

MICROECONOMICS THEORY AND APPLICATIONS



150/ FO GN G2



MICROECONOMICS

THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

Fred R. Glahe
University of Colorado, Boulder

Dwight R. LeeVirginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Blacksburg





Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

New York • San Diego • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta London • Sydney • Toronto Illustrations by Carol Schwartzback

Cover photograph $^{\circ}$ by Charles Merkle 1980/Free Lance Photographers Guild, Inc.

Copyright © 1981 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Requests for permission to make copies of any part of the work should be mailed to: Permissions, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 757 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017.

Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 80-84392 ISBN: 0-15-558623-8



MICROECONOMICS

THEORY AND APPLICATIONS





To Charles, Jeff, and Jennifer

试读结束: 需要全本请在线购买: www.ertongbook.com

PREFACE

Our goal in writing this book has been to present in a clear, precise, and non-mathematical manner the essential core of microeconomics so that the student can acquire a solid understanding of the theory. To assist in the attainment of this goal, a large number of examples and applications that are relevant to the theory are discussed. These examples and applications are designed to shorten the lag that students encounter between the mastery of a theory and the illumination and satisfaction that result from applying it. Although they require no knowledge of statistical or econometric techniques, the examples and applications are often based on research that employs those methods.

The examples show how the theory that has just been examined is useful in understanding important and topical issues. The applications tend to be longer and to use, rather than simply illustrate, the theory developed in the chapter. Both the examples and the applications reinforce the theory that has been developed and further an appreciation for it. It is our belief that this presentation will appeal to students and will make their course in intermediate microeconomics an intellectually satisfying experience.

The book is also useful from the perspective of the professor. Although the chapters can be assigned out of sequence to parallel classroom lectures, there is a logical flow to the existing order that provides a useful continuity to the presentation. In many respects, this order should complement the organization of most microeconomics courses as they are conventionally taught.

There is one significant departure from the conventional sequence of topics. The chapter on welfare economics and general equilibrium is not the final chapter of the book. All too often, the last thing that the student learns from a microeconomics textbook is that some rather heroic assumptions must be satisfied if the market economy is to perform properly. The assumptions behind

viii PREFACE

the perfectly competitive general equilibrium model and the efficiency conditions that flow from those assumptions are important and are carefully developed in Chapter 12. But the theoretical and practical significance of this model needs to be put into a reasonable perspective-a perspective we strive for in the two remaining chapters. In Chapter 13, market failure is treated in detail in conjunction with the development of the theory of public goods and externalities, and an in-depth application dealing with the problem of pollution is provided. Chapter 13 also examines the importance of property rights and contains examples of how market arrangements develop spontaneously through the extension of property rights and then internalize previous externalities. This chapter provides both a justification of the political process and the means to take a realistic look at how this process works - a topic that is developed in the concluding chapter. By applying many of the tools that have served so well in analyzing private markets and by drawing on the increasingly important literature of public choice, useful insights into the political process are developed in Chapter 14. At this point, it should be clear to the student that the public sector does not provide a perfect substitute for imperfect markets.

A Student Workbook and an Instructor's Manual are available for use in conjunction with the text. The main feature of the Student Workbook is an extensive program review of each chapter. The workbook also contains a self-quiz for each chapter and problems that focus on the graphical and mathematical analyses. The Instructor's Manual contains a summary of the highlights of each chapter, comments on the problems in the text, and additional questions and problems for quizzes and examinations.

Many people have played an important role in the preparation of this book. We would especially like to acknowledge the assistance of our colleagues at the University of Colorado, particularly Philip Graves, Charles W. Howe, Larry Singell, Bernard Udis, Frank Vorhies, and Wesley Yordon. In addition, we are indebted to the critical reviewers of our manuscript: George Babilot, San Diego State University; Paul Barkley, Washington State University; Ralph Bradburd, State University of New York at Albany; Charles R. Chittle, Bowling Green University; Robert Cooter, University of California—Berkeley, James Moore, Purdue University; James Ramsey, Michigan State University; Eugene Silberberg, University of Washington; and Norman J. Simler, University of Minnesota. Lastly, we are indebted to Colene Priebe for her speedy and accurate typing of the manuscript.

Fred R. Glahe Dwight R. Lee

CONTENTS

Introduction to Microeconomics

1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7	What Is Economics? Normative and Positive Economics 5 Economic Theories 6 Example 1-1: The Just Price 6 Methodology 9 A Look Ahead 12 Summary 13 References 13 Problems 14		
	Mathematical ar	Appendix: nd Graphic Analysis	
	Introduction 16 Functions 16 The Concept of Slope 20 Problems 24		
Chapte	er Two	Demand and Supply	25
2-1 2-2	Introduction 25 Demand 26 Example 2-1: Mass Transit Versus Wealth 30	ix	

Chapter One

1-1 Introduction

CONTENTS

2-3

Supply 33

2-4	Equilibrium 37 Application: Outlawing High Prices 41 Example 2-2: The High Cost of Price-Controlled Gas 44 Example 2-3: Gasoline and the Black Market 47 Application: Exposing the Speculator 50 Summary 56 References 57 Problems 58
Chapter Three	Price Elasticity: Measuring Response to Price 61
3-1	Introduction 61
3-2	Demand Elasticities 62 Example 3-1: Estimated Price Elasticities of Demand 68 Example 3-2: Price Elasticity of Demand for Gasoline and the Oil Company "Conspiracy" 74
3-3	Supply Elasticity 79 Application: "Undesirable" Goods, Prohibition, and Law Enforcement 80 Application: Does Crime Pay? 84
3-4	Example 3-3: Unemployment and Juvenile Delinquency 86 Summary 88 References 89 Problems 89
Chapter Four	Consumer Behavior 93
4-1	Introduction 93
4-2	Consumer Preferences 93
	Example 4–1: Experimentally Determined Indifference Curves 104
4–3	The Budget Constraint 110
4-4	Consumer Optimization 113
	Application: The Scarcity of Priceless Goods 118 Application: Capturing the Consumer's Surplus 122 Application: Charity Versus Corner Solutions 124 Application: Charity and Paternalism 126
4-5	Summary 128 References 130 Problems 131

4A-1 Introduction 133

Appendix: The Optimal Consumption Pattern Over Time

4A-2 4A-3 4A-4	Time Preference 133 The Interest Rate and the Budget Constraint 135 Optimal Consumption Pattern Over Time 137		
Chapte		The Theory Behind the Demand Curve	139
5-1 5-2 5-3	Introduction 139 Consumer Response to Changes in the Budget Const The Consumer's Demand Curve 143 Example 5-1: How Smart Do You Have to Be to Behave Rational		
5-4	The Productivity of Exchange 158 Application: An Introduction to Benefit-Cost Analyse Example 5-2: The Recreational Value of a Reservoir	sis 163 164 68	
5-5	Summary 172 References 174 Problems 174		
Chapte	er Six	Production	177
6-1	Introduction 177		
6-2	Factors of Production 177		
6-3	The Production Function 179 Example 6–1: Fertilizer Application and Potato Prod Application: Agriculture and Diminishing Returns Example 6–2: Obtaining Zero Population Growth Example 6–3: The Empirical Estimation of Isoquants	188 192	
6-4	Returns to Scale 199		
6-5	Technological Progress 200		
		202	
6-6	Summary 204 References 205 Problems 205		

Chapter Seven	
---------------	--

Production Cost Theory 207

7-1	Introduction 207	
7-2	The Concept of Cost 207	
7-3	The Optimal Input Combination 209	
7-4	Long-Run Cost 214	
7-5	Economies of Scale 218	
	Example 7–1: Electric Power Generation 220	
7-6	Short-Run Cost 222	
7-7	The Relationship Between Long-Run and Short-Run Costs 231	
	Application: The Construction of Long-Run Average Cost Curves	234
	Application: Optimal Gasoline Consumption 236	
	Application: Optimal Fertilizer Use 240	
7-8	Summary 241	
	References 243	

Appendix: Linear Programming

7A-1 Introduction 245
 7A-2 The Diet Problem 245
 7A-3 Other Linear Programming Problems 249

243

Problems

Chapter Eight

Perfect Competition 251

8-1	Introduction 251
8-2	The Assumptions of Perfect Competition 251
8-3	Demand in Perfect Competition 254
8-4	The Firm's Behavior in the Short Run 256
8-5	Short-Run Supply 260
8-6	Long-Run Equilibrium 265
	Example 8-1: Taxicabs in Chicago, Part I 268
8-7	Constant-Cost and Increasing-Cost Industries 271
	Example 8–2: Competition and Discrimination 272
	Application: Economic Rent 275
	Example 8-3: Short-Run Quasi-Rents to Professors 278
	Application: Long-Run Equilibrium in Agriculture 278
8-8	Summary 284
	References 285
	Problems 286

Chapter Nine

287

Pure Monopoly

UNTENTS		Хi

9-1	Introduction 287	
9-2	Monopoly Demand and Revenue 288	
9-3	Graphic Derivation of the Marginal Revenue Curve 291	
9-4	Market Equilibrium 295	
	Example 9–1: Taxicabs in Chicago, Part II 298	
9-5	Monopoly Supply 300	
9-6	Multiplant Monopoly 301	
9-7	Price Discrimination 305	
•	Example 9–2: Price Discrimination in Medicine 308	
	Example 9–3: Multipart Pricing by Utilities 310	
	Example 9–4: The Standard Oil Case 312	
9-8	Perfect Competition Versus Pure Monopoly 314	
	Application: The Social Cost of Monopoly 316	
9-9	Government Regulation of Monopoly 318	
9-10	The Application of Monopoly Theory	
	to Government Regulation 323	
	Application: The Borden Milk Case 324	
	Application: The Morton Salt Case 325	
	Application: The Utah Pie Case 326	
9-11	Summary 328	
	References 331	
	Problems 332	
Chapt	ter Ten Imperfect Competition	335
10-1	Introduction 335	
10-2	Monopolistic Competition 335	
10-3	Oligopoly 344	
.0 5	Example 10–1: Advertising and the Price of Eyeglasses 344	
10-4	Unorganized Oligopoly 346	
	Example 10–2: The Pricing Behavior of Oligopolists 348	
10-5	Organized Oligopoly 355	
	Example 10–3: Testing Administered Pricing Theory 356	
10-6	Cartels in Action 362	
	Application: The Great Electrical "Conspiracy" 362	
	Application: The Railroad Cartels 365	
	Application: The Oil Cartel 367	
10-7	Summary 369	
,	References 372	
	Problems 373	
	110bidiib 5/5	

Chapter Eleven

Market Distribution 375

11-1	Introduction 375
11-2	The Demand for Inputs Under Perfect Competition 375
11-3	The Demand for Inputs Under Imperfect Competition 381
	Example 11–1: Estimates of the Demand for Labor 384
11-4	Market Demand for Factor Inputs 385
11-5	The Supply of Factor Inputs 386
	Application: Overtime Pay 392
	Example 11–2: The Supply Curve of Physicians' Services 394
	Application: The Negative Income Tax 394
	Application: Income-Maintenance Experiments 400
11-6	Market Input Supply and Factor-Market Equilibrium 406
	Application: The Economic Effect of Illegal Aliens 406
	Example 11–3: Occupational Licensing and Factor Mobility 408
11-7	Monopsony 409
	Application: The Effects of Minimum-Wage Legislation 413
	Example 11–4: The Impact of Minimum-Wage Laws 416
11-8	The Distribution of Income 418
11-9	Summary 425
	References 428
	Problems 429
Chapter Turches	Malfava Faamamiss
Chapter Twelve	Welfare Economics
Chapter Twelve	Welfare Economics and General Equilibrium 429
Chapter Twelve	
•	and General Equilibrium 429
12-1	Introduction 429
12-1 12-2	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431
12-1	And General Equilibrium 429 Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition
12-1 12-2	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435
12-1 12-2	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440
12-1 12-2	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation:
12-1 12-2	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446
12-1 12-2 12-3	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448
12-1 12-2 12-3	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448 The Theory of the Second Best 454
12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448 The Theory of the Second Best 454
12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448 The Theory of the Second Best 454 Input-Output Economics 456
12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448 The Theory of the Second Best 454 Input—Output Economics 456 Application: The Welfare Cost of Excessive Medical Care 460
12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5	Introduction 429 Economic Efficiency 431 Efficiency and Perfect Competition in a General-Equilibrium Model 435 Example 12-1: Watering Down Efficiency with Water Pricing 440 Example 12-2: Trucking Regulation: The Political Popularity of Waste and Inefficiency 446 The Problem of Comparing Efficient Allocation Positions 448 The Theory of the Second Best 454 Input-Output Economics 456 Application: The Welfare Cost of Excessive Medical Care 460 Application: Blue Whales and Marginal Cost Pricing 462

Problems 471

473

515

Cnapt	er Thirteen Public Goods, Exter and Po	rnalities ollution
13-1	Introduction 473	
13-2	Public Goods 475	
	Example 13–1: Privately Supplying a Public Good:	
	The Lighthouse Case 480	
13-3	Externalities 486	
	Example 13–2: Eliminating Externalities	
	Through Business Arrangements 490	
13-4	Property Rights 492	
	Example 13–3: Establishing Property Rights 496	
	Application: Environmental Pollution 499	
13-5	Example 13-4: Pollution Taxation in Practice 508 Summary 509	
15-5	References 511	
	Problems 512	
	Problems 312	
Chapte	er Fourteen The Economic A	
	of Political Decision	Making
14-1	Introduction 515	
14-1 14-2	Introduction 515 Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516	
14-2	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516	
14-2 14-3	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518	
14-2	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522	
14-2 14-3	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518	
14-2 14-3	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14–1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy,	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14-3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14-3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14-3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541	
14-2 14-3 14-4	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14-3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544	
14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14–1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14–2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14–3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544 Problems 544	
14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14-1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14-2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14-3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544	548
14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14–1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14–2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14–3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544 Problems 544	548
14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14–1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14–2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14–3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544 Problems 544	548
14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5 14-6	Market Choice Versus Political Choice 516 Competing for Votes 518 Externalities and Voting Rules 522 Example 14–1: Voting Rules and the 1972 Democratic Presidential Primaries 528 Political Apathy, Representative Democracy, and the Influence of Special-Interest Groups 528 Example 14–2: The Popularity of Political Ignorance 532 Example 14–3: A Defense of the Bicameral Legislature 534 Application: The Economics of the Election Process 539 Summary 541 References 544 Problems 544	548

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS

Introduction 1-1

This textbook is about basic economic theory and how it is used to analyze economic problems. The theory is somewhat conceptual and abstract, but the economic problems we will consider are unfortunately quite real and concrete. The feeling is sometimes expressed that a practical-rather than a theoreticalapproach must be employed to address and understand real problems. What this view overlooks is that we are unable to formulate a practical approach if we do not understand the problem being considered-and all of our understanding is ultimately rooted in some theoretical structure. This opening chapter is intended to convey the concept of why theory is so important to our understanding of the real world and to provide an introduction to the ways in which economists theorize. The importance of theory will become increasingly evident as we progress through this book. We will develop theories and then apply them to practical problems that concern all of us, providing insights and understanding that will never be available to those who reject economic theory as impractical. As good theorists, however, we must first spend a little time defining our topic and looking at the types of questions that our definitions will lead us to consider.

What Is Economics? 1–2

Economics existed as a social science for many years before attempts were made to define it precisely. Once economists did begin to attempt to define the scope and nature of economics, they were often at odds with each other. In fact, the controversy over what economics is all about once reached such proportions that the Canadian economist Jacob Viner was prompted to quip, "Economics is what economists do." Although this may be an entertaining anecdote, it is not very satisfying to you as an economics student.

The English economist Alfred Marshall defined economics as the "study of mankind in the ordinary business of life." This was perhaps the most popular and widely used definition 60 years ago, but it fails to shed much light on the precise scope and nature of economics. Acknowledging the limitations of his definition, Marshall also remarked: "Every short statement about economics is misleading (with the possible exception of my present one)."

Recent definitions of economics have centered around aspects of the human condition, such as unlimited human wants versus the scarcity of resources available to satisfy these wants. The economist chiefly responsible for this approach to the problem of defining economics, Lord Lionel Robbins, states in his path-breaking book *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science*:1

Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.

Most contemporary definitions of the scope and nature of economics are merely elaborations and extensions of Lord Robbins' basic thought. For example, consider today's most widely read definition of economics, written by Nobel Laureate Paul A. Samuelson:

Economics is the study of how men and society end up *choosing*, with or without the use of money, to employ *scarce* productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society. It analyzes the costs and benefits of improving patterns of resource allocation.²

Throughout this book, we will demonstrate that Samuelson's (and our) definition of **economics** is applicable to all forms of conscious human action, ranging from such common, everyday problems as deciding how to allocate our time to the very important questions concerning the protection and quality of the environment in which we live.

The Fundamental Economic Problem

As more specific definitions of economics evolved, it became increasingly clear that one fundamental problem lies at the heart of all economic problems—the problem of **scarcity**. We are simply unable to convert our limited resources into all the goods and services we wish to consume. No matter how productive we become, or how many new resources we discover, we will still want more than what is available.

Economics has often been called the "dismal science"-a description first

¹Lionel Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1935), p. 16.

²Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics*, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973), p. 3.

applied by the Scottish historian Sir Thomas Carlyle in the early nineteenth century. There is an element of truth in Carlyle's remark, but this is not because economics is dull and uninteresting. Far from it. Any subject that deals with such a range of interesting problems could hardly be called dull. Economics is dismal only in the sense that the conclusions economists ultimately reach are often gloomy. Economic theory can guide us in the more efficient use of our resources, create more productive employment opportunities, and produce more wealth, but the end result will always be the same. Because resources are scarce, we will always be denied many things we would dearly enjoy having. So in some respects, economics is like the messenger who brings bad news, and many people resist the conclusions of economic analysis for the same reason that the king killed the messenger. Unfortunately, neither tactic changes the message.

An immediate implication of scarcity is that choices must be made and that each choice will be a costly one. Every time we choose to have more of one good, we are choosing to consume less of some other desirable commodity, and the value of this *sacrificed consumption* is the **opportunity cost** of every choice that is made. The economists' message is that every decision involves a cost—a message captured in the statement, popular among economists, that "there is no such thing as a free lunch." When someone begins talking about the benefits that will be realized from the expansion of a program or project, the economist is trained to point out that the resulting benefits can only be acquired by diverting resources from the production of other desirable goods and services. This does not make economists universally popular, of course; people often do not care to be reminded that their pet projects have disadvantages as well as advantages.

But if we are to make intelligent economic decisions, it is essential to consider opportunity cost. A rather obvious objective of any economy is to put available resources to use in the most valuable ways possible. The problem of scarcity can then be translated into the problem of directing limited resources into activities where they will be most valuably used. To do this, we must determine the value of a resource in each of its many possible employments, so that we can calculate the opportunity cost of each resource decision. A desirable resource decision directs that a resource be used where it will provide the most value—that is, where its value will exceed its cost.

Microeconomics

The branch of economics concerned with how individuals deal with the problem of scarcity is **microeconomics**. The analysis in this textbook will focus on individual decision makers and how they attempt to achieve their goals in their roles as consumers and producers. Understanding how consumers and producers behave and how their behaviors interact will help us understand how the economic process determines what goods will be produced, who will produce them, how they will be produced, and where they will be distributed. These are the basic questions that are answered by microeconomic analysis.