
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE REGIONS OF RUSSIA

DEMOCRACY UNCLAIMED

GRIGORII V. GOLOSOV

Political Parties in the Regions of Russia

DEMOCRACY UNCLAIMED

Grigorii V. Golosov



BOULDER
LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 2004 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2004 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Golosov, Grigorii.

Political parties in the regions of Russia : democracy unclaimed / Grigorii V. Golosov.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58826-217-0 (alk. paper)

1. Political parties—Russia (Federation) 2. Russia (Federation)—Politics and
government—1991– 3. Political culture—Russia (Federation) 4. Democracy—Russia
(Federation) 5. Democratization—Russia (Federation) I. Title.

JN6699.A795G565 2003

2003047047

British Cataloguing in Publication Data

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

⊗ The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the financial support of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., which granted me a fellowship from September 2002 to May 2003. Of the organizations that supported this decade-long project in the earlier phases of its implementation, I would like to extend my gratitude to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Research Council of Norway, and the Central European University, Budapest. I also wish to acknowledge the advice and assistance provided to me at my home institution, the European University at St. Petersburg. I am particularly indebted to Vladimir Gel'man, who gave unstintingly of his profound knowledge of Russia's regional politics, and to Iulia Shevchenko, who helped me both as a scholar, by giving me valuable advice, and as my wife, by supporting me throughout the project. I would also like to thank two anonymous manuscript readers for their suggestions, and my research assistants at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Bram Caplan and Caroline Savage, for their help. Those errors of fact and interpretation that remain in the book, as well as the views expressed, are entirely mine.


Acronyms of Political Parties

APR	Agrarian Party of Russia
ChR	Honor and Motherland
DPR	Democratic Party of Russia
DVR	Democratic Russia's Choice
KPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
KPRSYa	Communist Party of the Republic of Sakha–Yakutia
KPRT	Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan
KPS	Kuznetsov–Polozov–Savitskii: Together for the Sake of the Future
KPSS	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
KRO	Congress of Russian Communities
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
NDNG	Our Home Is Our City
NDR	Our Home Is Russia
NPRF	People's Party of the Russian Federation
NPSR	Popular Patriotic Union of Russia
OKS	All-Russian Coordination Council
PES	Party of Economic Freedom
PPR	Orthodox Party of Russia
PRES	Party of Russian Unity and Accord
PST	Party of Workers Self-Government
RDDR	Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms
RiZ	Equal Rights and Legality
RKRP	Russian Communist Workers Party
RNRP	Russian Popular Republican Party
ROS	Russian All-People's Union
RPRF	Republican Party of the Russian Federation
SDPR	Social Democratic Party of Russia
SPP	Social Help and Support
SPS	Union of Right Forces
VR	Russia's Choice
ZPN	For Genuine People's Power, Civil Peace, and the Interests of the Man of Toil
ZVU	For the Rebirth of the Urals

Regions of the Russian Federation



- | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Adygeia | 16. Chuvashia | 31. Kahbarovsk |
| 2. Aginskoe Buriat | 17. Dagestan | 32. Khakasia |
| 3. Altia territory | 18. Evenk | 33. Khanty-Mansi |
| 4. Altia republic | 19. Ingushetia | 34. Kirov |
| 5. Amur | 20. Irkutsk | 35. Komi |
| 6. Arkhangel'sk | 21. Ivanovo | 36. Komi-Permiak |
| 7. Astrakhan | 22. Jewish autonomy | 37. Koriak |
| 8. Bashkortostan | 23. Kabardino-Balkaria | 38. Kostroma |
| 9. Belgorod | 24. Kaliningrad | 39. Krasnodar |
| 10. Briansk | 25. Kalmykia | 40. Krasnoiorsk |
| 11. Buriatia | 26. Kaluga | 41. Kurgan |
| 12. Chechnya | 27. Kamchatka | 42. Kursk |
| 13. Cheliabinsk | 28. Karachaevo-Cherkesia | 43. Leningrad |
| 14. Chita | 29. Karelia | 44. Lipetsk |
| 15. Chukotka | 30. Kemerova | 45. Magadan |



- | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| 46. Marii El | 61. Primorskii | 76. Tiumen |
| 47. Mordovia | 62. Pskov | 77. Tomsk |
| 48. Moscow city | 63. Riazan | 78. Tula |
| 49. Moscow province | 64. Rostov | 79. Tver |
| 50. Murmansk | 65. Sakha | 80. Tyva |
| 51. Nenets | 66. Sakhalin | 81. Udmurtia |
| 52. Nizhnii Novgorod | 67. Samara | 82. Ul'ianovsk |
| 53. North Ossetia | 68. Saratov | 83. Ust-Ordynskoe Buriat |
| 54. Novgorod | 69. Smolensk | 84. Vladimir |
| 55. Novosibirsk | 70. St. Petersburg | 85. Volgograd |
| 56. Omsk | 71. Stavropol | 86. Vologda |
| 57. Orel | 72. Sverdlovsk | 87. Voronezh |
| 58. Orenburg | 73. Taimyr | 88. Yamalo-Nenets |
| 59. Penza | 74. Tambov | 89. Yaroslavl |
| 60. Perm | 75. Tatarstan | |

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
<i>Acronyms of Political Parties</i>	xv
<i>Map: Regions of the Russian Federation</i>	xvi–xvii
1 Introduction	1
2 National Political Parties in Russia	19
3 Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: An Empirical Overview	57
4 The Supply Side: Party Labels and Party Resources	91
5 The Demand Side: Candidates Seeking Office	127
6 The Demand Side: Executive Control and Legislative Autonomy	161
7 The Effects of Electoral Systems	207
8 Political Engineering vs. Party Underdevelopment	245
<i>References</i>	285
<i>Index</i>	299
<i>About the Book</i>	307

Tables

2.1	Results of the 1993 Elections to the State Duma of Russia	34
2.2	Results of the 1995 Elections to the State Duma of Russia	38
2.3	Results of the 1999 Elections to the State Duma of Russia	43
3.1	Regional Legislative Elections in Russia, 1991–2003, by Electoral Cycle and Year	63
3.2	Regional Legislative Elections in Russia, 1993–2003, by Region	63
3.3	Regional Executive Elections in Russia, 1991–2003, by Electoral Cycle and Year	66
3.4	Regional Executive Elections in Russia, 1995–2003, by Region	66
3.5	Political Parties in Regional Executive Elections, 1995–2003	71
3.6	Regions in Which Party Nominees Won the Largest Shares of the Vote in Regional Executive Elections, 1995–2003	72
3.7	Political Parties in Regional Legislative Elections, 1993–2003	73
3.8	Regions in Which Party Nominees Won the Largest Shares of Seats in Regional Legislative Elections, 1993–2003	74
3.9	Empirical Indicators of Party Activity and Success in the First-Cycle Regional Legislative Elections, 1993–1995	83
3.10	Empirical Indicators of Party Activity and Success in the Second-Cycle Regional Legislative Elections, 1995–1999	85
3.11	Empirical Indicators of Party Activity and Success in the Third-Cycle Regional Legislative Elections, 1999–2003	87
4.1	Average Numbers of Organizations Entitled to Nominate Their Candidates and Registered Regionally, 1995–2001	95
4.2	Branches of National Political Parties in Ten Selected Regions, ca. December 2001	96
4.3	KPRF Performance in National and Regional Legislative Elections, 1993–2003	102
4.4	Numbers of Regional Legislative Elections in Which Candidates of the KPRF Conglomerate Contested the Specified Percentage Shares of Plurality/Majority Seats, by Electoral Cycle, 1995–2003	103

4.5	Participation of Unity in Regional Legislative Elections, December 2001–September 2002	110
5.1	Results of Regional Legislative Elections by Party Lists in Sverdlovsk Province, 1996–2002	133
5.2	Intraelite Conflicts and Party Formation in the Regions of Russia, by Electoral Cycle, 1995–2003	137
5.3	Factors of Incumbents' Electoral Success in the Second- and Third-Cycle Regional Executive Elections, 1995–2003	145
5.4	Occupational Backgrounds of Regional Legislators and Party Representation by Occupational Categories, 1995–1999	155
5.5	Occupational Backgrounds of Regional Legislators by Political Affiliations, 1995–1999	156
6.1	Legislative Appointment Powers in the Regions of Russia, Average Scores, ca. 2001	174
6.2	Legislative Appointment Powers and Legislative Leaders' Success in the First Direct Executive Elections in the Republics of Russia, 1991–2000	174
6.3	Numbers of Regions with the Identified Scores of Legislative Appointment Powers, ca. 2001	175
6.4	Administrative-Territorial Districts and Bicameralism in the Republics of Russia, 1993–2001	178
6.5	Occupational Composition of the Legislative Chambers of Bashkortostan, 1995 and 1999, Percentage Shares	179
6.6	Institutional Design and Districting in the Regions of Russia, ca. 2001	181
6.7	Committee Structures in Fifteen Regional Legislative Assemblies Elected in the Second Electoral Cycle, 1995–1999	197
7.1	Electoral Systems in the Regions of Russia, Percentage Shares by Electoral Cycle, 1993–2003	217
7.2	Electoral Systems and Party Representation in Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies, 1993–2003	224
7.3	Electoral Systems and Representation of the KPRF Conglomerate in Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies, 1993–2003	225
7.4	Electoral Systems and Representation of Noncommunist Parties in Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies, 1993–2003	226
7.5	Candidates, Votes, and Seats in the 1998 Elections in Krasnodar Territory	228
7.6	Candidates, Votes, and Seats in the 2001 Elections in Kamchatka Province	229

7.7	Total Percentages of the Vote Cast in Multimember District Elections in Five Regions of Russia	231
7.8	Candidates, Votes, and Seats in the 1998 Elections in St. Petersburg	234
7.9	Candidates, Votes, and Seats in the 2002 Elections in Saratov Province	240
8.1	Factors of Party Development in the Regions of Russia, First Electoral Cycle, 1993–1995	250
8.2	Factors of Party Development in the Regions of Russia, Second Electoral Cycle, 1995–1999	252
8.3	Factors of Party Development in the Regions of Russia, Third Electoral Cycle, 1999–2003	253

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to examine the systemic disincentives to party formation in the regions of Russia. An influential approach in political science stipulates the indispensability of political parties for democratic development (Lipset 2000: 48) by equating "modern democracy" to "party democracy" (Katz 1980: 1). In a similar vein, many scholars contend that parties are essential to the process of democratic consolidation (Pridham 1990: 2). Weakly institutionalized party systems seriously impede democratic development, because without institutionalized political parties, democracies tend not to fare well on such important parameters as citizen involvement, policy stability and accountability, leadership recruitment and turnover, political legitimacy, and democratic survivability in general (Mainwaring 1999: 323–341). Yet more than ten years after the collapse of authoritarian rule, and well after the arrival of relatively free and fair sub-national elections, the very existence of political parties in the regions of Russia remains questionable. From this point of view, democracy in the regions of Russia remains unclaimed.

Outline of the Book

My definition of "political party" ultimately descends from the categorization of Downs (1957: 25): a party is "a team of men [and women] seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in duly constituted elections." Epstein (1966: 104) clarified this definition by adding that "the recognizable label . . . is the crucial defining element." The model of party competition advanced by Downs assumes that voters are motivated exclusively by policy considerations. At the same time, however, they are rational individuals who want to minimize costs entailed by electoral choice, which means that they are not inclined to waste their time examining party programs and scrutinizing candidate profiles. They need information shortcuts from their policy preferences to individual candidates. Downs himself was inclined to believe that such information shortcuts were, in fact, ide-

ologies (Hinich and Munger 1994), which was an entirely plausible assumption given that Downs limited his analysis to two-party competition. In multiparty competition, however, party labels not only signify divergent ideologies but also play the role of information shortcuts. In other words, they serve as coordination devices that allow voters to coalesce on their policy preferences. Thus in this book, a political party is any group that contests elections under its own label.

From this perspective, party formation means that instead of contesting elections as independents, politicians either join existing parties or coalesce to form new ones. This fairly self-explanatory concept, however, is rarely used in comparative political research. Instead, a large and increasing number of scholars prefer to speak of party institutionalization, which, as defined by Huntington (1965: 394), is the process by which parties become established and acquire value and stability. In Russia and the majority of other post-Soviet countries, at least on the subnational level, the central question is not the degree of parties' ideological or organizational cohesion but rather the lack of important parties as such. In other words, what matters in these democracies is not why political parties have or have not managed to acquire value and stability, but why they have or have not become established. Ironically enough, the few studies that have examined party formation empirically have so far dealt not with new democracies that produce massive evidence on the subject, but rather with fairly old democracies in the early times of their existence, such as Victorian Britain (Cox 1987) and the pre-Civil War United States (Aldrich 1995).¹ My study, while heavily relying on this work for theoretical insight, deals with very contemporary social settings characterized, for instance, by the presence of the electronic mass media. Thus it is intended to add the present to the small body of research on party formation that is already in existence.

When approaching the principal question of my study, I assume that political parties emerge as a product of politicians' self-interest. As Aldrich (1995: 24) put it, "politicians turn to their political party—that is use its powers, resources, and institutional forms—when they believe doing so increases their prospects for winning desired outcomes, and they turn from it if it does not." This assumption leads me to a strongly elite-centered perspective on party formation in Russia. In an influential strain of literature on democratic transitions, elites emerge as principal actors who ultimately determine both the direction of political transformations and their outcomes (Higley and Burton 1989). From this perspective, the major difference between Russia and many other new democracies, including postcommunist ones, is a remarkably low level of elite change after political regime transformation (Gel'man and Tarusina 2000). As demonstrated by Cox (1986), political parties started to command the majority of the vote in Britain not earlier than the power of the individual members of parliament

eroded. In a similar vein, it may be expected that the vast resources inherited by the post-Soviet elite from the past, when successfully converted into electoral advantages, emerged as an obstacle to party formation. Leaving the empirical elaboration and refinement of this expectation for further analysis, at this moment I would like to emphasize its importance for the overall explanatory framework employed in this study. If political parties were the only kind of agencies that could be successfully employed for securing individual electoral success, then their emergence simultaneously with the arrival of electoral institutions could be taken for granted. If, however, elites can rely upon alternative resources that can be utilized in the electoral arenas, this creates a situation where the costs and benefits of party affiliation are weighted against those of nonpartisanship.

While following Downs (1957) and Aldrich (1995) in identifying electoral success as the major goal of politicians and thereby as the primary incentive for party formation, I extend the set of incentives to be analyzed by introducing an additional dimension that concerns the regions' institutional design. Indeed, as rules that constrain political behavior (Carey 2000), institutions determine the scope of available means and thereby shape the goals of politicians. The vast majority of Russia's regions use constitutional models that involve separation of powers between directly elected chief executives and legislative assemblies. Correspondingly, my analysis deals with two principal kinds of political actors, the executives and the legislators. For the executives, to maximize power means to maximize control over the legislature. For the legislators, to maximize power means to maximize legislative autonomy. I also discuss electoral system effects and current efforts by Russia's federal authorities to "engineer" the development of party systems at the regional level.

The logic described above determines the organization of this book. In Chapter 2, I describe and analyze Russia's national political parties and party system. I begin with an examination of the origins of Russia's political parties in the period when they were not able to participate in elections. Then I analyze the activities of individual political parties that were active in Russia in 1993–2003. My analysis demonstrates that in 1993–2003, the institutional and political conditions of Russia remained unfavorable for party formation. The set of factors that, in one way or another, suppressed party formation included presidentialism, the lack of party-structured elections coincidental with the event of regime change ("founding elections"), certain characteristics of the electorate, and the ban on Communist Party activities imposed by the national executive in 1991. Thus when placed into a cross-national perspective, Russia's party system can be characterized as excessively fragmented and excessively volatile, while the influence of national political parties over the presidency and federal government seems to be negligible. At the same time, political parties seem to be rapidly

developing in the electorate, and they did manage to emerge as principal agencies of democratic decisionmaking in the national legislature. In both capacities, they have strong incentives for territorial penetration. Thus the lack of territorial penetration suggests the existence of region-level factors that effectively resist it.

Chapter 3 systematically presents empirical evidence on the lack of party penetration. The regularity of Russia's regional elections, both executive and legislative, was established in parallel with the country's slow drift toward symmetrical federalism. The pattern of holding regular regional legislative elections was evident already over 1993–1995 and remained stable since then, while regional executive elections were being held on a relatively regular basis starting in 1995. Detailed information on regional elections presented in the chapter includes aggregate evidence on the levels of activity and success of political parties. Then I present and analyze the data on individual parties. The analysis demonstrates that the role of political parties in regional elections remained small throughout the whole period, and it tended to decrease in 1999–2003. The overall pattern of party activity in the regions seems to gradually stabilize, but is supplemented with a high degree of changeability in the compositions of individual political parties present in the regions. Overall, the evidence presented in the chapter suggests that in the majority of Russia's regions, the services offered by political parties remain out of demand.

I begin Chapter 4 by testing a possible alternative interpretation of the data, according to which the services of political parties are unavailable rather than out of demand. Given the low level of their electoral success, political parties may be simply absent in the regions. The chapter demonstrates that such an explanation is not valid. In fact, what is observable in the regions is the oversupply of party labels. I argue that oversupply effectively inflates the cost of affiliation with political parties, thus undermining the process of party formation. Then I proceed to demonstrate that even those parties that are generally viewed as strong enough to provide valuable support to their candidates are not actually in capacity to contest every elected office. This happens for a constellation of reasons involving the relatively low social standing of party activists, the organizational properties of parties, and coalition politics. Finally, I briefly examine services offered by political parties to candidates in regional elections. I demonstrate that while party affiliations may be useful for the majority of candidates, there are numerous and easily available alternatives to the services parties can offer. In this connection, I analyze the role of money and paid campaign organizers in Russia's regional elections. The general conclusion of the chapter is that party labels are quite in supply, but few of them are in demand; those party resources that are actually demanded are in scarce supply; and there are viable alternatives to almost anything a party can offer.

Chapter 5 shifts the focus of my analysis to the demand side. Proceeding from the assumption that political parties are valued as means of achieving electoral success, I examine the utility of political parties in Russia from this specific standpoint. I start with the argument that political parties cannot be expected to be very useful under conditions when electoral outcomes are predetermined. For parties to exist, a certain level of uncertainty is a necessary condition. Uncertainty, in turn, stems from conflicts within the elites. Thus intraelite conflicts emerge as the first topic of the chapter. My analysis demonstrates that they do indeed serve as basic preconditions for party formation. However, the principal participants in the majority of such conflicts tend to rely upon superior resources provided by their institutional affiliations. In executive elections, these resources substitute for party affiliations in two senses. First, by ensuring the organizational and financial superiority of their holders, they allow them to conduct electoral campaigns without party assistance. Second, information conveyed to the voters by the labels attached to institutions and businesses is at least as valuable as information conveyed by party labels. The same applies to regional legislative elections, where party affiliation is most likely to be skipped by those categories of candidates who have something else to rely upon. In fact, in these smaller and less important electoral arenas, available substitutes for party affiliation tend to proliferate, as the advantages of administrative and economic power become complemented with the advantages of social capital.

Chapter 6 examines the second aspect of party utility, the use of political parties for maintaining and maximizing power within varying institutional contexts. I begin with a description and analysis of the formal institutions in the regions of Russia. The analysis demonstrates that while clear manifestations of presidentialism can be found in some of the regions, this is not the case in many others, and that the most widespread constitutional model on the regional level of Russia's politics is semipresidentialism. Rather than facilitating party development, this exacerbates the regional executives' will to place legislatures under their political control and thereby makes conditions for party formation even worse. On the one hand, regional executives find institutional ways of preventing party development, as exemplified by the use of bicameralism and administrative-territorial electoral districts in many of the republics. On the other hand, the political mechanisms of establishing executive control over the assemblies involve political parties only rarely. While prone to external political control, the regional assemblies are nevertheless capable of achieving certain degrees of legislative autonomy. Politically loyal deputies do not necessarily lack their own policy agendas. Quite the reverse, the opportunity to pursue these policy agendas motivates them to seek legislative seats, with political loyalty to the executive being delivered in exchange. My analysis

demonstrates that the policy domain within which such agendas can be set and pursued is the economy. Yet for this to be achieved, regional legislatures develop committee structures rather than party structures, which makes party affiliation irrelevant on the assembly floor.

In Chapter 7, I examine how different modifications of individual candidacy-based plurality-majority rules, as well as combinations of these rules with proportional representation, influence party formation in the regions. I begin by providing factual information about the history of the adoption, technical characteristics, and relative spread of different electoral formulas in the regions of Russia. Then I analyze some of the findings established in comparative electoral system research and juxtapose them with Russia's political reality, which leads me to a number of theoretical expectations regarding the effects of different electoral formulas upon party formation. Findings presented in the chapter suggest that that proportional representation supports party formation not only mechanically, by excluding independents from the electoral arenas, but also, in mixed systems, by way of the interaction of their plurality-majority and proportional tiers. At the same time, each of the observable modifications of plurality-majority rules is more favorable for party formation than the dominant system, single-member plurality. I explain this phenomenon by developing a model that incorporates these systems' ability to set lower effective thresholds and to enhance the information value of party labels, thus facilitating the entry of party candidates and their electoral success. Thus it is not by accident that by 2003 single-member plurality established itself as a prevalent system in regional legislative elections.

In Chapter 8, I bring different causal factors together by developing and statistically testing a comprehensive explanatory model of party underdevelopment in the regions of Russia. The model incorporates intraelite conflicts, electoral system effects, voter preferences, and a number of control variables commonly featured in ecological analyses of Russian politics. On this basis, I proceed to discuss the prospects of inducing party formation by means of political engineering. First, I identify incentives that drive national political actors to pursue strategies aimed at accelerating party formation in the regions. These incentives, while different for the executive and for the legislature, are nevertheless sufficiently strong and mutually compatible to make them coalesce. In this connection, I examine two major innovations, party reform and regional electoral system reform. While political engineering is a persistent topic of certain strains of political research, to my knowledge there are few studies of actual cases of political engineering. From this perspective, many aspects of the interrelated party and electoral system reforms in contemporary Russia—the formation of proreform coalitions, the resistance of antireform actors, and their early attempts at adaptation to the changing institutional environments—are of