

GREAT VICTORY FOR THE MILITARY LINE OF CHAIRMAN MAO TSETUNG

**— A CRITICISM OF LIN PIAO'S BOURGEOIS
MILITARY LINE IN THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG
AND PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGNS**



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PART ONE

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO MILITARY LINES IN THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN

Guided by the great leader Chairman Mao Tsetung and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the movement in China to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius has been developing in an extensive, thoroughgoing and sustained way. Conscientious study of Chairman Mao's proletarian military thinking and military line and intensive criticism of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line constitute an important part of this movement.

Lin Piao's bourgeois military line has shown itself to be extremely harmful in all its aspects. This was especially so after Lin Piao took charge of the routine work of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee in 1959, when his bourgeois military line developed more fully.

To suit their counter-revolutionary aim of usurping Party leadership and seizing state power, Lin Piao and his sworn followers shamelessly stood the facts of history on their head, claiming nonsensically that the strategically decisive engagement in the Chinese People's War of Liberation (1946-49) was initiated by Lin, and that the victory of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was the result of his "wise and resolute command." They extolled Lin Piao as a "military genius," a "strategist," an "ever-

victorious general," etc., etc. Obviously, each and every such mask must be stripped from Lin's face.

Below are some relevant facts of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, showing how Chairman Mao's proletarian military line overcame Lin Piao's bourgeois military line and resulted in great victory in this first campaign of the strategically decisive engagement in the War of Liberation.

I. A SKETCH OF THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN AND ITS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign began on September 12, 1948 — when the vanguard units of our Northeast Field Army reached the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and clashed with the enemy — and ended on November 2, lasting altogether 52 days and divisible into three stages.

In the first stage, from September 12 to October 19, our army took Chinchow, wiping out over 120,000 enemy troops, capturing Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, and cutting off the enemy's retreat by land. This induced a part of the more than 100,000 enemy troops at Changchun to revolt against the Kuomintang, and the rest to surrender, among the latter being Cheng Tung-kuo, another Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters.

In the second stage, from October 20 to 28, our army annihilated in the Heishan-Tahushan sector of western Liaoning Province 1 army, with 5 corps or 12 divisions, of enemy reinforcements, totalling more than 100,000 men who were sent from Shenyang to relieve Chinchow.

In the third stage, October 29-November 2, our army liberated Shenyang and Yingkow, wiping out nearly 150,000 enemy troops. In the whole campaign, 1 Kuomintang "bandit suppression" headquarters, with 4 army headquarters (the 1st, 6th, 8th and 9th) including 11 corps headquarters that in turn commanded 36 regular divisions, plus several irregular divisions and some miscellaneous armed forces —altogether 470,000 men or more — were wiped out, while Shenyang, Changchun, Chinchow and 11 other cities were captured. The entire northeastern China was now liberated.

Our army also won a series of victories in the other theatres of war from July 1 to November 2, 1948. We defeated the enemy in the campaign along the middle section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and in the Tsinan campaign, all fought in Shantung Province; in the Sui-Ki campaign (also known as the eastern Honan campaign, fought in the sector comprising Kaifeng, Suihsien and Kih sien), and in the Hsiangyang-Fancheng campaign of the Central Plains theatre; in the central Shansi campaign of the northern China theatre; and in the Chengcheng-Hoyang campaign of the northwestern China theatre. During this four-month period, in these campaigns and in the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, we knocked out a million enemy troops, basically changing the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. The Kuomintang forces were reduced to about 2.9 million men, while ours grew to more than 3 million. In his article "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation" of November 14, 1948, Chairman Mao pointed out: **"The military situation in China has reached a new turning point and the balance of forces between the two sides in the war has**

undergone a fundamental change. The People's Liberation Army, long superior in quality, has now become superior in numbers as well. This is a sign that the victory of the Chinese revolution and the realization of peace in China are at hand." Chairman Mao also said: "Accordingly, the war will be much shorter than we originally estimated. The original estimate was that the reactionary Kuomintang government could be completely overthrown in about five years, beginning from July 1946. As we now see it, only another year or so may be needed to overthrow it completely." Actually, the People's Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949, less than a year after Chairman Mao wrote these words, the course of the war fully demonstrating the correctness of his thesis.

The Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns constituted the strategically decisive engagement in the War of Liberation. After these three major campaigns, in which the main forces of the Kuomintang troops were virtually wiped out, our army supported by the people of the whole country switched to nationwide strategic pursuit and quickly liberated China's entire mainland.

II. THE WAR SITUATION BEFORE THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN, CHAIRMAN MAO'S WISE POLICY ON THE STRATEGICALLY DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT

1. DESPISING THE ENEMY STRATEGICALLY WHILE TACTICALLY TAKING HIM SERIOUSLY

Chairman Mao says: ". . . Strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them

all seriously." Strategically, all reactionaries are paper tigers; they are terrifying in appearance but not all that powerful in reality. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful. It is on this basis that we must build our strategic thinking. If strategically, with regard to the whole, we dare not despise the enemy, dare not overthrow him and dare not fight and win victory, we shall be committing a Right-opportunist error. Tactically, however, all reactionaries are real tigers; in each specific struggle we must take the enemy seriously, be good at struggle and carefully study and perfect our art of struggle. It is on this basis that we must build our tactical thinking. If tactically, with regard to each part, we do not take the enemy seriously and are not prudent, we shall be committing a "Left"-opportunist error.

Despising the enemy strategically while tactically taking full account of him is Chairman Mao's great strategic thinking and a powerful ideological weapon with which we can overcome the enemy. It was by following Chairman Mao's strategic thinking that in the past decades we defeated powerful enemies, domestic and foreign, and won great victories in revolution and construction.

On June 26, 1946, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang launched its nationwide counter-revolutionary war. Chairman Mao, in his article "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence" of July 20 of the same year, analysed the political, economic and military situation as regards the enemy and ourselves. He pointed out specifically: **"Although Chiang Kai-shek has U.S. aid, the feelings of the people are against him, the morale of his troops is low, and his economy is in difficulty. As for us, although we have no foreign aid, the feelings of the**

people are for us, the morale of our troops is high, and we can handle our economy. Therefore, we can defeat Chiang Kai-shek." In his report "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" delivered on December 25, 1947 at a meeting of the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao profoundly analysed the international and domestic situation at that time, further pointing out: **"We said then [that is, at the time when the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang launched the adventurist war in 1946] that Chiang Kai-shek's superiority in military forces was only transient, a factor which could play only a temporary role, that U.S. imperialist aid was likewise a factor which could play only a temporary role, while the anti-popular character of Chiang Kai-shek's war and the feelings of the people were factors that would play a constant role, and that in this respect the People's Liberation Army was in a superior position."** Chairman Mao also advised the whole Party: **"We should rid our ranks of all impotent thinking. All views that overestimate the strength of the enemy and underestimate the strength of the people are wrong."** Events have proved entirely correct Chairman Mao's brilliant thesis of daring to fight and daring to win victory, and the ten major principles of operation¹ he formulated on the basis of our army's long experience in fighting.

¹ Referring to those included in Chairman Mao's report "The Present Situation and Our Tasks":

1) Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later. 2) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later. 3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city

Guided by Chairman Mao's strategic thinking and under his personal command, and with the active support of the people in the Liberated Areas, the People's Liberation Army beat back the offensives by Chiang Kai-shek's forces on several fronts in the first year of the War of Liberation, i.e., from July 1946 to June 1947, forcing the enemy to switch from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive, while our army went over from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. In the second year of the war (July 1947-June 1948), the Kuomintang forces, constantly pounded by our army, changed from overall defensive to regional defensive, and again in August 1948 from regional defensive to defence of key points. In these two years of hard fighting, our army wiped out a total of 2.64 million enemy troops, opening up excellent prospects for the war as a whole.

Taking a Right-opportunist stand and with his reactionary, idealist and metaphysical world outlook, the renegade and traitor Lin Piao invariably overestimated the enemy's strength and underestimated that of the people; he dared not fight and win victory, but strenuously opposed Chairman Mao's strategic thinking. When Chairman Mao with his boldness of vision decided to launch the strategically decisive engagement against the

or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times. 4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out

Kuomintang forces with the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in the Northeast, Lin Piao tried in a hundred and one ways to counter and undermine this great strategic decision. In good time, Chairman Mao sharply criticized Lin's Right-opportunist line and armed the whole Party, army and people with the concept of despising the enemy strategically while taking full account of him tactically. This resulted in the speedy victory of the war for the liberation of the Northeast and subsequently of the entire country.

2. THE WAR SITUATION WAS FAVOURABLE TO US, THE TIME RIPE FOR THE STRATEGICALLY DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT

By July 1948, that is, when the War of Liberation had entered its third year, the Liberated Areas had grown to 2.35 million square kilometres, or 24.5 per cent of China's total area, while their population had increased to 168 million, or 35.3 per cent of the total at the time. They included 586 cities of and above county-town level, or 29 per cent of China's cities in that category, and had within their territory 12,847 kilometres of railway lines

one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy. 5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. 6) Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest). 7) Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. At

and a fair amount of mining and other industries. Although at that time the enemy temporarily accounted for a greater part of China's population, territory and cities, he no longer enjoyed such vast superiority in any of these respects as at the beginning of the war. Politically, economically and militarily, our situation steadily improved while that of the enemy daily deteriorated.

Politically, after overcoming the interference of Liu Shao-chi's opportunist line, which was "Left" in form but Right in essence, the land reform movement developed tremendously in the Liberated Areas, consummating this great transformation in the relations of production in areas with a combined population of about 100 million. This considerably raised the people's class consciousness and spurred their enthusiasm to support the liberation war. Mobilized and organized under the slogan "Defend our homes and land," the people in their millions were active in sending grain to the front, working in civilian teams and joining the army to fight the enemy. A surging tide of support for the front quickly formed, with the masses readily supplying manpower and materials needed for the war effort. Meanwhile, in conjunction with the

the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities. 8) With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Seize at opportune moments all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them. 9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and material are at the front. 10) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should in general not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

land reform, a movement for Party consolidation was initiated throughout the Party organization, by which the Party was greatly developed and strengthened and its links with the broad masses were tightened. By the autumn of 1948, Party membership had grown from the 1.21 million of May 1945 to 3 million; the Party had basically overcome certain undesirable features in class composition, ideology and style of work that had existed to some degree, and deepened its understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of Party policy. In his "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area" delivered on April 1, 1948, Chairman Mao pointed out in connection with the great achievements in the work of land reform and Party consolidation in that area: **"It was on this basis that during the past year the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization was able to perform war services on an immense scale in support of the great People's War of Liberation."** This appraisal applied not only to the land reform and Party consolidation in that particular Liberated Area. It applied also to such work in all other Liberated Areas.

Quite opposite to the situation in the Liberated Areas, the Kuomintang reactionaries had sunk into grave political crisis. Their policy of waging civil war, plus the close collaboration between U.S. imperialist monopoly capital and Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrat-comprador capital in cruelly exploiting and oppressing the Chinese people and plundering their wealth, led to daily deterioration in the livelihood of the labouring masses in the areas under Kuomintang control. The people had no way out but to unite and wage mighty, extensive struggles against hunger, persecution, civil war, autocracy and national betrayal. Some even took up arms against

the Chiang regime. For example, Party-led armed guerrillas active in the countryside south of the Yangtze River numbered upwards of 30,000 men. The anti-U.S., anti-Chiang national democratic united front led by our Party had developed apace after two years of war; many democratic parties and personages and mass organizations had come to see more clearly the real nature of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, accepted our Party's political views and joined the anti-Chiang struggle it led. In short, the Kuomintang reactionaries were subjected to onslaughts from two sides: on the regular battle front and from within the areas under their control. Caught in this cross fire, Chiang Kai-shek found it increasingly difficult to sustain his reactionary rule.

Economically, too, the Liberated Areas and the Kuomintang-held territory presented two entirely different pictures. In the summer of 1948, Chairman Mao publicized his famous verse: **"Let the army advance, production increase and the sense of discipline grow stronger, and the revolution will be ever-victorious."** This was in fact a guiding principle for work throughout the Liberated Areas. It meant that the army should continue its strategic offensive and advance into the Kuomintang-occupied territory, that the Liberated Areas should keep up their energetic efforts to develop production and support the front; and that, with all this, plus a yet stronger sense of discipline throughout the Party and army, we would be assured of countrywide victory in the revolution. Guided by this principle of Chairman Mao's, and with the carrying out of land reform and the favourable condition of the main battlefield having shifted to the Kuomintang areas, an excellent economic situation prevailed in the Liberated Areas where industrial and agri-

cultural production was developing rapidly and the people's livelihood improving accordingly.

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, however, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries' policy of civil war and national betrayal caused runaway inflation, serious devaluation of the paper currency, skyrocketing of prices, closing down of large numbers of national industrial and commercial enterprises, mass impoverishment, smouldering popular discontent and widespread mass uprisings. These combined to force the Chiang Kai-shek regime to the brink of total economic collapse.

Militarily, the situation was also favourable to us. The Kuomintang forces had shrunk from 4.3 million men at the beginning of the war to 3.65 million; of these only 1.98 million were combatants of and below divisional (brigade) level, with a little over 1.7 million capable of front-line fighting. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army had in the same period grown from 1.2 million men (including 600,000 belonging to the field armies) to more than 2.8 million, of whom 1.49 million belonged to the field forces. In the first days of the war, the numerical strength ratio between the enemy and ourselves was 3.5 : 1, whereas at the beginning of its third year the ratio had changed to 1.3 : 1. The enemy still outnumbered us, but as a matter of fact, in striking force that could be used at the forefront he no longer enjoyed numerical superiority. Besides, the Kuomintang forces had been cut off by us in the northeastern, northern, eastern and northwestern China and Central Plains theatres, and were for the most part in the passive position of having to receive blows, hardly able to support and co-ordinate with one another in any campaign. The enemy also had to set aside troops to cope with the armed