Where Is the LONE RANGER?

AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A STABILITY FORCE

SECOND EDITION

Robert M. Perito

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Praise for
Where Is the Lone Ranger?

"A timely assessment of America's ability to develop and field an essential component of stability operations—constabulary forces, also known internationally as 'formed police units.' Perito demonstrates their importance by drawing on American experience, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and explains why America has been slow to arrive at this solution, as well as why its governmental system inhibits its implementation."
—**David Bayley**, distinguished professor emeritus and former dean, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York, Albany

"Our men and women in uniform can face greater danger from drug traffickers, violent mobs, and lawlessness than from enemy tanks, planes, and ships. Robert Perito has given us a blueprint for building capable and sustainable institutions to provide the rule of law ... this is a mission we WILL perform again."
—**William B. Caldwell IV**, Lieutenant General, United States Army

"The second edition of *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* remains the 'go to' text for those wishing to learn how the security gap was tackled in peace and stability operations involving U.S. forces. Perito writes with the flair of an academic, the accuracy of a seasoned practitioner, and the passion of someone who cares deeply about establishing the rule of law in postconflict environments. *Realpolitik* doesn't get realer. Perito convincingly illustrates the enduring requirement for an international expeditionary police force—as well as the limitations of police deployed under a military mandate and the problems of soldiers training police. He courageously reminds us that the proverbial masked lawman is now needed more than ever in the crisis zones across the globe."
—**Andrew Carpenter**, Chief of the Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

where is the
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In memory of
Patricia Campbell Perito

Foreword

Complex Contingency Operations:
Assessing Our Past and Preparing for Our Future

"A fiery horse with the speed of light, a cloud of dust, and a hearty 'Hi-Ho, Silver!'" So began each episode of the *Lone Ranger*. With his faithful companion, Tonto, the Lone Ranger stood against lawlessness and injustice. After a decisive shootout, peace was restored and justice reestablished. The masked man and his sidekick then rode off, more work to be done elsewhere. *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* reminds us that reality isn't like a television show. The international community has no Lone Ranger to restore peace and establish justice; it has only governments, coalitions, and alliances.

The United States, its allies, and potential coalition partners may not want to undertake the kinds of nation building, peace operations, or complex contingencies that have characterized the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. Who would? Reality has a way of imposing itself on our lives; the same is true for nations. America must work toward the future it wants but deal with reality as it is.

The United States Institute of Peace is publishing a second, updated edition of *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* to help the current U.S. strategic review deal with reality. As much as the United States would like to avoid involvement in complex interventions, failed and failing states with shifting demographics, diminishing resources, growing integration, and nefarious actors empowered by new technologies dictate otherwise. A solid strategic review, including an objective examination of the military and nonmilitary capabilities from the last eleven years of wartime experiences—as well as other historical experiences—is vital. The current U.S. debate, however, is likely to miss that mark by overly focusing on military capabilities.

In four major case studies—Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan—Perito looks at one of the most essential activities associated with restoring peace and justice in a fractured society: creating and improving police. Although each nation's case is unique, common conditions existed in each that differ only in degree: the breakdown of civil order; high levels of violence; the

rise of black markets, illicit trafficking, gang activity, and corruption; porous borders; weak governments; conflicted loyalties; and sectarianism. Further, in each case, political leaders, governing bodies, judges, critical infrastructure, and elections all needed protection, and the intervening force in each case had to raise a police force while it established security.

The commonalities that emerge in Perito's case studies match my personal experience. I commanded an infantry brigade in the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994–95. Part of my unit's responsibility was to impose security and reestablish the police, courts, and jails in Haiti's second largest city, Cap Haitien. In 1999, I was the deputy commanding general of Task Force Eagle and Multinational Division–North in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During my tour, our command helped Ambassador Robert Farrand implement the Brcko Arbitration Decision. We also helped seat the Srebrenica government, and we were involved in several other incidents mentioned in Perito's case study. During the "surge" period in Iraq, June 2007–July 2008, I was the commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq. Our command helped accelerate the growth—in size, capability, and confidence—of all Iraqi security forces, as well as the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Iraqi Joint Force headquarters. We were involved in assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to reform the Iraq National (now Federal) Police. Some of these activities are also mentioned in Perito's case studies. Finally, in 2009–10, I helped Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus as well as Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV in restructuring NATO's approach to developing the Afghan national security forces. So I read *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* not just out of an academic interest but as one who served in the operations that Perito describes. I found his discussion of the cases engaging, well balanced, and informative.

At the end of the book, Perito recommends that the United States establish "an effective U.S. stability force" that includes "civilian police constabulary units, civil police, judicial teams of judges, lawyers, and court administrators, and corrections officers." He further states that these "public order and law enforcement components are essential . . .[and] must be assembled and ready at the outset of military operations. They should be under the control of U.S. military authorities because unity of command in the initial phase of an operation is paramount. Civilian control of the civilian elements of the force should, however, be restored as quickly as possible." As a former practitioner, I drew four major conclusions from squaring the case studies in *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* with my personal experiences.

The United States—alone or as part of a coalition or alliance—will be involved in these kinds of operations again. Call them what we will—peace

operations, complex contingencies, nation building, reconstruction, stability operations—the United States has been involved in the kinds of actions Perito describes for much of its history. Moreover, if the megatrends, game-changers, potential worlds, and black swans of the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* are any indication of the strategic environment and the United States' role in it, these actions will be part of our future as well.[1]

All societies have a degree of violence, criminality, corruption, and instability; no nation's governance is perfect. The tolerance in each society for these activities and imperfections varies. For each, however, there is a threshold which, when crossed, triggers a negative spiral that can result in the collapse of trust and governance. Sometimes this collapse necessitates external intervention. Given America's global interests, future intervention in some cases is inevitable. When—not if—it happens, the chorus of "never again" will change to "why aren't we ready?"

In 1990, while a student in the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, I participated in a command post exercise in which the United States was part of a NATO peacekeeping mission in a collapsed Yugoslavia. In the exercise, the U.S. commander had a Russian subordinate unit. Many thought the scenario unrealistic. Reality demonstrated that it was not.

Both military and nonmilitary forces are needed in the kinds of crises that are likely in our future. One of the ultimate goals in such interventions is to move the levels of violence, criminality, corruption, and instability back below that society's threshold in order to provide "space" to improve its governance. Military force is often necessary in these cases, but insufficient. Also necessary is a suite of other forces—governmental, judicial, economic, and police. The essential characteristic of the future is uncertainty. Preparing for the inevitable "next time" requires developing the suite of military and non-military capabilities and the ability to use them. Now, while our experience is fresh, is the time to identify and create these capabilities.

Imposing security and enforcing security are related but distinct activities. Imposing security is the first key task in interventions like most of those executed since the end of the Cold War. Without security, the levels of violence, criminality, corruption, and instability will remain above the threshold of acceptability, prolonging the intervention, delaying the ability to address the underlying issues, and increasing the duration and cost of the intervention.

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1. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends: December, 2012).

Police forces may be an essential element to final success, but initially, because of predatory behaviors and other conditions, local police are more likely to be part of the problem than part of the solution. On the other hand, whether part of a larger intervention force consisting of military forces or alone, constabulary police forces are immediately useful, for they are a mix of military and police capabilities. They help impose security and begin immediately to set the conditions for enforcing security—ultimately the job of police forces. Enforcing security requires a set of minimum conditions: the constabulary forces must be large enough and capable enough to handle the existing level of violence and criminality; a body of law must exist, and the judicial and confinement systems must work adequately well; and a sufficient social agreement to obey the law must be present in the citizenry.

Often these conditions emerge over time, and they commonly develop unevenly under the umbrella of imposed security. For example, training a constabulary may proceed faster than developing a local police force; improving a judiciary system usually takes longer than improving confinement capacity. And if a body of laws must be passed and promulgated, that will take longer still. As these conditions develop, trust returns to the social fabric. Slowly, the umbrella of imposed security can be lifted in areas of a country where these minimum conditions emerge, and the composition of the intervention force can change accordingly. Given enough patience and progress, the imposed-security umbrella can close altogether, and security can be enforced by the nation's police forces.

The United States as part of a multinational coalition employed a large enough force to impose security in Haiti in 1994; NATO did so in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Kosovo in 1998. None of these interventions was perfectly executed, but all moved violence and instability below the threshold, setting up the conditions not only for force reductions but also for the long process of improving governance. Neither in Afghanistan nor in Iraq did the United States, NATO, or coalition partners initially employ sufficient force to impose security. The result prolonged each war, delayed the ability to address the underlying issues, increased the cost of the intervention, and risked ultimate success. Too light a footprint is as unhelpful as one that is too heavy.

Preparing for the inevitable "next time" requires understanding the difference between imposing and enforcing security, having the right mix of capabilities to do both, and knowing how to transition between the two effectively.

Raising police is not a "stand-alone" activity; it requires a campaign-style and enterprise approach. Simply put, raising police forces and creating the

associated conditions that allow for law enforcement in the kinds of inter-vention operations Perito describes takes concerted effort over time.

The approach, therefore, requires "campaign-like" thinking—that is, a form of thinking in which individual decisions and actions have meaning only in relation to the larger, future goal. Raising police forces, developing a judicial system, and creating a confinement program are not discrete ac-tivities—they are related. Each of these activities is the cumulative result of many smaller tasks accomplished over time—hence requiring a campaign plan. Further, success in the three major activities entails success at the local, provincial, and national levels—hence requiring an enterprise approach.

As Perito's Afghan case study shows, neither a campaign nor an enter-prise approach was present in NATO's lead-nation methodology to police, judicial, or confinement development, or to the minimum conditions re-quired for law enforcement. Nor is a campaign or an enterprise approach reflected in the belief that one merely must contract out the parts of each major activity and then just "supervise the contracts." Adopting a campaign-like and enterprise approach increases the likelihood of coherence over time; a lead-nation or contracting methodology results in more incoherence.

We can prepare now for the inevitable "next time" by adapting the pro-fessional training and education requirements in the military and nonmili-tary agencies responsible for orchestrating police, judicial, and confinement development—an inherently interagency activity. We could also conduct more interagency exercises that force the development of campaign-like and enterprise approaches. Finally, we could, as *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* suggests, figure out how to have ready and available capabilities that we know will be required.

Time matters: costs in lives and treasure, as well as in political will, de-mand progress and continual improvement. I remember a conversation that I had in Iraq during the summer of 2007 with several members of the Jones Commission, a group led by retired Marine general Jim Jones, tasked by the U.S. Congress to evaluate the Iraqi Security Force development effort. Several of the senior police leaders in the group said that the best way to develop high-quality police was to have high entry-level requirements and an extended training program, followed by an apprentice period—in total, about a yearlong program. Ideally, I agreed. Practically, however, I completely disagreed.

As Perito notes in his Afghan case study, the initial German approach to police development would have taken decades to succeed, if ever. Gen-erations are required to complete a transformation of police who had been viewed as pariahs and enforcers of a dictatorial regime. One of the ways

to accomplish police transformation includes the slow process of selecting, training, and promoting the right people for police leadership positions. But this approach cannot be used alone. If it is, the intervention plays into the hands of those seeking to destabilize the country, discredit the government, and protract the crisis situation long enough for intervention forces to lose interest.

Augmenting the slow process must be a faster one, a way that recognizes that quality is an iterative characteristic of both people and institutions. This faster process initially uses sufficient selection criteria, training standards, and promotion requirements. Then, it employs continual training to improve the initial product—police, leaders, processes, and institutions—over time. The U.S. police, judiciary, and confinement systems did not emerge fully mature overnight; they won't emerge quickly anywhere else either.

Leaders of an intervention must look for ways to accelerate the slow process. In Iraq, for example, the minister of interior tripled the capacity of the Baghdad Police College by opening extension campuses in Mosul and Basrah; this expansion allowed for almost three times the number of cadets to receive the full three-year training and education program. Then he increased the capacity yet again. First, he added a program for those Iraqis who already had a college education. Second, he introduced a program for long-serving police with adequate education to become limited-duty officers. Finally, he created a program to convert army officers who wanted to become police officers.

The slow process with the kind of accelerants the Iraqi minister of interior introduced and the fast process that recognizes quality as an iterative characteristic can work together. Similar approaches establishing both "alternative adjudication methodologies" as well as a formal judiciary and rule-of-law program are also possible. Time matters in the kinds of contingency operations *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* is focused upon.

Now, before the "next time," we should review the assumptions on which we base our approaches for police, judicial, and confinement development. In *Where Is the Lone Ranger?*, Perito makes it clear that U.S. efforts to create police forces, as well as the systems and institutions necessary to sustain them, have a mixed record of successes and failures. Perhaps more important, his case studies show that many of the failures resulted from repeated erroneous assumptions and strategies.

U.S. policymakers currently are undertaking a strategic review of the capabilities the United States will need to deal with future contingencies. *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* reminds us how we should prepare for when, not if, reality imposes itself on the United States again. Bob Perito has written a

timely and useful book. Every security professional—governmental, military, private contractor, and non-governmental agency—would do well to study what *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* has to say and participate in changing the way the United States approaches the kinds of complex situations that are certain to be in our future.

—JAMES M. DUBIK
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31 DECEMBER 2012

Contents

Introduction

In the emerging literature on the challenges of establishing sustainable security in fragile states and postconflict environments, much has been written about the role of the military, but there are few works on the role of nonmilitary security forces. This study examines the past roles and future potential of constabulary forces in peace and stability operations, looking at the issue of sustainable security from a U.S. perspective.

The United States has a unique and troubled history with foreign interventions, particularly since the end of the Cold War. It has developed and deployed the world's most effective military forces but has struggled to provide police and constabulary. Under the Clinton administration, the United States played a primary role in peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but Congress, the U.S. military, and the George W. Bush administration had a deep aversion to peacekeeping. Perhaps for that reason, the United States was ill prepared to deal with the civilian mobs that looted Baghdad in 2003 and the demonstrators that threatened U.S. forces in Kabul in 2006. The United States did not have civilian constabulary forces trained in riot control; it used commercial contractors as police advisers and had no program to provide the operational constabulary, police, and judicial specialists that were required to establish the rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The need to create nonmilitary security forces for peace and stability operations was compelling. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States could no longer afford the luxury of ignoring turmoil in war-torn societies. Weak and dysfunctional states had become the primary source of international instability. Washington recognized its strategic interest in preventing failed states from providing breeding grounds for extremists and safe havens for terrorist organizations. By the spring of 2003, the United States was involved in a global war on terrorism, fighting two ground wars against extremist-based insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Balkans, the United States had faced the need to control civilian mob violence and ethnic cleansing that threatened the viability of peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and turned to its European allies for constabulary trained to deal with civil disorder. This required a prolonged diplomatic effort, and the forces took years to arrive. In Iraq and Afghanistan, allied