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Series

Independent Power Projects in Developing Countries

Legal Investment Protection and
Consequences for Development

by Henrik M. Inadomi



Wolters Kluwer

Law & Business

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AUSTIN BOSTON CHICAGO NEW YORK THE NETHERLANDS

Published by:

Kluwer Law International
PO Box 316
2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn
The Netherlands
Website: www.kluwerlaw.com

Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by:

Aspen Publishers, Inc.
7201 McKinney Circle
Frederick, MD 21704
United States of America
Email: customer.service@aspublishers.com

Sold and distributed in all other countries by:

Turpin Distribution Services Ltd.
Stratton Business Park
Pegasus Drive, Biggleswade
Bedfordshire SG18 8TQ
United Kingdom
Email: kluwerlaw@turpin-distribution.com

Printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN 978-90-411-3178-2

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Printed in Great Britain.

Independent Power Projects in Developing Countries

Energy and Environmental Law & Policy Series
Supranational and Comparative Aspects

VOLUME 7

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- to increase the access to environmental and energy information for students, academics, non-governmental organizations, government institutions, and business;
- to facilitate cooperation between academic and non-academic communities in the field of energy and environmental law and policy throughout the world.

Preface

In June 2001, the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law at the University of Oslo gave me a six-month contract to write a short article on multinational corporations' investment in developing countries' power sectors. As the article progressed, it evolved into a PhD thesis, which was submitted in December 2005. The years of learning have been exhilarating and fun, necessarily coupled with recurring bouts of frustration. In retrospect, the valleys were actually not that deep, and the hilltops were satisfying and left lasting impressions. All in all, a positive and educating experience on both professional and personal levels.

This book would not have been written were it not for the environment at the Institute. My sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisors, Ulf Hammer and Ola Mestad – for prescient comments, for encouragement, for gentle (and occasionally not so gentle) prodding and for personal and professional support. Hans Jacob Bull, Erling Eide, Endre Stavang, Erling Selvig, Knut Kaasen and Erik Røsæg and my PhD Committee consisting of Trine-Lise Wilhelmsen, Asif Qureshi and Lars Gorton, all deserve gratitude for their adjudication, comments and encouragement. My kindred research fellows Ivar Alvik, Sondre Dyrland, Henrik Ringbom, Beate Sjøfjell, Anne Karin Nesdam, Odd-Harald Wasenden, Henrik Bjørnebye, Camilla Dalbak, Hermann Bruserud, Margrethe Buskerud, Ingunn Ikdahl, and Sverre Ellenes, were an encouraging source of constructive and collegial criticism and support. Inger Hamre, Anne Finne Jorunn Birkedal and Ingeborg Vedal provided high quality library and admin services. I thank the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy for providing funding for *Energirettsprosjektet*.

With regard to support from practitioners, special thanks go to Kjell Haagen- sen, Ole Gran, Lully Heje, Astrid Brunt, Jason Roth, various host country utility representatives (who all have asked to remain anonymous), Louis T. Wells, Ole Sten-Olsen, Fransisco Toureilles, Apinya Subsaeng, Wolfram Anders, Nabil Moukarbel, Jannik Lindbæk, Erling Naper, Bundhit Eua-arporn, Giuditta Cordero Moss, Philip Andrews-Speed, and Steven Dow.

I am indebted to Odd Ivar Biller, Anders Daae, Terrance Conley and my other colleagues in the legal department in Norsk Hydro ASA for providing a supporting, stimulating, and fun working environment, and for allowing me some time off work to transform my thesis into this book. My very good friends Atle Beisland, Gaute Erichsen, Erik Solvang, Torkel Lindeland, Sigvart Eriksen and Christopher Holm also have donated time and effort through their professional and personal support.

Special thanks go to Professor Kurt Deketelaere and Karel van der Linde at Kluwer Law International for a quick and positive decision-making process and excellent editorial work, and to Gunabala Saladi and R. Gnaneswaran at Newgen Imaging Systems for excellent copyediting services.

Needless to say, while all of the above have contributed in making this book possible, the responsibility for errors rests solely with me.

I round off by thanking my closest. Our families in Thailand and Japan, and the Holm family, have been so kind and caring. My mother Inger deserves gratitude, respect and love for raising me and providing me with ballast after my father passed away in 1982. My wife Sariya has used her wisdom and humor to support both me and the conclusion of this book, and our daughter Helena has filled our life with so much joy and happiness. I dedicate this work to Sariya, for being there for me, for her good companionship, and for the wonderful time and all the fun we have together.

Oslo, September 08, 2009
Henrik M. Inadomi

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