GLOBAL TRADE LAW SERIES

# HARMONIZATION, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS IN WTO LAW

Humberto Zúñiga Schroder



# Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards in WTO Law

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# Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards in WTO Law

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The opinions expressed in this work do not reflect the official view of the Andean Community General Secretariat or any body of the Andean Integration System.

# List of Abbreviations

AB (WTO) Appellate Body

AFNOR Association Française de Normalisation (the French Standards

Association)

ALOP Appropriate Level of Protection

ANEC European Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer

Representation in Standardization

ANSI American National Standards Institute
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

API American Petroleum Institute

ARSO African Organization for Standardization
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

BCD Forum Broadband Content Delivery Forum

BIPM Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International

Bureau of Weights and Measures)

BSI British Standards Institution CAB Conformity Assessment Body

CAP Conformity Assessment Procedure(s)
CEN European Committee for Standardization

CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization

CIPA Camera and Imaging Products Association

COPANT Comisión Panamericana de Normas Técnicas (Pan American

Standards Commission)

COPOLCO ISO's Committee on Consumer Policy

CUP Cambridge University Press

#### List of Abbreviations

CUTS Consumer Unity & Trust Society

DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung e.V. (German Institute for

Standardization)

DLNA Digital Living Network Alliance

DSB Dispute Settlement Body

DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding

EEA European Economic Area
EC European Community
ECJ European Court of Justice

ECOS European Environmental Citizens Organization for

Standardization

EFTA European Free Trade Association

ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FLO Fairtrade Labelling Organizations

FTA Free Trade Agreement

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GMCF Global Mobile Commerce Forum
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
IAF International Accreditation Forum

ICSCA Industry Cooperation on Standards & Conformity Assessment

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IECEE CB IEC System for Conformity testing and Certification of

Electrotechnical Equipment and Components

IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements

ILAC International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation

IMOInternational Maritime OrganizationIPPCInternational Plant Protection ConventionISOInternational Organization for StandardizationISO/DEVCOISO's Committee on Developing Country MattersISPMInternational Standard for Phytosanitary Measures

ITA Industry Technical Agreement

ITU International Telecommunication Union

JAS-ANZ Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)

MFN Most-Favoured Nation Treatment

MR Mutual Recognition

MRA Mutual Recognition Agreement
MRL Maximum Residue Limit

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NILF Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development **OECD** OIE

World Organization for Animal Health (formerly known as the

International Office of Epizootics) International Organization of Legal Metrology

Pacific Area Standards Congress **PASC** 

**PECAS** Protocols to the European Agreements on Conformity

Sanitary and Phytosanitary (measures) SPS Standards and Trade Development Facility **STDF** 

Technical Barriers to Trade TBT TC Technical Committee

TRIS Technical Regulations Information System **TTMRA** Trans Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement

United Kingdom UK UN United Nations

**OIML** 

UN Economic Commission for Europe **UN/ECE** 

**UNCTAD** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIDO

US United States of America

**USDA** United States Department of Agriculture

WHO World Health Organization

World Standards Services Network WSSN

WTO World Trade Organization

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# Introduction

One of the most important events of the twentieth century, from a trade law perspective, was undoubtedly the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system. This event, intended to secure rules of trade at a global level with the main objective of ensuring that trade flows as predictably and freely as possible, marked the conclusion of years of negotiations between countries. The WTO began life on 1 January 1995 but its trading system is more than sixty years old. Since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided rules aimed at facilitating trade and promoting the efficient exchange of goods.

One of the ways in which this objective can be achieved is through the removal of trade barriers. These comprise any government regulation or policy that restricts international trade. They can take different forms: there are the traditional tariff barriers – which were discussed during the eight GATT Rounds<sup>3</sup> – and the increasingly significant non-tariff barriers, including customs formalities, import bans and also technical regulations and standards.

Technical regulations and standards are important and necessary for a variety of reasons, for example, compatibility of products and the protection of human health and safety. However, they can vary from country to country. This is not per se an impediment to trade and in fact is allowed by the multilateral trading system because of the existence of different levels of development and different physical conditions between countries. The problem arises when standards are set arbitrarily, because they can be employed by governments as a 'disguised' form of

<sup>1.</sup> World Trade Organization, 'The WTO...in Brief', available at the WTO web page <www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/inbrief\_e/inbr00\_e.htm> (accessed 30 Dec. 2010).

<sup>2.</sup> World Trade Organization, 'Understanding the WTO' (Geneva, 2003), 10.

<sup>3.</sup> Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), Dillon (1960–1961), Kennedy (1964–1967), Tokyo (1973–1979) and Uruguay (1986–1994).

protectionism, especially when they are introduced with the real purpose of creating an artificial comparative advantage for domestic producers.<sup>4</sup> The need to avoid scenarios like these is the reason why the WTO has provided a thorough legal regime on standards and conformity assessment procedures, aimed at ensuring that they do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.

The WTO regime on standards has been the result of an evolutionary process that started during the GATT, thanks to the efforts of its Contracting Parties, who were aware of the need for regulation in order to avoid situations like the ones above mentioned. These efforts bore fruit in the Tokyo Round Standards Code (1979),<sup>5</sup> which may be regarded as the first official GATT instrument that deals exclusively with standards and with the different scenarios in which they are likely to constitute obstacles to trade. This code paved the way for the subsequent negotiations, during the Uruguay Round, on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreements, which are the main WTO Agreements that deal with standards.

Efforts to regulate in the area of standards, however, began more than a decade before the approval of the Tokyo Round Standards Code. An interesting reference can be traced back to 1969, the year in which the Committee on Trade in Industrial Products<sup>6</sup> decided to establish a working group with the purpose of examining the diverse scenarios in which standards can act as obstacles to trade and proposing possible solutions.<sup>7</sup> One of the 'solutions' discussed in this Working Group was a 'Code of Conduct on Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade',<sup>8</sup> which later developed into the Tokyo Round Standards Code. The objective of this code was to 'ensure that standards, both mandatory and voluntary... are not formulated or applied in such a way as to cause unjustifiable obstacles to international trade'.<sup>9</sup> To achieve this objective, the Code required adherents to use 'as a basis for their standards relevant international standards'.<sup>10</sup> An initial draft of the proposed Code (concluded in December 1971)<sup>11</sup> contained two important definitions: firstly,

World Trade Organization, 'World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the links between Trade, Standards and the WTO', available at the WTO web page <www.wto.org> (accessed 30 Dec. 2010), xxxv.

<sup>5.</sup> Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT, B.I.S.D. 26S/8 (1980) (entered into force 1 Jan. 1980), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1079 (1979) (hereinafter the Tokyo Round Standards Code).

The composition and terms of reference of the Committee appear in GATT Doc. COM.IND/1/ Rev.2 (dated 9 Dec. 1969).

GATT Doc. L/3298, Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Report to Council, 22 Dec. 1969, at Annex I.

<sup>8.</sup> See GATT Doc. COM.TD/W/191, Non-Tariff Barriers Arising in the Field of Standards: Note on Implications for Developing Countries of Proposed Solutions, 28 May 1973, at paragraph 15. It is important to note that by 1973 the Working Group had not taken any decision as to the nature of the code but members of the Group had agreed to work on the draft of a contractual code for reasons of convenience (7, footnote 1).

<sup>9.</sup> Ibid., paragraph 17.

<sup>10.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11.</sup> See GATT Doc. Spec(71)143, Proposed GATT Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade, Contents of Revised Draft Prepared for Consideration by the Drafting

'harmonization', as the process of making the standards of different countries or organizations 'the same as regards their content although their layout and format may differ'. <sup>12</sup> Secondly, 'equivalence' of test methods (subsequently broadened to SPS measures and TBT technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures), which involved the acceptance of test methods imposed by a particular country, provided that such methods offer an assurance of conformity with applicable standards equivalent to the procedures carried out by the country of destination. <sup>13</sup> References to these two concepts were also included in the Tokyo Round Standards Code, albeit with some differences regarding the scope of 'equivalence', which now encompasses 'self-certification, test results, certificates or marks of conformity'. <sup>14</sup>

The reason this brief reference to the negotiating history of the Tokyo Round Standards Code was made lies in the need to show *how* and *why* the GATT Contracting Parties decided to implement different policy options in cases where standards and conformity assessment procedures differ between countries. Harmonization and equivalence were regulated originally in the Draft Code of Conduct on Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade and subsequently incorporated into the Tokyo Round Standards Code and the TBT and SPS Agreements. Mutual recognition was only *expressly* incorporated with the TBT Agreement, albeit exclusively for conformity assessment procedures.<sup>15</sup>

Harmonization is one way of facilitating trade and its goal is uniformity of trade measures. Equivalence, by contrast, is based on the fact that regulatory goals in relation to, for example, safety and health, may be fulfilled by the use of different kinds of measure. Thanks to this tool trade barriers can be removed and products can be accepted on the basis that they fulfil the regulatory objectives of the country of destination. Finally, mutual recognition means that two or more parties mutually accept each others' rules or standards, or the results of conformity assessment procedures. <sup>16</sup> These three concepts have been discussed for many years in both the TBT and SPS Committees, with different results. <sup>17</sup>

Group on 11 Jan. 1972, 30 Dec. 1971. Paramount in this regard was the proposal by the United States containing elements of a possible code on standardization (see GATT Doc. Spec(70)122 of 4 Nov. 1970).

<sup>12.</sup> GATT Doc. Spec(71)143, supra n. 11, at Section II, Article 6(a).

<sup>13.</sup> Ibid., Section III, Article 10(b).

<sup>14.</sup> See the Tokyo Round Standards Code, Article 5.2.

<sup>15.</sup> Note that the word 'expressly' has been emphasized because only the TBT Agreement addresses the so-called 'mutual recognition agreements' on Article 6.3.

F. Veggeland & C. Elvestad, 'Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements: Relevance for the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission', NILF Report 2004-9 (Oslo: Norwegian Agriculture Economics Research Institute, 2004), 1.

<sup>17.</sup> Harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition have been called 'trade-facilitation tools' (See, e.g., *ibid.*) However, for the purposes of the present work, these three concepts will not be treated in such a fashion, given the need to differentiate this term from the current negotiations in the WTO in the area of 'trade facilitation' based on the modalities contained in Annex D of the so-called 'July package'. More information on the concept of 'trade facilitation' can be found in <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/tradfa\_e/tradfa\_e.htm">www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/tradfa\_e.htm</a> (accessed 30 Dec. 2010).