conflict thus brought about is between the child and his or her own needs, in which the child's behavior fails to be expedient. Second, even though meeting his or her needs, the child's behavior can fail to meet the norms of the culture in which the child lives. Here the conflict is between the child and the culture's selective ways of gaining access to resources, and the child's behavior fails to be proper. Note that these are two separate spheres of needs that intersect but are not identical. A behavior that meets my needs may not be acceptable within my cultural milieu (e.g., grabbing all objects or food, defecating wherever I care to); but it is equally true that a culturally proper action may not meet my needs (e.g., limiting the food given to females and children in a family in order to feed the father or the boys). Developing selves in any culture thus have to grow and make themselves under conditions not of their own choosing *both* vis-à-vis available affordances *and* vis-à-vis proper ways of using those affordances. Scarcity of resources for an individual can be (and often is) as much a function of cultural organization as of natural resource limitations. From the point of view of a culture or a family (at least of a nurturing one) each new child is surrounded by all the available and appropriate resources for a new human being. However, from the point of view of the developing person there will inevitably be conflicts over both the availability and appropriateness of those resources. Furthermore, not all children's situations are nurturing (Sylvester-Bradley, 1991).

Stated in this way, and with a focus on cultural variation, the question naturally arises as to which cultures are the "best" in terms of expediencies, proprieties, or both, and which cultures are the "best" in terms of nurturing developing selves. Kohlberg's influential work on the development of moral thinking actually goes so far as to try to specify a more or less universal set of developmental stages toward the best set of proprieties. Many popular discussions of values have tended to hover around these questions of which set of mores is better (Bennett, 1993). However as Turiel (chapter 5, this volume) stresses, these concerns start from a mistaken equation between the values embodied in a culture and those of the individuals in that culture. The assumption that an individual's values simply mirror his or her culture's is overly simple, to say the least. Indeed, as Turiel emphasizes, a culture's values may literally force some individuals into ambivalence or conflict. Part of the problem here is that few thinkers have taken the issue of conflict seriously in trying to understand how selves appropriate their culture's proprieties.

TAKING CONFLICT SERIOUSLY

One domain in which conflict over values has been taken seriously is in the study of psychological issues surrounding prejudice and the integration of minorities into majoritarian practices and culture. To some degree, this focus on conflict with regard to minorities is misleading because it can lead to the false assumption that individuals who are in the majority group are never conflicted. Nevertheless, a focus on minority integration has the advantage of bringing conflict onto center stage, so to speak. An important case in point is W. E. B. DuBois. A student of William James, and widely known among African Americans for his sociological and psychological theorizing, DuBois' work is almost unknown among "mainstream" psychologists (Gaines & Reed, 1994, 1995; cf. Lewis, 1993). One of DuBois' central concerns is precisely the development of the self under conditions of conflict and tension. In particular, in his classic *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903/1990), DuBois formulated the theory that each individual necessarily internalizes some of the cultural divisions within which he or she grows up. DuBois was primarily concerned with self-image and self-esteem in African American children, arguing that some form of division within a person's value system is inevitable for Black Americans, or, more generally, for any person in a subaltern position within a culture. The argument is simple, but profound: In an explicitly racist society, the success of subaltern individuals requires that that individual explicitly renounce pride in those aspects of his or her person that the local culture deems to be associated with the inferior race. For an African American to succeed in the Jim Crow South, the (White) powers that be in that culture required a demeanor that signaled renunciation of all pride in one's African heritage. Turiel and Okin both dis-

cuss related examples concerning internal conflicts over values in girls and women who are forced to play subordinate roles in their family and society.

To this day, the distinction between White and Black criteria for success is a major factor in the personality development of all individuals American society deems to be Black. (Notice that this account presupposes a cultural definition of race—those who can "pass" are treated in a completely different way from their brothers and sisters.) Just as many African Americans learn to speak one way to other African Americans and a different way to White Americans (Labov, 1972), so, I would speculate, many African Americans probably learn how to regulate their thought and actions in accordance with two or more value systems.

As DuBois emphasized, for most individuals these conflicts of value are extremely powerful and painful. In many aspects of work, personal relations, and play there can be no unalloyed "good" or "bad" for such dual personalities. How can there be, when what society treats as "good" for people of a certain type is precisely what it treats as "bad" for other people, or vice versa? What is assertive and positive for Whites and males is often deemed aggressive and negative for Blacks and females. Anyone who is socialized into this society and belongs to even one outgroup will thus find themselves conflicted over at least some instances of good and bad, right and wrong. Writing more than 90 years ago, DuBois presciently explained how it was that African Americans who are proud of their African heritage necessarily confront the fact that that heritage is considered debased by mainstream American society. Those African Americans who try to take pride in their American heritage find themselves objects of suspicion within their own community, and are rarely granted full status as Americans by the mainstream. For such "dual personalities" there is always an alternative way of evaluating a given situation, character, or action. No fully developed subaltern self can possibly avoid such intrinsic duality.

The case of African Americans is perhaps an extreme one, based on literally centuries of cruel cultural history, but the psychological point made by DuBois is almost surely applicable in many other instances. Wherever selves grow up and identify with multiple aspects of their social milieu there should be some internal division of their value systems. After all, one may identify very closely with one's religion, one's gender, one's ethnic group—or all three together.

Antonio Gramsci—another intellectual from a highly marginalized group (in this case, Sardinians in Italy)—discussed the duality of values embodied in each individual's worldviews in his influential discussions of "hegemony" (Bocock, 1986). Gramsci, a political activist, was especially concerned with the question as to why subaltern individuals might come to internalize as "common sense" beliefs that could be demeaning to their selves (or worse). "One might almost say," Gramsci wrote of the average person, "that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is