Thomas Molnar

Authority and Its Enemies

With a new introduction by the author

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Introduction to the Transaction Edition

There appeared, soon after the Second World War, in 1945 in London, Austrian philosopher Karl Popper's work, *The Open Society and Its Enemies.* It was immediately and widely celebrated; it was also a kind of natural companion to another book, Horkheimer's and Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality,* published in the United States. Both works were written by refugees from German-occupied Europe who were or would have been victims of the official anti-Semitic policies. No doubt that these circumstances had prompted the writing of both books. Their combined thesis proposed that totalitarian ideology and practices were the products of personal character traits tending toward a strong authoritarian behavior, and that this behavior was best deployed in regimes closed upon themselves ideologically, granting rights only to the tested and the loyal in the service of a severely structured society held up as an ideal. As a contrast, Horkheimer/Adorno suggested the freely accommodating and tolerant personality, and Popper the open society with democratic and liberal policies in the framework set by the rule of law.

It is hardly doubtful that the authors had been impressed, on the one hand, by the repression in totalitarian regimes from which they suffered exile, and, on the other hand, by the Anglo-Saxon regimes where they found refuge. But

it is always risky for theses with a philosophical ambition to mix sentiments and arguments, at the latter's expense. And to construct typologies—of individual character and political regimes—on the basis of a historical moment, in the midst of events and with exacerbated passions. Exaggerations are never too far in such cases. Decades after the Horkheimer/Adorno book, Stanley Milgram at Yale University demonstrated very ingeniously that *all* of us are willing and eager to play the "authoritarian personality" vis-à-vis our fellow men (see the pertinent chapter in this book) and inflict pain amounting to torture on innocent people when so instructed. In Popper's case it was validly said by many of his critics that his biggest faux pas was to indict Plato as the prototype of fascist mentality and social planning. True, when Popper published his book, the Soviet Union, one of the victors in the war, was protected by Western public opinion, and thus the entire onus of totalitarianism was concentrated in the Nazi and fascist regimes. But as the Cold War provided ample proof of the totalitarian crimes of communism as well, Popper's thesis became increasingly shoddy in retrospect: Was Plato the overall creator of authoritarian and totalitarian mentality, a kind of super-accused at a super-Nürnberg trial? And also, could authoritarian and totalitarian regimes be so easily equated?

In reality, the issue is the problem of *authority* in general, not its possible excesses. When I undertook to write this book, I knew I would swim against the current, although my commentators emphasized the dispassionate approach I adopted. Only one letter to a magazine showed exasperation and informed the author and the approving reviewer that he, the correspondent, "obeyed only such authority of which he approves." This statement, naive and silly as it was, nevertheless hit the nail on the head. First, it admitted implicitly that authority is not necessarily directed *against* people since the letter writer willingly obeyed at least some laws or orders. Second, he demonstrated, without being aware of it, that if each obeys only the authority of his choice, anarchy at once breaks out. In other words, even the self-declared enemy of authority acknowledges the latter's validity when his own reasons, tastes, and interests tell him to do so. Multiply this individual choice by each member of society, you get a set of validated laws or customs.

You will now interject: an acceptable minimum of authority is of course unobjectionable, but I still refuse "authoritarianism" in other than legal relationships, in the family, in the classroom, among people in general. But whether informally or loosely constituted, groups (family, classroom, etc.) are not essentially different from society at large; they too have a common interest, a unified purpose, an identity to safeguard. The objective of one group is to teach, of another to bring up children, of yet another to defend a territory or secure material well-being. These groups are called school, family, army, and business enterprise, and their totality amounts, numerically and morally, to the whole society or nation. In short, at all levels human beings live in communities (which of course intersect), even, as the book points out, the hermit or the

castaway who has learned the minimum of living conditions from other men and tries to rejoin them. Tarzan is no exception, nor Robinson Crusoe.

Authority is thus the cement that keeps people together and is the factor allowing them to rely on each other in the vast give-and-take of social, material, and cultural transactions. It is then a positive factor, "invented" by nature, that divides us according to our functions, responsibilities, aspirations in life, equalities, and inequalities. It is, indeed, the last item of this list, inequality, that creates the controversy about authority and engenders the opposition that the term meets in ages of egalitarian fervor. Why the inequality, asked some ancient sages, when the sun that shines upon us and the air we breathe are equally distributed? This book tries to answer the question, but since it does so through reasoned discourse, the very reference to reason seems to some as an authoritarian endeavor. The antiauthority attitude usually originates in emotions and instances of indignation, and in such cases reason itself sounds like a provocation. In a lecture on the subject at Davidson College some years ago, professors and students showed themselves extremely hostile, but when I later had opportunities to speak privately with some of them, it turned out that my interlocutors were quite in agreement. What had happened? Simply, that as a group (the class), those who thought I was right in my analysis of authority *submitted* in silence to those who said aloud that I was wrong, that is, to those who had authority, the egalitarian-minded professors. In other words, authority came at once into play, although I am sure that the vocal opponents would not call their own behavior in any sense authoritarian. The opponents of authority, in the very process of exercising it, call their attitude reasonable and fair.[1]

These few examples suggest that the debate over authority is a far-reaching one, in fact it fills the pages of books on politics, pedagogy, and law since all of them involve techniques of using authority. In ancient China, officials (mandarins) were selected on the basis of an examination in literature. Fair enough. Yet, was the method itself not authoritarian, since the system, one norm rather than another, was arbitrarily imposed? In every society, achievement is measured according to a certain value hierarchy, then legalized by authority. The latter determines fashion, the validity of diplomas, the correct manners, even arguments in many cases, like the reference to Epicurus by disciples: *ipse dixit,* he himself said so, the issue is settled. In perilous or critical situations the majority willingly obeys the hierarchical superior, the one entitled to command, this being the means of protecting the group members from confusion, dispersion, or death (war, fire, flood, hostage taking, a major accident). Yes, you say, but in cases of catastrophe or emergency someone usually emerges and takes charge because he possesses a "natural" authority. Suppose, however, that none possess it in a given group and situation, or that several do who then disagree. Should a platoon in battle or schoolchildren in class vote for the sergeant or the teacher who leads them or teaches them the three R's?

As I said above, critics of this book were surprisingly favorable, perhaps because the times became heavy with signs of anarchy, protest, and defiance of the law and usage. They pointed merely at what opponents of my thesis were likely to say, namely, that conservatives would find the book "pessimistic," while liberals and libertarians would object to limits I advocated, for example, on artistic self-expression and media freedom. I lift this point from the texts of critics because it signals a crossroads. There are basically two visions here, involved in a never-ending conflict. The "individualist" votes for a possibly unlimited freedom (except for shouting "fire" in a crowded theater), the "communitarian"—not to be confused with the collectivist—for a concept that regards the rights of the social body as such. Is it really pessimism to consider human beings as tainted by evil (original sin)? By whatever name we call it, we find daily that they need restrictions, the source and methods of which we call authority. It may be "censorious," likewise, to limit the freedom of artistic expression (or, at least filter it through instances of selection—by authority), but when we note that public objects of art or texts may debase our image of world and man, censorship, used under various labels by all societies and groups, becomes an eminently reasonable instrument of authority.

Other points were made by other critics, some of them not quite perceptive in their historical comparisons. Two such criticisms stand out. One is this: If there is in our modern societies a loss of authority, there is also a corresponding gain because authority in premodern times used to be "mythological," whereas it is now out in the open, allowing dissent and debate. But is authority, even at its most enlightened, not always and ultimately "mythological" (I prefer the term *sacred*)? All authority comes from God, said St. Paul, and there is no ground to argue that he meant legitimately constituted authority alone. At any rate, where we give or receive orders or are participants in other acts of authority, there is in us a sense of awe as when we are confronted with one of the *limit-situations* (Jaspers's term), which places us in the center of the seriousness of the human condition.[3] This is so true—and here I again contradict my critic—that with all the "openness" of modern industrial-democratic society, authority has remained "mythological," although not perhaps the authority of church and state where we find it considerably dissolved and weakened, but the authority of international organizations and pressure groups. Why would we otherwise obey if power were not something mysterious, extraordinary in its manifestations, indeed surrounded by sacred elements?[4]

It is instructive to read classical, medieval, Renaissance, and post-Renaissance texts at random, practically up to the present century, texts on art, urbanism, the law, the structure of society, the life of princes and burghers. Unless these texts are destined for a special occasion of comedy or merrymaking, they are marked by *respect* for the way things are in their created status, respect also for the way society is organized and the world is structured. This respect for reality, for the inherent principles of the universe, is what separates

predemocratic from postdemocratic literature as Tocqueville saw it so profoundly, adding that the two evolve along two different stylistic canons.

One could weigh the critic's argument, were it not for his naive enthusiasm derived from Popper and Horkheimer/Adorno, the latter of whom he quotes. However, it is difficult to join his or their ranks. There are several theories why in our century authority has given way to permissiveness. I suggest that the fundamental reason is that "mythological" authority has been liquidated in Western societies, so that authority has become either beastly and provocative of beastliness, or weak and no longer exercised. Never has authority been so naked and crushing, on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, so permissive, self-effacing, and paralyzed when faced with revolt, provocation, derision, and brutality. We are left with the question: What kind of authority is viable, since it cannot anyway be separated from community life? Repressive? Permissive? Sacred? Even when authority denies itself and turns permissive, one cannot say that it disappears, only that certain institutions give it up, while others assume it and ready themselves to exercise it. After all, the beheading of kings did not open the gates to freedom and the open society; their authority was taken over by the Cromwells, the Robespierres, the Napoleons, and the Lenins. Or to switch examples, when the teacher does not use authority, the disruptive pupil will, eventually toting his gun. Democracy too relies on the nuclear arsenal (an eloquent instrument of authority!) when it faces the evil empire.

It is impossible not to note at this century's end the emergence of two new powers and authorities: one in the *media* with its planetary network and impact, the other the *transnational corporation* with its imperial trappings and ambitions. Tomorrow, they and the World Bank, the IMF, and other social and business agencies may lend substance to their authority by formulating their own mythology, although, as Carl Schmitt remarked, we may be far from "an alliance of the altar and the office building."

Thus, unless we are willing to incorporate the concept and the reality of authority into our philosophical and political discourse, there can be no way of grasping how society functions in normal times or in crisis. Nor can we then explain the collapse of the structured life on our streets, in the household, in schools and campuses, in political parties and the churches, and generally in all areas, private and public. One may always say that this is as it should be, that this is the true meaning of freedom. This is the routine argument, proposed particularly by those who benefit by the absence of authority and want to exercise another form of it, more to their ideological interest. Meanwhile, they hide behind a comfortable and profitable victimhood.

In periods when authority weakens, a sure sign of the impending collapse is that its enemies redouble their attacks against it, among other things in order to justify their imminent takeover. This strategy makes the surviving power holders even more shaky in their hardly tenable position, even more servile and yielding. There develops a fascinating interplay here, often re-

peated in history, an interplay that none dare to call by its name: the demise of one authority and the rise of another. Meanwhile both agree that authority as such is a bad thing, a mythological remnant, to be forever abolished in favor of a collective exercise of it.

In the two decades since this book was published, we have been living in an interlude: the passing of one authority, the emergence of another. The media, the universities, and the churches have greatly hastened the process.[5] They switched to an antiauthority language and style, not distinguishable from the style and language of their enemies. The first consequence is a growing confusion in their own ranks, the confusion of those who had trusted them. This too is a symptom of authority's self-abolition, this turning first against the loyal ones. It signals to the enemy that we have surrendered, the gates are open.

More concretely, the last two decades saw the loosening of the institutional ties within all the bodies on which civilization habitually rests. A fascinating process to watch. One prominent illustration is what happens to the *family*. Let us begin with last century's eager and honest *ethnographers* who discovered differently structured families from ours: matriarchal, extended, sexually tolerant, and so forth. Then came the Freudian *psychologists* who found hidden, subconscious motives, creators of tensions, resentments, conflicts on the part of parents, children, the male and the female. In turn, the main thrust of the *sexual revolution* was the family's sexual freedom and sexualization: no longer taboos against divorce, early sex, sex education, extramarital affairs and pregnancy, and incest. With birth control, abortion, and homosexual rights as mere sociological phenomena, thus protected by the prevailing *scientist ideology* and brooking no contradiction, *legislators and judges* had no choice but to yield, giving their laws an official stamp of approval to the *fait accompli*. The laboratories for the sexual revolution were the campuses, the mixed dormitories, the sex education classes. The media, claiming the "right of the people to be informed," provided the background sonority, the news value, the incitement through round tables, statistics, and sob stories.

The result is before us, the most important attempt in history to transform the family into something else, as yet with an unclear identity.[6] Subsequently, with the family perhaps decisively modified and loosened, other institutions have become easy targets, with unsuspected consequences. Authority, the linchpin of social existence, has been at any rate removed.

How far do the *causes* go back? Ours is the first civilization—three centuries, generously counted—that recognizes no models in creation or cosmos outside of manmade ones. Its cosmology consists of an undefinable, empty space and inanimate objects—planets, galaxies, molecules, interstellar clouds, dust and storms—colliding in it, according to unfathomable and daily differently measured laws. We have no idea of the origin, destination, or of the space/time in which we are located. The mythological view has indeed been lost; but what has been the gain?

Notes

1. Another episode on the same evening at Davidson College. We were at dinner where I was invited by a number of faculty members. I was talking with my neighbor at the table, and the talk turned to Napoleon, for whom I expressed my admiration. Thereupon, the professor said, placing his hand over his mouth: "I am so glad you admire him. So do I." "Why do you whisper?" I asked. "Because saying it aloud would make me a fascist [sic] in their eyes!" This brief exchange took place in an intellectually open school, in a politically open society.

2. When this book was written, nobody could conceive that fifteen years later the National Foundation for the Arts would provide funds for such an "art" as Andrés Serrano's "Piss Christ" (a crucifix immersed in a tank with the artist's urine), Mapplethorpe's repugnant homosexual acts on photograph, a New York woman's open show of her vagina, and so forth. The almost simultaneous removal of authority at art commissions, at court, at museums, and with art critics does not tell much for this reverse consensus, nor for the resistance of democratic decision making to the abject.

3. Walter Otto brings up an interesting feature of ancient Greek psychology, obvious in Homer and elsewhere. The Greeks knew as well as anybody else that most daily trivial decisions were made by individuals themselves. Yet, when major and collective decisions had to be made, they attributed them to the gods, recognizing the supra-human element in the situation.

4. See on this subject my *Twin Powers. Politics and the Sacred* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publisher, 1988).

5. Ever since Vatican Council Two (1962–65) the Catholic church has been in a state of disintegration. In her case this means unofficial but multiple renunciation to practices not only consecrated by time, but also derived from dogma and doctrine, forever unchangeable. Many bishops, clerics, and laymen, leaving the sphere of authority of the church and finding shelter under the counter-authority of the World, defy one after the other what Christianity has held sacred and immutable. Large numbers declare that the pope cannot tell them what to believe, what doctrine to prefer, etc.

This weakened status of the Roman church affects that of the churches of Reformation whose solidity, acknowledged or not, owed much to a stable See of St. Peter. Nowadays they succumb, one after another, to the authority of secular society and its manipulators.

6. Some pointers may be found of the present sociological orientation of the family. For example, children speak of "my daddy's husband" and of my "mother's wife," that is, they become integrated with homosexual "families." The new relationships propose a different language, and in turn different feelings. Nobody can tell where this will lead.

1.
On Authority

Our ordinary experience in today's family, school, court, church, and nation is that authority—of father, teacher, judge, priest, and president—is hard to maintain, if, indeed, it has not actually broken down. Whose fault is it? Is authority undermined by identifiable people and forces—or is it simply not exercised? Some would point to the popular pedagogic theories of John Dewey—"democracy in the classroom," for example—as the culprit. Others, like the late Jean Cardinal Daniélou speaking about the causes of the church's turmoil, would say that authority does exist, it is there, but those who ought to exercise it hesitate doing so.

Almost two decades ago, sociologist David Riesman called our attention in his book *The Lonely Crowd* to a new type of man that he labeled "other-directed." Such a man, nurtured by our civilization at this point, has no strong convictions and beliefs; he receives anonymous orders from his social environment and social peers, conforms to them, obeys them mechanically. According to Riesman, this type is a changeover from the earlier American "inner-directed" man who knew what he wanted, made individual choices, and had the courage to defend them. Now a superficial observer may conclude from Riesman's study that the "other-directed" man is more conscious, rather than less, of the existence of authority, which he recognizes and to which he conforms. The truth is

different. The "inner-directed" man is aware of authority because he, too, exercises it. He knows his place in the hierarchy of society, his personality has clear contours, he makes decisions and receives decisions. All around him there are "inner-directed" men, exercising authority: father, teacher, pastor, family physician. When he accepts their authority, he copies firm attitudes which he learns to value and admire. He wants to be like they are. This shows that by its nature authority is *personal,* or, at least, it has personal ingredients even though it is not necessarily visible. We obey God not because we see him; great moral and political leaders do not have to be present—in fact they may be long dead—in order to be respected; tradition has authority over us because our forebears had set down its meaning and its structure. However, when the social situation is more restricted and its manifestations are more frequent, as in the family, the school, and in the maintenance of order in the street, authority must be concretely present in visible form. It is exercised regularly, perhaps even uninterruptedly, by parent, teacher, and policeman.

Is authority really needed in these smaller social spheres? The question is legitimate since we often hear and read statements that, except for very small children, every individual ought to be allowed freedom of expression and the right to decide what is best for him on all matters. This, at any rate, is the prevailing view; contradicting it may bring social penalties. A few years ago over the waves of a New York radio station I debated a lawyer who insisted that no authority (law) ought to curb dealers in pornographic literature in the display of their wares in shop windows. Also, recently, the ACLU proposed that primary school children should have the right to take their parents to court. A number of court cases ensued when long-haired pupils were ordered by principals or teachers to cut their hair.

These are samples taken from a vast number of situations where many of us feel that while freedom to act as we wish is a good thing, nevertheless *someone* ought to have the right to enforce a certain norm. Reflecting upon it, we soon find that this norm cannot in all cases be the outcome of a consensus or of a majority choice. Majorities are shifting, and what gives a norm its value (its *normative* character) is precisely that it is durable, not subject to popular whim or majority pressure. A norm is then a way of believing, speaking, or acting, which is consecrated by both reason and custom, one strengthening the other. And authority, if we base it on this formulation, appears as speech and action from the secure base of a norm. Otherwise, speech and action may be incidental, not binding beyond an immediate effect, or outright arbitrary, enforced but unreasonably.

After these somewhat abstract considerations, let us turn to the prob-

lem of the presence and absence of authority in situations where we experience the problem. Experience and reflection will tell us that there are natural groups and others which, while also natural, are better described as consequences of complex interactions between individuals and groups. I call the family a natural group—it is the basic social cell—and I call, for example, an art movement or a censorship bureau a complex social group. There are no societies without some form of the family—extended or simple—but many societies do not have artists associated according to devotion to a style, or censorship which deals with complicated matters of value and moral or political critique of existing norms.

The mere fact of speaking of families indicates that certain functions—permanent ones—are fulfilled by a group of people called father, mother (eventually grandparents), and children (eventually uncles, aunts, and cousins). The functions are relatively easy to list: protection, the creation of an intimate and warm environment, the regularity of habits, the acquisition of a language, a frame of reference supplying and reenforcing the identity of the members. These functions, which are so "natural" that we hardly perceive them, follow from biological and psychological necessities, and also from an added element which we can only call *love*. It is often argued that this latter is merely our awareness that the biological functions are performed in a manner that satisfies us. To argue thus is, however, a willed depreciation, a conscious impoverishment of an experience we all have and which cannot be, without violence done to it, reduced to anything else. Family love is as much *given* as its external, functional manifestations. The child and the parent do not dissociate, when giving or receiving the act of protection, care, respect, obedience, and authority, from the love which permeates those acts and is one with them.

Now my contention is that *authority* is analogous to love. Every act within the family is either a manifestation of authority (and corresponding obedience or refusal) or a manifestation of its absence. At first sight, love could be represented by a larger circle, authority by a smaller one inscribed in the first. Love is always present in the form of care, consideration, gifts, gestures, and so on, whereas authority needs a precise external sign, a regular reaffirmation, a direction. I once heard a father say how he envied his brother who merely had to signal to his teenage sons in order to silence them when he was talking with other adults. "My son would continue talking," he lamented in a resigned tone. The case of the two brothers displays similar situations and similar sentiments of parental love, but they are made dissimilar by the presence or absence of authority. It is not difficult to conclude that love is more effective (and mutually more satisfying) when accompanied by authority. The latter is indeed a way of channeling love; instead of a general and ubiquitous emotionalism,

love becomes structured, apportioned, is made directive, I would even say "educational" if the term had not been devalued as a part of the bureaucratic jargon. Anyway, love is formative and humanizing when coupled with authority; in combination, the two are the cement of the family structure.

A popular writer on family life and teenage psychology insists that authority ought not to be obvious because then it provokes rather than soothes the child's temper. One of his illustrations is a fourteen-year-old boy playing ball in the family living room and being reprimanded by his mother. The boy not only continues, he becomes impertinent and exasperates his mother, who, in turn, begins to shriek, then breaks down in a fit of sobs. The writer's advice is that the mother ought to have explained why she would not tolerate ball-playing in the apartment. If a family situation were a formula of physics or mechanical engineering, the adviser would be right: the best way to save energy and unnecessary expenditure (in this case, of tears and anger) would be a rational planning of each participant's place and movement, a set of preexisting formulas for do's and dont's. The living family is, however, not a mechanism with wound-up parts; there authority must be exercised and accepted in many instances without prior discussion, not mechanically but on the grounds of the function that each member has as a result of age, status, experience, and consciousness of the general welfare (common good).

With the last expression we have made an important step toward understanding the nature and role of authority. Society consists of individuals and groups, the one as important and fundamental as the other. Rousseau was dangerously wrong with the first statement of his work on "social contract," that "man is born free, yet we see him everywhere in chains." Man is born free as God's child, but neither as a member of nature nor of society, if freedom means self-creation, self-sustenance, and unlimited license to do as one pleases. Man's (rather already the child's) freedom, and with it his individuality, is circumscribed by the freedom and reality of the social group. Philosophers will forever debate which comes first, man or society, but we can safely assert that the problem is falsely formulated. Man cannot function outside society, and the latter does not exist without the individuals who compose it. Yes, one may object, but the individual can at least survive alone. Even this is questionable. We have never seen an *individual alone*. There are, to be sure, sporadic instances: Tarzan, the hermits, or a few Japanese soldiers who, after World War II, disappeared in the jungle of the Pacific islands rather than surrender to American troops. But if we take a more careful look, we realize that not even these individuals were ever alone and that it is impossible to say whether they sustained themselves by their own

efforts, outside the physical (animal) act of feeding and finding shelter. Tarzan, or whoever his prototype had been, was not a complete human being until he learned to speak; besides, prior to his encounter with other men, he had been nurtured by animals and was a member of *their* tribe; hermits carry their memories and skills, even their motivation to become hermits, from society to the solitude of the forest; and the Japanese soldier chose his lonely life on the grounds of a prior loyalty—to the Emperor—which continued to sustain him morally. The Thoreaus of the world owe to society the very formulation of their wish for utter privacy.

Authority, at its elementary level, is then the natural price that the individual pays for membership in society, without which he would not be an individual, let alone a protected and integrated one. By these terms I do not mean exclusively "defense against aggression," which is practically the only grounds on which social philosophers of a certain school justify the existence of society and state; I mean by integration and protection the fact that we learn society's language, mores, and traditions, without which we would be individuals physiologically, but not in the human sense, that is, infinitely rich in thought, modes of expression and articulation, with a sense of identity and belonging, with rather clear reflective choices, preferences, refusals, and aspirations. Thus if nature shapes our immediately given body, society fashions our reflective life, our ethical being, our tastes, our personality. And by "society," let us remember, we mean family, school, church, state—all the social articulations that one calls institutions.

None of them could exist without *authority*. Just as individual man is unimaginable without the social group membership which helps him become a fully conscious, challenged, and challenging person—in the same way each social group can only hold together if it is differentiated according to objectives, functions, and persistence in survival. We have seen that, in the last analysis, there can exist individuals not belonging to society, but that it is questionable whether (1) they are men and women in the full sense of these words, and whether (2) they can survive. Similarly, there can be societies not held together by authority. In such a case, however, they are (1) temporary and fragile groups, threatened by the canceling of the coexistence contract at any moment, and (2) unable to survive due to the permanent inner defiance of decision-making. One may argue here, too, that some families grant complete freedom to their members, that children are brought up permissively, and that husband and wife give each other sexual freedom to gratify their desires with any outsider of their choice. Or one may cite the latest examples of hippy communes and others, similarly modeled. Nevertheless, such families are held together by outside pressure, that is, by a degree of conformity to