IAN S. LUSTICK

UNSETTLED STATES

DISPUTED LANDS

Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza

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Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

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

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For Terri, Hilary, and Alexander

Preface

This book studies the incorporation of additional territories into existing states and the equally problematic process of how states relinquish control over territories. The theory I develop views state expansion and contraction as closely related but asymmetric political achievements. Though the initial impetus for the analysis was the relationship of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and though I developed my theory by comparing the changing relationships of Britain to Ireland (1834–1922) and France to Algeria (1936–62), this book has a larger purpose—to explain patterns of similarity and difference in the expansion and contraction of any state by treating states as institutions subject, in their own way, to the laws governing all institutions.

I began this project as an analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State in 1979–80. Among other things, I was charged with evaluating scenarios for the eventual disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war but inhabited, despite intensive Israeli settlement efforts, by overwhelming majorities of Palestinian Arabs. It was clear enough that the goal of Israeli government policy at the time was to incorporate the territories into the Jewish state by policies of de facto annexation. But how likely were these policies to succeed, and on what factors would this success depend? What theory of state expansion and contraction, I wondered, when applied to the forces pushing toward incorporation or separation of these territories, could sort the impossible from the possible, the possible from the probable, the probable from the inevitable?

Inside the State Department there was not much I could do about my

need for such a theory except sharpen my appreciation of its absence. But when I left the Department in the summer of 1980, I returned to academia with concrete questions about Israel and the territories and the knowledge that if I could not produce a theory of state expansion and contraction I would not be able to answer them. To inform my choice of factors likely to be decisive I studied the debate in Israel over whether policies designed to ensure the incorporation of the occupied territories were succeeding. I then sought historical cases of expansion and contraction with enough structural similarities, but enough substantive differences, to test the theory that began to emerge—a theory that might not only account for the trajectory of the Israel–West Bank/Gaza relationship but also identify the conditions for Israeli absorption of or withdrawal from these areas.

While I immersed myself in the long and intricate histories of these relationships, the world outside my study was being dramatically reshaped. In eastern Europe, central Asia, south Asia, and Africa the abstract problems my detailed inquiries were designed to address—of the presumptively permanent but actually contingent nature of state boundaries, of the relationship between the internal complexion of states and their external shape, and of the mysterious links between gradual processes of political metamorphosis and sudden transformations—took on an obviousness not present when I began the study, as well as an aspect that was as often horrifying as it was inspiring. With these developments in mind I try, at both the beginning and end of this book, to explain why I think that the theory I advance, although developed and tested in three specific settings, has robust implications for explaining patterns of order and disorder associated with any large-scale discontinuity in the size and shape of states that does not primarily and directly result from war.

In the decade and a half it has taken to bring this project to completion I have accumulated more debts to colleagues, friends, students, institutions, and relatives than I could possibly list here. I hope those who aided, abetted, or just tolerated the various obsessions associated with this work will accept my thanks and forgive me if by accident they are not named.

Foremost among the institutions whose generous support permitted me to make this book what I wanted it to be are Dartmouth College, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the United States Institute of Peace. With its steadfast commitment to research by Dartmouth faculty and its various fellowship and support programs, including funds provided through the John Sloan Dickey Endowment for International Understanding and the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College gave me the freedom and resources to sustain a long-term, intrinsically speculative research program. My colleagues at Dartmouth,

especially in the Government Department, were a constant source of encouragement and reassurance. I especially thank the staff of the Goverment Department—Kathy Donald, Eunice Lemkul, Suzanne Markloff, and Earl Raymond—for their steady, capable, and good-humored assistance. Just as important to me was the ingenuity of Dartmouth's superb reference librarian, Robert Jaccaud, and the dedication and skill of its interlibrary loan specialists, Patricia Carter and Marianne Hraibi. A special thanks is also due to a dozen students who worked assiduously as research assistants in the accumulation, sorting, and filing of information, and to the many more, at Dartmouth and at the University of Pennsylvania, whose hard work in courses spun from this project made crucial contributions to my thinking and learning.

The bulk of this book was written under the terms of substantial grants from the United States Institute of Peace and, especially, from the Interpretive Research Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Without the confidence in me expressed by these grantors and the generosity of their support I could not have completed this project and would probably not even have been able to try. In addition I am delighted to acknowledge the support received for the final stages of manuscript preparation from the staff of the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania and from the resources of the Richard L. Simon Term Chair in the Social Sciences, which I currently hold.

For assistance of various kinds in connection with visits to Britain, Ireland, France, Algeria, Israel, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, I thank the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics, the Political Science Department at University College, Dublin, the United States Embassy in Algiers, the United States Embassy in Tel-Aviv, and the U.S. Consulate-General in Jerusalem, the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris, and the Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes sur les Sociétés Méditerranéennes and the Dépôt des Archives d'Outre-mer in Aix-en-Provence. I also express my thanks for the hospitality I was shown by the Political Science Department of Tel-Aviv University, the Sociology and Anthropology Department of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the staff of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East, the Eretz Yisrael Academy, Rafi and Shoshana Menachem, David and Laura DeNola, Avner and Noga Bar-Ilan, Yoram and Penina Peri, and Assem Tahhan.

Next to the financial assistance I have acknowledged and the support of my family, the contribution to my work for which I am most grateful has been the commentary provided by colleagues, in many disciplines, on preliminary drafts (sometimes several different drafts) of various portions of this work. First among these is Yoram Peri, my Israeli consultant on this project, as supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

His unmatched knowledge of Israeli political life, and his intense, good-humored curiosity about it, were constant sources of enlightenment and encouragement. Just as steadfast in his readiness to respond to my appeals for comment and advice was David Laitin, whose intellectual instincts I have relied on so heavily to guide me through difficult choices. For the rest I can only express my appreciation by listing their names: Avner Bar-Ilan, Paul Bew, Thomas Callaghy, Jack Censer, Martha Crenshaw, Laurence Davies, Irene Gendzier, Adrian Guelke, Ernst Haas, Peter A. Hall, Lawrence Kritzman, Gene Lyons, the late Bernard McLane, Bruce Marshall, Roger Masters, James Mayall, Nelson Kasfir, Baruch Kimmerling, Andrea Leskes, Benjamin Neuberger, Eric Nordlinger, Brendan O'Leary, Margaret Pearson, Donald Pease, Dani Rubinstein, Anne Sa'adah, René Seve, Gershon Shafir, Kenneth Sharpe, Immanuel Sivan, Sammy Smooha, Charles Townshend, the late John Whyte, and Frank Wright. Since I disagree on some matters of consequence with each of these people, and on many matters with some of them, I stress that I list them here to thank them for the benefit of their critical thinking, not to associate them in any way with my argument or conclusions.

I also owe a great deal to the editorial staff of Cornell University Press, especially Roger Haydon, Kay Scheuer, and Joanne Hindman for their professionalism, their good judgment, and their sympathetic understanding of the objectives of this study, and to Kathryn Gohl, for an excellent job of copy-editing.

An earlier version of Chapter 3 appeared in *Politics and Society*, 18, 1 (1990), and I am grateful to Sage Publications, Inc. for permission to use material from that article in this book.

I am beholden, above all, to my wife Terri. Without her love and her confidence in me and in this project I could not have carried it to completion.

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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Unsettled States, Disputed Lands

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PART I

The Changing Shape of States

In the world as we know it in the 1990s, no fact about states is more obvious than the impermanence of their boundaries. United Germany represents, above all, a tremendous expansion in the territory ruled by the state formerly known as the Federal Republic of Germany. Meanwhile, states ruled from Belgrade and Prague have shrunk drastically in size: the only certainty about the borders of the states replacing Yugoslavia is that they will be changing. In 1988 the Soviet state had boundaries encircling fifteen socialist republics. In 1991 the state with Moscow as its capital exercised its claims to authority within the Russian Federated Republic only. Questions about its ability to uphold those claims over all the autonomous republics and regions within its designated borders suggest that the shape of the Russian state itself may undergo significant change. Meanwhile, other successor states of the Soviet Union, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, struggle to expand or maintain their boundaries.

But eastern and central Europe and central Asia are not the only areas of the world where fluctuation in the shape of states is evident. The industrial democracies of western Europe are making fundamental decisions that will determine their future as separate territorial states or integral components of a "United States of Europe." The Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985 officially marks British rule of Northern Ireland as contingent on political trends within Ireland. Basque separatists continue violent challenges to the integrity of the Spanish state.

In Africa the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia has substantially reduced the territory ruled by that state. With separatist pressures on the

rise in other regions, the shape of the state ruled from Addis Ababa will remain problematic for a long time. Whether or not part of Chad is ever attached to Libya, it is an open question what borders the Chadian state will have by the end of the century. Morocco, it appears, has successfully expanded its boundaries to include the western Sahara.

In the Middle East, the Jordanian state formally and substantially revised its boundaries in 1988 by excluding the West Bank from its domain. On the other hand, the merger of the two Yemeni states into one seems relatively successful. Lebanon survives on paper, but in its eastern and southern provinces the Syrian and Israeli states appear the actual rulers. Having failed to expand its borders to include Kuwait, Iraq now fights, along with Turkey, to prevent chunks of territory from emerging as a Kurdish state.

In South Asia, central governments in India and Pakistan strain to contain ethnic and religious movements threatening to splinter the subcontinent into at least as many states as were produced by the end of the Soviet Union. Tibet is increasingly restive, returning the question of Chinese rule over that country to the international agenda. Sri Lanka continues to be torn by vicious fighting between Tamils and Sinhalese, suggesting the inability of the Sri Lankan state to maintain the whole island within its domain.

Cyprus, the Koreas, Indonesia, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and Canada are only some of the other states whose territorial shape is under pressure or may change as the result of hostile action, cooperative agreements, or both, within the next decade.

From a historical perspective the spatial malleability of states is neither surprising nor extraordinary. Even states that today appear endowed with relatively stable borders are in fact products of wars and other processes of territorial aggrandizement, contraction, or consolidation. Closely examined, the territorial shape of any state reveals itself as contingent on as well as constitutive of political, technological, economic, cultural, and social processes.

Despite the complexity of these processes, change in the size and shape of individual states has often been presented as (and sometimes is) a straightforward function of armed conflict—of the application of force majeure to extend or defend boundaries. Certainly the United States owes its continental size to the forcible seizure of Mexican territories and the victory of the North ("the Union") in the Civil War. War was also decisive in the mid–nineteenth-century expansion of the German state in central Europe, its reduction in size after World Wars I and II, the enlargement and reduction of the Japanese state's boundaries in the 1930s and 1940s, and the expansion of the Vietnamese state in the 1970s. Similarly today, in the Balkans, on the Horn of Africa, in Ngorno-Karabakh, and on the

Iraq-Kuwait border, states and would-be state-makers do battle with one another over territories to be or not to be included within their domains.

But the intricate histories of British, French, and Italian state formation show that coercion is usually only a partial explanation, and sometimes no explanation at all, for the changing size and shape of states. Ongoing negotiations over the possible secession of Quebec from Canada, the essentially nonviolent detachment of the non-Russian republics from Russia and of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia, and the reunification of Germany clearly demonstrate that peaceful separation of territories from existing states is possible, that conquest of territories does not necessarily mean their political integration, and that acquisition of a territory in war does not necessarily mean its permanent separation from rival claimants. With respect to territorial expansion and contraction as a *political* problem, it is precisely those cases where force majeure was not decisive in the determination of outcomes, or where it is not expected to be decisive, which are of the greatest interest.

These simple considerations have profound but usually unnoticed implications for the study of states. Most working definitions of the state treat its shape as exogenous to its operation, suppressing the fact of territorial variability by treating borders as historically or externally imposed constants. But since boundaries of states change, the territorial composition of any particular state is a variable.[1] Since variation in the shape of states is politically consequential, definitions that treat the territorial compass of a state as fixed make it difficult to pose crucial research questions because, in addition to clarifying meaning, definitions also place limits on research. By making certain things "true by definition," every definition automatically prevents questions about those things from being asked.

For the last twenty years, students of the state have typically begun their work with Max Weber's classic definition—"a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."[2] Dozens of scholars have tinkered with Weber's formulation to suggest, for example, that an organization might qualify as a state whether or not it seeks to legitimize its use of violence, whether or not its authority is deemed legitimate, or whether or not it possesses or seeks to hold a monopoly on coercive authority. With these adjustments researchers have been able to ask many questions of great interest. But since almost all variants of Weber's conception abide, implicitly or explicitly, by his stipulation of the exogenously determined or a priori "givenness" of the territorial shape of the state, they exclude or discourage questions about the construction and maintenance of boundaries of "established" states or about the implications of change in those boundaries.[3]

I should emphasize that most analysts neither assert nor believe that the

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