



SELECTED WORKS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume II

**WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!**



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OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG**

**Volume II**

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**THE PERIOD OF  
THE WAR OF RESISTANCE  
AGAINST JAPAN (I)**



# POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RESISTING THE JAPANESE INVASION

*July 23, 1937*

## I. TWO POLICIES

On July 8, the day after the Lukouchiao Incident,<sup>1</sup> the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a manifesto to the whole nation calling for a war of resistance. The manifesto reads in part:

Fellow-countrymen! Peiping and Tientsin are in peril! Northern China is in peril! The Chinese nation is in peril! A war of resistance by the whole nation is the only way out. We demand immediate and resolute resistance to the invading Japanese armies and immediate preparations to meet all emergencies. From top to bottom the whole nation must at once abandon any idea of being able to live in submissive peace with the Japanese aggressors. Fellow-countrymen! We should acclaim and support the heroic resistance of Feng Chih-an's troops. We should acclaim and support the declaration of the local authorities of northern China that they will defend the homeland to the death. We demand that General

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On July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperialists staged the Lukouchiao Incident in their attempt to annex the whole of China by armed force. The Chinese people unanimously demanded war against Japan. Ten days elapsed before Chiang Kai-shek tardily made a public statement at Lushan announcing armed resistance to Japan. He did so under nation-wide popular pressure and as a result of the serious blow the Japanese invasion had dealt to the interests both of the British and U.S. imperialists in China and of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie whom Chiang Kai-shek directly represented. But at the same time the Chiang Kai-shek government continued to parley with the Japanese aggressors and even accepted the so-called peaceful settlements they concluded with local authorities. It was not until August 13, 1937, when the Japanese aggressors launched a major attack on Shanghai and

Sung Cheh-yuan immediately mobilize the entire 29th Army<sup>2</sup> and send it into action at the front. Of the Central Government in Nanking we demand the following: Give effective aid to the 29th Army. Immediately lift the ban on patriotic movements among the masses and let the people give full play to their enthusiasm for armed resistance. Immediately mobilize all the country's land, sea and air forces for action. Immediately weed out all the hidden traitors and Japanese agents in China and so consolidate our rear. We call on the people of the whole country to throw all their strength behind the sacred war of self-defence against Japan. Our slogans are: Armed defence of Peiping, Tientsin and northern China! Defend our homeland to the last drop of our blood! Let the people of the whole country, the government, and the armed forces unite and build up the national united front as our solid Great Wall of resistance to Japanese aggression! Let the Kuomintang and the Communist Party closely co-operate and resist the new attacks of the Japanese aggressors! Drive the Japanese aggressors out of China!

This is a declaration of policy.

On July 17, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek made a statement at Lushan. Setting out as it did a policy of preparing for a war of resistance, the statement was the Kuomintang's first correct declaration on foreign affairs for many years and it has consequently been welcomed by all our countrymen as well as by ourselves. The statement listed four conditions for the settlement of the Lukouchiao Incident:

(1) Any settlement must not infringe China's sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) there must be no unlawful change in the administrative structure of Hopei and Chahar Provinces; (3) there must be no dismissal and replacement, at the demand of others,

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thus made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his rule in southeastern China, that he was compelled to embark on armed resistance; but Chiang never ceased his clandestine attempts to make peace with Japan right up to 1944. Throughout the War of Resistance Chiang Kai-shek opposed all-out people's war in which the entire people are mobilized, and pursued the reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan but actively opposing the Communist Party and the people; thus his actions completely violated his own Lushan statement that "once war breaks out, every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland". The two policies, two sets of measures and two perspectives discussed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this article reflect the struggle between the line of the Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek's line in the War of Resistance.

of local officials appointed by the Central Government; (4) the 29th Army must not be confined to the area in which it is now stationed.

The concluding remarks of the statement read:

Concerning the Lukouchiao Incident, the government has decided on a policy and a stand to which it will always adhere. We realize that when the whole nation goes to war, sacrifices to the bitter end will be called for, and we should not cherish the faintest hope of an easy way out. Once war breaks out, every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland.

This, too, is a declaration of policy.

Here we have two historic political declarations on the Lukouchiao Incident, one by the Communist Party and the other by the Kuomintang. They have this point in common: both stand for a resolute war of resistance and oppose compromise and concessions.

This is one kind of policy for meeting Japanese invasion, the correct policy.

But there is the possibility of the adoption of another kind of policy. In recent months the traitors and the pro-Japanese elements in Peiping and Tientsin have been very active, they have been trying to get the local authorities to acquiesce in Japan's demands, they have been undermining the policy of resolute armed resistance and advocating compromise and concessions. These are extremely dangerous signs.

The policy of compromise and concessions is the diametrical opposite of the policy of resolute armed resistance. If it is not speedily reversed, Peiping, Tientsin and the whole of northern China will fall into the hands of the enemy, and the entire nation will be seriously imperilled. Everyone must be on the alert.

Patriotic officers and men of the 29th Army, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and conduct resolute armed resistance!

Fellow patriots of Peiping, Tientsin and northern China, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and support resolute armed resistance!

Fellow patriots throughout the country, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and support resolute armed resistance!

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and all patriotic members of the Kuomintang! We hope that you will firmly adhere to your policy, fulfil your promises,



oppose compromise and concessions, conduct resolute armed resistance, and thus answer the outrages of the enemy with deeds.

Let all the armed forces in the country, including the Red Army, support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration, oppose compromise and concessions and conduct resolute armed resistance!

We Communists are whole-heartedly and faithfully carrying out our own manifesto, and at the same time we resolutely support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration; together with the members of the Kuo-mintang and all our fellow-countrymen, we are ready to defend the homeland to the last drop of our blood; we oppose any hesitation, vacillation, compromise or concessions, and will conduct resolute armed resistance.

## II. TWO SETS OF MEASURES

To achieve its purpose the policy of resolute armed resistance calls for a whole set of measures.

What are they? The principal ones are the following:

1. *Mobilize all the armed forces of the whole country.* Mobilize our standing armed forces of well over two million men, including the land, sea and air forces, the Central Army, the local troops and the Red Army, and immediately send the main forces to the national defence lines, while keeping some forces in the rear to maintain order. Entrust the command on the various fronts to generals loyal to the national interests. Call a national defence conference to decide on strategy and to achieve unity of purpose in military operations. Overhaul the political work in the army in order to achieve unity between officers and men and between the army and the people. Establish the principle that guerrilla warfare should carry the responsibility for one aspect of the strategic task, and ensure proper co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare. Weed out traitors from the army. Call up an adequate number of reserves and train them for service at the front. Adequately replenish the equipment and supplies of the armed forces. Military plans on these lines must be made, in keeping with the general policy of resolute armed resistance. China's troops are far from few, but unless these plans are executed, they will not be able to defeat the enemy. However, if the political and material factors are combined, our armed forces will become unmatched in East Asia.