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Once again, I can only reiterate that it would be presumptuous for me to claim responsibility for a work which contains so much plagiarism. I must, however, carry the burden for the many errors which remain. Once again, I can only express adherence to the Chinese slogan 'collective initiative and individual responsibility'.

Bill Brugger

The Flinders University of South Australia
December 1979

ABBREVIATIONS

ACFTU All China Federation of Trade Unions
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ANU Australian National University
BR *Beijing Review* (formerly *Peking Review*)
CB *Current Background*
CC Central Committee
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CQ *The China Quarterly*
EEC European Economic Community
FBIS *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*
FEER *Far Eastern Economic Review*
GMRB *Guangming Ribao*
GNP Gross National Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
JPRS *Joint Publications Research Service*
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCNA New China (Xinhua) News Agency
NPAD National Programme for Agricultural Development
NPC National People's Congress
PFLP Peking Foreign Languages Press
PLA People's Liberation Army
PR *Peking Review*
RMRB *Renmin Ribao*
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SC State Council
SCMM *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (later *SPRCM*)
SCMP *Survey of China Mainland Press* (later *SPRCP*)
SPRCM *Selections from the People's Republic of China Magazines* (formerly *SCMM*)
SPRCP *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press* (formerly *SCMP*)
SW *Selected Works*
SWB *Summary of World Broadcasts* (British Broadcasting Corporation) Pt 3 *The Far East*
TPRC *Translations from the People's Republic of China (JPRS)*

URI	Union Research Institute
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.


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Hainan Is.
PHILIPPINES
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International Boundary
Provincial Boundary
AR Autonomous Region
JILIN Province
Hefei Town
NH Ningxia Hui AR

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is the sequel to *China: Liberation and Transformation, 1942–1962* which traced the history of contemporary China from 1942–62. That volume noted that, up to 1962, no fundamental split had occurred in the Chinese leadership concerning developmental strategy. This volume will trace the split which did occur in the leadership after 1962. To set the scene, therefore, I can do no better than to repeat part of the concluding section of the first volume and request that those who have read it proceed straight to the first chapter.

In the early years of the People's Republic, debates on developmental strategy centred on the applicability of the wartime experiences of the Chinese Communist Party, in the revolutionary base areas, to problems of running the whole country. In Yan'an, in the early 1940s, a model of administration had been worked out which was felt to have contributed much to the eventual victory of the Communist Party. The Yan'an model depended upon a new type of leader—the 'cadre'—committed to change within a network of human solidarity and with an orientation which was both 'red' and 'expert' (or, in the idiom of that time, 'virtuous' and 'talented'). He was kept on his toes by a process of rectification in which he was required to answer for his conduct in the field and to learn how to apply Marxism-Leninism and generalised Party policy to a concrete environment. The cadre operated in a situation of decentralised authority where only broad policy was centrally determined. In operational decisions, he was granted much leeway in interpretation and wide scope for initiative. The cadre's initiative, however, was constrained by the requirement that he adhere to the Mass Line technique of reconciling central policy with mass sentiments. According to the prescriptions of the Yan'an model, administration was organised according to a principle of dual rule, where local cadres were enjoined to be responsive not only to vertical chains of command but also to local Party committees. In practice, this meant that the many political campaigns, which characterised that time, were led by the local Party branches and, thus, the horizontal component in the dual rule scheme was strengthened. To prevent a growing division of labour between leaders and led, a programme of *xiaxiang* (later called simply *xiafang*) was introduced whereby cadres were transferred to lower levels of administration and were required to work for a time as ordinary peasants. In this process, they were able to help the

peasants construct informal or semi-formal *minban* (people-run) education units. Throughout the whole process, units (both civilian and military) were encouraged to become self-sufficient and competent in both production and other duties. Rural co-operativisation, therefore, was much more than an agricultural programme. It was the first step in a process of integrating agriculture, industry, administration, education and defence.

During the Civil War of 1946–9, fighting over rapidly shifting fronts led to an erosion of the principles of Yan'an. At the same time, the confusion generated by a much more intense process of land reform gave rise to a rectification movement very different from that of Yan'an. China's first experiment with open-rectification (where people outside the Party were involved in disciplining cadres) was not a great success and, with the restoration of order at the end of the Civil War, a much tighter system of central control was gradually imposed.

The experiences of 1947–8, the sheer problems of administering large urban as well as rural areas, the general inexperience of cadres, the Cold War and economic blockade, all led to a decision to implement a model of administration which derived from the Soviet Union. As an imported model, it was applicable neither to the objective situation in China in the early 1950s nor to the tradition of the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet model, which was often implemented dogmatically, tended to prescribe a leadership type which was more that of the manager than that of the cadre. The leader was still committed to change but within a network of technological solidarity (between roles and structures rather than human beings). In a situation where both policy and operational decision-making were centralised, the commitment of leaders was to 'expertise' rather than political values and the quality 'virtue' ('red') was interpreted increasingly in technological terms. The culture hero frequently became the engineer and model worker rather than the political activist and the powers of local Party branches tended to be eclipsed in a centrally-organised, vertical bureaucracy. In such a situation, *xiaxiang, minban* education and the Mass Line became less important, a slow programme of co-operativisation tended to be run from the top down and the army became separated from the rest of society.

The Soviet model of administration, however, was only imperfectly implemented and, in the mid-1950s, certain of its features came under attack. By the Great Leap Forward of 1958–9, which saw the culmination of rural collectivisation, the model was dismantled and many elements of the Yan'an tradition were adapted to the changed situation. The original Yan'an model had been formulated in a period of moderate radicalism. In 1958–9, however, the political climate often went to radical extremes and an excessive concern for production and 'ultra-left' idealism resulted in 'mistakes'. The debates of the early 1960s focussed on

these mistakes. At issue here was the role of the Great Leap Forward in bringing about the economic crisis of 1960 – 2. Various leaders disagreed on the extent to which one should assign blame to the policies of 1958 – 9 or to the three years of very bad harvests which China experienced at that time. In 1962, when Mao decided that the policies of post-Great Leap retrenchment had gone far enough, a major cleavage occurred amongst the leadership and this volume will document its development.

China: Liberation and Transformation 1942 – 1962 speculated on the reasons why disputes remained constrained by a basic policy consensus until 1962. Though no definitive conclusion was reached, it was argued that 1962 was important in marking the beginning of Mao's fundamental reappraisal of the process of socialist transition. The 'new democratic' formula, adopted in the 1940s and early 1950s, was not particularly concerned with defining socialism, since the current 'new democratic revolution' was seen as a species of 'bourgeois democratic revolution'. During that revolution, it was believed that a 'four-class bloc' would eradicate the landlords together with the bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie. By the 1950s, however, as the Chinese engaged in 'socialist construction', they came to see socialism as a static model in much the same way as Stalin had conceived the term in 1936. At that time, Stalin had outlined a number of features of 'socialism' in order to demonstrate how the Soviet Union had basically achieved them. The Stalinist model had been criticised by Trotsky on the grounds that socialism had been pitched at too low a level.[1] What was more to the point, however, was that the Stalinist model lacked a diachronic element. Mao was to remark on Stalin's poor knowledge of dialectics. But when he made those remarks, Mao did not see that China, in abandoning the Soviet model of administration, had not abandoned the Soviet model of socialism.

Thus Mao's seminal essay, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (1957), whilst rejecting many of the Soviet ways of doing things, still adopted a managerialist method of 'handling contradictions' in order to make the model work more effectively. What was new about Mao's conceptualisation of 'uninterrupted revolution', in January 1958, was his attitude towards the periods of consolidation between the various stages in the construction of socialism.[2] It was, however, still informed by the 1936 Stalinist view, reiterated in 'On the Correct Handling . . .', that 'large-scale turbulent class struggles, characteristic of times of revolution [had] in the main come to an end'. Though it might have been the case that Mao was not entirely unsympathetic to those who claimed, in 1958, that the socialist revolution might be growing over into communism, there is no evidence that he was prepared, at that time, to incorporate such considerations into his theoretical view of socialist transition. He thus found it quite easy, in the subsequent period, to condemn the 'communist style'.

It was a consideration of events in the Soviet Union which led Mao Zedong to reformulate his views on socialist transition. In analysing what was particularly 'leftist' about the mistakes of Stalin, Mao began to come to a view of what constituted 'revisionism'. By 1962, 'revisionism' was seen not simply as a behavioural characteristic but also as the fostering of conditions under which policies appropriate to a superseded stage of development might be implemented. It arose from a disjunction between three elements of the relations of production (the pattern of ownership, the relations between people at work and the reciprocal interrelation between production and distribution). As Mao began to move away from a behavioural to a more substantive conception of 'revisionism', he must surely have begun to take stock of conditions in China which, in many ways, mirrored the 'reforms' then under way in the Soviet Union. The decentralisation of decision-making power to local areas, fostered during the Greap Leap, was giving way to a mixture of recentralisation and decentralisation of power to units of production. Atomised units, therefore, began to be linked more by the market than by the plan and economists had come forward to promote the virtues of 'market socialism'. These were the same conditions which had produced 'revisionism' in Yugoslavia—a country which Mao became convinced was no longer socialist. The Soviet Union, moreover, seemed to be heading in the same direction.

The reason why Mao did not come to this view until 1962 might have been because he was preoccupied with the economic damage resulting from natural calamities and from the Great Leap. It might also have been the case, however, that he had not had time to study political economy until after he had retired to what he referred to as the 'second front' in 1959 when Liu Shaoqi took over many of his former duties. Whatever the reason, the period 1960–2 did see Mao's first serious study of political economy. But he was still a novice and his notes, written at that time, reveal much inconsistency and confusion. As this volume will go on to show, his inconsistency was to have quite serious results in later years.

Mao's new thoughts about the structural conditions for 'revisionism' led him quite naturally to a reformulation of 'class struggle'. There had been much talk of 'class struggle' during the Great Leap, but one gets the impression that it was still seen in the old Soviet sense; it resulted from the persistence of remnant classes and ideologies which were supported by external forces. But, by the early 1960s, Mao began to feel that, in socialist society, certain structural conditions might produce *new* bourgeois elements. This generative view of class had very important implications for domestic politics. It implied that the revolution was constantly in danger of sliding backwards. Thus, socialism came to be seen not as a model to be achieved and consolidated but as the whole process of transition from the old society to communism. It was, moreover, a *reversible*

process. Mao had, indeed, begun to add a diachronic element to his view of socialist transition. There was now no room for models.

Inner-Party Struggle

Mao's move away from considerations of behaviour to considerations of structure had very important implications for the way debate was conducted in the top policy-making circles. The conscientious adherence to Party norms of debate was no longer to be any guarantee that one would not be seen as the promoter of 'antagonistic' structures. Up to 1962, it seemed that the process of decision-making was able to accommodate all sorts of deviant and heterodox views, provided that organisational norms were adhered to. The Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai cases, however, appear as major aberrations. This may have been because Mao believed, in each case, that the existence of an independent power base suggested a conspiracy to seize supreme power. In each case also, a belief in a Soviet connection lent weight to such a view. But the important point is that, whereas in the case of Gao Gang most Party leaders were prepared to support the conspiracy theory, in the case of Peng Dehuai many were not. To such people, it must have seemed that Peng had been victimised simply for his views on the Great Leap and a very unfortunate precedent had been set. Earlier, Chen Yun had lost power because of a similar opposition to the Great Leap but the case of Peng Dehuai did seem to be the first time that a senior leader had been publicly humiliated for such a position. Whether that assessment was correct or not is an open question. Suffice it to say that the case of Peng Dehuai was to be a major element in the events which led up to the Cultural Revolution and which will be explored in this volume. In that revolution, many more cases like that of Peng Dehuai were to occur and the resentment continues to this day.

At lower levels of the Party organisation, the norms of inner-Party debate had started to break down much earlier than the Peng Dehuai case. The collapse of consensus at the highest levels was not to occur until Mao had discarded much of the Soviet model of socialism. At lower levels, concerned more with operational matters, consensus began to break down as soon as the Soviet model of administration had been discredited. Thus, many people were capped as 'rightist' in 1957–8 purely because of their expressed attitudes and not because of any physical act of opposition. Such a situation was to affect quite profoundly the way rectification movements were carried on. Following Teiwes, [3] one might draw a clear distinction between the closed type of rectification movement which had occurred at Yan'an and the open type of movement of 1947–8 which had resulted in confusion. The movement of 1950 was once again a closed movement as the Party strove to restore order, though

elements of open rectification appeared in the subsequent three and five anti movements of 1951–2. When the Soviet model was implemented, the rectification movements were, once again, closed, but, unlike that closed movement in Yan'an, were not reliant on material solicited by Mass Line techniques. Thus, the Party became more and more exclusivist and cut off from the masses. This prompted Mao's call for an open process of rectification in 1957 which, after much opposition, finally got off the ground and then quickly got out of hand. One cannot be sure whether Mao supported the sudden decision to terminate open debate in mid-1957, but that reversal did signify a return once again to closed rectification. If Solomon is right and Mao was able to steer the subsequent anti-rightist movement on to specifically economic targets, then we might have the basis for an understanding of the excessive 'commandism' which sometimes developed during the Great Leap. Ideally, at that time, since open rectification could no longer be implemented, the closed process of rectification should have been informed (in the Yan'an style) by a parallel development of the Mass Line. But, when the pace of change was too quick for mass comments to be solicited, the Great Leap might actually have contributed to the exclusivity of the Party and occasioned the complaints which were voiced in 1960–1. In contrast to the 1959 campaign against 'right opportunism' in the aftermath of the Peng Dehuai case, the movement of 1960–1 was again relatively open but took place in such an atmosphere of demoralisation that one wonders whether the masses were mobilised actively to remedy the situation. All too often, it seems, the masses might have been persuaded merely to endorse the decision of work-teams and to blame the bad economic conditions on local cadres, regardless of their actual guilt. But significantly, the campaign of 1960–1 did give rise to the formation of new peasant associations and these were to become quite important in the period covered in this volume. In the first two chapters, much will be said about the relationship between peasant associations and work-teams.

It would seem, therefore, that, after Yan'an, closed rectification movements led to Party exclusivity and open rectification movements led to confusion. By the early 1960s, the attempt to get back to the spirit of Yan'an by combining closed rectification with the implementation of the Mass Line had failed. What was more important, however, was that, once Mao had decided that elements of a new bourgeoisie might develop in the Party structure itself, then the only kind of rectification movement which he would promote would be the open type. Mao, therefore, had to take the risk of whatever confusion might occur. Such was the thinking which led eventually to the Cultural Revolution.

The Decision-making Process

The apparent ease with which Mao returned to the 'first front' in 1962, which marks the starting point of this volume, has given much weight to a view of Chinese politics which sees Mao as the consistent drafter of the political agenda. According to this view, Mao constantly shifted his position between radical and more conservative policies. This was because of changing information from below, produced either by Mass Line techniques or invented by his close advisers such as Chen Boda or Kang Sheng. Thus, a 'conservative' or an 'ultra-leftist' was simply someone who did not keep up with Mao's changing position. There can be no doubt about the extraordinary power enjoyed by Mao both before and after the Party began to talk about 'collective leadership' in the 1950s. Indeed, the case of Peng Dehuai could be interpreted as showing that Mao was quite capable of taking a personal initiative and launching a surprise attack against someone who thought he was adhering to the norms of inner-Party debate. At times, Mao must have been a very difficult person to live with. Yet, if one looks at the whole period up to 1962, one finds that Mao did not often act in that way.

After 1962, however, Mao's political style began to change. As more and more of his political initiatives were blocked by a Party machine which feared the consequences of renewed radicalism, Mao began to work out a series of strategies to remove a large number of senior leaders from their posts. Mao certainly changed the rules of the game. How justified one deems him to have been in this will depend upon one's view of Mao's diagnosis of the changing orientation of the Party leadership. Implicitly, the post-Mao leadership has criticised Mao for violating the accepted rules of procedure. Mao would probably have criticised them for violating the process of socialist transition. Yet, right to the end, Mao maintained some respect for the rules of procedure and was to criticise many other people for violating them. That is why current (1976–9) recapitulations of history have been able to prise Mao apart from many of the advisers who surrounded him. This volume will perhaps help one to come to an assessment as to whether that attempt is credible.

NOTES

1. Trotsky, 1972 (original 1937), pp. 62–3.
2. Mao Zedong, 28 January 1958, *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter 1968–9, pp. 13–14.
3. Teiwes, 1979.

I
ATTEMPTS AT RADICALISATION
(1962–1964)

The Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, held in Beijing from 24 to 27 September 1962, was the culmination of two months extensive discussions at a central work conference which met first at Beidaihe and then in Beijing. The result of those discussions was an endorsement of Mao's call to combat 'revisionism' and to promote 'class struggle'.

As Mao saw it, the issues of 'revisionism' and 'class struggle' were the same both within China and internationally. Constant attention needed to be paid to the continued existence of classes in socialist society and the fact that imperialism was as powerful as ever. Party cadres, moreover, were falling into the morass of 'revisionism' in exactly the same way as some socialist countries were drifting back into capitalism. Unless there was constant vigilance, therefore, China could develop into another Yugoslavia; such he believed was happening to the Soviet Union.[1]

But how was the principle of class struggle to be operationalised? Here, Mao was extremely vague. The logic of the generative view of class was that, since 'new bourgeois elements' had begun to appear in the Communist Party, a large-scale 'open' process of rectification ought to be undertaken. Yet, the last such open rectification movement in 1960–1 had been directed at penalising cadres who had been too enthusiastic about the Great Leap Forward. Mao, therefore, first had recourse to a Yan'an-style movement, which combined closed rectification with mass mobilisation.[2] He was soon, however, to depart from this and introduce external elements into the process. Mao's position, therefore, tended to become quite ambiguous and such ambiguity led to many different interpretations of his directives. As a result of this, scholars are divided as to Mao's aims in the period 1962–5. Some tend to see Mao's consistent initiatives constantly being thwarted by an entrenched Party machine which feared the consequences of mass mobilisation. Others, however,