China 中國 Briefing, 1991

edited by

WILLIAM A. JOSEPH

Published in cooperation with
The Asia Society

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Preface

China Briefing, 1991 is the tenth in a series of annual assessments co-published by The Asia Society and Westview Press. This year's volume covers all of 1990 and the first half of 1991, focusing on the after-effects of Tiananmen on China's domestic politics, economics, society, and foreign relations.

This edition of *China Briefing* offers remarkable insights into the crosscurrents flowing through contemporary China. The chilling impact of 1989 is deeply felt in political life, in military affairs, and in the press—as several authors recount here. The buoyant optimism of the 1980s has turned to somber quietude in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the big event still lies ahead—the succession process following the deaths of Deng Xiaoping and other aging leaders. Some China specialists foresee the rise of reform-minded municipal and provincial politicians and technocrats over the course of this decade. Others have considerable doubts that the goal of a more plural, politically sensitive China will be reached very soon.

Given this mixed prognosis, the mood underlying *China Briefing, 1991* is one of caution tinged with understandable pessimism. That mood also pertains to U.S.-China relations. Twenty years after the famous détente of 1971–72, the bilateral ties are close to being on the rocks. Clashes have replaced communiqués. The divisive issues of Most Favored Nation, serious trade imbalances, GATT membership, convict labor, and human rights abuses are now central to the U.S.-China agenda. With few exceptions, the highest leaders of both countries no longer meet with each other in public or in private.

At the same time, *China Briefing* conveys some cautiously optimistic perceptions. Much of China's economic reform policy, as evolved in the decade from 1978–88, remains intact. Both statistical data and personal observations confirm that China's incredible economic takeoff was not totally destroyed by Tiananmen. On the other hand, the passionate momentum that once underlay the reforms has abated some-

what, and major policy decisions, particularly price reform in staple commodities, have been postponed.

A huge question mark hangs over what is now called "Greater China"—the linkages between the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Much hope has been generated by the web of economic and human ties between Taiwan and mainland China. Mixed signals come from Hong Kong: some business leaders feel confident about their future under Chinese sovereignty after 1997, but the outflow of professionals continues at an alarming rate.

All of these questions rest on leadership changes in Beijing. We cannot predict China's future with confidence, but we can and will offer our best insights into current developments and outline possible future scenarios.

I wish to thank the authors of this year's *China Briefing* for being conscientious, thorough, and responsive to our needs. Special credit for the end result goes to William Joseph, who commissioned the chapters and edited them with skill and sensitivity.

As with previous volumes, Susan McEachern, Alison Auch, and their colleagues at Westview Press made available their considerable publishing expertise. At The Asia Society, Andrea Sokerka carefully and efficiently assembled the manuscript, and Courtney Hurley provided excellent editorial and research assistance during her stint as publications intern. Our deepest appreciation goes to Deborah Field Washburn, Senior Editor, who worked with great energy and skill to bring this publication to press.

Robert B. Oxnam
President
The Asia Society

October 1, 1991

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Introduction: The Specter of Tiananmen

William A. Joseph

A specter is haunting China. Not the specter of communism proclaimed by Karl Marx in his *Manifesto* to be haunting Europe in the mid-19th century, but the specter of Tiananmen. Marx heralded the communist specter as an omen of a new socialist world; ironically, the specter of the Tiananmen massacre may well be a portent of the final chapter of communist rule in China and another installment in the global demise of communism. The major theme of *China Briefing, 1991* is the chilling effect that the tragic events of June 1989 continue to have on nearly every aspect of life in the People's Republic of China.

This volume focuses mainly on developments in China from the beginning of 1990 through mid-1991. As many of the contributors observe, the political situation in the PRC in this period was characterized by "paralysis," "immobility," and "uncertainty," while the public mood was one of "quiescence," "timidity," and "alienation." Nevertheless, this has been an eventful time in the PRC, and much has happened that can provide important clues to the nature of the post-Tiananmen order and to the underlying tensions that are likely to be decisive as China moves toward the 21st century.

The brutal suppression of the democracy movements in Beijing and other Chinese cities in June 1989 has left the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a shambles. Deng Xiaoping's program of economic reform, political change, and cultural liberalization had begun to repair some of the damage done to the party's image by the follies of the Maoist era. By presiding over a period of unprecedented—though still limited—prosperity and freedom through most of the 1980s, the CCP staked its claim to lead China into the future. But the fateful decision of Deng and other party elders to crush the democracy demonstrations may have dealt a fatal blow to that claim.

As Richard Baum points out in the opening chapter, there are numerous ways in which the party's "dramatic loss of prestige and pop-

ularity" in the wake of Tiananmen is apparent even while outright opposition is impossible in the prevailing climate of repression. Small acts of symbolic defiance are a fairly common occurrence; but more telling of the fragile state of communist authority in China is the tenuous control that the party now exercises over vital bulwarks of its rule. Several authors examine the erosion of central authority and the acceleration of the trend toward provincial and local assertiveness since Tiananmen. Baum notes the "conspiracy of silence" that met demands by CCP hard-liners for the punishment of party and state officials who supported the democracy movement; this resistance by inaction reflects "the regime's apparent loss of political support within China's vast state bureaucracy," and is, according to Baum, just one aspect of a pervasive legitimacy crisis that now engulfs the Chinese communist state. Two other mainstays of communist power in China—the military and the media—may also no longer be able to be counted on to act as compliant tools of the top party leadership in any and all circumstances. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) lived up to its professional ethic and followed the orders of the civil authorities in quelling the Tiananmen demonstrations, the damage to military morale and prestige caused by that action has had a marked impact on the outlook of many PLA leaders. Ellis Joffe documents the brooding mood of PLA commanders—which he characterizes as "silent, sullen, and waiting"—as they endure for the time being the party's campaign to ensure the army's political loyalty at the expense of military professionalism.

Judy Polumbaum describes what she calls the "untenable situation" that prevails among Chinese journalists in the aftermath of Tiananmen. On the one hand, the Chinese media, which by and large appeared supportive of the democracy movement in the spring of 1989, have been put under tighter ideological control; on the other hand, the apparent effectiveness of such renewed strictures on press freedom is belied by what is really only "a veneer of compliance and conformity in journalistic conduct and media content." Beneath the surface, Polumbaum asserts, the private yearnings of China's professional journalists for "greater autonomy" undermine the efforts of the party leadership to mold them once again into "a thoroughly subservient propaganda corps."

Faltering institutional support for the party in the bureaucracy, the army, and the press is compounded by the growing breach that separates the communist state and Chinese society. "Civil society" may have failed, as Baum discusses, in its 1989 insurrection against the state and may now be cowed by the post-Tiananmen terror; but nearly every sector of society is profoundly alienated from the party

leadership and the ideology it expounds. Many of the chapters in this volume explore dimensions of this crisis between state and society that is manifest in ways ranging from the widespread cynicism that greets official propaganda to the declining interest in joining the party or the PLA. Corruption remains one of the most obvious sources of public contempt for officialdom.

Economic performance is an important component of the legitimacy of any government, and economic revitalization was the foundation of Deng Xiaoping's popularity prior to Tiananmen. The hard-line conservatives who took charge of the party following Tiananmen have largely been thwarted in their efforts to modify major components of the economic reform program implemented over the last decade. Barry Naughton's review of the Chinese economy in 1990–91 shows that the hard-liners put forward policies that "envisaged a substantial shrinkage in the importance of the market and a major increase in the role of the [central] plan." But a reversal of the basic trend toward reform never took place, as Naughton demonstrates, principally because the hard-line program was economically "infeasible and unnecessary" by 1991 because problems like inflation had already been brought under control through market-based macroeconomic means. Deng Xiaoping also deprived the conservatives of critical support by giving his blessing to a continuation of the reforms, revealing once again the peculiar combination of economic openness and political repression that is the contradictory essence of his formula for "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

The economy may be a relatively bright spot in the current situation in China; by many measures, the economy is much healthier than it was a year ago. Strong economic performance could provide the regime with a basis for restoring some of its tarnished legitimacy. But, as Naughton says, the long-term prospects for the future are "not exceptionally favorable" because of the uncertainties and orthodoxies of the post-Tiananmen political environment.

The specter of Tiananmen also haunts China's international relations, especially, as David Zweig details, its relations with the United States. After a Sino-American "honeymoon" that lasted for most of the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing and Washington seem caught in a "downward spiral" of suspicion, recrimination, and conflict. Even if the Tiananmen tragedy had never occurred, the honeymoon was probably destined to end because of the altered geopolitical realities of the post–Cold War world and mounting tensions between China and the United States over issues such as trade and arms sales. But the relationship between the PRC and the United States has taken a partic-

ularly bitter turn in the last two years because of sharply divergent perspectives on human rights: the Americans accuse the Chinese government of widespread and wanton violation of the political and civil rights of its citizens, while the Chinese defend their right to have put down the "counterrevolutionary rebellion" of 1989 and charge the Americans with interference in China's domestic affairs.

Zweig's analysis shows how Sino-American relations have become a political hot potato on both sides of the Pacific. On the U.S. side, the debate swirls most conspicuously around the question of the renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status, pitting those (like President Bush) who feel that "continued engagement" rather than isolation is more likely to induce change in China against congressional critics who believe that China must be punished for its human rights transgressions. In China, hard-liners argue that the PRC must stand up rather than "kowtow" to the United States, whereas reformers are anxious to protect the economic benefits of close Sino-American ties.

Tiananmen has damaged the PRC's international legitimacy beyond its relations with the United States. The 1989 massacre and the continuing repression stand in stark contrast with the general trend toward democratization that is sweeping much of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Although the PRC remains an important player in regional and global affairs, it has probably lost much of its claim to be the foremost advocate for Third World causes in international forums. For many years the PRC touted itself as a model for other Third World nations and enjoyed increasing international prestige and respect, but Tiananmen has made China into something of a pariah state, to be tolerated out of necessity rather than embraced or admired.

One of the most ironic developments in post-Tiananmen China has been the selective use of "Maoism without Mao" by the current leadership as part of an effort to bolster its ideological legitimacy and strengthen its political control. Several of the authors in this volume note the revival of Maoist politics and policies in the areas they examine. They refer to the way in which the party has again trotted out—with little success—the well-worn Maoist model soldier, Lei Feng, in the hope of reviving the "communist spirit" of unquestioning loyalty and boundless self-sacrifice. Baum notes the recent wave of "Maoist-style policy changes" such as sending cadres for short-term stints of reeducation by workers and peasants and emphasizing the recruitment of laboring masses into the party rather than intellectuals or entrepreneurs. Naughton describes the restoration in 1990 of the authority of the party secretary (at the expense of that of the factory

manager) in state-owned enterprises, thus reversing one of the major innovations of the reform decade and reviving an old mechanism of political control. The repoliticization of the army and the media noted by Joffe and Polumbaum is clearly a throwback to the Maoist dictum that "politics in command" should prevail over professionalism. Even in foreign policy, Zweig suggests, the CCP has resurrected that portion of the Maoist world view that sees international relations in terms of class struggle and projects China as an island of ideological purity besieged by hostile forces.

Such examples of revivified Maoism do not signify a wholesale adoption by current CCP leaders of the ideology of the past. Rather they should be seen as part of the party's desperate quest to shore up flagging legitimacy and failing controls. But this quest is pursued through messages and means that have been discredited beyond redemption and reveals that what the leaderships of the Mao and Deng regimes have most in common is the desire to hold on to power at all costs. The factional squabbles and looming succession crisis that preoccupy the current doyens of the CCP and their underlings also reflect how little has really changed in the way China is ruled since the end of Mao's reign.

Tyrene White's chapter on China's population policy draws attention to a problem that has confronted the PRC from the Mao to the Deng Xiaoping eras and will certainly pose a daunting dilemma for Chinese policymakers for generations to come. The race between the amount of arable land and the number of people has plagued China for centuries; but it has special saliency for a government committed to rapid modernization and higher living standards.

Since 1980 the PRC has carried out what White characterizes as "the most intrusive and limiting family planning program in the world"; nevertheless, the unexpected results of the 1990 census have prompted a call from some quarters of the Chinese leadership for a tightening of measures to restrict further the number of births. White notes that, despite the renewed sense of urgency about China's demographic situation, the state is somewhat constrained in enforcing more severe family planning policies by the fact that "concerns for overall regime stability remain paramount" in the post-Tiananmen period; both central and local leaders are unwilling to run the risk of antagonizing large numbers of people by enforcing unpopular measures, especially in the countryside.

White's study is a reminder not to be too "city-centric" in assessing any aspect of the present situation in China or in speculating about various scenarios for the future. As she makes clear, the PRC's population policy plays very differently in the rural areas than it does in

the cities, and the demographic crunch, if it comes, will arise from the countryside because of the dramatic differences between rural and urban birth rates. More broadly, although the events of 1989 that led to the country's current legitimacy crisis were largely city-based, China's vast peasantry will be a crucial factor in determining how that crisis is ultimately resolved.

The situation on Taiwan, as surveyed by Edwin Winckler, seems, in many ways, to be the diametric opposite of that on the Chinese mainland. While Taiwan is certainly not without very serious problems, the last few years have seen remarkable progress on a number of fronts. The island's diplomatic isolation has been replaced by growing international presence and prestige. Although the Kuomintang still maintains a solid grip on central power, democratization has proceeded to the point where a reversion to authoritarianism looks to be all but impossible. The economy is well on the way to making the transition to the next stage in the successful pattern of East Asian development. And the breach between the Nationalist state and Taiwanese society has begun to heal, a trend perhaps best exemplified by the accession of a native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, to the presidency. It has certainly been, in Winckler's words, a time of "changing dynamics" on Taiwan; it has also been a time of dynamic changes.

If the ruling party on Taiwan seems admirably in step with the aspirations of its own people and with global political and economic trends, then the government of the PRC appears sadly at odds with its citizens and behind the times. Indeed, as this edition of *China Briefing* demonstrates, the CCP faces some profound challenges to its monopoly on power. Even though these challenges remain muted for the moment, they are acute enough to raise serious questions about the long-run ability of the Communist Party to govern China.

1
The Paralysis of Power: Chinese Politics Since Tiananmen

Richard Baum*

> Suddenly, the banner flew from a high window of a Beijing University graduate student dormitory. "We Will Never Forget June 4," it said.
> —*Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 1991

Two full years after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) shot its way into Tiananmen Square, the trauma of June 3–4, 1989, continued to cast a dark shadow over the Chinese political scene.[1] Although law and order were quickly restored in the aftermath of the bloody crackdown, it was far from "business as usual" in Beijing. Visibly stung by adverse foreign and domestic reaction to the massacre of unarmed civilians, China's embattled leaders were unable fully to recover lost credibility or restore lost momentum to their sputtering economic reforms. The net result was a prolonged period of governmental uncertainty, immobility, and drift, rendered more ominous by the onset of a protracted political deathwatch, as the Chinese people anxiously awaited the passing of "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping and a handful of his octogenarian comrades-in-arms.

* The author would like to express his appreciation to James Tong, Dorothy Solinger, and Richard Siao for their helpful comments on an earlier draft; research assistance was provided by Elizabeth Bowditch and Rock Tang.

[1] Although it has become commonplace to refer to the events of June 3–4 as the "Tiananmen massacre," it is now widely accepted that most of the killing that took place on the night in question occurred not in Tiananmen Square proper (which had been peacefully vacated by striking students several minutes before being overrun by armored units of the People's Liberation Army), but along a three-mile stretch of Fuxing, Fuxingmen, and Chang'an Boulevard, to the west of Tiananmen, where advancing troops had their path toward the square blocked by masses of defiant citizens. Although no reliable figures are yet available, current estimates place the total number of dead at between 600 and 1,200 including at least 39 students and "several dozen" soldiers, with an additional 6,000 to 10,000 civilians and soldiers injured. For a detailed account of the events of June 3–4, see Robin Munro, "Who Died in Beijing, and Why?" *Nation*, June 11, 1990.

As China uneasily entered the 1990s, the prevailing atmosphere in the nation's capital was *neijin, waisong*: internally tense, externally calm. A number of factors contributed to the undercurrent of political tautness. First and foremost was the dramatic loss of prestige and popularity suffered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government of Prime Minister Li Peng as a result of the Tiananmen crisis. Most apparent among urban residents in and around the Chinese capital, the erosion of respect for governmental authority manifested itself in a variety of ways, from the unfurling of a banner proclaiming "We will never forget June 4" outside a Beijing University dormitory window, to the publication in the *People's Daily* of an ingeniously encrypted poem calling on Li Peng to "resign from office and assuage the people's anger"[2] and the organized smashing of *xiaoping* ("small bottles"—a homophonic wordplay on Deng Xiaoping's given name) on several college campuses. Potentially more serious was the regime's loss of support within its own bureaucracy, as evidenced by the post-Tiananmen defections of several Chinese diplomats and at least two high-ranking government officials, and by the unprecedented conspiracy of silence that greeted attempts by CCP hard-liners to expose and punish party members and cadres who had participated in the 1989 disturbances.[3]

Lending added gravity to the government's legitimacy crisis was a widespread public perception of rampant corruption among senior party cadres and their pampered offspring, the *gaogan zidi* (children of high officials). China's partially reformed, semimarketized economy offered substantial opportunities for well-connected officials and their family members to enrich themselves by engaging in commercial speculation, profiteering, and graft. Such behavior, known generically as *guandao* (official racketeering), had been a major focus of public bitterness and resentment during the run-up to the Tiananmen crisis. Following the June crackdown, Deng Xiaoping and other top leaders sought to disarm popular anger by initiating a well-publicized anticorruption drive within the party and government. Although the campaign resulted in the firing, demotion, or expulsion from the party of a number of middle- and lower-level cadres, extremely few high officials or *gaogan zidi* were subject to criminal prosecution. Many citizens

[2] The poem in question, authored by a Chinese student living in the United States, was published in the overseas edition of the *People's Daily* on March 20, 1991.

[3] The high-ranking defectors were Xu Jiatun, 74, former head of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua, China's official news agency, and Zhao Fusan, 64, member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Diplomatic defections were reported in Canada, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, among other places.

consequently remained skeptical of the party's commitment to rooting out economic corruption and *guandao* within its own ranks.

Further complicating the party's efforts to overcome its post-Tiananmen credibility gap was the question of how to deal with the popular reform-oriented former Communist Party chief Zhao Ziyang, who had been sacked at the height of the Beijing Spring for displaying sympathy toward student demonstrators. Hard-line conservatives wanted to expel Zhao from the CCP for "splitting the party" and "inciting counterrevolutionary rebellion." Their path was blocked, however, by a coalition of moderates and right-centrists led by Deng Xiaoping, who wished to avoid a debilitating intraparty vendetta.

Also at issue was the fate of more than 2,000 political prisoners—mainly unemployed youths and other marginal urban elements, but also including a number of students and higher intellectuals—who had been arrested after June 4 on assorted charges of rioting and rebellion. Following an initial wave of peremptory arrests, beatings, and well-publicized executions of alleged "hooligans" and "thugs," the Chinese government early in 1990 began to limit the scope and intensity of its judicial reprisals. Anxious to dispel international criticism and stem the global tide of post-Tiananmen economic sanctions, the regime lifted martial law in Beijing, released several hundred imprisoned pro-democracy activists, and allowed fugitive dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi to leave the country. Thereafter, Chinese courts began imposing somewhat milder prison sentences on convicted leaders of the Tiananmen disorders. In the spring of 1991 the government-controlled media tacitly downgraded the severity of the disorders, no longer routinely referring to them as "counterrevolutionary rebellion" or "turmoil," but as mere "disturbances" or "incidents."

While seeking to defuse global sanctions and rebuild domestic support, China's leaders also faced the prospect of a potentially divisive succession struggle. With 86-year-old Deng Xiaoping in visibly declining health, a sharp increase in behind-the-scenes maneuvering by rival CCP leaders and factions belied the regime's repeated claims of internal unity and stability. As Deng's public appearances grew less and less frequent, speculation centered more and more on the ruling coalition's capacity to survive the passing of its chief architect. Although a nominal successor to Zhao Ziyang—former Shanghai mayor and municipal party secretary Jiang Zemin—had been endorsed by the CCP Central Committee, the new party chief lacked strong organizational backing in Beijing; and memories of the intense power struggle that attended Mao Zedong's 1976 death served as a vivid reminder of the

high stakes and potential volatility of succession politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Closely related to the issue of leadership succession was the question of the political loyalty and reliability of the People's Liberation Army. Military morale, discipline, and esprit de corps had been severely strained by the PLA's unwelcome role in implementing the May–June crackdown, and party leaders were clearly concerned about how the army might react in the event of renewed civil disturbances. In December of 1989 this anxiety turned to outright alarm when, in far-off Bucharest, officers of the Romanian army refused to carry out orders to fire on civilian demonstrators, thereby igniting a massive popular uprising that resulted in the overthrow of the Romanian communist regime and the execution of its paramount leader, Nicolae Ceausescu. Deeply disturbed by the implications of the Romanian uprising, Chinese leaders instituted a major command reshuffle and rectification within the PLA and its civilian adjunct, the People's Armed Police (PAP). Despite this shakeup, it was not clear how China's military and security forces would respond in the event of a post-Deng succession struggle, or to whom they would pledge allegiance.

A rising swell of religious and ethnic unrest in China's remote western border provinces further added to Beijing's post-Tiananmen political difficulties. Since 1987 the Tibetan capital of Lhasa had been the scene of periodic anti-Chinese street protests. In the winter of 1989, a series of violent clashes between Buddhist demonstrators and Chinese security forces, in which hundreds were killed, led to the imposition of martial law and the banning of foreign media. In neighboring Xinjiang province, long-simmering ethnic hostilities erupted in the spring of 1990 when a group of militant Uighur separatists came under siege from local Chinese security forces near the frontier city of Kashgar, resulting in numerous fatalities.

A final source of post-Tiananmen political stress lay in a rising tide of provincial economic assertiveness that bordered, at times, on defiance of central authority. By the late 1980s, a half-decade of fiscal and administrative decentralization had given China's 30 provincial-level governments substantially increased control over local resources and revenues, as well as greater discretionary authority to regulate local finance, trade, and investment. Wishing to protect and enhance their newfound autonomy, provincial governments—particularly along China's relatively prosperous southeastern seaboard—were reluctant to implement Beijing's 1988–89 austerity program, aimed at curbing runaway inflation and cooling off the country's overheated economy. In this situation of rising provincial recalcitrance, the paralysis of power occasioned by the Tiananmen crisis served to exacerbate existing cen-

trifugal tendencies. Unable to command unquestioning obedience from provincial leaders, the central government was forced to adopt techniques of bargaining, compromise, and conciliation in its relations with local authorities. As a result, observers began to speculate openly about the possibility of regional economic fragmentation in post-Deng China.

So it was that China entered the 1990s in a rather fragile state of societal equilibrium. It was a state characterized not so much by overt political disintegration or popular defiance as by deepening dissension, doubt, and drift. Perforce, it was not a state that inspired great confidence in, or optimism about, the future.

Public Quiescence and the Failure of "Civil Society"

For all the government's manifest political insecurity, no "second wave" rebellion took place in China after the June crackdown. Three main factors helped to account for the relatively rapid return to political quiescence. First, the Chinese army, despite severe internal misgivings and morale problems, managed to maintain overall discipline in the ranks during the crucial stages of martial-law enforcement in Beijing, thus avoiding the type of massive military defection that later sealed the fate of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. However unhappily, the PLA by and large followed orders, and this undoubtedly helped to dampen popular enthusiasm for revolt.

A second reason for the rapid diminution of popular rebelliousness centered on the apparent effectiveness of the police crackdown against alleged "rioters" and "hooligans" after June 4. The harsh tactics of intimidation adopted by public-security forces throughout the summer of 1989, which included televised displays of bruised and battered captives being manacled by baton-wielding police, coupled with the onset of an intensive government propaganda campaign portraying the Beijing Spring as a criminal conspiracy, served as sobering reminders—if such were needed after June 4—that the sword of the state remained powerful and swift.

A third, related reason for the apparent decline of popular unrest was the absence in China of a viable infrastructure of "civil society"—that is, interest groups and other voluntary civic associations. Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Chinese society has been marked by a high degree of organized dependency, with the daily lives of citizens subject to comprehensive monitoring and regulation by their administrative "work units" (*danwei*). There are in China no autonomous social forces—no self-governing churches, trade unions, or professional guilds—to shield citizens from the intru-