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
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## EDITORIAL

It has been a little over two years since the current editorial team took the reins here at *American Review of Canadian Studies*. While it has been somewhat of a whirlwind experience getting up to speed on the submission, reviewing, and publishing systems upon which we rely, we now feel (relatively) familiar with the task of producing the journal. Thus, we thought it an opportune time to reflect upon the last few years and think about where we are going in the future.

First and foremost, we have come to truly appreciate that the production of a scholarly journal requires the efforts of many people. We sincerely thank all of the authors, reviewers, editorial board members, and staff members at the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Western Washington University, and Routledge for making it possible to get a high quality journal out to the reading public in as timely a manner as possible.

A second observation worth noting is the great diversity of scholarship (in subject matter, approach, and ideological commitment) that we are fortunate enough to have submitted to *ARCS*. It is truly impressive to read the range of work currently being done by Canadianists around the world, and we are honored to serve as a key conduit through which this work is communicated. In both complement and contrast, the diversity of our publication serves to strengthen each contribution, as well as the journal and Canadian Studies as a whole.

An important function of *ARCS* is to provide thoughtful, critical reviews of new books on topics of relevance for Canadian Studies. To this end, we would like to formally welcome Dr. Christina Keppie to the *ARCS* editorial team. Christina has graciously agreed to lead our Book Review Section as Book Review Editor. Christina's academic background is French linguistics with a focus on Acadian Studies. She has been researching the relation between ideological movements and Acadian identity in the discourse of New Brunswick Francophones. She is currently working on expanding her research to other Canadian maritime provinces, Quebec, and the State of Maine. Her plans for the Book Review Section include expanding its scope by including more reviews of books published in French and establishing yearly themed reviews, such as First Nation relations, mass media, and immigration.

There are a handful of Special Issues to look forward to in the future, including one centered on the theme of "The Nature of Canadian Studies in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century." This special issue will be drawn from selected papers presented at the 2013 Biennial Meeting of ACSUS in Tampa, Florida. Going forward, we would be happy to consider additional Special Issue proposals from potential guest editors who have a timely and relevant theme in mind.

To all of our readers, reviewers, and authors, then, thanks for making this journal fly. Please keep reading and contributing; by doing so, you are ensuring *ARCS*' continuing vibrancy and vitality.

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## **The Afghanistan Task Force and Prime Ministerial Leadership: Tactical Retreat or a New Direction in Managing Canadian Foreign Policy?**

Nicholas Gammer

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It has been assumed that since inheriting Martin's decision to send 2000 soldiers to Kandahar, Stephen Harper has maintained control over all aspects of the Afghanistan mission. Donald Savoie and others have made the argument that the Prime Minister and his advisors have dominated and centralized the policymaking process while relegating other institutional players to a secondary role. This article challenges this image and suggests a more nuanced picture of the relationship between Harper and the bureaucracy. With the foundering of the Afghan mission, the government created the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) and bent the rules of engagement to break down the barriers of "departmentalism." For Harper it was a matter of political survival; for the Privy Council Office (PCO) it was an opportunity to maximize its influence. By 2008 a new generation of mandarins in the ATF were sharing the foreign policymaking platform with key players in the executive branch of government. In the process Harper's command over foreign policy has been challenged as new approaches to rapid civilian–military responses are sought.

**Keywords:** Afghanistan Task Force; prime ministerial leadership; Stephen Harper; privy council; RoCK

### **Introduction**

We believe that Canada's role in Afghanistan should give greater emphasis to diplomacy, reconstruction and governance and that the military mission should shift increasingly towards the training of the Afghan National Security Forces.

These efforts should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and by a single task force directing the activities of all departments and agencies. The objective is to ensure better balance, tighter coordination and more systematic evaluation of Canada's contribution.

(Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan 2008)

Conventional wisdom has it that Prime Minister Stephen Harper's foreign policy priority—Canada's Afghanistan mission—demonstrated his domination of the foreign policy process. Having inherited former Prime Minister Paul Martin's decision to redeploy some 2000 Canadian troops to the Kandahar region in February 2006, Harper supposedly ensconced himself at the center of his foreign policy machinery and personally controlled virtually all facets of the mission. This concentration of power began long before Harper was elected and had already captured the attention of academics such as J.L. Granatstein

(1982) and S. Dupre (1987). Harper, however, is said to have accelerated the process and, more than any other prime minister, developed a comprehensive communications strategy designed to keep a tight rein on his foreign and domestic policies (Wells 2006). The Prime Minister used his office (the PMO) to “pre-approve” and filter the messages and actions of his ministers (Kirton 2007, 55). His “iron message control,” willingness to discipline ministers and backbenchers and strategic acumen quickly became the stuff of legend (Stanbury 2009, 31). In advancing his “government from the centre” thesis, Donald Savoie (1999) and others have made a strong case that Harper and his advisors have dominated and centralized the policymaking process while relegating other institutions and players to largely advisory capacities. Consolidation has arguably allowed the PMO and a supportive Privy Council Office (PCO) to shroud the entire government in what one journalist has described as a “wall of selective silence” resulting in a demoralized and subservient bureaucracy (Naumetz 2009, 52). This situation has prompted calls for reforms to Canada’s cabinet system of government and, more specifically, to what is seen by many as the unworkable doctrine of ministerial responsibility and accountability (Bakvis 2001).

Today the Prime Minister, the PMO and other central agencies increasingly occupy the locus of power at the expense of cabinet. Canada’s traditional foreign policy bureaucracies—foreign affairs, national defense and international development—have gradually surrendered their pre-eminence to the political/executive branch of government. While the traditional relationship between politicians and civil servants had been based “on practice and tradition, not rules” (Savoie 2003, 4), this realignment nonetheless represents a significant shift.

However, at least in terms of the Afghanistan file, this characterization bears closer scrutiny. The creation and evolution of a little known Secretariat of the Privy Council, the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF), which eventually spearheaded Canada’s Afghanistan policy, suggests a more nuanced relationship between the Prime Minister and key elements of the bureaucracy. By early 2008 a new public service elite, led by a more proactive generation of civil servants, found itself sharing the top of the foreign policy-making pedestal with the executive branch of government. This arrangement was expedient both for the politicians, represented by the PMO, and the bureaucracy, represented by the PCO. Each needed the other and each was willing to bend the rules of engagement to achieve its own objective—political survival for Harper’s minority government and an opportunity to re-establish the power and influence of the public service for the PCO.

The success of the ATF in managing the Afghanistan mission calls into question assumptions made about Harper’s leadership and also intimates a new foreign policy approach. Does centralizing authority in an agency like the ATF facilitate more efficient and effective responses to complex insurgencies like Afghanistan? If so, how does this concentration of power affect governance in general and the role of the prime minister in particular?

### **“Departmentalism” and the Martin Legacy**

Early in the Afghanistan campaign it was evident that a combat based mission would not succeed. The multidimensional policy challenges posed by failed states had broadened the definition of what constitutes “foreign policy” and was challenging the long-established roles of individual ministries. Without integrating development and diplomacy, furthermore, domestic support for the mission would dissipate quickly. Consequently, the then-Prime Minister Martin called on traditional line departments to adopt Canada’s 3D model, often referred to as the Whole of Government (WoG) approach. Novel for the time, this initiative

attempted to address the problem of departmentalism—the predisposition of bureaucracies to avoid coordination from the center. Driven by institutional memory, traditional functional delineations and intense competition for resources, bureaucracies including the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade (DFAIT), National Defence (DND), Finance/Treasury Board and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) were predisposed to oppose efforts to coordinate their activity. The 3D approach also had implications for the PCO which housed the foreign and defense policy advisor for the Prime Minister and was led by the Clerk, Canada's most powerful public servant.

In the spring of 2005, Martin gave practical application to the 3D, or WoG, approach by authorizing a Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)—consisting of members of Canada's military, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) training contingent, and CIDA representatives—in Kandahar. The primary objective of the PRT was to achieve stability, security and an extension of Kabul's authority through regular interactions with provincial authorities and the local population. The Kandahar PRT was headed by Glyn Berry, Political Director from DFAIT who liaised with the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. Although the PRTs were established by individual countries and supposed to reflect the local Afghani needs, the military components were under the command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This meant that the Political Director of Canada's PRT was constrained by other NATO members who were also contributing to the mission. The PRTs were further constrained by many domestic problems—conflicting reporting structures, agendas and priorities coupled with military dominance. As Martin's new highly influential Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier put it, “Yes, we have 3D and the military does all three Ds” (Berthiaume 2007, 5). Not only was the outspoken CDS responsible for upgrading Canada's military profile and co-authoring Martin's defense policy statement, Hillier, more importantly, was instrumental in persuading the Prime Minister in March of 2005 to accept the move to Kandahar, one of the most dangerous regions of the NATO campaign (Stein and Lang 2007, 188). This lent credence to the concern that the military establishment had become the driving force behind Canada's foreign policy on Afghanistan (Middlemiss and Stairs 2007).

Contributing to the problem of departmentalism was conflict over the nature of development work. Typically, Canadian Forces advocated shorter term rebuilding projects whereas CIDA's focus was on longer-term ventures often associated with governance and other social initiatives. CIDA's policy was to deliver assistance as much as possible through the Afghan people while Canadian Forces favored tying reconstruction projects specifically to Canadian contributions. Glyn Barry's death from a car bomb on January 16, 2005, underscored the urgent need to search for more effective way to merge military and civilian initiatives.

### **Harper in power**

During the election campaign, the Conservatives paid little attention to the Afghanistan mission (Stein and Lang 2007). Yet, soon after coming to power in February 2006, the government announced significant changes. Besides a stronger role for the military, Harper moved away from Canada's traditional role as a neutral middle power by distinguishing rivals from allies. For Harper, Afghanistan represented an opportunity for Canada to reclaim its place in the world by “stepping up to the plate” and taking a stand “on the big issues that matter.” In these early days of his leadership, he was committed to a more muscular foreign policy and holding firm against international terrorism. He declared that “Canadians don't cut and run at the first sign of trouble”



(Blanchfield 2006). The Conservative government's funding priorities reflected this new foreign policy posture—DND received substantial funding increases while DFAIT faced budget cuts.

By the fall of 2006, Harper's determination to stay the course was being tested by changing realities on the ground (*The Globe and Mail* 2006) especially in light of increasing casualties. As Stein and Lang observed:

Once Canadians woke up to the reality that their soldiers were fighting and dying, their indifference to Canada's role in Afghanistan dissipated quickly. The mission in Kandahar would become synonymous with Stephen Harper's prime ministership, a defining feature of his government. (Stein and Lang 2007, 232)

Canada's effectiveness was being impeded by weak and inconsistent commitments from some NATO allies and by poor coordination among Ottawa's line departments. Harper's charismatic but blunt CDS had become the public face of a faltering mission (Blanchfield 2006). A 2006 Strategic Council Poll completed for CTV News and *The Globe and Mail* (2006)—a period when the casualty count was low—indicated that 54 percent of Canadians were in opposition or ambivalent to the war.

### The pre-Manley ATF and the resurrection of DFAIT

The government saw Canada's leadership role in Afghanistan as central to other diplomatic international engagements. However, if Harper wanted to maintain Afghanistan as a foreign policy priority while minimizing the associated risks, he understood he would have to change his approach. He began rebalancing the Kandahar mission by positioning a top level diplomat at the forefront in place of CDS Rick Hillier. DFAIT was resurrected as an important foreign policy hub with the objective of achieving better coordination between military and development policies.

Harper also upgraded Canada's diplomatic presence in Afghanistan to an EX4 level of ambassadorship, equivalent to the highest diplomatic rank given to Canadian Ambassadors in the major world capitals. In April of 2007 he appointed a new Ambassador to Afghanistan, based in Kabul. He chose Arif Lalani, a high-ranking diplomat considered one of the rising stars in DFAIT. Harper also appointed Michel de Salaberry, a senior diplomat with extensive Middle East experience,<sup>1</sup> as Senior Civilian Consultant for the Kandahar region, with support staff from DFAIT (Blanchfield 2006). Salaberry was tasked with improving the coordination of reconstruction efforts and publicizing Canada's development initiatives. He also acted as Ambassador Lalani's personal representative in the Kandahar region.

These appointments were accompanied by an important institutional change—an ATF was created within the newly ascendant DFAIT. The ATF would use public service expertise to renew the focus on development assistance and diplomacy. Of equal significance was the appointment of David Mulroney as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Interdepartmental Coordinator for Afghanistan to lead this new entity. After having distinguished himself by rising swiftly up the ranks of DFAIT, Mulroney had previously served as Harper's Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Advisor in the PCO and was a trusted advisor. Based in Ottawa, the task force also included Lieutenant General Mike Gauthier of CEFCON (Canadian Expeditionary Force Command),<sup>2</sup> Vincent Rigby (Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence at DND) and Stephen Wallace, the newly appointed Vice-President of

the ATF at CIDA. Brigadier General Tim Grant of Task Force Kandahar and Ambassador Lalani in Kabul became task force members in Afghanistan.

Besides coordinating and supporting the work of diplomats in theater, Mulroney's ATF was responsible for ensuring that CIDA, DND and DFAIT were all in step with the government's objectives. All matters related to Afghanistan came under Mulroney's "single shop" within DFAIT (Mulroney 2007). He instituted daily contacts between various components in the Foreign Affairs planning and operations hierarchy and their counterparts in DND, CIDA and other federal agencies. Mulroney also maintained regular communications with the National Security Advisor in the PCO and with Kevin Lynch, the Clerk of the PCO.

Mulroney achieved limited success in improving the development and coordination of policies between departments (Mulroney 2009) but departmentalism was not significantly reduced. Some DFAIT insiders feared that housing a semi-autonomous task force would do little to enhance the department's power and prestige while others were not pleased with shouldering expanded interdepartmental responsibilities in what had become a very dangerous mission. As a senior official in DFAIT would later remark: "Within DFAIT it wasn't easy for civilians to accept the idea that they needed to be on a 'war footing'" (Confidential interview 2009). As Ian Brodie, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff in the PMO at the time recalled, Foreign Affairs was "skittish about the war" while CIDA was "OK with writing big cheques but didn't want to be on the ground" (Brodie 2009). Improving the level of coordination between Canada's line departments remained a significant challenge.

These developments, combined with declining public support for the Afghanistan mission, made it clear to Harper that he would need an even more innovative policy approach. He would have to replace his loyal but often obstinate Minister of Defence, Gordon O'Connor, whose poor communication skills, tepid support for the mission's new direction and poor relationship with Rick Hillier were becoming a public relations liability. He would have to fundamentally change the way policy expertise was integrated with the public service. Such a change would also require also stepping back from the foreign policymaking process. In other words, his short experience as Prime Minister had taught Harper that a successful Afghanistan policy could no longer be guided by his hand alone.

### **A calculated gamble: The Manley Panel and its secretariat**

In establishing the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan in the fall of 2007, Harper provided his government with an opportunity to resurrect his foreign policy on Afghanistan and improve its communications with the Canadian public while searching for consensus. At the same time, there was considerable risk for Harper in striking the panel. It was an acknowledgement that his Afghanistan policy, as well as his government, was in peril. It was also an admission that a measure of consensus-building and compromise within the broader policymaking community had become necessary. While weighted in favor of conservative members like Jake Epp (a Cabinet minister in the Clark and Mulroney governments), Derek Burney (businessman, diplomat and former Canadian Ambassador to Washington), Paul Tellier (experienced high ranking bureaucrat and former Clerk of the Privy Council) and Pamela Wallin (former television broadcaster and journalist), the panel's independent status was legitimized by the presence of its Chair, John Manley, a former high-ranking Liberal minister in former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's government. Initial attempts by Harper's PMO to leave as little as possible to chance by setting out specific terms of reference were quickly rebuffed by the panel

(Burney 2009). Panel members, the PMO was quick to learn, were highly attuned to the need to safeguard their independence and reputations (Confidential interview, 2009). Harper let Manley “run with the operational and policy side of the war” and refrained from micro-managing the Afghanistan file (Brodie 2009).

Illustrative of the growing authority of the bureaucracy was the establishment of the Panel’s Secretariat. The Secretariat was made up of a small, select group of high-performing public servants seconded by the PCO from a cross-section of departments associated with the Afghanistan file. Heading the Secretariat, after being moved from DFAIT’s ATF in October 2007, was David Mulroney. Other elite members included Elissa Golberg and Sanjeev Chowdhury from DFAIT, Colonel Michael Cessford from DND and Elizabeth Thebaud from CIDA. The members of the Secretariat were intimately aware of the shortcomings of the DFAIT-based ATF experiment. This experience allowed the Secretariat to provide the bureaucratic expertise and influence necessary to forge, in only four months, a report of considerable breadth and depth. With the critical insight provided by members of the Secretariat, the Panel was able to articulate a surprisingly clear vision of the mission’s role and to identify new policymaking avenues, especially on an operational level. The impact of key members of the Secretariat on the Panel’s report represented the first in a series of corrective steps taken by bureaucratic agents that made it possible for the Harper government to develop a more politically palatable policy on Afghanistan. It also introduced a new direction that confounded Ottawa’s traditional policymaking precepts.

The January 21, 2008, Manley Report was the turning point in what up to that point had been “Rick Hillier’s war” and set the stage for the March 16 parliamentary debate which extended the life of both the Kandahar mission and the Harper government. The Manley Report was critical of the Harper government for not being open and frank about the nature of the mission and its accomplishments and of the Liberals for playing political games. CIDA’s reconstruction efforts, limited by restrictive regulations, were criticized as well. The report supported the Conservative’s call for transport helicopters to reduce danger posed by the roadside bombs responsible for most of Canada’s 77 military casualties. It suggested that the Liberal demand to end Canada’s combat mission by February 2009 was illogical and dishonored the sacrifices already made. Manley did not miss the opportunity to be highly critical of some NATO members for living in a “delusional world” and shirking their responsibilities to the mission. Another significant finding for the Harper government was a blunt demand for NATO to secure 1000 additional soldiers for the southern region of Afghanistan by February 2009. This recommendation gave the Harper Conservatives ammunition to use against their reluctant NATO partners, while providing the Liberals with a way of backing away from then-party leader Stéphane Dion’s insistence on terminating Canada’s combat role by February 2009. On a political level the Panel’s recommendations proved useful in providing common ground around which a badly divided parliament could coalesce. In short, the Manley Report represented more positives than negatives, even though it called on the Harper government to open up its tightly controlled communications policy. The Manley report also provided the opportunity for a transformed and relocated ATF to take center stage in Canada’s Afghanistan mission.

#### **New directions and a new home for the ATF**

The requirement for “a coordinating body that was much more operational,” observed a high ranking advisor in the PCO, was simply not going to be met by DFAIT (Confidential

interview 2009). DFAIT's weak performance evacuating Canadians during the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon conflict did little to foster confidence in the department. Harper and the then-Clerk of the Privy Council Kevin Lynch recognized that greater interdepartmental coordination could be achieved by the PCO, a smaller agency more suited to managing the philosophies, capabilities and priorities of the various bureaucratic institutions connected to the Afghanistan mission. Derek Burney's influence on the Panel may have also contributed to the decision to move the ATF from DFAIT to the PCO. A prominent proponent of leading from the center during the Free Trade negotiations in Brian Mulroney's government, Burney was among those Manley Panel members who advocated for a single, compact agency. David Mulroney and key members of the Manley Panel Secretariat were shifted to the newly-formed PCO ATF, formally known as the Afghanistan Task Force Secretariat. The importance of the new ATF was confirmed when David Mulroney was promoted to the rank of Deputy Minister overseeing what amounted to a 26 person department. While under the public's radar, these appointments signaled not only the growing influence of bureaucratic forces but Harper's acquiescence to their emergence.

The reconstituted ATF was given the responsibility of pushing beyond the 3D concept towards the integrated application of diplomatic, development and defense initiatives. The ATF mandate, as articulated by the Manley report, was as follows:

- Strategic policy development and integration
- Coordination of the government's activities and operations in Afghanistan
- Building coherence and consistency in communicating the mission to Canadians, international audiences and to Afghans
- Tracking implementation (PCO website)

### **The ATF secretariat**

By March of 2008 the new ATF was the hub and nerve-center managing Canada's post-Manley Report foreign policy on Afghanistan. The ATF made effective use of its extraordinary independence and access to the Prime Minister and relevant cabinet ministers to preside over a broad spectrum of security, development and defense issues. These ranged from the purchase of medium-lift helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to the creation of benchmarks and timelines to determine the effectiveness of aid and development contributions. Mulroney and his ATF enjoyed unparalleled freedom in implementing the Manley Panel recommendations, bringing a more appropriate military-civilian balance to the mission, and bringing Ottawa's line departments in step with the government's WoG objectives. Throughout his tenure, Lynch, a supporter of the WoG approach and leading champion for the renewal of the public service, was pivotal in smoothing the way for this transformation. Lynch seized a timely opportunity to strengthen the public service in general and the PCO in particular.

Of particular importance to the ATF was its mandate to establish "franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan" and to enlarge the civilian presence in the mission (Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan 2008, 38). Quarterly reports to Parliament and the public under the title of *Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan*, as well as a plethora of government websites, a media-embedding program, outreach efforts to academics, support to field visits by officials, release of benchmarks and a series of RoCK-Talk sessions between Golberg and various departmental officials in Canada (designed to review and discuss how the mission was progressing) were

unprecedented in opening up the mission to Canadians. The Canadian public became aware of the often perilous job performed by public servants who were working with Afghans outside the safe confines of Kandahar Airfield. "One should not understate the role and import of communications as an integral part of the work we've done within the ATF which was also at the forefront of the minds of the Ministers of the CCOA. The latitude the ATF had in informing Canadians about various aspects of the mission was really unparalleled," observed Brett Boudreau, Director of Communications (2010).

### **Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan**

On February 8, 2008, Harper announced the first Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan (CCOA) and indicated that the new committee would be given considerable autonomy in watching over security, development and defense issues relevant to Canada's mission. The original CCOA was chaired by Minister of International Trade David Emerson and included the Minister of National Defence Peter McKay, Minister of Public Safety Stockwell Day, Minister of International Cooperation (CIDA) Beverly Oda and Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Bernier. The CCOA was a critical link between the bureaucratic and political hierarchies and reported regularly to the Prime Minister and the Planning (and Priorities) Cabinet Committee. In addition to the afore-mentioned tasks, Mulroney's ATF was given the responsibility of providing secretariat support to the CCOA. In more specific terms, Mulroney not only chaired the Deputy Ministers' Coordinating Committee, but also served as Secretary to the CCOA, thereby cementing the critical political-bureaucratic link in this distinctly new phase of the mission (PCO website).

Given Harper's reputation for control, what is surprising is the degree of autonomy with which David Emerson's CCOA operated. "During my chairmanship of the Committee I never felt constrained either by the PM or the PMO," Emerson recalled in describing the necessity for his government "to get a hold of the mission—recognized as "Hillier's war"—from a civilian perspective" and to find a more focused and clearly defined strategy in order to stay the course in Afghanistan. "What made this possible was that Harper understood his position and respected my role ... and was simply not interested in micromanaging the file," Emerson added (Interview 2009). From all accounts Emerson was an effective chair who was "very well respected by his peers ... [and] visionary in the sense that he pushed you and pushed you to deliver" (Chowdhury 2010). He earned the praise of both his cabinet colleagues and members of the ATF who appreciated not being constrained in undertaking their various responsibilities. The CCOA also appreciated Emerson's performance (Day 2009). Besides working hand in glove with the ATF, Emerson's Committee reported regularly to the Prime Minister and the Planning (and Priorities) Cabinet Committee on a broad array of matters including Canada's three signature projects—the upgrading of the Dahla Dam, the construction of schools and the elimination of polio in Kandahar province.

### **Integrating operations in Ottawa and Kandahar**

The growing effectiveness and presence of the ATF and the CCOA corresponded to the loosening of the Prime Minister's control over the Afghanistan file. Soon after the new ATF was established, Mulroney oversaw the creation of the office of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). The first incumbent was Elissa Golberg, formerly a DFAIT member of the Manley Panel Secretariat. Upon her arrival in February 2008, Golberg, at



34 years of age, was given unprecedented field-level authority over both civilian and military activity in order to integrate Canada's mission in Kandahar. Golberg, dubbed "the Rock," was a key link between Mulroney's ATF in Ottawa and Ambassador Lalani's office in Kabul. As such, she was given unprecedented latitude to create a more disciplined but energized interface between Brigadier General Denis Thompson's military forces in Kandahar and an array of Canadian civilian agencies under her purview.

In the spring of 2008 a series of informal meetings between a small collection of diplomatic, development and military personnel in Kabul cobbled together a series of recommendations that reflected their field-level expertise and focused on "what we should be doing" instead of "who [we] were working for" (Confidential interview, 2009). Their draft was then sent through Mulroney's ATF for review and minor refinement before going through the CCOA and Cabinet approval in record time and emerging as the government's six priorities, released in Ottawa in June of 2008.<sup>3</sup> The Golberg-Thompson team promptly established a series of integrated teams called "Committees of Practice" to implement these six priorities throughout Kandahar province. Soon after, Golberg's team, with Thompson's support, was also responsible for implementing the Kandahar Action Plan (KAP) described by Golberg as a "multi-national and multi-agency strategy based on priorities identified by Afghans" (Golberg 2008). Not only did the civilian component of Golberg's team increase from 16 to 100, but so did the number of civilians who were operating in often dangerous "outside the wire" environments.

With so many teams working outside the wire, field-generated input carried greater weight in Ottawa. This type of horizontal management constituted a rather revolutionary approach to operations antithetical to the traditional top-down planning and operational orthodoxy prevalent before the Manley Report. In working towards the achievement of military-civilian, interdepartmental policy and operational integration, Golberg's approach, like Mulroney's, reflected the expanded use of the "horizontal governance" approach to making public policy.<sup>4</sup> Understandably, horizontal governance was seen as a threat and resented by many in the Ottawa's bureaucratic establishment who had become comfortably ensconced in the traditional, hierarchical planning and decision-making silos.

Unified operational and policy objectives, initiated by Golberg and others in the field, were often sent to an increasingly influential ATF for prompt action and usually quick approval. On a number of occasions Golberg acknowledged the benefits of having a high degree of authority:

There was never a need for us to call our superiors. That's the benefit of having mission command, if you will, on the civilian side and on the military side, because our senior managers trust us to make those decisions and to come to an agreement with them. (Golberg 2009)

Golberg's achievements and the empowerment of her interdepartmental team were complemented and facilitated by the ATF's success in Ottawa, where member departments were frequently adopting a horizontal approach to the management of the Afghanistan file. Wallace was Vice President of CIDA's ATF and a veteran of the pre-Manley attempts to coordinate departments working on the Afghanistan file. He realized that CIDA's performance required improvement and that by buying into a unity of purpose, unified interdepartmental strategies and greater accountability, the department's development initiatives could achieve far greater success (Wallace 2010). With the support of Bev Oda, CIDA's minister and member of the CCOA, Wallace advocated for the expanded application of horizontal management both in Ottawa and in the field. As a result, CIDA's



development workers achieved greater operational flexibility and greater influence than ever before. "People on staff were embraced by a sense of purpose and enthusiasm," observed Ellen Wright (2010), Wallace's Chief of Staff, as she described the frantic pace and long hours at CIDA's ATF headquarters. Furthermore, improvements in cross-pollination between the military and CIDA reflected the increased autonomy and accountability that had begun to take hold in Afghanistan. "The need to operate on a real-time footing," Wallace (2010) observed, "gives you more power and legitimacy."

Changes within Public Safety (PS) Canada also reflected the greater application of the horizontal management approach. Created in 2003 and consisting of five agencies, PS was established to harmonize the work of all federal departments on matters of national security.<sup>5</sup> The main objective of PS was to train, upgrade and reform the Afghanistan police force, court system and prisons in Kandahar. It would not have been possible to undertake this highly complex task with any effectiveness without the lead of the ATF and the support of the RoCK in breaking down departmental silos. As with CIDA, this highly complex endeavor relied upon the ground-level input of police training officers, Corrections and Border Services personnel and other PS representatives who constituted a significant part of Golberg's team in Kandahar. Kristina Namiesnioski (2010), Assistant Deputy Minister of PS Canada, observed that the ATF "forced a greater level of integration between the operational folks on the ground and policy folks in Ottawa." It also brought a higher degree of empowerment and autonomy to PS representatives working with the RoCK team in Kandahar to implement the government's six objectives and the KAP.

In contrast to all the other line departments, DND stood to lose power due to effective integration. It had been the best prepared for the conflict in Afghanistan before the Manley Report and, while grudgingly paying lip service to the 3D concept, it had been the de facto lead department in all three. However, even DND benefited from the ATF approach because a stronger civilian presence and clearer objectives increased public support for the mission. Furthermore, there was an understanding in military circles of the necessity to adapt military thinking and planning to the new multidimensional realities of conflicts like Afghanistan. This realization prompted the military to accommodate greater harmonization of civilian-military policies, clearly-defined national objectives and benchmarks introduced by the government. DND drew some quick lessons concerning the effectiveness of having a field-level civilian authority like the RoCK on an equal footing with the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in Kandahar. The combined influence of both these commands had a significant impact on the operational and policy-making side of Canada's mission.

Suspicion and resistance lingered in military circles where some higher-ranking members felt that the Manley Report, and the military's support for it, was largely politically driven (Gauthier 2010). Some, like the former CDS Rick Hillier (2010) after his retirement, disparaged a Harper government policy paper that was suggesting that the Clerk of the PCO and the Deputy Minister of Defence assume a greater role in guiding the military. This type of criticism did not diminish the civilian-military integration achieved in Kandahar or the rising admiration within the military for the growing number of public servants who risked their lives in the field to implement complex initiatives.

The ATF's push to realign the civilian-military elements of the mission also transformed the PRTs. In 2007, the PRT had 2500 members, only 11 of whom were civilians, which resulted in ineffective ad hoc decision-making dominated by the PRT's commanding officer. By 2008, the integrative process had rebalanced the personnel so that Canada's PRT had the highest civilian-military ratio within NATO. Better-balanced management of