
the

baltimore case





1760

174:



Politics,
Science,
and

Agg Trial of

C harater

THE BALTIMORE CASE

ALSO BY DANIEL J. KEVLES

The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America

In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity

The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (co-editor)

THE

BALTIMORE CASE

A Trial of Politics, Science, and Character

DANIEL J. KEVLES



W. W. NORTON & COMPANY

NEW YORK • LONDON

Copyright © 1998 by Daniel J. Kevles

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First Edition

Portions of this work originally appeared in The New Yorker.

For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110.

The text of this book is composed in Electra
with the display set in Centaur
Composition by Binghamton Valley Composition
Manufacturing by Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Book design by Jo Anne Metsch

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kevles, Daniel J.

The Baltimore case : a trial of politics, science, and character / by Daniel J. Kevles.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-393-04103-4

- $1. \ \ Cellular \ immunity-Research-Moral \ and \ ethical \ aspects.$
- 2. Fraud in science. 3. Baltimore, David. 4. O'Toole, Margot.
 - 5. Imanishi-Kari, Thereza. I. Title. QR185.5.K48 1998

364.16'3—dc21 97-51774

CIP

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110 http://www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 10 Coptic Street, London WC1A 1PU 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 In Memory of My Father, David Kevles, and for Michael and Joel, the Next Generation

Contents

Preface	9
Headlines, 1991	13
ONE	
"A Beautiful Paper"	19
TWO	
Tough Customers	47
THREE	
Assertions of Error	67
FOUR	
Misconduct in America	96
FIVE	
A Demand for Audit	118
SIX	
"A Perfect Object Lesson"	135
SEVEN	
A Moment's Vindication	152
EIGHT	
Baltimore v. Dingell	173

Contents

Fraud Story	198
TEN Burden of Proof	222
ELEVEN Bad for Science	246
TWELVE "Rough Justice"	266
THIRTEEN Dr. Healy's Mantra	289
FOURTEEN Justice Delayed	309
FIFTEEN Matters of Judgment	327
SIXTEEN Crossing the Experts	343
SEVENTEEN Final Verdicts	366
Glossary of Technical Terms	389
Glossary of Source Abbreviations	392
Endnotes	395
Essay on Sources	487
Acknowledgments	491
Index	495

Preface

DAVID BALTIMORE won the Nobel Prize for physiology or medicine in 1975, when he was a thirty-seven-year-old professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). Baltimore had been known among biologists as a wunderkind for some time. The work for which he shared his prize, a study of how a special class of viruses reproduce themselves (the AIDS virus was later shown to be one of them), ran contrary to most contemporary beliefs on the subject. After receiving the Nobel Prize, he continued doing research, but he also began to take a leading role in public debate about genetic engineering, the AIDS epidemic, and other issues over which science and public policy meet. He brought to whatever he did a degree of self-confidence that some of his colleagues called arrogance but that was integral to his achievements. In 1990, when he was fifty-two, he became president of Rockefeller University, one of the world's distinguished centers of teaching and research.

Eighteen months after he went to Rockefeller, David Baltimore fell from grace. He resigned, citing pressure from his colleagues and the personal toll of fighting a long battle over what was alleged to be a fraudulent research paper that he had collaborated on when he was at M.I.T. A frontpage article in the *New York Times* noted that the "spectacle" of Balti-

more's downfall made it seem "larger than life, with an effect greater than any case of scientific fraud in memory."*

David Baltimore was never suspected of faking anything himself, but he had stubbornly defended the work of someone who was—a biomedical scientist at M.I.T. named Thereza Imanishi-Kari. She was one of six coauthors of the disputed paper, which reported on an experiment in immunology and was published in the journal *Cell* in 1986. Baltimore's support of her work was perceived to be unprofessional and unwise, if not irresponsible. He was the senior author of the paper, and because of the notoriety of his involvement, the affair became popularly known as "the Baltimore case." David Baltimore went back to M.I.T., resuming his professorship of biology. He continued to do brilliant work, but he was dishonored as a public figure.

From its inception, the Baltimore case piqued my interest as a student of the affairs of science in American society. At first, I had no intention of writing about it. I knew none of the principals until 1991, when I first met David Baltimore in another connection, and so far as I could tell from the press coverage, Imanishi-Kari seemed guilty and Baltimore foolhardy in defending her so vigorously. The Baltimore case seemed to touch deep-seated doubts about the scientific enterprise. Many people thought it high time that scientists answered to the public that in large part pays their bills, and I thought they had a point in demanding an enlargement of accountability.

However, others—a minority, to be sure—considered Baltimore and Imanishi-Kari victims, unfairly pursued by witch-hunting zealots ignorant of the way science works. The case dragged on for a decade, leaving wrecked careers in its wake, pitting congressmen against scientists, and producing both martyrs and tormentors. I had been wondering how and why scientific fraud and misconduct had emerged as an issue in the United States during the 1980s, when it was of little consequence in any other scientifically vital nation. The sustained ferocity of the case in and out of the media prompted me to suspect that an analysis of it might throw some light on science in late-twentieth-century American society and would be revealing in and of itself. I began looking into the Baltimore case, suspending judgment on questions of guilt or innocence as well as foolhardiness or courage until I had mastered the facts on my own.

There was plenty to look into. The case had been covered in numerous newspaper and magazine articles, probed in several congressional hearings,

^{*}Philip J. Hilts, "Nobelist Caught Up in Fraud Case Resigns as Head of Rockefeller U.," New York Times, Dec. 3, 1991, p. 1

Preface 11

and exposed in the reports of more than one investigative agency of government. Most of the people involved in the case granted me interviews and some gave me access to their files of memoranda and correspondence. Contests over the charges against Imanishi-Kari generated extensive testimony and opened many previously confidential documents. Ultimately, the case proved to be a rich site for contemporary history, providing both abundant public and private documents and access to the recollections of living participants.

I am a historian by training and practice, and I have approached this vast body of material with a strong sense of the historian's respect for evidence, duty to weigh contradictory forms of it, and obligation to achieve a balanced understanding of the story. I have also felt it imperative to deal with the science to the extent necessary to appreciate what came to be contested. The case started as a small dispute in a laboratory over an experiment and then exploded into the larger sphere of politics and the media, but it remained fraught with technical issues throughout its life.

I have written the book to make its scientific content accessible to nonbiologists as well as to biologists, keeping discussions of the technical issues as concise as possible and relegating elaborative material to the notes. I have provided a brief account of the disputed experiment in the latter part of Chapter One. It was technically intricate, and lay readers should not be discouraged if they have trouble grasping all of it. I know biologists who find it difficult to comprehend. For assistance on the main scientific points, I have provided illustrations and a glossary of technical terms and concepts.

Following the case itself, the large majority of this book reaches far beyond technical matters. It is about individual character and behavior in science and the interactions of scientists with each other as human beings and professionals. It is about the relationship of science to the investigative powers of Congress and the executive branch; about the media's treatment of scientific ethics and practices; about the material dependency of science on the federal government; about tensions emergent in the late twentieth century between the biomedical sciences and American political culture.

But this book is also about the civil rights of scientists, particularly Thereza Imanishi-Kari. Once I started studying the record of the case, several points became quickly evident:

- Imanishi-Kari had not had a fair trial.
- She had been convicted in the court of public opinion and nowhere else.

 Those who condemned Baltimore for defending his collaborator overlooked or were indifferent to those crucial aspects of the case, among others.

Eventually, I became persuaded that Imanishi-Kari was innocent of the charges against her and said so, explaining why, in an article that appeared in *The New Yorker* magazine in May 1996. In subsequently writing this book, I found no reason to modify the fundamental judgments expressed there—except to have been reinforced in them by the outcome of the case. In June 1996, Thereza Imanishi-Kari was officially exonerated on all the counts that had been brought against her. David Baltimore began to re-enter public life, and in 1997 he was appointed president of the California Institute of Technology (where I have been a member of the faculty for more than thirty years). At its core, this book is the story of how a great injustice was perpetrated in the name of scientific integrity and the public trust and how it then came to be remedied, or remedied as much it could be after its weight had been endured for a decade.

Daniel J. Kevles Pasadena, California March 1998



Science as something already in existence, already completed, is the most objective, impersonal thing that we humans know. Science as something coming into being, as a goal, is just as subjectively, psychologically conditioned as are all other human endeavors.

—Albert Einstein Address, 1932

And the significance of this great organization, gentlemen? It consists in this, that innocent persons are accused of guilt, and senseless proceedings are put in motion against them. . . .

> —Franz Kafka, The Trial

True gold fears no fire.

—Chinese Proverb