THE EXISTENTIAL SELF IN SOCIETY



Edited by Joseph A. Kotarba and Andrea Fontana

The Existential Self in Society

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Foreword

Stanford M. Lyman

A risen spirit is haunting American sociology: the self. I say "risen" rather than "new" because the idea and problematics of self are older than the discipline and have affected its development from the beginning. What has revitalized the self as central to sociology is its emancipation from second-class citizenship as a dependent variable, its recognized autonomy as an independent phenomenon and topic for investigations into the social construction of human relations. The self is now conceived *existentially*, in terms of its contingent, assembled, changeable, and precarious modalities. Autonomy and emancipation entail a reconceptualization of the relationship of the self to mind and society, a rewriting of the hoary thesis that animated the social psychology of the pragmatists and found its near-iconographic expression in the eponymous book of George Herbert Mead and in the subsequent writings of his colleagues, interpreters, and critics. The existential self is free-floating, or nearly so, like Mannheim's idealized intellectuals, who, having been liberated from ideological constraints and utopian fantasies, might construct and reconstruct the world. What happens to thought and to social institutions is, thus, much less determined by external material forces and far more problematic with respect to the positivists' promise of prediction and control than ever before.

How the existential self appears and assembles itself in society is a topic of the present book. The authors of course cannot give a closed, determinate, and predictive picture of this process or of its product. To do so would violate the very premises of their perspective. Existential sociology is postpositivist and postfunctionalist. It leaps beyond the overthrown paradigms that promised sociological seerdom and social scientific hegemony. It returns sociology to an *unprivileged* position in its relation to human activity. Whereas general social science and, more particularly, conventional sociology have opted for its Baconian elevation above the suspect reasoning capacity of ordinary humans, existential sociology follows the admonition of Pico della Mirandola to place the human studies side by side with their subject, sharing the latter's attributes, deriving their concepts from an acceptance of *man* for what he is and treating sociology as *his* expression.

It is thus that in the pages to follow we meet characters who are simultaneously familiar and unorthodox but never "deviant": victims, ex-nuns, homosexuals, wheelchair runners, organization men and women,

and a host of secure, insecure, formed, and forming selves in various states of becoming, persevering, transposing, and dying. Because we are all part of this universe, this is but a small segment of the entire population of existential selves. However, small and unrepresentative as it is, it provides a portraiture and a description of some of the most salient processes, dilemmas, conflicts, and contradictions in which the self both participates and observes its own and others' participation. In the existential world we are all simultaneously ethnographers and subjects of ethnography.

This new sociology takes its departure from the uneasy relationship between experience and meaning. The former has the character of being-in-itself, the truly empirical; the latter, of being-once-removed. Yet, experience is, in and of itself, without meaning; it belongs to the world of the absurd. Meaning is given to experience through language. A sociology of the absurd becomes, then, an existential phenomenology, the discipline that examines how the raw experiences of everyday life are sociolinguistically constituted as parts of the ever reconstructed comprehensible world. The land of the absurd is a labyrinthine limbo where few care to live. Language is the Ariadne's thread that winds each Theseus out from the dangers of Minotauran meaninglessness.

The nonabsurd world and the existential self are created within the perimeters of time, place, manner, and power. Although seemingly "out there" for every person, each of these is subject to individual and collective interpretation, reconstruction, counterdefinition, and manipulation. Time retains its Augustinian mystery as *durée*, while its man-made forms appear, inter alia, as history, evolution, event, memory, term, hours, minutes, seconds, and the terminable or interminable future. The spaces on the earth are *territorialized* through accomplishment of human dominion over them and exist under such forms as established, contested, or soon-to-be-sovereignized regions, states, provinces, or colonies; as places for public or private activity; as interactional or obstructed trajectories of communication; and as what the philosophers call "extension," i.e., nature's construction of the fleshly limit of the human body. What is peculiarly human has its pristine character, but such is the distinctiveness of each individual's or group's understanding that personality, group identity, idiosyncrasy, inheritance, culture, and situation are said to modify—or mollify—its appearance. And standing over duration, space, and the mannered self is the protean phenomenon of potency, the capacity to secure compliance in the face of resistance. If we were to look for the sociological concept that expresses the unity of time, place, manner, and power within a single individual or a collective entity of awesome personification we would find it in *charisma*, acting as form and force, the instrumentality of true social *change* rather than mere historical *passage*.

The existential self has something of the character of Simmel's stranger: it is ever with us but mysterious. For some, e.g., "primitive men," its mystery as well as its existence goes unnoticed as self remains an undiscovered and inarticulated aspect of a collective humanity. One historian of the individual, Colin Morris, speaks of the emergence of self-referencing in the West in the twelfth century, and surely he is right to point to its intimate connection to the European rediscovery of Latinate humanism. But the existential self had earlier origins in Yahwistic religion, as Max Weber's study of *Ancient Judaism* certainly suggests, and a later development as a consequence of the Protestant ethic. Yahweh was the self-chosen god of the Hebrews, who were admonished to have no other gods before him and to enter into a contract (covenant) with him for mutual benefit. Yahweh and the Hebrews had constantly to work out, reinterpret, and renegotiate the terms of that contract, and the Hebrews were enjoined to open continuous discussions and debates with Yahweh through their representatives, the prophets. The prophets, as Weber pointed out, were not officeholders, bureaucrats, or priests; rather, they were men who lived on the edges of Hebrew civilization, who would assert their authority as negotiators and spokesmen charismatically, and, by this very process, they suggested an individuation of mankind. Moreover, the covenant with Abraham, especially after its renewal with Moses, was one of laws, and it adumbrated a *politicized state* as the appropriate social organization. The search for a Christian *community* of believers, conjoined in faith, is a later Pauline development, introducing a respecification of the powers of Yahweh and the weakness of man and requiring a mystifying obscurantism to replace the no longer negotiable terms of man-god relations. When Calvinism reopened the question of faith and fate once again—this time in relation to a god who was declared to be omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely prescient—man was left in a fully determined but absolutely incomprehensible world, granted the free will to choose his path but always ignorant of his ultimate destiny. The recognition of an absurd condition takes its point of departure from the human condition after the Reformation. The Puritans invited each man to seek his calling within himself, to plunge into the unfathomable void of this world in the hope of obtaining a sign of his place in the next.

The existential self is poised precariously between the two philosophies of absurdity that distinguish, in opposed argument, the relations between world and meaning. For the first, all that exists meaningfully is language, while the world is a dark cave of shadows and appearances; for the second, the world is an obdurate but solid mystery, possessed of its own intrinsic character, while language is a pale and ephemeral producer of its illusions.

For man, then, the future of an illusion also could mean an illusion of the future. The unarticulated and unwritten word might yet be its most potent element; language consists of "language games," as Wittgenstein reminds us. But we are all in what Nietzsche called the prisonhouse of language and cannot escape to the freedom of existence-in-itself. When the epigoni of the Frankfurt School call for a new emancipation of communicative conduct, they do not call for a liberation *from* it. It would appear that we are all Vladimirs and Estragons, living in a Sartrean world from which there is no exit—we cannot depart from our anxiety-provoking waiting room; we endlessly converse, while the time for our appointment with Godot seems always to be postponed.

The existential self is also ambiguously located on two of the dualities that derive from the critique of Cartesianism: embodiment-disembodiment and articulation-ineffability. The self seems to be embodied within the anatomical frame that nature has given to man. Moreover, the self is said—or desired—to be just that, i.e., singular. For each human there is, supposedly, but one self. However, contained within a body, this self has organic characteristics. It evolves, develops, grows. And it separates its essence from its appearance. A single body for each human might seem to require a single embodied self, but there are problems inherent in this requirement. The comprehension of the development and presentation of this self within the same body makes it difficult to discover it empirically and to classify it analytically. The self is surely essentially more than and different from its appearances ("roles"), and by its possessor it is perceived at any given moment as fully formed rather than in process—as "being" rather than "becoming." Yet its appearances alone are visible, and its brute existence and state of motility are not available at all to the observer. These must be inferred. An unbridgeable gulf separates the experience of the self by its possessor from the apprehension of it by its observer.

Moreover, the self is disembodied even as it is supposedly limited by human extension. For the self finds its singularity encompassed within a collectivity that transcends its fleshly limits. Typically, we see ourselves as members of historically and socially constituted sodalities. The pronominal "I" defines itself as a member of a plural "we." Asked "Who am I?", the individual is likely to respond categorically: I am a black, an American, a professor, a homosexual, a cripple, etc. The "I" seems to require a reference *group* that owes its own claim to recognizable existence to the social constitution of collectivities. "I am I" is not an answer that anyone, even I, will respect. Thus we all disembody and socialize the self in the very act of claiming its singular embodiment and individuality. An individual becomes a person, and a person exhibits his or her personification of the social self-referencing group.

Moreover, if disembodiment connects the bodied self to other bodies in space, it also links it to collectivities in time. The disembodied self partakes

of history, memory, hope, or dread. To say "I am a Jew" is at the very least potentially to identify with the Yahwist, Elohist, or secularizing conceptions of that people's past, to dredge up to consciousness the recollections of one's own ethnic group life, and/or to connect one's persona to the dreams or nightmares of the always problematic future that the cunning of futurity holds out to Jews. The disembodied self can be referred to predecessors, contemporaries, consociates, and successors in a single synthesizing phrase: "I am we." For this apparently inescapable singular plurality the problematics of the "I" are great. Its very "I-ness" is at stake. It struggles against becoming submerged completely in the "we-ness" that gives it its unique identity.

The existential self also seems to depend on language for its own confirmation and for its affirmation of or conflict with the world around it. The conversation of gestures, so basic to symbolic interaction, is vernacular in character: the sign becomes a symbol. The world around us is subdivided into an *Umwelt* and all else that is beyond it by the juridical rules of action and the jurisdictional rules that tell us where the action takes place. These rules are articulatable, although for most socialized persons they need not be spoken or written down. Hence, a major project of the ethnomethodologists has been to introduce an archeology into symbolic interaction and to plumb the depths of the juridical and jurisdictional knowledge from which every person's *Umwelt* derives. Although much of this work appears to be microecological, it could herald the social scientific reconstruction of civilization itself. Language in its expressed forms and in its deep structures provides the means by which the existential self finds, defines, and reorders its place in the world.

However, the existential self and its students are also troubled by the limits of language and that which is beyond language—the unutterable. Again we must turn to Yahwistic thought to grasp some clues to this phenomenon. To the ancient Hebrews, and to religiously-minded Jews today, their god's name was unutterable and symbolized by letters that were not pronounced. He was the "the lord," "our god," the one "who brought us out of Egypt." Understood through his commandments, contractual arrangements, punishments, and rewards, he nevertheless remained ineffable. Identification with him did not permit his name to be spoken. Rather, it was silently understood by all who were members of the covenanted agreement by which his sacred authority was established. By a dialectical process the very essence of membership in the covenant became itself unutterable, so that a constituted sacred peoplehood revealed its awesome roots precisely by being inexplicable to outsiders. The bases for identification with the sacralized we-group became an insoluble mystery to outsiders at the very moment that its unspeakable character formed the ground for an in-group understanding that required—indeed, demanded—no words.

The existential self owes a part of its existence to the supraexistential

soul and to the reference groups with which the soul identifies. The soul, it seems, belongs to a soul group. The soul is disembodied at death but remains immortal, finding its place, in accordance with different eschatologies, in transmigration, paradisiacal reward, or hellish torture. The mundane existential self of modern secular man has its own intimations of immortality. In its relation to the sacred reference group to which it refers for guidance and self-definition it transcends both embodiment and life. Nowhere is this more revealed than in the selves that find their inspiriting source in ethnicity and its descent, in what Max Weber recognized as the mystery of blood, a primordial irrationality that forms both the taproot of collective ascriptive solidarity and a source for referential individual identification.

The ethnic self constitutes one instance in which silence confirms identification at the same moment that it confounds comprehension. Ethnicity can conventionally be depicted in terms of color, culture, and condition, but these act only as mediating shibboleths for the unutterable covenant that binds together every member of an ethnic congregation. A most telling example—one that harks back to ancient Hebrew sources and the dialectical desublimation in which the ineffable character of Yahweh was transformed into the unutterable basis for individual and group identity—is that of "soul" among America's blacks. Although the soul idea among American Negroes can be traced back to the transmigratory, disembodiable, and shadow-casting soul complex of West Africa, its special character in the United States is that of something uncommunicable, ineffable—something that cannot be transmitted to or adopted by outsiders. Afro-American "soul" can be experienced by blacks but not explained to whites. To share in the ethnic legacy of "soul" is also to become a part of the silence that accompanies rightful descent. By contrast, to demand a verbal explanation of "soul," or—worse—to claim the right to partake of it without possessing the appropriate ascriptive credentials is to signal one's fundamental ignorance of its sacred and inexpressible nature. This tacit estate of ethnicity is an ineffaceable source of ethnocentrism.

A sociology of the existential self must take as its topic the irremediable marginality of that self. For the existential self is the product of both experience and the language used to render that experience understandable, but it is a member of neither the brute society of experience nor the reconciling community of language. Ethnolinguistics has rightly emphasized the importance of speech communities; but if it is to be faithful to the nature of its subject matter, existential sociology must recognize man as the creature who is never fully realized as a participant in his word- and symbol-using world. Always there is a striving for that emancipatory self-realization that would translate the self into its irreducible individuality; always there is an agonizing search for recognition and response that, when granted, pulls one back into the collective identity.

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We dedicate this book to our children—to Christopher Joseph and Jessie Marie Kotarba and to Nicole Marie Fontana—for whom the self is a joyous adventure.

J. A. K.
A. F.

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Introduction: Existential Sociology and the Self

Andrea Fontana

> When a new *paradigm* appears in the world, you may know *it* by this sign, that all the dunces are in confederacy against *it*.
>
> With apologies to Jonathan Swift and thanks to John Kennedy Toole

> The chief merit of the name "relativity" is in reminding us that a scientist is unavoidably a participant in the system he is studying.
>
> Nigel Calder

The discipline of sociology was born in the nineteenth century, and to acquire credibility it patterned itself on the natural sciences, which were, at the time, enjoying great legitimacy and success. This is what Durkheim did, for example. However, science has moved onward, while traditional sociology has not.[1] Newton's quest for absolutes has given way to Einstein's understanding of relativity, in which time and space depend on perspective and context. It is not that Einstein's science has abandoned the search for ultimately invariant properties of the universe, but it has acquired a new awareness: that to understand the vast ordering and patterns of the universe one must begin by realizing its utter diversity and complexity. Something as simple as a flash of lightning in the sky can be perceived in totally different ways, depending on the location of the observer and on whether the observer is stationary or moving toward or away from the lightning.

If the natural sciences have changed, why not sociology? Much of sociology is still preoccupied by a Newtonian concern with invariance and formal causes that blinds it to the complexity and uniqueness of its subject matter: human beings. As a result, the sociological quest for understanding humanity tends to oversimplify human behavior by clustering its diversities in oversimplified analytical categories, often chosen with no regard to the variable elements of space, time, and situation. Thus, sociological categories of human behavior tend to be presented in either dichotomous or fourfold choices (see, e.g., Parsons, 1951), stripping human behavior of its complexity and leaving us with a skeletal view that in no way represents the human beings who people the everyday world.

In response to these concerns, a number of alternative models of social life, including existential sociology, have emerged in recent years. All too often, however, these models begin and end with harsh criticisms of traditional sociology, with perhaps a bit of programmatic statement on how sociology *ought* to be accomplished, and in some recent models, like ethnomethodology, theory and substance alike appear to be moving away from sociology's still viable disciplinary scope. The basic purpose of this book, then, is to demonstrate that the promise of existential sociology, especially as articulated in the earlier Douglas and Johnson (1977) work, is being fulfilled. The essays presented here portray the development of a distinctive existentialist theory and the application of that theory to a range of contemporary social issues. Although our ideas are new, we bring them to bear on the further understanding of one of sociology's and social psychology's key concepts: the self.

What is existential sociology?[2] I hesitate to define it outside its empirical usage. The empirical chapters of this book will show the meaning of existential sociology far more accurately than a definition could at this point. However, some guidance is necessary for the uninitiated reader, and a working definition will therefore be provided. Existential sociology is the sociology that attempts to study human beings in their natural setting—the everyday world in which they live—and to examine as many as possible of the complex facets of the human experience.[3] Existential sociology does not discard the topic of inquiry of traditional sociology, the formal properties of human behavior, but it wishes to include other important features. Thus, existential sociology looks at formal behavior, informal behavior, rational elements, irrational elements, genetic dispositions,[4] psychological traits, and social rules; in short, it opens its inquiry to anything that forms the context of human action. Existential sociology pays particular attention to the forgotten elements in the social sciences—to feelings and emotions (see Manning, 1973; Fontana, 1981; and Merleau-Ponty, 1962). To paint a picture of human beings without considering their feelings and emotions is like making a painting of a peacock's tail in black and white.

And yet, this is exactly what traditional sociology has done. Following Durkheim's lead, Western sociology basically has been the study of social rules as these are determined and shaped by society, with the human actor assigned the role of mere performer, following a script.[5] In a metaphorical sense, the human performer in traditional sociology is very much like a musician in a large orchestra, playing his tuba or oboe according to the musical score and the conductor's baton, with little leeway for personal interpretation. In existential sociology, instead, the human performer is like a jazz musician in a small combo. There is a musical theme to follow, but since there is no score to read and no band leader, there is plenty of room for mood, feelings, and interpretation. Life is not quite a jam session, but it certainly requires improvisation. As absolutist social rules break

down and lose their meanings, people are forced to be creative in coming to grips with their worlds.

Lest we credit existential sociology with a totally new breakthrough, a few words on its antecedents are in order.[6] Throughout the centuries, most Western intellectual political and religious thinkers have attempted to subordinate feelings and creativity to rationality; yet if we read history well, we see that a great many events were influenced and shaped by less-than-rational elements, too often ignored in post hoc historical accounting. Could we, for instance, ignore Antony's feelings for Cleopatra in analyzing Roman policy toward Egypt at that time? Should we consider only rational elements in examining the Nazis' atrocities against the Jews? More recently and closer to home, who can forget the televised sight of then-presidential candidate Senator Edmund Muskie crying tears of rage in a snow-swept square somewhere in New Hampshire because of publisher Loeb's unpleasant comments about the senator's wife? Those tears dissolved Muskie's rage and also his presidential chances.

The territory of existentialism has been mapped out chiefly by philosophers and by the writers of novels, short stories, and plays. The latter have always been concerned with the total person, and existential philosophy has been a perennial reaction against more rationalistic modes of thought, such as empiricism and theologies; still, over the centuries, it has waxed and waned in influence, more often than not being submerged in a new wave of rationalism (see Dahrendorf, 1968; Koyré, 1958). As science gained enormous credence and momentum in the past few centuries, so did rational modes of thought, epitomized in modern times by the methods of scientists, technologists, and bureaucrats. While sociologists like Georg Simmel and Max Weber gloomily pointed to the inevitable march of an increasingly rationalized society (see Gerth and Mills, 1946; Simmel, 1968), writers like Kafka and Dostoevsky cried out against the vise that was reducing modern man and woman to puny human beings, overbound by rules and constraints (see Kafka, 1956; Dostoevsky, 1970). Existential notions like freedom, authenticity, sincerity, humanism, empathy, and creativity beat in vain against the walls of the crystal palace of scientism (Yalom, 1980). Society became a cage, and we were the rats running its mazes. It is no wonder that many early sociologists turned their attention to society's rules, whose iron grip was strangling humankind at the time.

The golden flight of scientism was temporarily obscured by the dark shadow of the two world wars in the twentieth century. Conformity and rationality grew increasingly meaningless as people died for reasons that were hard to rationalize (see Hemingway, 1940). It was in this period that Jean-Paul Sartre championed the movement that is known as existentialism. He said that man was condemned to be free, condemned to choose his own values (Sartre, 1945a, 1945b, 1945c). Camus was another great exponent of existentialism. His hero, Sisyphus, kept smiling while con-

fronting the futility of existence (Camus, 1955). Closer to home, Ernest Hemingway wrote about and lived a life of freedom, challenge, unrestrained passions, and deep feelings (Hemingway, 1940, 1953, 1957, 1964).

Soon people lost the urge to question. From cars to cameras, pianos, radios, television sets, recorders, tennis rackets, and baseball gloves we indulged in an unthinking orgy of materialism, consumerism, and technologism, under the more-than-ever-powerful aegis of scientism (de Grazia, 1962).

The struggle of literature against an overly rational and scientifically based picture of human beings has created in existential sociologists both a sensitivity to and an awareness of the complex and problematic nature of life, but their discipline is based more on existential philosophy than on literature.

Søren Kierkegaard, who wrote in the nineteenth century, is often regarded as the founder of modern existentialism (Yalom, 1980). Faced with an increasingly unquestioning society, complacently living by absolutist platitudes, Kierkegaard felt the deep *Angst* of searching out the meaning of being. While Kierkegaard sought the meaning of man vis-à-vis his Maker, his basic principle of inquiry was the same as that of existential sociology. Rejecting shop-worn paradigms and frayed explanations, he looked instead at the complexity of life-as-it-is-lived (Kierkegaard, 1957).

Friedrich Nietzsche, also a nineteenth-century philosopher, turned anguish into anger and declared God to be dead. Nietzsche meant to point out that paradigms at times grow old and their roots begin to rot. Yet tradition, sloth, vested interest, deep-seated beliefs, ignorance, and habit often make people go on accepting the existing paradigms—in other words, the unquestioned tenets upon which a particular reality is constructed (Nietzsche, 1968). For example, the astronomers representing the powers-that-be refused to look through Galileo's telescope; they did not wish to be confronted with a universe that did not revolve around the earth (Brecht, 1966). Similarly, famous surgeons, their backs turned to the patient, read anatomy from Galen's books in the operating room, literally refusing to look inside the human body, leaving the surgery itself to lowly assistants.[7]

The ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are of tremendous heuristic value to existential sociology, but it is in the works of two other philosophers that we find more direct connections with the empirical discipline of existential sociology: Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. Dilthey offers sociology the notion of *Verstehen*, of understanding human beings by empathizing with them. Dilthey intended his ideas to be used for the interpretation of history, yet their message is equally valid for existential sociology: one must immerse oneself in everyday reality—feel it, touch it, hear it, and see it—in order to understand it (Dilthey, 1961).

Dilthey's theory of interpretation was not novel. Schleiermacher and others had already written much about interpretation (hermeneutic un-

derstanding),[8] but it was Dilthey's ideas that proved relevant to sociology and influenced generations of sociologists, from Max Weber onward.[9] Empathetic understanding grounded in the concrete reality of everyday life is a basic tenet of today's existential sociology.

Edmund Husserl was disturbed by the lack of scientific precision generated by Dilthey's methodological approach (Husserl, 1965). He therefore sought to create a scientific philosophy to reach the pure essence of beings. He called this discipline phenomenology. Phenomenology is often confused with existentialism, but the two perspectives are distinct in the ways they approach the empirical world. In fact, Husserlian phenomenology is not directly amenable to sociology.[10] To "do" phenomenology requires closing off ("bracketing") the social world, thereby literally eliminating the object of inquiry of sociology.

Husserl sought to discover the essence of human consciousness by reductions, a progressive "stepping back" from human involvement in everyday life (Husserl, 1962, 1964). He hoped in this way to do away with variable elements that relativize human behavior and irremediably tie it to a given situation and context (Garfinkel, 1967). If one "stepped back" far enough, according to Husserl, one would be left with a "consciousness of" some action but would remain uninvolved in it.

Whether a complete Husserlian reduction (i.e., the achievement of pure consciousness) is possible or not is debatable; in any case, it is clearly not easy. Yet Husserl's impact on existential sociology can be seen in the work of Alfred Schutz, who applied phenomenological ideas to the problems of social science. Schutz turned his mentor upside down, so to speak.[11] He ignored Husserl's presocial consciousness and focused instead on what was apprehendable to our senses—on our presence and actions in the everyday world. Schutz developed a set of concepts (Schutz, 1971a) that are very useful as a frame for the sociological study of human interaction, since they point out many of the social links that allow interaction itself to take place, such as "reciprocity of perspective," the belief that two interactants can exchange places and see the world from each other's viewpoint, and the "natural attitude," the pragmatic, utilitarian stance taken by individuals in their daily lives.

Thus it was from Dilthey that existential sociology gained the idea of empathetic understanding, grounded in everyday life. It was from Husserl (via Schutz) that it realized the ways in which human beings share (or fail to share) their universe. And it was from two other students of phenomenology that existential sociology acquired yet another paramount element: the idea that the self is not a reified entity but an incarnate one. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty both pointed to the important fact that human beings are single entities: that body and soul are not separate but form an indivisible whole. Heidegger spoke of *dasein* (being-in-the-world) and Merleau-Ponty spoke of *être-au-monde* (being-within-the world);