

**THE
HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD WAR II**

Edited by
Marcel Baudot
Henri Bernard
Hendrik Brugmans
Michael R. D. Foot
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen

Translated from the French by
Jesse Dilson

With additional material by
Alvin D. Coox
Thomas R. H. Havens

M

**THE
HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
WORLD WAR II**

Edited by
Marcel Baudot
Henri Bernard
Hendrik Brugmans
Michael R. D. Foot
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen

Translated from the French by
Jesse Dilson

With additional material by
Alvin D. Coox
Thomas R. H. Havens

Encyclopedie de la Guerre copyright ©1977 by Casterman. Translation and additional material copyright ©1980 by Facts On File Inc., New York.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission.

Originally published as **ENCYCLOPEDIE DE LA GUERRE 1939-1945** by Editions Casterman, Paris and Tournai.

First published in English in 1980 by Facts On File Inc., New York.

Illustrations by Andre Dumoulin

First published 1981 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD and **MACMILLAN LONDON LTD**
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives throughout the world

ISBN 0 333 28211 6

This book is sold subject to the standard conditions of the Net Book Agreement.

Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

List of Abbreviations

AA	Antiaircraft
AAF	Army Air Force
ABDA	Australian-British-Dutch-American Command
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Force
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Area
Gestapo	<i>Geheime Staats Polizei</i>
IGHQ	Imperial General Headquarters (Japanese)
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
OKH	<i>Oberkommando des Heeres</i>
OKL	<i>Oberkommando der Luftwaffe</i>
OKM	<i>Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine</i>
OKW	<i>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht</i>
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
RAF	Royal Air Force
RM	Reichsmark
RN	Royal Navy
SA	<i>Sturmabteilung</i> (Storm Troops)
SD	<i>Sicherheitsdienst</i> (Security Service)
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> (Protection Squads)
TAF	Tactical Air Force
USAAF	U.S. Army Air Force
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	U.S. Navy
USS	U.S. Ship

Throughout *The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II*, certain words, phrases or names appear in **bold face**. These are cross-references—e.g., in the article on Albania, **Malta** appears in bold face; this indicates that there is an article on Malta in the *Encyclopedia*.

INTRODUCTION

ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Those developments in the domestic and foreign policies of the major powers that contributed directly to the outbreak of war in 1939 are discussed in the following pages. No attempt is made, however, to retrace the whole history of the interwar period. This introduction covers three periods: the immediate post-World War I years, the ensuing era of hope and reconciliation and the period of new struggles and crises.

1918-1925: The Postwar Period

Two victors and future adversaries: the United States and Japan

When the Armistice ending hostilities on the Western Front was announced on November 11, 1918, it soon became obvious that the first "world" war had at least two undeniable victors: Japan and the United States. The European winners naturally felt greater relief than those overseas. But precisely because the Europeans suffered more than the non-European powers, the latter reaped greater gains from the war. Both the United States and Japan strengthened their positions in the world at a relatively modest price.

The United States did not go to war until 1917. And even after its official entry in the war, many months passed before an expeditionary force could be recruited, trained and transported to Europe. Although American troops brought great relief to the hard-pressed British and French in the final months of fighting, America's involvement was brief, and its deaths in battle were limited to 91,000. But the nation had given enormous economic assistance to the Allies and was determined to be reimbursed for it. After the war, the United States emerged more powerful than it had been in 1914.

Japan suffered virtually no losses from the time it declared war on Germany in 1914. It occupied German positions in the Chinese province of Kiaochow and expanded its foreign commercial relationships at the expense of France and Great Britain, both preoccupied with their life-and-death struggle. At the peace conference Japan found itself in a position of power without any involvement in the territorial rivalries of the

European nations. In recognition of its services it received some German possessions in the Pacific, including bases that would later be useful for Japanese economic, political and military expansion. The Far Eastern equilibrium thus shifted in favor of a state that had achieved the first victory of a nonwhite nation over a white power by defeating the Russians in 1905. While the Americans were mainly interested in the Atlantic, Japanese imperialism became a powerful force in the Pacific and East Asia, where it soon laid the basis for a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" under its control. Despite their different areas of interest, the likelihood of an eventual conflict between these powers was already perceptible.

The new Russia

Russia's czarist government bore a large share of the responsibility for World War I, which it initially viewed as an opportunity to reclaim the honor lost in its defeat by Japan in 1905. Nicholas II and his ministers also hoped that an international crisis would reunite the people under the Czar's autocratic yoke. Instead they suffered military reversals and, finally, revolution. When the new Bolshevik government decided to renounce its dream of a revolution by the masses and to conclude a separate peace at almost any price, it signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, which ended fighting on the Eastern Front and allowed the Germans to mount a new offensive towards Paris.

In and out of the conflict, Russia thus weighed heavily in the balance. Officially ignored by the other great powers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (a name adopted in 1922) remained a significant international factor. Although excluded from the League of Nations until 1935, the Soviet Union was nevertheless a reality, even in the eyes of the nations that refused it diplomatic recognition. Soon some discerning statesmen like Germany's Walter Rathenau began to seek its support, if not its friendship. Gradually the new Communist regime and its potent ideology assumed a principal role in the evolution of European politics following World War I.

The Soviet government had its first important deal-

ings with two countries that had, wholly or in part, belonged to the czarist empire: Finland and Poland. Circumstances in both states raised the issue of self-government, officially endorsed by the Bolsheviks for the non-Russian peoples of the former czarist empire. Lenin himself asserted that no nation could consider itself free as long as it oppressed another.

However the cause of national autonomy in Finland was split along ideological lines. Finnish conservatives who had been quite amenable to the weak autonomy granted by St. Petersburg became separatists after 1917. On the other hand, a large part of the extreme left in Finland, whose previous political opposition to czarism had been reinforced by nationalism, refused to break with the Kremlin. The Bolsheviks, they pointed out, promised a vast socialist federation of all peoples under an egalitarian regime. This was surely preferable, in their view, to a parochial state dominated by a conservative elite.

Such arguments led to the outbreak of civil war in Finland, which ended in the establishment of a monarchy under German protection and, later, of a conservative republic. Marshal Carl Gustav von Mannerheim, who repulsed the Soviets and suppressed the Finnish Communists, founded the "Lappo" movement, based primarily on fascism, in 1930. At the same time the creation of a strong social democratic organization, supported by an efficient agricultural cooperative movement, strengthened the foundations of the country's parliamentary government and made possible a stable national democracy. Relations with the USSR, however, remained troubled. The outbreak of the "Winter War" with the Soviet Union in 1939 led Finland into an unnatural alliance with Nazi Germany.

In Poland, too, the conflict between communism and nationalism divided loyalties. To Lenin and most of his colleagues, the revolution's success hinged on its fate in the West. Although the Communists' attention centered primarily on Germany, Poland stood in their way; it could be either an obstacle or a corridor to the rest of Europe. The new Polish state, moreover, had fluid borders. Historically, it could lay claim to vast lands in central and eastern Europe. While some Poles objected to the presence of alien peoples within their boundaries, others pressed for the inclusion of as much territory as possible.

The expansionist group, led by the veteran anti-Russian freedom fighter Jozef Pilsudski, soon won out and shaped an ambitious plan of conquest. In April 1920 a Polish offensive was launched toward the south, and with the assistance of the Ukrainian separatist leader Simon Petlyura, who was operating against the Red Army, Kiev was occupied the following month. But by July the military balance began to

swing the other way. While the Poles allied themselves with the Ukrainian freedom movement, the Soviets not only rallied their forces around the banner of revolution, but also exploited the traditional hatred between members of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic population.

The Red Army, commanded by General Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, actually reached the gates of Warsaw. The infant republic seemed doomed only months after its birth. But in mid-August the pendulum swung once again. In a series of audacious maneuvers, the Polish general staff launched a counter-offensive that drove back the Russians, with the aid of a group of French officers led by General Maxime Weygand and a young captain named Charles de Gaulle.

The eastern Russo-Polish frontier was finally drawn along a line first proposed by the British statesman Lord Curzon in December 1919. The war that began in April 1920 ended on March 18, 1921 with the peace pact of Riga. But the wounds it left on both sides never really healed and eventually led to another war in 1939, when the Soviets invaded Poland.

The end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

In southeastern Europe the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed with its surrender to the Allies in November 1918. Before World War I the monarchy had been an economically integrated entity (there were no customs barriers separating Trentino from Galicia or Bohemia from Transylvania). But intensifying ethnic loyalties eventually tore apart the multinational empire and helped set off the war. The treaties of Versailles, Trianon and Saint-Germain divided Austria-Hungary into the "Successor States," but the problem of minority disputes continued.

This problem presented certain contradictions. On the one hand, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia favored both nationalism and the application of the Wilsonian principle of "the free self-determination of peoples." But within each of these states were dissatisfied ethnic minorities. Quarrels soon broke out in Czechoslovakia between the dominant Czechs and the Slovaks and Sudetic Germans, and in Yugoslavia the predominantly Eastern Orthodox Serbs clashed with the Roman Catholic Croats. In 1928 the Croatian peasant leader Stepan Radich was assassinated during a session of the Yugoslavian Parliament. Continuing ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia were exploited first by Mussolini and later by Hitler.

A similar situation occurred in Rumania, a relatively old state that emerged from the war in possession of Bessarabia (formerly under Russian rule), Dobruja and Transylvania. The city of Alba Iulia in Transylvania was the center of a separatist movement that had great

strength in two Rumanian provinces, Wallachia and Moldavia. The new Rumania, almost twice as large as the original area, also included an enlarged German population and a substantial Hungarian minority, which also threatened the country's unity. Bucharest therefore had every reason to oppose "revisionism," i.e., attempts to alter the terms of the Armistice. Guided by its minister of foreign affairs, Nicolae Titulescu, Rumania set out to play an influential role in the League of Nations, the caretaker of the treaties that guaranteed its boundaries.

Like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Rumania turned to France, another "victorious" power intent on preserving the status quo. Through the Little Entente, created in 1922, Paris tried to maintain order by extending its protection to these three central European countries with the greatest stake in preserving the postwar international system. Yet France lacked the military means to guarantee the safety of these territories and could offer nothing more than condolences when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Among the nations frustrated by the outcome of World War I was Hungary, reduced to scanty proportions by the Treaty of Trianon. Before 1914 it had comprised half of the Hapsburg monarchy and reigned over a primarily non-Magyar population. Weaker but more homogeneous in 1919, Hungary yearned for its lost grandeur and became a leading revisionist power. This exaggerated nationalism led, after the end of Bela Kun's short-lived Communist republic, to an authoritarian regime with fascist tendencies.

The collapse of the Hapsburg empire left among its fragments one last Successor State, the humiliated "German Austria." Described by one journalist as "the state nobody wants," this rudimentary nation, stripped of its former raw materials, was barely viable. It was composed of a crowded, prestigious capital cut off from its multinational hinterland and a sharply contrasting rural population to which Vienna meant nothing. While the capital had a Social Democratic majority and a municipal government that was a model of progressive administration, the rest of the country regretted the passing of the monarchy and demanded an authoritarian regime. This polarization resulted in the civil war of February 1934, which eliminated the Austrian Social Democrats and isolated the Christian-Socialist government, too feeble by itself to resist National Socialist pressure.

Whatever their political leanings, most Austrians were dissatisfied with their state and sought alternatives to it. Some advocated a restored monarchy; many others supported unification with Germany or rallied to the Pan-European movement begun by the Austrian Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi in

1922. The "Greater German" advocates included many who were neither chauvinists nor rightists. Indeed, a large number of socialists hoped to emerge from their isolation in Vienna and join their German counterparts in the Weimar Republic. The *Anschluss* movement was initially blocked by France, which regarded reinforcement of German power as a mortal threat. Yet in the end, the union denied to Austrian and German democrats before 1933 came about under the Nazis despite French objections.

The German question

Europe's greatest problem after 1918 was Germany, a country that remained hostile toward its former enemies for two important reasons. In the first place, German military leaders refused to admit that they had been vanquished on the battlefield. The Allies had virtually ended their campaign the very day German forces evacuated the territories they had occupied. It was therefore psychologically understandable but politically disastrous for Friedrich Ebert, first president of the Weimar Republic, to greet the returning troops as "unconquered." Worse yet, civilian politicians who negotiated and implemented the Armistice fostered the "stab in the back" legend that the German army would have been victorious if only those at home (Jews, socialists etc.) had not betrayed it.

A second problem was the continuation of the Allied naval blockade of Germany for three months after the Armistice. Starving German civilians conceived a hatred of the victorious powers that, in time, benefited Hitler. A generation suffering from malnutrition in infancy or adolescence matured as victims of post-war injustice.

Under these circumstances a socialist-dominated provisional government attempted to pull the country together again after the war. On November 9, 1918, after Wilhelm II had fled to the Netherlands, Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a republic. At Weimar, the home of Goethe and the symbol of a peaceful Germany, a constitutional assembly met but failed to resolve either of the two problems threatening it: communism and economic collapse.

Exploiting the confusion that followed defeat, the extreme left tried to duplicate the Bolshevik example of immediate revolution. Factory workers and military personnel returning from the war formed workers' and soldiers' councils, the German equivalent of the Russian "soviets," in which extremists commanded a sizable audience. The country seemed on the brink of a communist revolution. This threat was averted, however, due to the resolute moderation of the German Social Democrats and the absence of leadership among the extremists.

The German left, consisting of the reformist Inde-

pendent Social Democratic Party and the radical Spartacus League, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, was poorly organized at the war's end. The Spartacists, who advocated violent revolution, lacked the military strength to overcome the army and other right-wing organizations. Some "red" units periodically attempted sudden grabs for power, but never managed a decisive stroke. Germany thus entered a period of purposeless civil war that lasted until 1923. Luxemburg and Liebknecht had tried to give the movement greater direction, but they had been assassinated in 1919 by a band of reactionary officers. The same year right-wing forces crushed an attempt by anarchists to establish a soviet republic in Bavaria.

Following the death of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, the Spartacus League became the German Communist Party. Its only achievement, however, was to help make Germany ungovernable. Until the moment Hitler assumed power, Communist leaders denounced the Social Democrats as "Social Fascists," the "Enemy Number One" of the German working class. The division within the German left weakened the entire workers' movement and facilitated the Nazi seizure of power.

The chances of the status quo

In response to the distress of the vanquished countries, the victors of World War I offered only one solution: respect the Treaty of Versailles. Yet the Germans would never accept this "dictated" peace, a symbol of its impotence and humiliation in 1918. The German delegation at Versailles indicated its attitude by breaking the pen used to sign the treaty.

The Versailles peace agreement took large territories away from Germany, including the Polish province of Poznan and parts of Silesia and Schleswig-Holstein. The most painful loss, however, was the traditionally German port of Danzig, declared a "free city" under League of Nations supervision. East Prussia was separated from the rest of Germany by a narrow land corridor adjacent to Danzig, created to give the new Polish state an outlet on the Baltic Sea. This arbitrary division of Germany became the cause celebre of German irredentists and eventually gave Hitler a pretext for starting World War II.

Germany also lost its colonies, which were placed under League of Nations mandate and administered by the victorious powers. Unlike the territorial losses in Europe, the colonial issue did not evoke deep resentment among most Germans; Hitler never sought the return of colonies either in his domestic propaganda or in his foreign policy. Yet businessmen interested in foreign trade and advocates of a strong navy, important elements in German politics, felt the

colonial loss deeply and continued to hope for its rectification.

In addition to the territorial provisions of the treaty, the Germans objected to the notorious Article 241, which saddled Germany with sole responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. This statute was designed to justify the reparations demands of Britain and France, which intended to make Germany pay the entire cost of the war on the Western Front. The financial burden thus imposed on the German government was so onerous that it provoked debate even in the Allied countries and aided German revisionists in their demands for alteration of the entire system imposed by the treaty. British economist John Maynard Keynes, in his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920), warned of the disastrous consequences of reparations. His predictions seemed confirmed by the inflation in Germany in 1923, which made fulfillment of the reparations demands less likely than ever.

Germany's postwar economic collapse, attributed by Keynes and others to the reparations burden, had serious social as well as economic repercussions. The entire German middle class, who normally lived on fixed incomes and accumulated savings, was financially leveled as inflation wiped out the value of bank accounts. Particularly hard hit were pensioners and others dependent on regular payments whose amounts had been set before the inflation began. Thus a former cornerstone of the German social order dissolved into a mass of frightened and rootless individuals with little stake in the existing political system, a ready audience for Nazi propaganda.

Britain and France, alarmed by the signs of growing chaos in Germany, agreed to discuss modification of reparations payments at the Genoa Conference in April and May 1922. The most noteworthy outcome of the meeting, however, had nothing to do with reparations. Walter Rathenau, head of the German delegation in Genoa, met secretly at nearby Rapallo with Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Chicherin and agreed to an informal alignment between the two countries. Both Germany and Soviet Russia thus succeeded in overcoming the diplomatic isolation that the Western Allies had attempted to impose on them.

The Soviet connection helped German leaders evade one further provision of the Versailles Treaty: the forced disarmament of Germany. Reduced to a token force of 100,000 men, the German army was supplemented by officers and technicians trained in the Soviet Union. Germany's armaments, kept at a minimal level by the treaty, were clandestinely augmented by equipment manufactured in Soviet factories. The restricted size of its armed service also gave the German command an opportunity to impose un-

usually stringent entrance requirements, which produced a force of unsurpassed excellence. Officers like Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel, experts in the unorthodox use of armored formations, received their training in the seemingly harmless "Versailles Army." When Hitler later succeeded in tearing up the treaty, he found this cadre an excellent nucleus around which to shape his strike force.

Hope in Geneva

With an unstable Germany bent on unraveling the international order, Europe faced an uncertain future after the end of the war. One hope for the preservation of peace was the newly created League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson, disappointed by the failure of the Versailles conference to negotiate a just settlement, said of his Fourteen Points, "I lost them in the ocean, but the league will fish them out again."

The League of Nations was the first attempt in history to create a broad international government with real powers. Its Assembly, located in Geneva, was made up of representatives from all member states; the Council was comprised of delegates from the great powers and was charged with carrying out the league's decisions. An arbitration system was created to resolve and prevent quarrels, and specialized league agencies such as the International Labor Bureau (later the International Labor Organization) attempted to promote worldwide cooperation in specific fields.

Although impressive in concept and organization, the League of Nations achieved only limited success in its main task: the maintenance of peace. League mediation settled a 1923 conflict between Greece and Italy over the island of Corfu. Yet the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which required the submission of any international disagreement to arbitration by the league, was never ratified; the great powers refused to forfeit the right of military intervention where their "vital interests" were at stake. Although the idea of replacing force with law was attractive, it conflicted with the more "sacred" notion of national sovereignty.

In addition to the great powers, some of Europe's smaller countries felt this way. In 1923 war broke out between Greece and Turkey, two long-standing rivals in the eastern Mediterranean. The collapse of Turkey's Ottoman Empire in 1918 encouraged Greece, with covert support from Britain and France, to seek expansion into Asia Minor. Yet Turkish military forces, revitalized by the "Young Turk" government of Kemal Pasha Ataturk, repulsed the Greek invasion and forced Greece, in the Treaty of Lausanne, to renounce its Asian territorial claims. The league failed to prevent or even to mediate this conflict. Its involvement came only after the fighting had ceased,

when a league commission was created to supervise the exchange of Greek and Turkish minority populations.

One disappointment for pacifists in the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish war was the refusal of the British left to support the creation of a League of Nations army capable of acting against an aggressor state. The British "New Commonwealth Society," which included prominent conservatives such as Winston Churchill among its members, recognized the importance of such a force in establishing the league's credibility. But the traditionally pacifist socialists disdained what they called "international militarism." In the absence of effective sanctions and safeguards, Geneva remained a social club for diplomats.

The nationalist upsurge

With the League of Nations reduced to impotence, pacifists and internationalists hoped at least that nationalism, which had caused the carnage of World War I, would never again trouble world peace. Yet by 1923 the intensely nationalistic *fasci di combattimento*, led by former Socialist Benito Mussolini, had seized power in Italy.

Fascism was the only original political movement of the interwar period. Liberalism, socialism and Christian Democracy were survivors of an earlier era. But fascism, new and difficult to classify, had a disorienting effect on public opinion. Despite its nationalist appeal, it rejected the pillars of the extreme right in Italy: clericalism, monarchism and capitalism. Established by war veterans, the movement reflected the bitterness of those who had brought Italy into the war in the hope of territorial gains that were later denied in the Treaty of Versailles. It also rekindled the memory of the battlefield, where national solidarity overcame religious, social and political differences. Prone to violence, the fascists scorned parliamentary procedure as ineffective talk. Most of Mussolini's followers genuinely desired social change but rejected the old ideologies of communism and socialism without offering any alternative. In practice, fascism reached a fairly easy accommodation with the House of Savoy and the Vatican, symbols of the Italian establishment. Yet it remained a restless and unstable force in the nation's politics.

Outside Italy, Mussolini's political adventures were greeted with sympathy or indifference. Although the assassination of the outspoken Social Democratic deputy Giacomo Matteotti on June 10, 1924 alienated some sectors of public opinion, the killing did not upset the European right, which generally preferred demagogues to socialists. In the opinion of conservatives, Italy needed greater discipline to make the trains run on time and keep public officials honest.

Socialism had been brutally eliminated, but order was reestablished.

1925-1931: The "Good" Years

Despite the turbulence of the postwar years, the pacifists were not entirely frustrated in their desire to see nationalism reduced in importance as a political force. Passions fostered by the war ebbed, and reconciliation began to seem possible. For five years diplomats tried to lay the basis for a durable peace.

The "illegal" war

In 1923 President Raymond Poincaré of France sought to force the Germans to honor their war reparations by ordering his troops to occupy the Ruhr valley. Most Frenchmen approved of this move. Socialist leader Leon Blum was in the minority when, at a congress of the Socialist International in Hamburg, he pleaded for greater flexibility in the application of the Treaty of Versailles.

The military operation, however, proved ineffective. The presence of French soldiers in the Ruhr did not improve the attitude of the German people towards reparations. The working class began a campaign of passive resistance against the French intruders. This "Battle of the Ruhr" gave the Nazis a chance to glorify their first martyr, Horst Wessel, who posthumously lent his name to the movement's hymn. French authorities aggravated the tension by using Africans as occupation troops. The resulting riots intensified Germany's renewed nationalism. Poincaré was defeated in the elections of May 24 and thus forced to resign.

His failure opened the door to other solutions. Aristide Briand on one side and Gustav Stresemann on the other, two patriots who advocated Franco-German amity, succeeded in erasing one part of the Versailles system. By signing the Locarno Pact in late 1925, Germany sought to reassure French and Belgian public opinion regarding her western frontier. There would be, according to the provisions of the treaty, no dispute over its definition, nor any question of "revenge"; the Alsace-Lorraine problem was permanently resolved. Although no treaty guaranteeing the status quo of Germany's eastern frontier was ever negotiated, Locarno could at least be regarded as the dawn of Franco-German reconciliation.

Briand and Stresemann worked together for the next five years to strengthen the bond they had established. French ministers came and went, but Briand, the "man of Geneva," was constantly in his office on the Quai d'Orsay. Once he went so far as to invite his German colleague to an intimate "man-to-man" colloquy with no reporters present. And when

Stresemann entered the League of Nations Assembly on September 8, 1926, Briand welcomed him.

Germany's economic situation improved after the end of the Ruhr occupation. The investment level rose to such an extent, in fact, that Allied leaders renewed their demands for payment of reparations. On two occasions American financiers visited Europe in an effort to set German payments at a realistic level. Allied demands gradually eased, however, in the face of continued German refusal to pay.

One great obstacle to the quest for permanent peace was the foreign policy of the United States. America had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, and the Republican Party, in power at the time, seemed bent on short-sighted isolationism. Finally, however, the leaders of the United States demonstrated that they were not completely uninterested in the fate of the world. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, on Briand's suggestion, proposed an international treaty with the grand aim of outlawing war, its signatories pledging never to use armed force to settle their differences. On August 27, 1928, 15 delegations met in Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand pact. None of the solemn speeches welcoming a new era of harmony dared raise the question, What happens if one of the signatories breaks its word?

The Federalist idea

Clarence Streit, a *New York Times* correspondent who covered the League of Nations in Geneva, became absorbed with the idea of world federalism. Bored with endless debates and resolutions, he founded the "Federal Union" movement, which envisaged not world federation but a union of the Atlantic democracies with common interests. His book *Union Now* gained some popularity in the United States but had little effect on the other side of the Atlantic.

Yet the federalist idea began to gain popularity in Europe as well. In 1923 Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi published his manifesto *Panuropa* in Vienna and with it launched a campaign for a European union. He continued to promote the movement until his death in 1972. By nationality, Coudenhove-Kalergi was Austro-Hungarian, born in Tokyo of a Japanese mother and a diplomat father. Educated in the Theresianum, where many youths who were to enter the Austrian diplomatic service spent their formative years, he was well acquainted with centrifugal nationalist tendencies. But why, he asked himself, could not different racial and religious groups live peacefully in a community with no internal boundaries under a tolerant government?

A resident of Bohemia after the war, Coudenhove-Kalergi suddenly found himself a Czech citizen. He accepted his new status uneasily, fearing that the crea-

tion of the Successor States would lead to economic fragmentation, and the emergence of new boundaries as divisive as the old ones. This ran counter to his idea of historical progress. After Coudenhove-Kalergi became convinced that the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy had been inevitable, he concluded that the only solution was to work for the end of all frontiers and customs barriers, not only in the Danube basin but throughout Europe.

Coudenhove-Kalergi found his first followers in Austria. Following the appearance of his manifesto, he published a federalist journal in several languages. Its purpose was not to arouse the masses, but rather to sway the political and economic ruling classes. Federalist committees were formed in various countries and included spokesmen from all the democratic parties, bankers, industrialists, trade union members, writers and artists. Beginning in 1925 large conventions were organized with the support of statesmen like Stresemann and Briand.

In September 1929 Briand issued the most sensational proposal of his career, calling for creation of a "United States of Europe" within the League of Nations. The "good era" that fostered such ideas, however, was close to its end. Briand himself never quite grasped the meaning of his initiative. He talked constantly of federalism, telling one French journalist that he was inspired by the example of Switzerland. But when he was asked what would happen to the concept of national sovereignty if his dream were realized, Briand replied that there would be no question of altering it. Whether because of pragmatism or oversight, the memorandum outlining the United States of Europe was vague on many points.

European politicians reacted to the proposal courteously but without enthusiasm; it was tabled while their parliaments occupied themselves with seemingly more pressing national problems. Smaller countries agreed to participate on condition that the new federation would not be dominated by the larger nations. The stronger powers maintained that those nations with more important responsibilities should be given a greater voice. Agricultural nations spoke of a European entity that would pledge to purchase their crops, while the industrial nations demanded the benefits of free trade. Briand's plan thus resembled the fabled Spanish inn, where guests found whatever they had brought with them.

The most important responses to the idea of federation were those of Germany and Great Britain. With the Nazi threat growing, Stresemann's countrymen viewed Briand's project only as another opportunity to agitate for revision of the Versailles Treaty. British leaders, who still saw themselves as the masters of a world empire, disliked any proposal to integrate their

country with the Continent. A grand unification project like the United States of Europe was not likely to win their approval. As Churchill later said of the Europeans, "We are with them, but not of them."

Shortly after Briand launched his federalist proposal, Gustav Stresemann died, exhausted by his struggle to be heard even in his own German People's Party. Almost at the same time the Great Depression struck, bringing with it the rise of trade barriers and political extremism. The United States of Europe project thus foundered. Aristide Briand continued in the struggle for several years, attempting unsuccessfully to win the French presidency. With him died the federalist idea.

Discounting Europe's ability to help itself, Britain's Laborite Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald appealed to the United States to halt the slide into worldwide anarchy. He visited America in October 1929 but returned with nothing substantial. Unable to stem Britain's soaring unemployment rate, his socialist government fell and was replaced with a "national unity" cabinet dominated by Conservatives.

Socialism on its sickbed

The world economic crisis was unquestionably a major factor in bringing about Nazism and World War II. It ruined the confidence of Europeans in their parliamentary institutions and drove millions of them to despair. For European socialists, however, the Great Depression marked only a further stage in a decline that had begun with the collapse of the Socialist International in 1914 and continued with the rise of Italian fascism in 1922.

Italy's Socialists, strongly syndicalist in orientation, believed that the "final conflict" with employers would begin with a series of massive strikes, leading to a workers' seizure of the means of production. Italian workers actually occupied their factories, with exemplary discipline, in 1922. They discovered, however, that their leaders had no idea of what to do next. The Socialist movement in Italy was soon rent by factionalism and Socialist deputies withdrew from Parliament, just as the bourgeoisie, frightened by the workers' actions, turned to a "strong man" who seemed capable of reestablishing order. Mussolini had in fact encouraged the occupation of the factories, but his demagogic outbursts brought only knowing smiles from the propertied classes and gained him the funds he needed. It was this support that allowed him to make the "march on Rome" of October 28, 1922, when he could have been arrested easily if King Victor Emmanuel III had wanted to stop him.

As Mussolini began to consolidate his power, Italian Socialists and trade union leaders put up only weak, local resistance. Unfortunately for the future of

democracy in Europe, this turn of events was far from unusual. In the period between the wars, a whole series of nations bowed before reactionary strongmen or kings, with the labor movement caught by surprise each time.

In Hungary, after the elimination of the short-lived Communist government of Bela Kun, Admiral Miklos von Horthy was elected regent on March 1, 1920. He did not immediately establish a personal power base, but his regime moved gradually toward the extreme right and into an alliance with the fascist powers. The fear of bolshevism and the aspirations of the territorial revisionists were major causes of this shift. Socialists fought bravely in rear guard actions but failed to halt the move to the right.

In Bulgaria the peasant leader Alexander Stambulisky undertook a program of agrarian reform and social legislation in cooperation with the urban proletariat. But this program collapsed when he was killed in a nationalist coup d'etat in 1923. His death was followed by a period of bloody chaos that ended only after King Boris III assumed a royal dictatorship in 1935, opening the way to collaboration with the Axis powers.

Political confusion also led to authoritarian takeovers on the Iberian Peninsula. In 1923 General Miguel Primo de Rivera established a dictatorship in Spain that ruled harshly in the beginning but eventually softened into a benevolent paternalism. Disillusioned former followers soon assembled a fascist opposition. Discouraged by his loss in a referendum and in ill health, de Rivera resigned in 1930; the way was then open for a test of strength between republicans and fascists, which culminated in the Spanish civil war. Neighboring Portugal moved slowly from a republican form of government toward a moderate dictatorship with the election of General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Carmona as interim president in 1926 and president in 1928. Beginning in 1928, however, the government was dominated by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who became premier and dictator in 1932, and his conservative corporatist regime.

Democracy also failed to establish a foothold in the newly independent Baltic States. Lithuania was the first of them to adopt a fascist government, beginning in 1926 with the virtual dictatorships of Augustinas Voldemaras (1926-29) and Antanas Smetona (1929-39). In Estonia and Latvia a powerful labor movement developed, but it too submitted to fascist control in 1934.

The countries of southeastern Europe were no more receptive to democracy. In Greece, after a democratic interlude dominated by the conservative politician Eleutherios Venizelos, a military dictatorship was es-

tablished in 1936 under General Ioannis Metaxas. In February 1938 King Carol II took control of Rumania as the head of an authoritarian government. Neighboring Yugoslavia, torn by internal nationalistic strife, submitted to the rule of the Serbian King Alexander, who was assassinated in 1934 by a militant Croat, evidently armed by Italian Fascists. The country was subsequently dominated by the increasingly repressive government of Prime Minister Milan Stoyadinovich, who, like many other rightist leaders, offered his services to the Rome-Berlin Axis.

In Poland socialism also retreated before powerful nationalist forces. In 1926 the old national hero Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, a veteran of the labor movement, established an authoritarian government. His regime was far better than many others in Europe, tolerating opposition parties and a free press. To the disappointment of Socialists, however, Pilsudski pursued a conservative course; he valued national unity over social reform and refused to support any initiatives that might encourage partisan strife. Upon his death in May 1935, Pilsudski was succeeded by a military junta that shared his conservatism. Known as the "colonel's clique," this group brought the country into an uneasy coexistence with Nazi Germany.

This succession of setbacks for democracy would have been less important if the socialist parties of western Europe, with their enormous followings, had taken vigorous steps to deal with the world economic crisis. But they too remained hesitant and indecisive. Even the British Labor Party, which seemed more likely than any other socialist group to take power by parliamentary means, could offer no original remedy for the economic disarray.

A Labor government under Ramsay MacDonald, formed in June 1929, was in office when the Great Depression struck. For two years the minister of finance, Philip Snowden, watched helplessly as unemployment grew. Finally the government decided on a policy of deflation involving drastic budgetary cuts. Social services in particular were severely slashed. The result was widespread disillusionment among British workers. On August 25, 1931 the frustrated MacDonald admitted failure and resigned. A so-called National Union government was formed several days later and presided over again by MacDonald, who had broken with his party. The Laborites, severely shaken by MacDonald's defection, suffered one defeat after another in subsequent elections.

The Socialist International, which had hoped to construct a "world safe for democracy" from the ruins of World War I, was by now a spent force. In 1914 it had failed to halt the outbreak of war, and four years later it had had little effect on the peace-making process. In a number of countries the movement had proved in-

capable of saving parliamentary democracy. And, finally, it lacked direction in the face of the economic crisis.

In all of Europe, only the Scandinavian socialists had the energy and initiative to combat the Depression with economic controls. While German socialists wondered whether to cure the capitalist patient or let him die and pocket the legacy, the Scandinavians pragmatically applied the policies of the British economist John Maynard Keynes. Their success in alleviating unemployment and other economic hardships helped keep the Swedish socialists, under Per Albin Hanson, in power for decades. The successes of socialism in Scandinavia, however, were much less noted than its failures in Britain and other European states.

“The Great Light in the East”

As the Depression engulfed Europe, boding future catastrophes, the USSR prepared for its “great leap forward.” Deeds of heroic scope had occurred there after the October Revolution, beginning with Leon Trotsky’s creation of the Red Army, his defeat of the White Russians and the conclusion of peace from the Polish border to Vladivostok. The relatively liberal “New Economic Policy” then gave the Russians breathing space for several years. But in 1928, after securing absolute control over the Soviet states, Stalin decreed the first Five Year Plan—a gigantic adventure that was to affect profoundly the destinies of entire peoples.

At a time when parliamentary democracy seemed incapable of solving major problems, the Soviet government seemed to provide courageous and stable leadership. While ethnic and linguistic conflicts threatened to split apart many European states, Stalin succeeded in reuniting the diverse nationalities of the former Russian Empire. The vast, planned Soviet economy contrasted sharply with the crumbling economic systems of the West; Europeans, shocked by England’s abandonment of the gold standard on September 21, 1931, watched the Soviets’ coordinated industrial expansion. The USSR could proudly describe itself as a “country without unemployment,” in the face of mass joblessness elsewhere.

The new prestige of the Soviet Union was dimmed by the Great Purge and the show trials of the late 1930s, with their death sentences and stories of preposterous conspiracies. Yet many Europeans remained dazzled by “the great light in the East.” Certainly they saw no comparable sign of hope from the U.S., whose only notable contribution to world affairs was the Wall Street crash of 1929.

The Rising Sun of Japan

Most Europeans, preoccupied with their own economic problems, paid little attention to other parts of the world. In Asia, Japan had a free hand to expand its sphere of influence. We have already seen how World War I increased the power of Japan, like that of the United States, at the expense of the European states. From that point on, Japanese leaders worked constantly to enlarge their domain and prepare new enterprises. Like Germany in the late 19th century, Japan grew economically by flooding the world’s markets with low-priced goods. Older industrial powers complained of “unfair” competition and sought to discredit Japanese products as inferior, but they could not match their low cost, enabled by cheap Japanese labor. “Made in Germany” gave way to “Made in Japan.”

Here, then, was an energetic and ambitious nation on an overpopulated archipelago. If the Nazis based their propaganda on the need for “living space,” Japan could make a similar claim with greater justification. In 1927 the Japanese statesman Baron Giichi Tanaka presented a memorandum outlining the necessity and plans for his country’s expansion. History showed, he claimed, that empires form around vigorous nations able to bring neighboring lands under their control, to the benefit of all. His scheme involved spiritual as well as economic and military considerations, seeking as it did to preserve national unity through the Shinto religion and the cult of the emperor. With the Soviet Union absorbed in its industrialization and the United States in its isolation, Japan entered a course that would lead it through Pearl Harbor to the atomic holocaust of Hiroshima.

By 1930 the “good” years were over. Economically disorganized, politically fragmented and morally unsettled, Europe groped for solutions that only determined action could achieve. Unfortunately for the peace of the world, unscrupulous dictators and expansionist politicians were all too eager to provide their own solutions.

1931-1939: The Approaching Danger

The 1930s saw one last attempt to achieve a collective security system for Europe. This was the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932, presided over by former British Prime Minister Arthur Henderson.

Toward rearmament

Henderson arrived in Geneva following elections that had proved disastrous for his Labor Party. His experience at the conference hardly assured him of a satisfying end to his career. Although he obtained the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts and asserted hopeful-

ly that the work of the conference would not be in vain, in the end it accomplished nothing.

The idea of armaments limitation was not new. After the end of World War I, a naval conference had met in Washington to codify a new equilibrium among the naval fleets of the great powers. The compromise finally accepted by all the participants provided that the British and Americans would each have a proportion of five, Japan a proportion of 3.5 and France and Italy 1.5 each. This was by no means a prelude to disarmament. The conference succeeded, however, in persuading Great Britain to renounce the principle of "two navies," which held that the British fleet must be stronger than any two following it. The United States had not yet achieved supremacy but its Navy was nevertheless on a par with Britain's.

Such arrangements found little support among pacifists, who insisted that armaments were in themselves a cause of war and that any reduction in their stockpiling would advance the prospects of peace. They asserted also that the huge expense of this unproductive materiel wasted resources that could be put to better use. Finally, they argued that since Germany had been disarmed and the safety of its neighbors consequently assured, and since the winners of World War I had promised to follow the loser in disarming themselves, there was no longer any reason for delay.

Preparations for the conference of 1932 were made with meticulous care. A number of experts tried to inventory each power's armaments. The calculations were enormously complex, especially since the conferees attempted to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons. The meeting reached no agreement on any specific point, despite an avalanche of communiques.

If ever circumstances had favored true disarmament, the time had been immediately after World War I. By 1932 the tide had already turned, and once again the European states had begun to fear one another. No state really wanted to shoulder the burden of military budgets, but only Denmark had renounced arms, and its example had little effect. Once more the armaments manufacturers lived in luxury, as armies and navies vied to outdo each other in offensive and defensive capabilities.

Had Germany really disarmed? France began to doubt that even that proviso of the Versailles Treaty had been fulfilled. As a result, French leaders decided to set up a system of national security based not on agreements for collective action but on an impregnable fortified line of defense. Begun in 1930 the Maginot Line, named after the politician Andre Maginot, was a striking example of a military instrument that was obsolete even as it was being designed.

French military leaders based their calculations entirely on their experience in World War I, a war of position in which defensive strategy was supreme. They failed to take into account the potential of modern military technology. When the Germans attacked in 1940, the Maginot Line failed even to slow them down.

But few could foresee that the next conflict would not be fought under the same conditions as the previous one. Col. Charles de Gaulle tried to persuade several French cabinets that modern technology favored swift offensives. He failed for the most part, although he managed to convince Paul Reynaud, who in 1940 became president of the Council of the Republic. Reynaud, however, could not admit publicly that the gigantic sums spent on the Maginot Line were a complete waste and that a diametrically opposite strategy was required, nor could the National Assembly confess to its original stupidity.

Rearmament began at the crest of an economic crisis. Insecurity prevailed, for the League of Nations and international conferences were no longer thought capable of assuring a durable peace. Threats to the world order were at first vague, but came clearly into focus as time passed.

Cracks in the British Empire

These threats first appeared in the Far East. Europeans unquestionably underestimated the importance of Japanese expansion, since East Asia was far away. Although Australia alerted Britain of the danger, it doubted whether the Royal Navy, based in Singapore, was capable of defending the South Pacific and began to turn to the United States in search of naval protection in the event of Japanese aggression. The events of 1941 proved that fears for the continent were well-founded. Ultimately, Australia was saved from invasion only because of American sea power.

The Dutch government, meanwhile, worried about Indonesia. Could this great colony stand off an extended siege with only a garrison of a few tens of thousands and a few warships based in Surabaya? Cabinet leaders had tried to convince the Dutch Parliament of the need for reinforcing the navy, but the Socialists and Communists had killed this proposal in 1923. Most citizens of the Netherlands had little interest in the colony and doubted the ability of the mother country to defend it.

The interwar period saw the decline of the British Empire which, for better or worse, became a commonwealth. Although this was not total disintegration, it was certainly a loosening of the ties binding the "white" former colonies to the mother country. In 1914 Great Britain was still able to declare war on Germany in the name of all its overseas possessions

without first consulting them. Canada, New Zealand, Australia and to a lesser extent South Africa participated in the military effort. At the end of the war, however, they demanded much greater autonomy as the reward for their loyalty. In 1931 the Westminster Conference granted almost complete independence to the white dominions. The Ottawa Conference of the following year sought to cushion the effects of political decentralization by forming an economic association. A system of "imperial preferences" exempted Commonwealth members from import duties on goods shipped to Great Britain.

The Westminster and Ottawa conferences were an initial step toward decolonization. Yet they were probably not as important as observers believed at the time. For several years, trade within the Commonwealth actually fell as compared to trade between England and the Continent. The two conferences, moreover, involved only dominions speaking the English language, in which the Anglican Church was the dominant religious organization and the British parliamentary system of government prevailed. The word "Commonwealth" as used in the United Kingdom referred only to those nations. Yet problems of a different sort developed at the same time in Britain's largest nonwhite colony—India.

On the subcontinent, British rulers always followed the principle of "indirect rule," giving the greatest possible latitude to native Indian authorities in internal affairs. For many years it was common for Indians to study at British universities. The elements of an experienced national administration were gradually being assembled. Yet the Indian independence movement did not begin with this native elite. It crystallized instead around one of the most fascinating figures of the period, Mohandas Gandhi.

Both a spiritual and political leader, Gandhi ceaselessly pressed the anticolonialist struggle while attempting to elevate the morale of the country. An apostle of nonviolence and civil disobedience, he taught the Indian masses a discipline before which the British authorities were impotent. For example, groups of women would lie across railroad tracks to prevent a train from departing. Britain could not fail to be impressed by the man Churchill had called "this half-naked fakir." The world watched as Gandhi visited London to negotiate gradual decolonization; the talks failed, but his trip pricked the British conscience. Although Britain granted India complete independence only in 1947, events leading to this end were set in motion well before the war by Gandhi's constant appeals to ethics, fasting and "self-restraint." India remained quasi-neutral during World War II, emphasizing its aspiration to self-rule.

Japanese and Italian expansion

As the forces of independence gained momentum in India, the Japanese began establishing a protectorate of their own in Asia, but not without difficulty. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, which had traditionally been within the Russian sphere of influence. Mukden was occupied in September. The following year Japan established a satellite state in the region called Manchukuo, ruled by a Japanese puppet who was a descendant of the old Manchu dynasty. And in 1937 an incident involving Chinese and Japanese took place in Peking, providing the Japanese with an excuse for further conquests. Japanese forces soon occupied all the large Chinese coastal centers, but they failed to gain control of the vast rural areas surrounding them. The Chinese themselves, exhausted by confusing battles among assorted warlords, managed to unite in a nationalistic fervor against the common enemy. The Communists and the Kuomintang Nationalist government concluded a truce, renouncing their "fight to the finish" until the Japanese could be driven into the sea.

Japan, however, resolutely attempted to consolidate its holdings on the Asian continent. A "New Order" for the Far East was officially proclaimed in 1938. The phrase was borrowed from the Nazi vocabulary, but it had a particular significance for Tokyo. Japanese leaders were establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere under their control, comparable to the budding empires of Mussolini and Hitler with whom the Japanese had signed an anti-Comintern pact in 1936, forming a triumvirate known as the Axis. A government of Chinese collaborators was set up in Nanking. Japanese actions, however, aroused increasing alarm in the United States. In 1939 the federal government, prodded by the "China Lobby" in Washington, annulled a 1911 treaty guaranteeing Japan regular delivery of essential raw materials, especially oil. This was viewed as an act of economic war because of Japan's heavy dependence on foreign imports to augment its scarce mineral resources. Japanese military leaders began to consider countermeasures.

At about the same time, Italy expanded its East African possessions from Somaliland, declaring war against Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. The Italians launched a military campaign on October 3, 1936 and achieved a rapid victory, partly through the use of poison gas against defenseless Ethiopian troops. The Italian defeat of 1896 in the battle of Adowa was avenged. Fascist Italy could now consider itself a great power, especially since it also obtained favorable rectification of the frontiers of its Libyan colony.

But even an empire of this magnitude failed to satisfy Mussolini. Italian youth "spontaneously" flooded the streets, chanting "We want Corsica, Nice

and Tunisia!" Instead of these objectives, Italian leaders chose the poorly defended Kingdom of Albania. On April 7, 1939 Mussolini's troops landed in the domain of King Zog, who promptly fled his country. Once again, audacity paid off. Italy now occupied territory in Europe beyond its peninsula, with a bridgehead on the east bank of the Strait of Otranto—the springboard for a future campaign against Greece.

The world watched for the response of democratic Europe to these violations of international law. In each case, however, the League of Nations proved powerless. Japanese delegates at Geneva explained that their country's Chinese operations conformed to the league's charter. Conditions in the Far East, they said, threatened to degenerate into anarchy, and ample precedents had been set by the great democratic powers for quelling chaos in smaller or less powerful countries by colonizing them. The British and French, afraid to seem hypocritical, found this argument difficult to answer. A commission of inquiry headed by Lord Lytton was dispatched to the areas in question. Its report strongly criticized Japan, but no action was taken.

In Ethiopia, much closer to Europe, aggression was even more clear-cut. A member of the league had declared war on a fellow member, also on the pretext of internal disorder. Some rifle shots had been exchanged between Italian and Ethiopian soldiers at Wal-Wal, a point well within Ethiopian territory. After some weeks of negotiations whose only effect was to gain time for Mussolini, the conflict expanded. Emperor Haile Selassie was driven from his country and went to Geneva, where he presented his case. The embarrassed members of the league voted economic sanctions against Italy, but these proved totally ineffective. They merely provided Mussolini with an excuse for indignation, hastening his break with the league.

Expansion of Nazi Germany: The *Anschluss*

The most serious threats to peace were posed by Germany, where Hitler had assumed power in February 1933. He proceeded cautiously at first. His initial cabinet grew out of a coalition with the right, the so-called Harzburg Front, which gave him, for several months, much-needed respectability. Many observers believed that the fanatical Nazis, who had received a million fewer votes in the most recent election than in the preceding one, were finally checkmated by the conservatives. But once he had secured his position, Hitler ousted members of other parties from the cabinet and made it clear that wealthy industrialists would not determine government policies. The way was open for the construction of a totalitarian state.

The first step in this direction was the "Night of the Long Knives" in June 1934, directed against "revolutionary" elements among the brown-shirted Nazi storm troops—SA (*Sturmabteilung*). Many of the latter, including SA chief Ernst Röhm, had demanded greater emphasis on the "socialist" aspects of the Nazi program. Hitler crushed the movement with a series of executions and seized the occasion to liquidate moderate opposition groups in the same way. This brief bloodbath reassured the middle class and subdued the Nazi left, demonstrating that Germany would thenceforth have just one master.

In his foreign policy Hitler at first showed moderation. In 1934 he concluded a nonaggression pact with Poland, which was to be his first victim in World War II. For the moment, Europe was reassured; Hitler seemed less interested in foreign conquest than in domestic matters, particularly ending unemployment. Indeed, the German economy was reviving, due to a combination of factors—the slackening of the worldwide Depression, clandestine remilitarization and a far-reaching government construction program. Germany was the first country to develop a national highway system, which was admired by all of Europe. Seen in this context, the concentration camps in which the political opponents of Nazism were being "reeducated" seemed hardly to matter. This first "German miracle" was brought about largely by the modern pump-priming methods also practiced by Roosevelt's New Deal and the Scandinavian social democracies. Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's economic adviser, was thoroughly acquainted with the principles of Lord Keynes.

Behind this facade of moderation, however, Hitler began to undermine the Versailles Treaty system and thus to alter the European balance of power. Compulsory military service was introduced in March 1935; the Locarno Pact was violated in March 1936 when Hitler sent in troops to occupy the demilitarized Rhineland. In August of that same year, the period of required military service was fixed at two years. The following month a plan for economic self-sufficiency was developed. Gradually, Germany was assembling the machinery of conquest; while building its military strength, however, it was for the moment carefully avoiding armed conflict.

The first object of Hitler's expansionist ambitions was Austria, his birthplace, where long-standing tensions erupted into civil strife in February 1934. Provoked by a local scuffle, socialist and clerico-fascist forces clashed in Vienna, whose working-class district was the target of devastating artillery fire for several days. Fighting also broke out in several provincial cities. It ended with the annihilation of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. The Christian Socialist gov-

ernment of Engelbert Dollfuss, deprived of the possibility of working-class support, tried vainly to mobilize a mass following through the creation of a patriotic front. The first Nazi thrust in Austria came on July 25 of the same year, when Austrian Nazis assassinated Dollfuss and attempted to seize power. But the coup failed to arouse any response in the strife-torn country. Mussolini, alarmed by the prospect of German expansion, concentrated Italian troops at the Brenner Pass on the Austrian border. Rather than risking armed conflict, Hitler backed down and dissociated himself from the coup.

Less than four years later, he was ready to try again. This time, however, there was no pretense of an internal uprising. Summoning Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg to his Berchtesgaden retreat, Hitler announced his intention of occupying the country. Would Schuschnigg, by ordering a military defense, seek to prevent the *Anschluss* and shed German blood? Schuschnigg capitulated. German troops marched into Austria on March 13, 1938 to the loud acclamations of crowds of Nazis. Austrian workers, traumatized by the civil war of 1934, made no move to resist.

Mussolini also accepted the *Anschluss*. Alienated from Britain and France by their resistance to his Ethiopian adventure, he felt less antipathy than earlier towards Hitler's ambitions in Central Europe.

War in Spain

The Western democracies meanwhile had other matters confronting them. Civil war had broken out in Spain, and they tried vainly to deal with its consequences. Since 1931 Spain had been a republic torn by dissension and civil strife. Conservative groups, supported by a majority of the upper class, the military and the ecclesiastic hierarchy, favored a restoration of the monarchy. This was bitterly opposed by the Spanish labor movement, itself divided among socialists, communists and anarchists. Power lay in the hands of the moderate left. In July 1936 the Spanish military rebelled against the government and moved to seize power for the conservatives. The leader of the rebel junta, Gen. Francisco Franco, enlisted most of the Army's high-ranking officers on his side and through them controlled a large part of the armed forces. The republicans, on the other hand, were unable to organize an effective defense. After a long struggle, the fighting ended in complete victory for Franco, and leading leftists fled the country.

The civil war not only set Spaniard against Spaniard, but also inflamed emotions throughout the world. Public opinion in every nation polarized on the issue of Franco's revolt; positions to be taken in the coming world war began to emerge. The USSR, seeking political advantage, shipped war materiel to

the republican government. Germany supported Franco with both arms and bomber squadrons; the latter proved their destructive capacity in the bombardment of the Basque city of Guernica—the massacre immortalized in Picasso's famous painting. Italy also sent troops to fight on the rebel side. Many leftists fought for the republic, most of them in the "International Brigades" that saw action in Madrid and on the Catalan front. Even within these volunteer units, a violent and sometimes bloody rivalry developed between communists and their fellow soldiers. Experiences like these decisively affected the opinions of such leftist writers as Andre Malraux and George Orwell.

The Western democracies, for their part, tried vainly to limit the repercussions of the Spanish conflict. Britain, followed reluctantly by France, attempted to establish a policy of nonintervention that would isolate Spain from world politics. The effort failed; as one satirist noted, the democracies managed only to "refrain from intervening in the intervention of others." The League of Nations stayed aloof from the conflict, and Britain lost a little more of its prestige. That country's Conservative government, however, was in a strong position, with a solid majority in Parliament and general approval from the electorate. Such was not the case in France, where a Popular Front government had come to power in May 1936.

The Popular Front owed its origin to the events of February 1934, when a massive demonstration by fascist groups in Paris caused street fighting and shook not only the short-lived government of Edouard Daladier but the Third Republic itself. Urged on by labor leaders and workers, Communists and Socialists made common cause after the years of bitter hatred that had followed their schism at the Congress of Tours in 1920. With the republic in danger, a mass demonstration took place in Paris to support anti-fascist unity. Difficult negotiations between leaders of the two parties resulted in the formation of a Popular Front. In the elections of 1936 the front, supported by the Radical Party, won a smashing victory. Socialist leader Leon Blum became premier for the first time.

Blum's government had barely taken office before it was confronted by a wave of sit-down strikes by workers in Paris and other cities. Hurriedly conferring with union leaders and employers, Blum obtained agreement on a number of social issues, including paid holidays. With this understanding, the sit-down strikes ended, and the recently merged Socialist and Communist unions began to enroll millions of new members. Most of the new recruits, inexperienced in the politics of class struggle, were manipulated by the Communists in their effort to gain control of the unified trade union movement.