

The FUTURE of GOVERNING

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*Four
Emerging
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B. Guy Peters

The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models

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Preface

Change in the public sector is the rule rather than the exception. The quest for the perfect way of structuring and managing government has gone on as long as there has been a government, always to end in disappointment. The problem has been in part that no single definition of what constitutes perfect administration exists. Further, each solution tends to create its own new set of problems, which in turn will create a new set of reforms. Although this cycle of reform is beneficial for those of us interested in the process of change, it is less so for those involved in the process. Frequent changes tend to create cynicism about reform efforts both inside and outside the public sector. However, such efforts can be a politician's best friend, given that they are at times the only possible reaction to intractable policy problems.

Although change is a common experience in the public sector, the reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s has been extraordinary, not only in the number of reform initiatives but also in the fundamental nature of the changes being considered. In New Zealand, for example, it is not altogether hyperbolic to say that a revolution has occurred in the public sector. The traditional Westminster model of government in that country has been replaced by ideas drawn from public-choice economics and private management. Even countries that, according to other criteria, appear to be performing more than adequately have found it necessary to invest a great deal of time and effort in reforming their public sectors.

Perhaps because of the ubiquity and fundamental nature of change in these two decades, the administrative reforms being implemented are far from intellectually consistent. Although they sometimes parade under umbrella terms such as "reinvention," a number of different strands of thought about change are emerging. Further, these patterns are often inherently incompatible even though their advocates are implementing them as components of the same reform program. Thus it is crucial to understand the ideas that undergird reforms, not only intel-

lectually but also for practical reasons. If a number of the reforms now being implemented are indeed incompatible, then they cannot be successful, and these probable failures can only exacerbate the already pervasive conception that government is incapable of doing anything right.

The ideas contained in these reform efforts may be incompatible, but it is significant that contemporary reforms are driven by ideas. Each of the four models of change I will discuss in this book has a set of ideas beneath the more practical reform proposals being implemented. Some of these models, the market, for example, have a substantially clearer intellectual basis than do the others, but all four do have some identifiable theoretical foundations. This characteristic distinguishes the current round of reform from some of the tireless tinkering that has tended to characterize administrative reform. Most discussion of the reforms has taken place in the context of individual countries or groups of countries, but it is important to look at the common ideas that have guided and motivated the transformations.

Although the focus is primarily on the ideas undergirding reform, another concern is with the manifestation of those ideas in different national settings. Context is extremely important for understanding politics and administration. The various political and administrative traditions of the developed democracies have provided a set of lenses through which to interpret contemporary ideas for making government perform better. These lenses sometimes produce confusion, with the same concept being interpreted quite differently in the various national settings. Despite that possible confusion, the differences are useful indications of the disparities among administrative systems and therefore can serve as the basis for interesting comparative analysis.

A comparative analysis could include almost the entire world and certainly the entire developed world. I will provide examples of reforms from a number of countries, including some in the developing world, but I will focus on examples from the English-speaking democracies. Ease of access to information is an obvious reason, but there is also more than a little intellectual justification for this focus. These countries have been innovators in a number of ways, and collectively they have reformed more extensively than have most other countries. Moreover, some of the Anglo-American countries were in need of more extensive reforms than were many other developed democracies.

There have been a number of people who have had a significant influence on the development of this book. Perhaps the individual to whom I owe the greatest debt of gratitude is Donald Savoie. Through Donald's good offices I have been able to develop a continuing relationship with the Canadian civil service and a large number of capable and dedicated civil servants. We have worked together as senior fellows of the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) for several years, a collaboration that has been crucial in developing my own thinking about government and public administration. Several other individuals at

CCMD have been extremely supportive of my research on public administration and have contributed to it. In particular Ralph Heintzman and Maurice Demers have encouraged and helped fund the research and have provided their own valuable insights into the practice of public administration.

A number of other colleagues have helped shape the ideas in this book, sometimes without being aware of how much they were contributing. Vincent Wright provided me with a visiting position at the Centre for European Studies, Nuffield College, Oxford. The opportunity to have several months of virtually uninterrupted time to think and write was crucial to finishing the book. Numerous stimulating, if sometimes rushed, conversations with Vincent also contributed to my thinking about contemporary administrative change. Jon Pierre and his colleagues at Forvaltningshogskolan at the University of Gothenberg provided a similar, if alas shorter, opportunity. Patricia Ingraham asked me to write a paper that became the foundation of this book. She and her colleagues at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, also provided a number of interesting insights on the reform process at conferences in Washington, D.C., and in lectures in Beijing, China. Several colleagues in Norway, including Tom Christensen and Morten Egeberg, have provided interesting and important feedback on some of the ideas contained here. And many colleagues in Pittsburgh have helped me think through some of the ideas; others assisted (in their own way) by making it impossible for me to rush through the manuscript.

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Changing States, Governance, and the Public Service

Governance is a scarce commodity. Governments have created a vast array of institutions designed to exercise collective control and influence over the societies and economies for which they have been given responsibility. Those efforts at institution-building have certainly provided comparative politics with an interesting array of data, but it is much less clear that they have moved any closer to solving the problems of regulating the behavior of people and organizations. If anything, these efforts at governance may be less successful now than were similar efforts in the past. There has been some loss of government's policy autonomy to external actors, such as international organizations and amorphous international markets, at the same time that an apparent popular resistance to being governed has sharply increased. Political leaders in the world today must ask whether what they do in their national capitals has much effect in shaping the lives of their citizens.

Fortunately, governments, government leaders, and their civil servants continue attempting to find better ways of governing. I say fortunately not just because these efforts keep students of the public sector occupied but also because there is a great capacity to do good for citizens, individually and collectively, through effective public action. It is now fashionable to malign government and the people working in it and to point out gleefully all their failures. Such skepticism and cynicism are cheap; great commitment and courage are required to continue attempting to solve problems that almost by definition exceed the capacity of any individual or private actor to solve. If the problems had been easy or profitable, they probably would have remained in the private sector, and government would never have been made to cope with them. Despite the popular mythology, government is rarely imperialistic, nor does it look for new problems to solve; governments are more likely to be handed the poisoned chalice of an insuperable problem.¹

It remains crucial for governments, and the individuals who constitute them, to continue their search for innovative mechanisms for making government work better and to serve society better. This effort must be carried on even in the face of "ill structured" (H. A. Simon 1973) or "intractable" (Schon and Rein 1994) or "wicked" (Dunn 1988) problems and often in the service of a mass public that neither recognizes nor appreciates the effort involved. Contemporary public servants are neither martyrs nor saints, but they are individuals charged with continuing to make collective decisions and to enforce previous decisions on behalf of the public interest.

The leaders of government are also charged with reforming and improving the internal performance of their organizations. Many of the efforts at reform that I will discuss have been internally generated, an indication that the public sector is not resisting change, as many of its critics assume, but in some cases is actually leading the way for change (Tellier 1990; B. Peters and Savoie 1994; Derlien 1995). Of course, there are at least as many reforms that have been imposed from the outside, some of which have indeed been resisted vigorously by the entrenched civil service. There is no monopoly on virtue or vice in the world of administrative reform.

My purpose in this book is to examine the efforts that are being made to make government work better. Numerous efforts have been occurring all over the world since at least 1980. In most industrialized democracies these reforms have originated internally, but in many of the less developed countries they have been imposed by agencies of external aid as conditions of receiving assistance (United Nations Development Programme 1988). Even countries that appear to be extremely successful from the outside, such as Japan, have engaged in large-scale administrative reforms (Muramatsu and Krauss 1995), partly as a means of keeping pace with other countries.

The discussion will focus largely on the Anglo-American democracies, because generally these have been the most active and innovative reformers. I will, however, use examples from other countries if they can illuminate an analytic point. My intention is not so much to describe the numerous efforts at administrative reform—that has been done extremely well in a number of other places (Savoie 1994a; Zifcak 1994; *International Political Science Review* 1993). Rather, it is to look at the ideas that drive the reforms and that provide a diagnosis of the problems as well as the basis for prescriptions to remedy them. Given that purpose, and the ubiquity of reform, the focus on a smaller number of cases is not particularly damaging.

Understanding administrative reform in turn requires understanding the traditional model of governance that is the backdrop against which attempts at reform must be viewed. Rather than evolving from a set of intellectual principles, this model tended to evolve from practice and rarely has been articulated as a distinct model. Despite its lack of an intellectual foundation, the traditional model was once thought to be the way in which the public sector should be or-

ganized, and indeed it worked rather well for decades. During the height of optimism about government's capacity to solve social problems, for example, the 1950s through the early 1970s, the basic model for governance appeared to require little fundamental debate. The task then was to refine the model, make it more "rational" with techniques such as program budgeting (Novick 1965) and cost-benefit analysis (Mishan 1988), and then merely to let the governing system continue to produce effective policies and continued socioeconomic improvements.

Certainly some conservative politicians and thinkers did raise questions about the virtues of those (by then) traditional ideas about government and especially about the increased role of the public sector (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1968; Sawyer 1982). For most people in and out of government, however, the parameters of acceptable public action then were broad and well established. There was a pervasive belief that government could regulate the economy through taxing and spending and that it had sufficient economic resources to ameliorate social problems such as poverty, sickness, and poor education. The fifties and sixties were the period of the "mixed-economy welfare-state," of "treble affluence" (Rose and Peters 1978), and of the promise of an ever-brighter future through public action.

The fifties and sixties were also the period of consensus politics (Kavanagh and Morris 1994) in most countries of Western Europe and North America, and both scholars and practical politicians proclaimed the "end of ideology" and the creation of a "post-industrial society" (Gustafsson 1979).² Even a conservative such as Richard Nixon would say, "We are all Keynesians now," and would attempt to create new social programs (Spulbar 1989) rather than roll such programs back as subsequent Republican presidents and congresses attempted to do.³ Similarly, Christian Democrats in Germany could preach the virtues of the "social market economy" as a desirable alternative to unbridled capitalism (Peacock and Willgerodt 1989). Clearly something has changed in the economy and in the popular mind since that time, and with that change has come a change in the definition of what constitutes good government and acceptable public administration. Before looking at what has changed, however, I offer a somewhat more complete idea of the traditional model and some of its strengths and weaknesses.

TRADITIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE OLD-TIME RELIGION

Dwight Waldo (1968) once wrote that public administration has had so many identity crises that in comparison the life of the average adolescent appeared idyllic. Waldo was discussing public administration as an academic discipline, but its contemporary practice displays much of the same uncertainty. Questions about its practice include such basic issues as the structure of government, man-

agement of those structures, and the proper role of public administration in governance (Harmon 1995). Many traditional certainties about government and the public service are now either totally altered or are subject to severe scrutiny.

Rather than being singular, the old model of public administration is actually a number of different concepts (Richards 1992), and at least six old chestnuts have guided our thinking about the public service and its role in governance (B. Peters and Wright 1996). These six ideas clearly are no longer as canonical as they once were.⁴ The sometimes forgotten aspect in the discussion of alternative approaches to public management is that these principles evolved over a long period and generally represent responses to a number of problems that existed in public administration in earlier times. Indeed, there is a real chance that some of the problems for which the old chestnuts were designed may reappear once they are replaced with more modern conceptions about how to run government.

Reforms solve problems existing at one time, often in the process creating a new set of problems that may generate subsequent reforms (Kaufman 1978; Aucoin 1990; B. Peters 1995a). Moreover, a word of caution about administrative reform does not mean that the old ways of running government were necessarily better. The appeal to prudence simply points out that these approaches to public management did solve certain problems, albeit creating some additional ones. Overturning the older modes of administering, though solving some problems, may in the process revive older difficulties and perhaps even create new ones. If the potential costs of discarding the existing system of public administration are not recognized, then change may appear entirely too attractive.

An Apolitical Civil Service

The first of the six principles is the assumption of an apolitical civil service, and associated with that the politics-administration dichotomy and the concept of "neutral competence" (Kaufman 1956) within the civil service. The basic idea is that civil servants should not have discernible political allegiances and that they should be able to serve any master, i.e., any government of the day. The civil servant may have views about particular policies and is almost expected to, as a member of an organization responsible for making and implementing policies (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). But they are not expected to have partisan views that might lead them to be disloyal to a government of one complexion or another.

The principle of an apolitical civil service has been largely an Anglo-Saxon preoccupation, compared to administration in other industrialized democracies (Silberman 1993). However, even in countries with a more overtly politicized civil service, such as Germany and France (Derlien 1991; Bodiguel and Rouban 1991), the concept of competence ranks at least as high as political allegiance in the selection of civil servants. Similarly, the civil services of the Scandinavian countries tend to be less overtly politicized than that of Germany, but even there po-

litical allegiances are often known or assumed (Ståhlberg 1987). The characteristic common to these civil service systems is that objective qualifications are the first hurdle for recruitment, and political considerations follow those.

Although depoliticization of the civil service has been very much an Anglo-American concern, it is also a rather recent administrative value. In the United States, for example, the spoils system dominated recruitment until the mid-1880s, and even then the number of merit appointments under the Pendleton Act (1883) was rather small (Skowronek 1982; Ingraham 1995a). By 1904 only half of the total federal employment was under the merit system, and most of that was in lower-level clerical positions (Johnson and Liebcap 1994, 30–33). In the United Kingdom the merit system was initiated only slightly earlier than in the United States, although it spread throughout the administrative system more quickly (Parris 1969). The historical record in other Anglo-American democracies is not significantly different, as patronage appointments were either replaced by merit gradually under British rule from the end of the nineteenth century or as former colonies institutionalized merit systems quickly after gaining independent status (Braibanti 1966; Koehn 1990).⁵

Associated with the concern for maintaining an apolitical personnel system was the argument that politics and administration were, and more importantly, should be separate enterprises. In the United States this principle was stated first by Woodrow Wilson (1887) and restated more forcefully by Goodnow (1900). In the United Kingdom the argument was also advanced, first implicitly in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1853) on the civil service and then later in the Haldane Report (Machinery of Government Committee 1918) on the structure of government. In both countries the argument was that the job of the civil service was to implement the decisions made by the political masters and to do so without questioning the sagacity of the decisions.⁶ Other Anglo-American political systems have had similar apolitical civil services and have encountered the same problems of increased politicization.

Despite the ideological advocacy of an apolitical civil service, it is increasingly clear that civil servants do have significant, if not necessarily dominant, policy roles in most contemporary governments (B. Peters 1992; Kato 1994; Plowden 1994). It is also clear to most analysts that governance is better, on average, because they do (Terry 1995). The policy role of civil servants is most obvious at the implementation stage, where the role of implementors in determining real policies occurred as early as the 1930s (Gulick 1933; Almond and Lasswell 1934). In addition to the policy that emerges from "street-level bureaucrats" (Lipsky 1980; Adler and Asquith 1981) dealing with individual cases, the public bureaucracy has a more systematic role in making public policy through implementation. The recognition of the empirical reality of the role of the bureaucracy in governance and of the benefits that arise from that involvement has not prevented the continuing ideological advocacy of separating politics and administration, however.

The manifest policymaking role of the public bureaucracy arises most clearly

in the promulgation of "secondary legislation," "regulations" in the language of American government. Very few legislatures in the world are capable of writing laws that specify the necessary details for complex policy areas and thus depend upon their bureaucracies to fill in that legal and technical content. In the United States, for example, although Congress passes only a few hundred bills each year, something approaching 5,000 final rules are passed annually.⁷ The accumulation of rules over the years has produced over 10,000 pages of them in the *Code of Federal Regulations* for agriculture policy alone (Kerwin 1994, 18–19). In other industrialized democracies the volume of secondary legislation appears no less; even in the European Union there are approximately ten times as many rules written as pieces of primary legislation adopted (Blumann and Soligne 1989).

The civil service also has a significant, if now threatened, role as policy advisers at the formulation stage. Although ministers may be elected to make policy decisions, they may lack the capacity to do so effectively (Blondel 1988). Even in countries where civil servants are generalists by education and career patterns, through experience they can gain greater command of the details of policy than can ministers who are in office for only a short time (B. Peters 1992). And the role of the civil service in policy formulation and advice is perhaps even more crucial within developing and transitional governments, in which the need for expertise and the demands for a "committed bureaucracy" are that much greater (B. Peters 1995a; Hesse 1993).

The problem then becomes how to structure government in ways that recognize the reality, and even the desirability, of the significant policy role for civil servants while simultaneously preserving the requirements of democratic accountability. This is a difficult balance for designers of government institutions to achieve, especially given the historical legacy of thought concerning the neutrality of the civil service and the current reality of public demands for enhanced accountability (Day and Klein 1987; Cooper 1995). Furthermore, political leaders have become ever more aware of the policy role of civil servants and in response often have attempted to minimize that role (Aberbach and Rockman 1988; C. Campbell 1993). Reducing the role of the civil service has been done partly for ideological reasons (they were perceived either as too far right or left) or simply for reasons of preserving institutional differences.

The struggle over competence and authority in making public policy is now more obvious to individuals working within government, as well as to citizens, than in the past. The politicization of the functions of the civil service, if not the members of the civil service themselves, may make the delicate balance of competent policymaking even more difficult to maintain. Years of one-party domination mean that current civil servants are often identified with the policies of that particular party. Further, the prevailing assumption, if not always the reality, is that civil servants must accept the party line of the incumbent government or face termination.

Hierarchy and Rules

The second significant change in attitudes toward the traditional model of government is the decline of assumptions about hierarchical and rule-bound management within the public service and about the authority of civil servants to implement and enforce regulations outside it. The neat Weberian model of management (Wright and Peters 1996) does not apply within public organizations as it once did, and in its place a variety of alternative sources of organizational power and authority are to be found. The market, as one example, is an increasingly significant standard against which to compare the structure and performance of government organizations (Lan and Rosenbloom 1992; Hood 1990; Boston 1991). Though it can be argued that the inherent differences between the public and private sectors are crucial to understanding governance (Savoie 1995b; Self 1993; Perry and Rainey 1988), even governments on the political left have implemented market-based reforms.⁸

For transitional and developing regimes the demands for greater economic efficiency in the public sector must be balanced against the needs to create some of the predictability, universality, and probity associated with Weberian bureaucracy. The changes being introduced in industrialized countries are based on the assumption that the employees implementing market-based reforms will have at least some of the public-service values that have informed the civil service. Without those values, market-oriented reforms run the risk of justifying corruption and becoming a publicly sponsored version of the excesses of capitalism. Those excesses to some extent have occurred already in the former Soviet Union and may well emerge in other transitional regimes. These aberrations, unfortunately, have not been entirely absent from the industrialized democracies in which market-oriented reforms have been implemented.⁹

There are other challenges to hierarchy. Alternative to the market model, as well as to traditional models of bureaucracy, is the "dialectical" or participatory organization. Scholars and reformers have discussed this model for a number of years, but government organizations are now being placed under increasing real pressure to accommodate the interests of lower-level employees, as well as those of their clients, into their decisionmaking processes (Barzelay 1992). This change in management is at once a manipulative mechanism for increasing efficiency and a genuine moral commitment to participation (Thomas 1993). Whether the participation is authentic or not, it is difficult for an organization to deny involvement and access to its employees and even to its clients.

Contemporary public organizations also must negotiate social compliance with their decisions and compliance with contracts for service delivery instead of implementing public programs directly through law and other authoritative means. The spread of network conceptualizations in the social sciences has been paralleled by a proliferation of network practices in governance (Scharpf

1991; Kenis and Schneider 1991). No longer can governments impose their wills through legal instruments and, if necessary, coercion; they must now work to achieve an outcome approaching consensus among a large group of self-interested parties who have some influence over the policy. Governing in most industrialized democracies has become a process of bargaining and mediating rather than applying rules (Kooiman 1993).

Civil servants increasingly are expected to make their own decisions about what constitutes the public interest, and they at times are compelled to make determinations diametrically opposed to the stated policies and desires of their nominal political masters.¹⁰ If civil servants and other appointed officials are indeed to become entrepreneurial then they must become less dominated by the dictates of these masters. If this approach were practiced, it would alter fundamentally ideas of accountability as well as ideas of management in the public sector, especially in the Westminster democracies (G. Wilson 1994c).

Changes such as these make the role of civil service managers even more difficult than it has been and leave the role of civil servants within governments more ambiguous. Further, the general absence of a formalized normative structure in government may make preserving accountability increasingly difficult (*Public Money and Management* 1995).

For developing and transitional regimes these changes are even more problematic than for the industrialized countries. Bureaucracies in European and North American countries are searching for ways to become more entrepreneurial and less constrained by red tape, but governments in many developing and transitional regimes have different challenges. The problem for many governments in such regimes is in creating the Weberian and rule-directed bureaucracies that are now being supplanted in the industrialized regimes. Applying the earlier characterization of bureaucracies in transitional regimes by Fred Riggs (1964) as "prismatic," one of the challenges of public management in contexts of low universality of rules is to ensure equality and uniformity of those rules.

Permanence and Stability

The third change in the assumptions about governance and the public bureaucracy concerns the permanence and stability of the organizations within government (Kaufman 1976). Employment as a public servant is usually conceptualized as being a lifetime commitment, a "social contract," with civil servants trading a certain amount of income for secure employment (Hood and Peters 1994). Joining a public organization is sometimes seen as joining a Japanese corporation once was—as lifetime employment. The permanence of public organizations is frequently overestimated (B. Peters and Hogwood 1988), but it has been an important partial truth about government. Increasingly, this pattern of permanent organization is being attacked. The growing recognition of the dysfunctions of

permanence and the realization that many significant social and economic problems currently exist within the interstices of public organizations have led to some discussion of alternative forms of government organization.

The character of the alternative organizational structures remains somewhat inchoate at present. In particular, ideas about task forces, "czars," interdepartmental committees, and similar structures have generated options for achieving more flexible governance.¹¹ Another possibility is the "virtual organization" as a means of linking a range of individuals, and with them institutional interests, to be employed across a range of government organizations. Given the spread of information technology, the necessity for people to be in a common setting in order to share the characteristics of an organization has diminished. Therefore, forming alternatives to traditional organizations has become practical.

For individual public employees, organizational methods would also be diverse, with contracting and consultancy arrangements, temporary employment at peak times (for tax and recreational employees, for example), and an increasing number of positions clearly not intended to be tenurable. In the senior civil service the idea of a distinctive career structure is now being questioned and abandoned, even in countries such as the United Kingdom, in which the civil service has been very much a group apart from other employment streams. The Treasury—long the homeland of the mandarin—has embarked on a process of reducing its own staff and thinking about how best to involve outside talent in its own work (HMSO 1993; HMSO 1994a).

The traditional sense of permanence in public organizations is being questioned from several perspectives. In one view, a change is simply a means of deprivileging the civil service during a time in which almost all organizations and employees are being confronted with downsizing and other threats to their existence. Another view holds that permanence and stability tend to ossify policy lines and to make coordination of policies more difficult. If temporary organizational structures were more common, the change could have two benefits. First, it would enable more organizational experimentation in solving problems (D. Campbell 1982) without the fear that a future dinosaur was being created (Kaufman 1976). Second, it could permit the creation of organizations with primarily coordinative tasks that could address a particular problem of interaction among programs and organizations and then disappear. The conventional wisdom would argue that government organizations would not disappear, but neither has there been much real attempt to create such organizations explicitly.¹²

Governments of developing countries appear even more affected by the permanence of public organizations and employment. Government is a major employer in these countries, especially for the relatively small professional and educated segments of the society. It is difficult for any government to dismiss existing workers, but it also may perceive the need to hire additional, politically loyal personnel. It may make sense to dismiss existing employees, however, if they have

been compromised by their participation in a regime with serious human rights abuses (B. Peters 1995a). In any case, the tendency for public employment to be conceptualized as permanent presents real problems for these governments.

An Institutionalized Civil Service

The fourth fundamental assumption undergirding traditional public administration is that there should be an institutionalized civil service that is governed as a corporate body. This concept is a somewhat recent development in some industrialized democracies, with patronage or personal service to the crown or both being the older model for managing the state. For the intellectual father of contemporary bureaucracies, Max Weber (1958; see also Mommsen 1989), the development of authority and bureaucracy—beginning with charismatic and traditional authority using patrimonial organizations and ending with rational-legal authority employing bureaucratic organizations—represented the development of the modern state (especially in Germany). Although some analysts consider it central to political modernity, the concept of a distinctive and professional civil service has been brought into question in a number of countries seeking to establish a more committed and activist civil service.

In addition to the impermanent government organizations being created, the personnel commitments of government also have become less permanent. Government organizations increasingly expand and contract to meet variable demands for work, for example, in tax offices or recreation programs. Although this style of personnel management may save money, it produces several empirical and normative questions for public managers and policymakers. Temporary employment for a significant portion of the public labor force may produce even more difficulties for citizens than the presumed indifference of permanent employees. Citizens will have to cope with public employees who may lack the commitment to service and other public values that in most instances have characterized the career civil service. At a more practical level, temporary employees may lack the training and information necessary to do their jobs properly.

Even if the civil service system itself has not been challenged, the manner in which it traditionally has been managed is being questioned. For example, one of the common principles of personnel management in the public sector has been a uniform set of grades for personnel throughout the civil service, based upon their qualifications, the difficulty of their assigned tasks, or both, with relatively equal pay within each grade. Advancement was to be based upon merit, demonstrated either by performance on the job or by a series of examinations. It is now less clear that merit is to be measured within the context of the public service and the public sector, as forces and priorities of the market are being used to test the worth of individuals and of policies.