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**THE RESHAPING OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

RICHARD C. THORNTON

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YEARS

*Reshaping America's
Foreign Policy*



RICHARD C. THORNTON

A Washington Institute Press Book



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Preface

This volume is the first of three analyzing American strategy and foreign policy during the period 1968–1988. Those to follow will treat the Carter and Reagan presidencies. My purpose is to offer an integrated, strategic approach for the analysis of one of the most complex twenty-year periods in American history. The approach includes consideration of arms control and strategic weapons, conventional power and geopolitics, and questions of oil, trade, and monetary policy. During this period the United States moved away from its traditional containment strategy and sought, as it still seeks, to construct a new global order.

By the late sixties fundamental changes in key global relationships generated by the war in Vietnam—militarily between the United States and the Soviet Union and economically between the United States and its principal allies, West Germany and Japan—had compromised containment. The growth of Soviet strategic power gradually neutralized the United States security guarantee to the Western alliance, while the shifts of Germany and Japan threatened to destroy the international order which the United States had done so much to construct after World War II.

These global changes produced a prolonged, but carefully veiled, internal debate within the American leadership which spanned four administrations and transcended party labels. A new strategy eventually emerged, incrementally but erratically, over the course of two decades as American leaders sought to maintain as favorable a position as possible in a rapidly evolving political-military-economic environment.

The debate within the United States leadership centered on the advisability of continuing but modifying containment or moving toward a new global order. Containment in this context means the forward American position on the Eurasian landmass around the periphery of the Soviet bloc—in which American power provides the essential security shield—and includes the political-military-economic relationships which sustain it.

The new global order, on the other hand, involved a gradual reshaping of America's international relationships and responsibilities to permit, and indeed to require, Germany and Japan to play greater security roles to match their expanding economic capabilities and thus to enable the United States to shift from forward and exposed containing positions to more secure ones. This, too, includes changes in political-military-economic relationships to support the new strategy.

Although the new strategy calls for the reconfiguration, and in some cases the withdrawal, of American military power from forward positions in Europe and Asia, it is by no means a retreat, nor does it represent the decline of the United States. Indeed, politically and economically, the United States is playing, and will continue to play, a greater role than ever before. Military disengagement in order to facilitate economic reengagement would more accurately describe the dynamics of the new strategy. The focus of containment was the American-Soviet adversary relationship; the focus of the new strategy is American economic competition with Germany and Japan.

Two key but much misunderstood terms require definition—strategy and policy. Strategy is the selection of both means and ends; strategic choice requires determination in the abstract of both objectives and ways to achieve them. Strategy's essence is structure—whether it is the structure of the strategic or conventional weapons balance, global or regional geopolitical balances, the trade balance, or the international monetary balance. The essence of policy, on the other hand, is a consistent, specific course of action. Thus the essential relationship is between strategy and policy, not strategy and tactics. Policy is the consistent application of specific means to achieve larger, structural ends. All diplomacy, the execution of policy, is tactics.

In each of the administrations treated in this trilogy, key issues arose containing clear and unambiguous strategic implications as to whether the specific policy under consideration would reinforce the

structure of containment or move away from it toward the new order. Of course, not every policy issue would carry the same strategic implications, but a few salient examples will illustrate the point.

During the Nixon administration the central issue was the outcome in Vietnam. Would the United States maintain the fragmented structure of Indochina, supporting South Vietnam in the manner it supported South Korea, or would we withdraw from the region? The principal protagonists were President Nixon, who sought to maintain a modified containment position, and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, who pressed for movement toward a new order. The decision, as will be shown in this volume, was to withdraw; and withdrawal, in turn, was the first step in a larger scheme to construct a new international order. Other issues, such as arms control, exchange rate realignment, and the structure of world oil, carried similar implications.

The Carter administration pursued a very active foreign policy agenda in which the containment–new order dichotomy was marked. SALT II with the Soviet Union, normalization of relations with China, deployment of the neutron bomb and Pershing II missile in Germany, withdrawal of troops from South Korea, greater military expenditures for Japan, policy toward Iran and the Middle East—all contained the same strategic implications. Would the policy decided upon move the nation toward containment or toward a new order? The principals here were national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued the case for containment, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who pressed for adjustment. The strategic continuity between Kissinger and Vance is apparent.

In the Reagan administration, arms control, the deployment and removal of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, divisive trade issues with Japan and Germany (including the gas pipeline crisis), and the opening to Iran, to name only a few, contained the same strategic implications. The president himself initially espoused containment against the views of his secretary of state, George Shultz, who pressed forward with the Kissinger-Vance line. The collapse of the Iran initiative seems to have brought efforts at containment to an end and settled the two-decade-long debate.

But the problem of building a new international order was complicated by more than the internal opposition of the proponents of containment. For movement toward a new order to be feasible, there was an external precondition—detente with the Soviet Union. The

new order involved reconstruction of collective security structures around the Soviet periphery in connection with the repositioning of American power, but such movement in a context of unfriendly relations with Moscow would simply open the door to a Soviet advance. Detente was a necessary precondition to disengagement and the construction of a new global order.

Thus, as we shall see, much of the disagreement in each administration between the advocates of containment and those arguing for movement toward a new order centered on the question of the timing of detente and arms control with Moscow. In essence, containment advocates argued that consolidation of geopolitical positions around the Soviet periphery should occur prior to any offer of detente with the Soviet Union. Advocates of the new order, on the other hand, argued the reverse, that detente should precede the disposition of geopolitical positions around the Soviet periphery. And in each administration proponents of the new order offered Soviet leaders the same *quid pro quo*—trade and technology in exchange for strategic weapons and geopolitical restraint.

For most of the period under study, Soviet leaders, judging by their actions, appeared not to have understood the positive implications for the Soviet Union in the new order. Soviet strategy demonstrated a straightforward geopolitical approach based upon growing strategic and conventional weapons power. Thus, in each administration, Moscow took initial steps toward detente only to draw back and attempt to exploit what appeared to be a geopolitical opportunity arising in the context of a perceived American disengagement from containment. Most recently, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet approach appears to be changing, but only time will tell if that is in fact the case.

I would like to thank Neil Salonen, Director of the Washington Institute, for support to undertake this extensive study. I would also like to give credit to Jonathan Slevin for his careful and insightful handling of this project and to Rebecca Salonen, whose brilliant editorial skills have transformed a scholarly tome into a very readable book. Thanks also go to the students, faculty, and staff of George Washington University's Elliot School of International Affairs and Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, where the author teaches.

Introduction

The legacy of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the administration of Richard M. Nixon was a gravely weakened American position in the four fundamental categories of global power: wealth (a severely weakened international economic position); power (the loss of strategic weapons superiority); geopolitical position (the evisceration of containment); and national will (erosion of popular consensus). In each category during the Johnson presidency the strategic indicators had turned from positive to sharply negative.

In strategic weapons, the United States fell from clear-cut superiority over the Soviet Union when President Johnson assumed office to virtual parity with Moscow as he was leaving it. Johnson's dogged effort to exhaust Hanoi in a war of attrition led instead to the weakening of the containment structure around the Soviet Union. The increasing cost of the war in Vietnam led to adoption of an expansionary monetary policy in hopes of paying for the war without affecting prosperity at home. Johnson refused to increase taxes (until 1968), cut back on "Great Society" expenditures, or call up military reserves.

The unfortunate effect of attempting to prosecute a major war without either sufficient financial resources or necessary manpower was to weaken the United States vis-à-vis its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, and to create the conditions for the rapid rise in economic power of America's two key allies—the former Axis powers, West Germany and Japan. The combined effect of war, inflation, and domestic disaffection sapped the national will and undermined the very foundations of American global preeminence.

Failure to Maintain Strategic Weapons Superiority

In a brief four years, between 1965 and 1968, President Johnson allowed the once superior United States ICBM advantage to slip badly in the face of an extensive and clearly visible Soviet missile construction program. High administration officials, especially Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, argued not only that the Soviet missile buildup presented no foreseeable threat to United States missile superiority but also that the United States actually had mistakenly built too large a nuclear force.¹ In failing to maintain the United States ICBM lead President Johnson moved the nation closer toward an already predictable, even though not yet existent, counterforce inferiority and land-based missile vulnerability.

The counterforce issue centered on the evolution of the land-based ICBM into a highly accurate offensive weapons system. From its earliest stages the developmental progression of the ICBM was scientifically well understood. Improvements in range, reliability, accuracy, numbers of warheads, launchers, warhead yield, and silo survivability were all key factors which, when compared to the development of the same characteristics in Soviet systems, allowed projections of relative system strengths and vulnerabilities into the future. Together, they constituted a measuring rod by which to gauge Soviet progress.

President Johnson had allowed the launcher-to-launcher ratio to narrow through 1968 without recommencing new American launcher construction, on the grounds that the United States could always maintain its advantage through technological superiority, by improving the accuracy of its ICBMs and by MIRVing them—that is, mounting several warheads on each missile. But the problem, which could already be anticipated in the mid-sixties, was that technological superiority could only temporarily compensate for launcher parity because it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would develop and deploy MIRVs, and make them accurate, too.

Improvements in range, reliability, and warhead yield simply refined the offensive threat for both sides, permitting destruction of even the hardest missile silos then possible to construct. Deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) offered a degree of survivability for the ICBM, for Moscow lagged well behind the United States in this fledgling technology, but missile defense was deemed destabilizing in the Johnson administration's strategic weapons concepts.

The Johnson administration's theorists, under the lead of Secretary of Defense McNamara, had contrived a strategic doctrine sanctifying the decision not to maintain missile launcher superiority. This concept was known as "mutual assured destruction," or MAD. The theory postulated that once each side had sufficient power to destroy the other in a retaliatory second strike, stability would be achieved. Since the United States already possessed that capability, according to MAD, there was no need to add to the ICBM force. The theory assumed that the Soviet Union sought the same objective the United States did—a stable nuclear balance, not superiority—and that therefore once the Soviet Union reached strategic weapons parity with the United States further missile construction would be curtailed.

The trouble with the theory was that the Soviets never subscribed to it. They continued to build far more missiles than were necessary for the establishment of a stable nuclear balance. Although MAD presumed similarity of objective for the two superpowers, the problems each faced were quite different. For Washington, strategic weapons superiority was the essential undergirding of the forward American global position on and around the Eurasian landmass, commonly called "containment."

For Moscow, reduction if not elimination of the United States nuclear advantage was its principal objective, for before Soviet strategy could succeed, American strategy would have to be defeated. Improvement of Soviet strategic weapons capability to the point where it neutralized American strategic weapons power therefore dictated continued growth of missile systems beyond the level of a retaliatory second strike. Termination of the United States ICBM program simply provided added incentive for the Soviet Union to accelerate its own programs to catch up. A position of strategic weapons strength, in turn, would enable the Soviet Union to embark upon more active efforts to destroy containment and to alter the geopolitical balance according to its own design.

A second, more important factor invalidating the theory of mutual assured destruction was the evolution of missile technology itself. By the time the Soviet Union had reached essential launcher parity with the United States (in the 1968–1969 timeframe), the first of several significant changes had occurred in strategic weapons technology. When President Johnson made the decision to terminate new missile launcher construction in 1965, the state of the art of strategic

weaponry was such that the manned nuclear bomber was a far more accurate weapons system than the ICBM.

At that time both land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles were “city-busters” or, in the jargon, countervalue weapons of low accuracy. Ballistic missiles still did not possess the precision guidance necessary to destroy enemy missile launchers. By 1968, however, the ICBM began to approach, and then excel, the manned nuclear bomber in delivery accuracy (while its sea-borne counterpart, the SLBM, remained a countervalue weapon until the late eighties). Indeed, accuracy combined with speed of delivery introduced a new factor into the calculation of the strategic weapons balance—the time-urgent, hard-target kill probability, or what may simply be called the “counterforce factor.”

The United States was first to deploy a highly accurate ICBM, Minuteman, raising however briefly the possibility of victory in a ballistic missile exchange by means of a disarming counterforce strike. Since the Soviet Union was well over a decade behind the United States in ABM technology, with no hope of protecting its forces against such a strike, the only feasible course for Moscow was to construct more launchers than the United States had warheads. The Soviets were thus driven by the very less developed state of their ballistic missile program to seek a larger number of missile launchers than the United States possessed. This was, moreover, now a feasible goal, since the Johnson administration had placed a self-imposed limitation on the United States land-based force, and thus on its counterforce threat.

Construction of a large number of missile launchers, particularly the heavier types, contained within itself the clear possibility of not only ensuring that a fraction of the missile force would survive an American first strike, but also of providing the basis of a Soviet first-strike capability—*once problems of accuracy and MIRVing were solved in the future*. Since the Soviet Union had chosen to deploy the bulk of its strategic rocket force on land, while the United States had allocated its forces in a land, sea, and airborne “triad,” the emerging danger for the United States lay in the increasing vulnerability of its relatively smaller land-based force as the Soviet Union’s relatively larger time-urgent, hard-target kill capability improved.

In other words, while initially defensive, the Soviet construction of a large ICBM force held the future possibility of fairly rapidly turning the tables on the United States and allowing Moscow to gain

strategic weapons superiority, because only the land-based ICBM would possess a counterforce capability for many years. The reverse, however, was not true.

For the United States, increasing ICBM accuracy (without also increasing the number of launchers) would not present a similar threat to the Soviet Union's ICBM force because the Soviet force was so large. Even MIRVing the United States launchers, which was begun in 1970, could not neutralize the Soviet threat. It increased the United States threat to the Soviet Union, but did nothing to decrease the Soviet threat to the United States, since the number of United States launchers remained the same and they were unprotected. Simply put, the theory of mutual assured destruction, based originally upon countervalue capability—the mutual destruction of cities—began to fail in the face of the growing counterforce threat—the ability to destroy the enemy's missiles.

Whether or not one assumed that the Soviet Union sought strategic weapons superiority over the United States, there was every reason to expect Moscow to develop its missile systems to the limits of their technological potential, as the United States was doing. Even a cursory analysis of Soviet missile research, development, testing, and deployment in the sixties conveyed the impression of a large, carefully thought-out program. For example, by 1968, the Soviet Union was well along in the deployment of the SS-9, a very large, "heavy" missile, which could in the future be fitted to carry multiple warheads, and the Soviets were hard at work to develop a capability to MIRV their missiles.

In 1966 the Soviets deployed 30 SS-9 missiles, tripling that figure the following year. In 1968 Moscow increased SS-9 deployment from 90 to 156 and had 72 more under construction, for a total of 228. (By 1971 they would have 308 in the heavy missile category.) The Soviets had developed and deployed a promising hard-target launcher and were well along in research and development of MIRV technology. To assume as the Johnson administration publicly did that the Soviet Union would *not* seek to perfect the technology to which it was committing extensive resources, and to believe that Moscow would ignore whatever advantages accrued to that weapons technology, was particularly short-sighted, if not politically irresponsible.

Outgoing Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford admitted what his predecessor Robert McNamara had refused to acknowledge regarding the Soviet Union's growing counterforce capability. On January

15, 1969, he said, "It is quite evident that if the Soviets achieve greater accuracy with their ICBMs, together with a MIRV capability, our land-based strategic missiles will become increasingly vulnerable to a first strike."² It would not be too strong to say that the Johnson administration's failure to maintain the United States strategic advantage in ICBMs, particularly in counterforce development, would be a critical factor affecting the policies of all subsequent administrations.

The Evisceration of Containment

President Johnson also presided over the disintegration of the containment structure around the periphery of the Soviet Union. This was the case in East, South, and Southeast Asia; in the Middle East, and in Europe. The central factor determining the collapse of the American position was the decision to pursue a full-scale war effort in Southeast Asia, without arranging to meet its domestic and international costs.

The cost of the Vietnam War exceeded \$100 billion during the Johnson administration alone (\$200 billion overall), and drove the president to select relatively low-cost and ad hoc foreign policy options in other areas to divert resources to the war effort. The need to acquire funds to sustain the military effort led to his strategic weapons decision and to such diverse foreign policy choices as the complete withdrawal of United States influence from South Asia, the abandonment of an even-handed approach in the Middle East, and the weakening of NATO through the drawdown of United States weapons stocks in Europe for use in Vietnam.

In four years of fighting, the United States had done enough in Vietnam to prevent South Vietnam's defeat but not enough to bring victory.³ Despite the presence of over half a million troops in Vietnam (though at any one time no more than 70,000 were combat forces), when President Johnson left office no satisfactory solution was in sight. American forces never lost a major engagement with the enemy—not even during the Tet offensive of 1968, which initially and erroneously was believed to have been a serious defeat. Victory was ruled out by the decision to prosecute the war without seeking the military defeat of North Vietnam itself, or without separating North Vietnam from its suppliers. The only possible outcomes were

an American defeat or a stalemate — and a stalemate would occur only if Hanoi or its suppliers became exhausted.

A long war of attrition for a democracy has a dubious prospect, at best. North Vietnam could continue to wage the war in the South at its own pace and at varying levels of combat indefinitely, before launching a major offensive, taking in some cases years to build up the necessary stocks of weapons and supplies, all of which came from outside the country, from Soviet, East European, and Chinese sources. In the meantime, Hanoi retained the initiative, keeping American and South Vietnamese forces off balance with widespread guerrilla and small-unit operations. Perhaps more important, American soldiers in the field were depicted as an alien occupation force instead of as an ally; and the longer the United States remained bogged down in what seemed to be a pointless conflict with no end in sight, the more difficult it became to stay in Vietnam because of growing and virulent anti-war sentiment at home.

In South Asia, the same cost-saving impulse led to the extraordinary policy decision to withdraw American power from the region, providing the Soviet Union with an unparalleled opportunity to manipulate the geopolitical balance on the subcontinent to its advantage.⁴ Earlier, as Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated in the late fifties, Soviet relations with India had improved markedly. In late 1960 the Soviets began to ship arms to India, spurring Delhi's military modernization program and a more aggressive border policy toward Beijing.

When sporadic border clashes between India and China erupted into full-scale conflict in October 1962, the Soviet Union, after some hesitation, took a pro-Indian position. India's humiliating defeat in the Himalayas led to a fundamental decision to accelerate the buildup of Indian military power, which under the circumstances meant an increased reliance on the Soviet Union. Although the United States had extended emergency aid to India during that crisis, Washington declined to support a major Indian military buildup in view of the United States-Pakistani relationship. The improvement of Sino-Pakistani ties that also evolved in the aftermath of the conflict left India with only the Soviet Union as a sure source of military aid.

War between India and Pakistan in 1965, just as the United States was entering the conflict in Vietnam in force, was the proximate cause for the withdrawal of American influence from the region. At the same time the conflicts — first in May over the Hindu Kush and later

in September over Kashmir — presented the Soviet Union with both a problem and an opportunity to improve its geopolitical position at United States expense. As a result of the conflicts, Beijing moved to support Pakistan as a counterbalance to India, while the United States imposed an embargo on arms aid to both India and Pakistan.

Thus, Moscow's problem was how to forestall the increase in Beijing's influence in Pakistan, and its opportunity was the freedom to maneuver in Washington's absence. In the fall of 1965, as the United States was becoming heavily involved in its initial Vietnam buildup, the Soviet Union temporarily backed off from unequivocal support for India to assume the role of mediator in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, a role which became clear at the Tashkent summit later in December.

In early 1966 it appeared that the Soviet Union sought to develop a more balanced approach to the subcontinent as it offered supplies to both India and Pakistan. But appearances were deceiving. A visit to Moscow that summer by newly elected Indira Gandhi marked a major departure in the evolution of Soviet-Indian relations. Moscow agreed to undertake a billion-dollar aid program for India over the next five years, through 1971. Indira Gandhi immediately and continuously demonstrated her gratitude by assuming an increasingly hostile and antagonistic posture toward American involvement in Vietnam. Soviet promises to provide arms to Pakistan dragged on until 1968, when it was agreed to supply some \$30 million in military aid. However, only a small fraction of that amount was ever delivered.

In retrospect, it is clear that the power balance between Pakistan and India began to tip in India's favor following the 1965 conflict and Washington's decision to withdraw. Between 1965 and 1970, India devoted roughly four times the amount of resources to its defense budget that Pakistan did. Combined with the Soviet billion-dollar aid program and the United States embargo, the emergence of Indian military superiority over Pakistan was a foregone conclusion.

Since the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent states in the late forties, American strategy had been to maintain an equilibrium between the two countries. In 1965 the Johnson administration, in an effort to seek economies in anticipation of the high costs of war, jettisoned that strategy, opening the door to Soviet manipulation of the region and the ascendancy of India to preeminence in South Asia, a development which would occur in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

The Johnson administration's policy in the Middle East had similar adverse consequences. Perhaps more than elsewhere, American policy in the Middle East must be appreciated in both regional and global contexts. The implications of several trends were apparent within the region by early 1967. The Soviet decision of 1963 to improve Arab (primarily Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi) military capability versus Israel was beginning to show results, tipping the quantitative military balance against Tel Aviv.

The Soviet program, centering on the supply of late-model T54/55 tanks, artillery, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles, came at a time when Israel's main suppliers, France and to a lesser degree West Germany, had begun to turn away from Tel Aviv in an effort to develop reliable bilateral relations with Arab oil-producing states. Britain, too, under increasing economic stress, had decided to withdraw its protective naval presence from Aden—a redeployment which was substantially completed by November 1967. The growing vacuum in the region, accentuated by the imbalance against Israel, led the Johnson administration to attempt to counterbalance Israel's growing vulnerability, initially by supplying tanks and air defense missiles to Tel Aviv and, from mid-1966 onward, taking a more active role as a supplier of military goods.

In a broader context, the Suez Canal had become increasingly important to Moscow as a supply route to Vietnam. Early in the Vietnam conflict, Soviet supplies went to North Vietnam primarily across Chinese territory by rail, and from Vladivostok by sea. But in China growing domestic strife (which would soon engulf the nation as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) prompted Moscow in early 1966 to commence a buildup of its military forces on the Chinese border.⁵ Both events forced a shift in the primary supply route to Hanoi.

The Cultural Revolution made shipment of supplies across Chinese territory a high-risk venture, while the buildup of Soviet forces on the Chinese border received priority over Vietnam-end goods on the Trans-Siberian railway, which at several points was still single-tracked. Supplies to North Vietnam were therefore increasingly rerouted by sea via the Odessa-Dardanelles-Suez-Indian Ocean-Malacca Straits route to Haiphong. By the spring of 1967 some two-thirds of all Soviet supplies to Hanoi were transiting the Suez Canal.

Events in Asia and the Middle East thus evolved to bring about an

unusual coincidence of interests between Israel and the United States. Israel's need was to counterbalance the growing strength of the Arabs, while the Johnson administration perceived an opportunity to achieve multiple objectives. The Israeli attack on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six Day War and the closure of the Suez Canal satisfied both Tel Aviv's need to redress the military balance in the region and Washington's need to interdict the Soviet flow of arms and supplies to Vietnam. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the United States moved rapidly to strengthen its position in the region, compensating for Great Britain's withdrawal as well as becoming Israel's main supplier of military goods, a relationship which continues to the present.

While the United States may have satisfied some short-term deficiencies in position in the region, however, the long-term consequences of shifting from the previous policy of attempting to deal evenhandedly with Israel and the Arabs to adoption of a more one-sided policy opened the door to Moscow here, too, to consolidate a position among the radical Arabs and attempt to further polarize Middle East politics.

In Europe, the Johnson administration encouraged Bonn's *Ostpolitik* in an effort to destabilize the Warsaw Pact. Termed "building bridges" to Eastern Europe, the policy may have succeeded too well. In the summer of 1968, Moscow moved to stamp out the growing unrest among its East European satellites by striking at the state where unrest was most advanced—Czechoslovakia. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, brought an unanticipated reward to Washington. While the Soviet move defeated any effort to undermine the Soviet hold on the Warsaw Pact—at least at that time—it also dashed efforts in Western Europe spearheaded by Charles de Gaulle to draw closer to Moscow as a means of achieving greater independence from Washington.

The French challenge, personally led by de Gaulle, roughly coincided with the entry into office of Lyndon Johnson and ended a short time after his departure. De Gaulle's concept, expressed most clearly in early 1965, was to revitalize and unify Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The approach was designed to help unify Europe, on the one hand. On the other hand, detente with the Soviet Union was to emancipate the continent from perceived American domination. It was, of course, a transparent effort to undermine the global position of what de Gaulle disparagingly referred to as the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxons.