



SELECTED WORKS
OF
ZHOU ENLAI

Volume I



周少

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Volume I

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PUBLICATION NOTE

Comrade Zhou Enlai was a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary and an outstanding leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. Throughout the long course of China's democratic revolution, socialist revolution and socialist construction, he applied the universal truth of Marxism to solving China's practical problems in many fields, such as to building the Party, political power and the army, work in the enemy-occupied areas and in our own base areas, united front and diplomatic work, and economic and cultural work. He made brilliant contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought.

To meet the needs of readers in their study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the history of the Chinese revolution, we have edited and are now publishing the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, which consist of two volumes. The first volume includes works before and the second those after the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Comrade Zhou Enlai wrote many articles, documents, letters and telegrams and made numerous important speeches. However, under the difficult conditions prevailing in wartime, many of these were lost. We have tried our best to collect those writings and speeches which are still extant. We include in these volumes the most important ones, many of which have not been published before.

Writings which were published during Comrade Zhou Enlai's lifetime or which exist in manuscript are reproduced here in their original form with a minimum of changes in language or of corrections of errors of fact. Records of speeches have been edited. To assist our readers, editorial and explanatory notes have been provided. Each editorial note is placed at the bottom of the page on which an article begins, while the explanatory notes come at the end of each volume.

Editorial Committee on Party
Literature, Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China

June 24, 1980

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE

December 11, 1926

I

Since we are firm in the belief that the present political struggle has only one goal — to overthrow the semi-feudal forces¹ and realize democracy — there are those who wonder why we need an active Communist Party in addition to the Kuomintang.² They assert that so long as there is an active Communist Party, there are bound to be conflicts and an eventual split with the Kuomintang.

Much has been said and written about this problem over the past three years. The following comments are necessary solely to further strengthen our present political struggle and to enhance the solidarity and mutual understanding of the revolutionaries.

1. The national revolution is the common way out for all the oppressed classes of China. Nevertheless, in the course of the revolution, each class has its own aims and, particularly when democracy is in the process of being realized, each has its own interests to pursue. Since interests differ, it is natural that the working class and the peasantry, being the most oppressed, should have the Communist Party, which works especially for their interests, to serve their cause and be their

In the winter of 1926, as successive victories were being won in the Northern Expedition and the worker-peasant movement was making rapid progress, the right-wing forces in the Kuomintang stepped up their counter-revolutionary activities and aroused sentiment against Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the worker-peasant movement. Right opportunists in the Chinese Communist Party, with Chen Duxiu as their leader, became frightened and, not daring to uphold leadership by the proletariat, began to yield and make concessions to the Kuomintang right-wingers. It was in these circumstances that this article was written and published in issue No. 37 of *The People's Weekly*, organ of the Guangdong-Guangxi Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

vanguard. A Communist Party serving the workers and peasants and guiding them onto the path of national revolution will in no way hinder the Kuomintang in its leadership of the various classes working for the revolution. On the contrary, both parties will benefit by complementing and supporting each other in their practical work.

2. Though the national revolution is the common aim of all the oppressed classes, the proletariat is the most uncompromising revolutionary class in the prolonged struggle, while the national bourgeoisie⁴⁵⁴ is inclined to compromise and the petty bourgeoisie often vacillates. To achieve national liberation and democracy, the real goals of the national revolution, we must rely on the proletariat, together with the peasants and handicraft workers, to urge the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie forward in an uncompromising struggle against our enemies. Hence, the Communist Party, which serves the workers and peasants, works solely to lead their revolutionary forces in promoting the cause of national revolution and to guard against the adverse effects of the other classes' tendency to compromise. Such activities can only benefit the Kuomintang, which is now leading the national revolution, and enhance its revolutionary character; there is no danger whatsoever of conflicts or a split. For if there were conflicts, they would be conflicts between the masses of revolutionary workers and peasants and a bourgeoisie that was compromising with the imperialist enemies; if there were a split, it would be a split between an alliance of the revolutionary left wing of the Kuomintang and the Communists on the one hand and the right wing that was abandoning the revolution on the other. Since the Kuomintang is revolutionary and is in the leading position in the national revolution, it has no reason to worry about such conflicts or such a split. Moreover, facts prove that since the May 30th Movement,³ the revolutionary workers and peasants, and especially the workers, have persisted in their anti-imperialist position and their strike tactics, and have time and again clashed with those members of the bourgeoisie who have attempted to compromise with the British imperialists. Following the assassination of Liao Zhongkai,⁴ the left wing of the Kuomintang fought in alliance with the Communists against those involved in the assassination and those opposed to communism, the Soviet Union and the worker-peasant movement. Thereupon, many persons who had abandoned the revolution broke away from the Kuomintang's ranks. This was not at all harmful to the national revolution or the Kuomintang; on the contrary,

the revolutionary forces became more united, and the national revolution made the progress that we see today.

II

Having said this, we must still make our position more concrete.

1. The aim of the Communist Party in leading the workers and peasants in the national revolution is to overthrow foreign imperialism and the semi-feudal forces in China, and its demands cannot go beyond the limits of democracy. But when the capitalists suppress the just demands of workers for some improvement in their standard of living, or when the landlords rally all the traditional forces to wreck the peasants' liberation movement, the Communists must stand with the workers and peasants and struggle to the end to emancipate them from their miseries. In striving for democracy, the Communists are on the side of the workers and peasants and naturally give greater urgency to their struggles and demands than others do. This is not overstepping the bounds of the national revolution, but promoting it.

2. As we know, the sole purpose of the national revolution is the liberation of present-day China; at the same time our revolution is a component of the world revolution. Therefore, while we agree that the revolutionary Kuomintang is the leading force in the national revolution and that members of the Chinese Communist Party must join the Kuomintang to carry on the common struggle, it does not follow that the Chinese Communist Party has lost its identity and should no longer have any independent views. The fact that the Kuomintang has established an alliance with the Communists and that members of the Communist Party have joined the Kuomintang shows the close relationship between the two parties and the leading position of the Kuomintang. Hence, the Communists, while supporting the Kuomintang and the National Government, should nevertheless put forward the political and economic demands of the workers and peasants, within the limits of democracy, and press the Kuomintang government to fulfil them one after another.

3. It has been our earnest hope that the Kuomintang might be a revolutionary party without left-right divisions, but things have not turned out as we wished. The national revolution is being carried out by an alliance of several classes, and their differences in character, as

reflected in the Kuomintang, naturally give rise to factions. The Kuomintang right wing has obviously been active in opposing the Communists, the Soviet Union and the workers and peasants and in collaborating with the forces of tradition, while its left wing has resolutely worked for the national revolution and the realization of democracy by pursuing the three revolutionary policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and support for the interests of the workers and peasants. Faced with these diverse tendencies ever since Dr. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Kuomintang, the Communists have consistently joined forces with the left wing in waging both ideological and practical struggles against the right. At the same time, the Communists have always hoped that the right-wingers would fully grasp the meaning of democracy and gradually turn to the left, and that loyal members of the Kuomintang would all become left-wingers. This being our position, we have never wanted to split the Kuomintang, still less to prevent it from becoming wholly revolutionary.

4. For the three reasons stated above — concern for the interests of the workers and peasants, the aim of the Communist Party in the political struggle and the hope placed on the Kuomintang — we must openly express our views. Marx said, "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims."⁵ Therefore, in the course of propagating communism, we must constantly make public our political views. Of course, under the Kuomintang government, our political views and criticisms are all well-intentioned; we hope that it will accept them, for they are fundamentally different from the hostile criticisms and disruptive propaganda of the imperialists, warlords and semi-feudal forces. Comrades in the Kuomintang may choose to equate such well-intentioned criticisms with the rumour-mongering and attempts to sow discord engaged in by the imperialists and reactionaries. Or, ignoring the facts, they may consider that those who protest the illegal acts of government officials and military officers and criticize erroneous measures taken by the Kuomintang government are libelling the entire Kuomintang and sabotaging the National Government. If so, they will be levelling arbitrary accusations against the innocent. For example, in recent months there have been several cases of government officials and military officers oppressing workers and sabotaging the peasant movement. When we criticized these law-breakers and when the workers and peasants made demands, it was in the hope that the Kuomintang government would punish the guilty parties so that