Art and Psyche

A Study in Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics

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Yale University Press
New Haven and London

Designed by Nancy Ovedovitz and set in VIP Galliard type by Rainsford Type. Printed in the United States of America by Vail-Ballou Press, Binghamton, N.Y.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Spitz, Ellen Handler, 1939–
Art and psyche.

Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Psychoanalysis and art. I. Title.
N72.P74S65 1985 701'.05 85–2281
ISBN 0–300–03372–9

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Preface

The general aim of this book is to make a modest contribution to what has been an ongoing dialogue between psychoanalysis and aesthetics for some seventy-five years. The study divides into two major sections. After the Introduction, chapters 2 and 3 deal with pathography, Freud's term for the psychoanalytic investigation of the relations between an artist's life and works and for interpretations based on these relations. This section, intended as a critique, is expository in nature. Chapters 4 and 5 look beyond pathography toward newer models, which are more open to speculation. My arguments in these two chapters are therefore more tentative and meant to encourage further investigations into many of the topics raised. In adopting this open-ended approach, I invoke the precept of Freud, who recommended that interdisciplinary studies relating psychoanalysis to other fields serve best as "an instigation, offering suggestions to specialists which they may [then choose to] take into account in their own researches" (1913, p. 75).

Almost from its origins, psychoanalytic theory has been applied outside the clinical sphere to works of art and used as a mode of understanding in at least three areas of major concern to aestheticians: namely, (1) the nature of the creative work and experience of the artist, (2) the interpretation of works of art, and (3) the nature of the aesthetic encounter with works of art. Unlike the clinician, the applied psychoanalyst does not undertake his project in response to a presenting complaint; he has no therapeutic goal; he lacks the interpersonal context for his own evolving transferences; in the absence of any live confrontational opportunities, his interpretations lack the intersubjective validation essential to clinical practice (and yet, as hermeneuticists argue, there is dialogue here as well). Thus, the applied psychoanalyst differs from the clinician in his motives (nontherapeutic), his methods, and his goals. Or does he? What is the rationale of the psychoanalyst who applies his theories in the aesthetic realm? What are his particular intentions? How are his methods determined? Are there criteria outside the clinical sphere for the evaluation of alternative psychoanalytic interpretations? Or can each alternative usefully critique the others?

One way of epitomizing this problem is to consider the *context* in which such nonclinical psychoanalytic interpretations take place. Frequently, psychoanalysts have met with an uncongenial reception by artists, critics, philosophers, and other scholars when they have ventured into the aesthetic domain. I submit that part of the reason for such misapprehension turns on this matter of context, on a failure to consider boundaries. Psychoanalytic authors are often unclear—both implicity and explicity—about precisely what aesthetic problems they are addressing. In the absence of such clarity—in the absence, for example, of stated criteria for what constitutes relevant theory or data—it is not unreasonable for outsiders to regard their interpretations as unilluminating or gratuitous.

My task then, is to present a survey of the shifting perimeters of psychoanalytic interpretation in the arts and to demonstrate that the ways in which analytic theory has defined context from early in the century up to now find striking parallels in both aesthetics and the history of criticism. If such parallels can be made explicit, if the context in a given psychoanalytic interpretation can be described and correlated with a specific aesthetic problem and a critical framework, then the foundations are further developed for future interdisciplinary dialogue. I offer here a series of three paradigms, each based on a specific definition of context. Each paradigm coordinates three variables: an aspect of psychoanalytic theory, an aesthetic problem, and a critical mode.

I have chosen to deal with mainstream theoreticians whose work can be traced directly to Freud and whose writings form the staple of what is currently taught and studied in the major American psychoanalytic institutes. I include no mention of divergent theories (for example, those of Jung, Adler, and Horney). Nor do I discuss the work of Lacan. Although it is currently much in vogue among certain literary critics, I feel that to treat his work adequately would be to go too far afield in the present study.

The first model, pathography, arose in the earliest stage of psychoanalysis, when Freud's major interest was in discovering the contents of the dynamic unconscious. Typified by the Leonardo da Vinci study of 1910, this model takes as its interpretative context the work of art plus whatever can be known about the artist's life and larger oeuvre. Emphasis is placed on conflict and repetition, and the theoretical base typically involves classical Freudian theory, that is, the analysis of drives and drive derivatives, reconstruction, and the oedipal constellation. This model is equipped to address such aesthetic issues as artistic cr· ·tivity, the precise relations between an artist's life and work, and artistic i· ·ntion and expression. Romantic criticism, with its emphasis on the centra· ·y of the artist's experience—as opposed to earlier emphases on art's instruc· ·ve or seductive capacity vis-á-vis an audience—correlates with this model.

The second ·odel of psychoanalytic interpretation takes as its context the work of art c· ·ceived as autonomous and constituted by its own internal

relations. The artist's experience is deemed irrelevant. The theoretical base enlarges to include ego psychology, which analyzes the relatively autonomous functions of the ego, with its organized and stable patterns of defense and adaptation. This model is designed to interpret works of art experienced sui generis and, in particular, to address questions concerning the origin and function of artistic form and individual style. Objective or New Criticism correlates with this mode of psychoanalytic interpretation.

The context in the third model expands to include the work of art plus its audience. Object-relations theory, with its emphasis on self and other, preoedipal experience, themes of fusion and separation, loss and reparation, transitional phenomena, and early infantile transference, serves as the theoretical framework. The aesthetic issues addressed are questions of audience response and the nature and genesis of aesthetic experience. This model is correlated with phenomenological and reader-response criticism. Issues of transference and empathy, implicit in all three models, move into the foreground and assume appropriately central roles.

Because interpretation necessarily occurs in a context and interpreters exercise some choice in defining their contexts, part of the problem is that such contextual choices are often left unstated. Thus, one goal of this study is to clarify and examine these consciously chosen contexts. A further and more radical goal—to illuminate some of their disavowed aspects—puts me in the odd position of challenging the very models I have set up by showing that any given interpretative context is necessarily more extensive and complex than can be consciously known by an interpreter at a given moment. From this somewhat subversive—but quintessentially psychoanalytic—perspective of using the discipline to critique its own interpretative models, all three paradigms may be seen as holding more features in common than is readily apparent. In addition to this perspective, however, I also seek to explore ways in which psychoanalysis can expand its positive contributions to the interdisciplinary dialogue by juxtaposing new areas of psychoanalytic research, for example, with perennial problems in the philosophy of art.

It is important to state at the outset that psychoanalysis is taken here to mean, not a unified body of theory, but, rather, a heady compound of knowledge and speculation, a complex aggregate of theoretical and clinical constructs—in a discipline riddled today with inner turmoil. My own position is in no way meant to be that of an apologist. Yet I could not have written this book if my years of involvement with psychoanalytic ideas and techniques had not convinced me of their power to speak to areas of aesthetic inquiry ignored or blurred by other approaches. Nevertheless, I hope this study will be sharply distinguished from those in which "psychoanalysis takes on the appearance of an 'imperialistic philosophy' asserting itself with a jumbled, bloated terminology" (Iser, 1978, p. 39).

Readers may notice from a cursory glance at the contents that my discussion

cites examples drawn from a variety of art forms, shifting from the visual arts to literature, and occasionally to music and the dance as well. Although each art properly requires its own aesthetic and deserves a separate treatment, I have drawn on a diversity of examples because my principal concern has been to explore outstanding contributions to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and the arts in general, and therefore I have seized upon such examples wherever they could be found.

A perennial problem in interdisciplinary research is knowing how much can be taken for granted and how much should be set forth explicitly before going on to make one's points. I have probably erred on the side of presenting more basic psychoanalytic theory than is necessary, certainly for analytic readers. My rationale has been that familiar material often takes on new color and significance when rediscovered in altered contexts, and I believe that the theory I have included is of sufficient consequence to bear repeated scrutiny.

In writing this book I have called upon my early years of training in the visual arts, dance, and art history, as well as upon more recent and current professional experience. In part, this study represents a distillation of research undertaken in three divisions of Columbia University: Teachers College (the Division of Philosophy and the Social Sciences and the Department of Developmental Psychology), the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (the Department of Philosophy), and the College of Physicians and Surgeons (the Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research). Thus, it is truly interdisciplinary in genesis and could not have been accomplished without the enthusiastic support and assistance of many people. In particular, I owe appreciation to my former professors at Columbia University, each of whom has contributed to my perspective in a unique way, each of whom has guided and inspired me. I owe special thanks to Mary Mothersill, Richard Kuhns, Maxine Greene, John Broughton, and Jonas Soltis. In addition, I wish to express appreciation to the faculty of the Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, Columbia University, among whom Robert S. Liebert must singled out for special mention, as well as to my fellow candidates, all of whom helped initiate me into the complexities of psychoanalytic theory and process and who have expressed their ongoing interest in my work. A very special word of gratitude is due to James E. Gorney, with whom I discussed a number of ideas that ultimately found their way into these pages. My acknowledgments would not be complete without an expression of deep appreciation to Leopold B. Bellak, with whom I encountered firsthand the depth and rigors of psychoanalytic work. The responsibility for what follows in these pages is, nevertheless, strictly my own.

Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to several dear friends, including Joanna B. Strauss, Laurie Wilson, Joan Baudouine, Jane Celwyn, Geraldine Brause, and Jennie Morgan, whose multifaceted help ranged from hours of

responsive listening to loving child care and reliable child transportation. For their indispensable professional assistance, I wish also to express gratitude to Doris Parker of the Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, who unstintingly made available to me dozens of articles for research, to Elizabeth King, who typed the original draft of the manuscript, to Tulin Duda and Barbara Folsom, whose meticulous readings have resulted in a more compactly written book, to my steadfast and sensitive editor, Gladys Topkis. To my beloved family, the dedication of this book suggests the depth of my gratitude.

Contents

1

Introduction: On the Dialogue between Aesthetics and Psychoanalysis

What should we be without the sexual myth,
The human revery or poem of death?
Castratos of moon-mash—Life consists
Of propositions about life. The human
Revery is a solitude in which
We compose these propositions, torn by dreams...
—Wallace Stevens, "Men Made Out of Words"

Psychoanalysts have made many forays into the aesthetic realm, particularly in their interpretations of literature and the fine arts and discussions of the particular or general pathology and/or ego strengths that predispose individuals toward artistic creativity. Likewise, smaller numbers of philosophers, art historians, and literary critics have commented on the usefulness of psychoanalysis as a way of approaching these areas of mutual interest. But there has been no thoroughgoing attempt to catalog or structure this dialogue between aesthetics and psychoanalysis.

In formulating this dialogue, I am addressing readers in both disciplines. To philosophers of art I propose a tripartite structure for understanding more clearly what different psychoanalytic authors are in fact doing when they approach the aesthetic and how their work mirrors or complements that of other disciplines; to psychoanalysts I offer ways of making their goals and methods more explicit and also more consonant with the modes of philosophy and criticism, which are the ultimate tribunals in affairs of the arts.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

What sort of dialogue is possible between psychoanalysis and aesthetics? Before describing the structure of my own work, it will be instructive to

consider the contributions of a number of authors drawn from the several disciplines which have bearing on this inquiry. The following review of the literature is by no means exhaustive; rather, it provides a sample of issues raised by prominent participants in the dialogue.

In attempting to integrate philosophical and psychoanalytic aesthetics, Lawrence Friedman (1958), an analyst, speaks of the need for promoting "a conversation between philosophy and psychoanalysis" (p. 371). In his view, the philosopher and psychoanalyst approach the aesthetic from different points: traditionally, the philosopher either begins with concepts of beauty or art that he applies to particular works or localizes the aesthetic fact or object whose properties he attempts to describe and from which he then infers more general principles. The psychoanalyst, however, is interested in explaining the origins of aesthetic experience—that is, the motivation and genesis of the artist's creativity and the viewer's response. Thus Friedman indicates that the philosopher's approach is structural in that he describes the nature of aesthetic experience, of art or beauty, as it is already created or found; the psychoanalyst's approach is genetic, historical.

This distinction is not entirely convincing, for, clearly there are philosophers (for example, Susanne Langer) who are deeply concerned with the origins of aesthetic feeling; similarly, there are psychoanalysts (notably Freud himself, and certainly the ego psychologists) who think in structural terms—for example, about the relation between aesthetic pleasure and other aspects of mental functioning. In general such a distinction might be valid if we were to consider only the more recent psychoanalytic thinkers (object-relations theorists), who trace aethetic response back to the experience of early childhood, but even this is questionable; D. W. Winnicott (1966), for example, is as intensely interested in describing the nature of the aesthetic experience as he is in deriving its origins.

Another author, art historian Herbert Read (1951), discriminates sharply between processes and products, claiming that the psychologist/psychoanalyst is interested in the former whereas the critic/philosopher is concerned with the latter. Again, the contrast seems oversimplified, as does the formula that the psychoanalyst is principally concerned with persons whereas the philosopher's major involvement is with ideas and things. Especially today, when art is conceived by many artists as process, it is inevitable that philosophers and critics have been drawn into a process-oriented approach, if only to describe and account for the art that is actually being produced. Current experimentation in the visual arts (for example, the environmental sculptures of Christo), theater (the plays of Stoppard and Beckett), and even music (the works of Cage, Glass, and Crumb) is with the act of making, with synchronism and with complex rearrangements of time sequences, with the participation of the viewer and the manipulation of aesthetic distance. Hence, today a convergence of the psychoanalyst's and the aesthetician's approaches seems especially promising.

With respect to twentieth-century art, strong emphasis must be placed on the presence of ambiguity, on the deliberate exploitation of a multiplicity of meanings or perceptual possibilities inherent in a given work. Psychoanalyst Ernst Kris (1952) characterizes this aspect of the aesthetic experience and offers a rationale for it:

> The level of stringency in works of art—their degree of interpretability—varies markedly from period to period. In some cases ambiguity is fully exploited, and correspondingly great demands are made on the audience; in other cases, . . . the demands on the audience are minimal; the interpretations called for are rigidly limited. We may suggest that art is likely to be characterized by low stringency (i.e., high ambiguity and interpretability) where systems of conduct ideals are in doubt or social values are in process of transition. . . . The present period seems to be of this kind. (p. 262)

This description is especially apt if we consider current avant garde theater (for example, works by Richard Forman, Meredith Monk, Spalding Gray), in which words often are used not only as units of discursive speech, or as mirrors of a shared vision of external reality, but as final terms, as entities with properties of their own;[1] audiences become absorbed into the aesthetic whole of a work (as is the case also in contemporary visual art, dance, and music) so that possibilities for projective interpretation multiply; an audience becomes accomplice to, and then gradually conscious of, its own manipulation; the traditional modes of music, word, and movement are fused in unprecedented ways, creating synaesthetic effects; improvisation is valued, and the goal is to expand awareness at the risk of shock rather than to confirm the familiar and comfortable. A climate such as this fosters fruitful dialogue between psychoanalysis and philosophical aesthetics. Any philosopher who seeks to understand the art of our time must soon deal with aesthetic qualities that can be seen as isomorphic with psychoanalytic constructs, such as displacement, distortion, reversal, projection, and condensation. Therefore, as Friedman points out, an interdisciplinary conversation is much in order.

Ernst Gombrich (1963), an art historian with a special interest in psychoanalysis, has made many contributions to this "conversation." He offers, for example, a psychoanalytic perspective on connoisseurship in the visual arts. Looking to the stages of psychosexual development as formulated by Freud (1905) and Karl Abraham (1927), he sees oral gratification as a genetic model for aesthetic pleasure. He draws an analogy, for instance, between our response to easily readable, too immediately obvious or gratifying art and the most primitive stage of passive-oral instinctual development. He speculates that a repugnance to such art may serve as a defense against its regressive pull. By linking "the idea of the soft and yielding with passivity, of the hard

1. See Freud (1900): "It is true in general that words are frequently treated as though they were things, and for that reason they are apt to be combined in just the same way as are the presentations of things" (pp. 295–296). He is referring, of course, to the use of words in *dreams*.

and crunchy with activity" (p. 40),[2] Gombrich accounts for the preference of sophisticated critics for art that is "difficult," that demands action on their part, that offers an opportunity to act on what is presented, to experience a challenge in the process of re-creation. ("The biter who finds the pleasures of passivity barred to him finds his compensation in the indulgence of aggressive impulses" [p. 41].) Thus the critic's preference for difficult, demanding art may correspond to the second, aggressive stage of oral development (Abraham, 1927).

This view is particularly fascinating because it expands the applicability of psychoanalysis even as it warns psychoanalysts to heed social context. Gombrich ingeniously applies an aspect of the psychoanalytic theory of erotogenic zones to aesthetic enjoyment and preference but then goes on to elaborate this simple thesis by showing that there are many ways of experiencing the "soft" as well as the "crunchy." According to him these differing responses are dependent on what he calls "the social context of the aesthetic attitude" (p. 36). He illustrates the dependence of aesthetic experience on context by pointing out that after impressionism literary allusions no longer constituted the "crunchy" challenge for the critic (as they had in the more frankly erotic, sleek paintings of the French neoclassic academy). By contrast, in the post-impressionist world of modern art, literary deciphering came to be replaced by the challenge of, as he puts it, unscrambling color patches, which has in turn been compensated for by the pleasures of beholding crude splashes of paint and a regressive pull into the primitive domain of archaic imagery (for example, part-objects, in the worlds of cubism, surrealism, and abstract expressionism). Thus he demonstrates that what is experienced as "soft" or "crunchy" depends upon the cultural context.

Gombrich's major caveat to psychoanalysts who would approach the arts is that, at least in the visual arts, tradition and convention outweigh personal elements. He suggests that even if we could somehow reconstruct the private, personal meanings of specific paintings to their creators—disclose their unconscious meanings—this would not matter much unless the most important aspect of a work of art were in fact its aspect as a sort of "shared dream," which he doubts. Further, he shows that if we take seriously the fact that art has a history (unlike perception and dreams, which he claims have not [p. 34])[3] and recognize that this history is built through "a constant extension and modification of symbols"(p. 33), we must realize that all art is derivative, and that without recourse to the development of style, modes of represen-

2. This idea has sparked some fascinating research into aesthetic preference by the experimental psychologist Irvin Child at Yale University. His work was presented as research in progress at the National Symposium for Research in Art, University of Illinois, September 21–24, 1982.

3. Gombrich fails to distinguish between the latent and manifest content of dreams. It seems clear that, even if we cannot speak of a history of the former, we might and indeed can trace a history of the latter.

tation, and so forth, we cannot play Pygmalion to any Galatea (p. 35). Without, in other words, a prodigious knowledge of the history of art, we are unable to re-create any work of art in terms of its personal meaning. "Without," as he says, "the social factors, what we may term the attitudes of the audience, the style or the trend, the private needs could not be transmuted into art. In this transmutation the private meaning is all but swallowed up" (p. 43).

Thus Gombrich enters the interdisciplinary dialogue with a warning the psychoanalyst does well to heed. On the other hand, if all art is derivative of other art, it is surely also derived from the biological and psychological (psychosexual, developmental) aspects of human experience, and it is precisely these features of its origins that psychoanalysis is particularly well suited to trace. What is paradoxical about Gombrich's contribution is that he himself has illustrated, with the analogy between aesthetic pleasure and an aspect of genetic psychoanalytic theory, how psychoanalysis may be useful in understanding not only the all-but-digested personal meanings in specific works of art but also the larger trends and issues in both art history and aesthetics. If we focus on the "all but" of the above-quoted passage, we see that it is precisely this region—the "all but"—that is the province of psychoanalysis. For when we encounter works of art, we encounter works created by individuals who are more than passive carriers of a tradition. It is to the personal and private, the "all but" of feeling, conflict, and choice, that psychoanalysis most often directs its attention, offering insights that, when integrated with historical knowledge, can yield a level of understanding not accessible, I believe, to art history alone.

Ernst Kris, art historian and psychoanalyst, has offered perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the potentialities inherent in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and aesthetics. It is to him that we owe the best-crafted links that have yet been forged. Kris raises a number of his own caveats, points out areas for future research, and explores aspects of the existing dialogue. I shall enumerate only a few of his points which seem both sufficiently general and pertinent to present at this juncture.

Kris (1952) contends that many attempts to apply psychoanalytic theory to the aesthetic realm have suffered from a tendency to equate psychoanalysis with one or two isolated quotations from Freud's early work. It is perhaps unnecessary to dwell on this problem, which, however, persists today.[4] But Kris's characterization of psychoanalytic theory as an "open system" (1952,

4. At a meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Philadelphia, December 1981), in the Symposium on Psychoanalysis (see *The Journal of Philosophy*, 78:10, pp. 549–72) it was clear from the papers and the discussion that Kris's complaint is still valid. Many philosophers seem unaware of the complexity and development of Freud's thought and the vast body of psychoanalytic literature produced since his death in 1939.

p. 16) is here very much to the point: the Freudian approach is more elastic and less monolithic than is sometimes perceived, and alternative psychoanalytic models may both complement and contrast with Freud's yet grow solidly out of it.

Kris is seconded in his lament over the erroneous reductionism of Freud's views on art by Richard Wollheim, a philosopher who also has made major contributions to the interdisciplinary dialogue. Wollheim (1974) offers a reading of Freud's aesthetic that may be intended in part as a corrective for those authors who fail to accord to Freud the sophisticated understanding claimed for him by both Kris and Wollheim himself. Freud's view of the work of art, according to Wollheim, is by no means a simple equation with joke, dream, or neurotic symptom, with "a sudden vehicle of buried desires" (p. 218) that requires a lapse of consciousness and attention. Rather, he sees Freud as recognizing the work of art to be "a piece of work," "constructive" rather than purely expressive.

Wollheim credits Freud with the awareness "that part of understanding how it is that a work of art affects us is recognizing the confusion or the ambiguity upon which this effect in part depends" (p. 217). In other words, he attributes to Freud the view that a work of art that fully engages us involves us in complex mental activities, which include efforts at mastery as well as regressive pleasure, hiding as well as seeking, composing as well as hearing, flexibly moving backward and forward from manifest to latent, affectively as well as cognitively. According to Wollheim, Freud's aesthetic includes an awareness of mental functions that have subsequently been identified as synthetic, integrative, and adaptive (see Kris). Wollheim regrets the fact that Freud never developed this "constructive" side of his aesthetic in theoretical terms, a side that Wollheim believes is exemplifed as early as the *Moses* study of 1914. To develop it Freud would have had to include in his studies on art an expanded discussion of unconscious operations involving the ego. Instead, of course, he focused on unconscious repression and pleasurable regression in art. Wollheim, taking on something of the role of an apologist, seeks to explain this omission by observing that whereas during the early years, when the studies on art were written, Freud had sufficient leisure to pursue such nonclinical interests, by the time he had become interested in ego functioning he was no longer free to pursue his inquiries into the aesthetic and to develop them in accordance with his later theory (p. 219).

While agreeing with both Kris and Wollheim on the richness of Freud's contributions to our understanding in this domain, I must take issue with this last point. We need only note that, after his structural revisions of 1923, Freud went on to write such nonclinical works as *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), and even *Dostoevsky and Par-*

ricide (1928) to assume reasonably that, had Freud any inclination to revise his earlier views on art to bring them more into line with his later structural theory and with developments in ego psychology, he could certainly have done so. In my view, Freud's prodigious contribution to our understanding of art requires, rather than an apology for what he did not say, a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of what he did say.

To this issue of the reading of Freud's aesthetic, an important contribution comes from philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1970), who prima facie seems to offer a reading contrary to that of Wollheim. Ricoeur strongly stresses not the discontinuity but rather the continuum between dreams and art in Freud's work. Arguing for what he calls "the generalization of the oneiric model" (p. 160), he in no way feels that Freud's emphasis on dreams is reductionistic or, indeed, that interpretation based on the continuity of dream with art is reductionistic vis-à-vis works of art themselves. He claims, rather, that an analysis of this sort can lead both to an awareness of the richness, even the inexhaustibility, of the psychoanalytic interpretation of art and paradoxically to an understanding of what may be the limits of psychoanalytic interpretation itself. My own view inclines toward Ricoeur's rather than Wollheim's, for I am convinced that, though Freud was certainly not innocent of the contribution of complex ego functions to artistic activity and aesthetic response (ego functions that were later labeled and described by such theorists as Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and Kris), the genius of his contribution lies squarely where Ricoeur places it, namely, in the recognition of multiple, intimate links between the realms of art and dream.

Ricoeur states that the interpretation of dreams stands as paradigmatic in Freud's oeuvre for all interpretations in the cultural sphere. He accounts for this by pointing to the continuities between dream and art from the psychoanalytic perspective: (1) for Freud dreams have meanings that are continuous with waking meanings and, hence, deeply imbedded in the cultural context (a point that Gombrich would have to dispute); (2) these meanings concern the disguised fulfillment of repressed desires that must be unmasked, brought to light via interpretation; (3) disguise is brought about by the complex mechanisms of dream-work, which, for Ricoeur, constitutes a paradigm for all "strategems of desire" (p. 160); (4) the desires disguised by dreams are necessarily infantile and, therefore, interpretation based on analogy with dreams must not only unmask hidden meanings but also unearth archaisms of various types and on many levels; and (5) dreams require the exquisite elaboration of "the language of desire" (p. 160), the representability by symbol of man's fundamental sexuality; hence they serve as an appropriate model for myth, legend, and folktale, the "great popular daydreams" (p. 160), as Ricoeur puts it. Yet, he does not fear that such a "generalization of the oneiric model" commits us to uninteresting repetition. On the contrary,