

VACLAV SMIL

MAKING_{the} MODERN WORLD

Materials and Dematerialization



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Making the Modern World

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Preface: Why and How

The story of humanity – evolution of our species; prehistoric shift from foraging to permanent agriculture; rise and fall of antique, medieval, and early modern civilizations; economic advances of the past two centuries; mechanization of agriculture; diversification and automation of industrial production; enormous increases in energy consumption; diffusion of new communication and information networks; and impressive gains in quality of life – would not have been possible without an expanding and increasingly intricate and complex use of materials. Human ingenuity has turned these materials first into simple clothes, tools, weapons, and shelters, later into more elaborate dwellings, religious and funerary structures, pure and alloyed metals, and in recent generations into extensive industrial and transportation infrastructures, megacities, synthetic and composite compounds, and into substrates and enablers of a new electronic world.

This material progress has not been a linear advance but has consisted of two unequal periods. First was the very slow rise that extended from pre-history to the beginnings of rapid economic modernization, that is, until the eighteenth century in most of Europe, until the nineteenth century in the USA, Canada, and Japan, and until the latter half of the twentieth century in Latin America, the Middle East, and China. An overwhelming majority of people lived in those pre-modern societies with only limited quantities of simple possessions that they made themselves or that were produced by artisanal labor as unique pieces or in small batches – while the products made in larger quantities, be they metal objects, fired bricks and tiles, or drinking glasses, were too expensive to be widely owned.

The principal reason for this limited mastery of materials was the energy constraint: for millennia our abilities to extract, process, and transport biomaterials and minerals were limited by the capacities of animate prime movers (human and animal muscles) aided by simple mechanical devices and by only slowly improving capabilities of the three ancient mechanical prime movers: sails, water wheels, and wind mills. Only the conversion of the chemical energy in fossil fuels to the inexpensive and universally deployable kinetic energy of mechanical prime movers (first by external combustion of coal to power steam engines, later by internal combustion of liquids and gases to energize gasoline and Diesel engines and, later still, gas turbines) brought a fundamental change and ushered in the second, rapidly ascending, phase of material consumption, an era further accelerated by generation of electricity and by the rise of commercial chemical syntheses producing an enormous variety of compounds ranging from fertilizers to plastics and drugs.

And so the world has become divided between the affluent minority that commands massive material flows and embodies them in long-lasting structures as well as in durable and ephemeral consumer products – and the low-income majority whose material

possessions amount to a small fraction of material stocks and flows in the rich world. Now the list of products that most Americans claim they cannot live without includes cars, microwave ovens, home computers, dishwashers, clothes dryers, and home air conditioning (Taylor *et al.*, 2006) – and they have forgotten how recent many of these possessions are because just 50 years ago many of them were rare or nonexistent. In 1960 fewer than 20% of all US households had a dishwasher, a clothes dryer, or air conditioning, the first color TVs had only just appeared, and there were no microwave ovens, VCRs, computers, cellphones, or SUVs.

In contrast, those have-nots in low-income countries who are lucky enough to have their own home live in a poorly-built small earthen brick or wooden structure with as little inside as a bed, a few cooking pots, and some worn clothes. Those readers who have no concrete image of this great material divide should look at Peter Menzel's *Material World: A Global Family Portrait* in which families from 30 nations are photographed in front of their dwellings amidst all of their household possessions (Menzel, 1995). And this private material contrast has its public counterpart in the gap between the extensive and expensive infrastructures of the rich world (transportation networks, functioning cities, agricultures producing large food surpluses, largely automated manufacturing) and their inadequate and failing counterparts in poor countries.

These contrasts make it obvious that a huge material mobilization and transformation will be needed just to narrow the gap between these two worlds. At the same time, material consumption has been a major cause of environmental pollution and degradation and further multiplication of current demand may pose a worrisome threat to the integrity of the biosphere. These impacts also raise questions of analytical boundaries: their reasoned choice is inevitable because including every conceivable material flow would be impractical and because there is no universally accepted definition of what should be included in any fairly comprehensive appraisal of modern material use. This lack of standardization is further complicated by the fact that some analyses have taken the maximalist (total resource flow) approach and have included every conceivable input and waste stream, including "hidden" flows associated with the extraction of minerals and with crop production as well as oxygen required for combustion and the resulting gaseous emissions and wastes released into waters or materials dissipated on land.

In contrast, others studies have restricted their accounts to much more reliably quantifiable direct uses of organic and inorganic material inputs required by national economies. I will follow the latter approach, focusing in some detail on key (because of their magnitude or their irreplaceable quality) materials consumed by modern economies. Their huge material claims lead us to ask a number of fundamental questions. How much further should the affluent world push its material consumption? Are any further increases associated with genuine improvements in quality of life? To what extent is it possible to divorce economic growth and improvements in the average standard of living from increased material consumption? In other words, does relative dematerialization (reduced material use per unit of product or performance) lead to absolute decline in demand for materials?

In order to answer these questions in a convincing manner I must review the evolution of human material uses; describe all the principal materials, their extraction, production, and their dominant applications; and take a closer look at the evolving productivities of material extraction, processing, synthesis, finishing, and distribution and at the energy costs and environmental impact of rising material consumption. And, as always in my

books, I will not offer any time-specific forecasts regarding future global and national use of materials. Instead, I will look at possible actions that could reduce our dependence on materials while maintaining a good quality of life and narrowing the gap between affluent and low-income economies.

We must realize that in the long run even the most efficient production processes, the least wasteful ways of design and manufacturing, and (for those materials that can be recycled) the highest practical rates of recycling may not be enough to result in dematerialization rates great enough to negate the rising demand for materials generated by continuing population growth, rising standards of living, and the universal human preference for amassing possessions. This makes it highly likely that in order to reconcile our wants with the preservation of the biosphere's integrity we will have to make deliberate choices that will help us to reduce absolute levels of material consumption, and thereby redefine the very notion of modern societies whose very existence is predicated on incessant and massive material flows.

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1

What Gets Included

Any study aiming to elucidate the complexity of material flows of modern societies, their prerequisites and their consequences, should be as comprehensive as possible, indeed its coverage should be truly all-encompassing. But this easily stated aspiration runs immediately into the key categorical problem: what constitutes the complete set of modern material uses? There is no self-evident choice, no generally accepted list, only more or less liberally (and also more or less defensively) defined boundaries of a chosen inclusion; a reality best illustrated by reviewing the selections made by the past comprehensive studies and adopted by leading international and national databases of material flows.

The first comparative study of national resource flows (Adriaanse *et al.*, 1997), subtitled *The Material Basis of Industrial Economies*, excluded water and air but included not only all agricultural harvests (not just raw materials but all food and feed as well), all forestry products, aquatic catches, extraction of minerals and fossil fuels, but also hidden flows accounting for extraction, movement, or losses of materials that create environmental impacts but have no acknowledged economic value. These hidden flows are dominated by overburden materials that have to be removed during the exploitation of mineral deposits (above all in open-cast coal and ore mining), processing wastes (particularly massive flows associated with the separation of relatively rare metals from rocks), soil, sand, and rocks that have to be removed and shifted during large construction projects, and soil erosion originating from fields and permanent plantations. Hidden flows are not monitored and their quantification is, at best, a matter of approximate estimates; more often of just informed guesses.

This is even more the case with the annual totals for hidden flows associated with imported raw materials: obviously, these estimates will be particularly uncertain in the case of large affluent economies (USA, Japan, Germany) that import a wide range of materials from scores of countries. Not surprisingly, the study resorted to using worldwide averages for these calculations: for example, it applied the rate of 0.48 t of overburden for a ton of bauxite and 2 t of overburden per ton of iron ore – global generalizations that must result in considerable errors when used as national averages.

Erosion rates are even more variable, their detailed national studies are rare and annual soil losses can differ by up to an order of magnitude even within relatively small regions, and yet the study used only the rates derived from the US inventory. Another highly uncertain inclusion was quantifying the mass of grass grazed by cattle (other animal feed was included in crop harvests).

Three years after this first comparative study came another project led by the World Resources Institute (WRI), *The Weight of Nations* (Matthews *et al.*, 2000). This study presented material flows for the four nations included in the original work (the USA, Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands) as well as for Austria and extended the accounting period from 1975 to 1996 (the original ended in 1993). Its subtitle, *Material Outflows from Industrial Economies*, indicated the report's concern with outputs produced by the metabolism of modern societies. As its predecessor, this study included all fossil fuels, hidden material flows (dominated by surface coal mining overburden), as well as the processing wastes from oil and coal industries.

Similarly, estimates for process losses and overburden removal were made for all nonfuel minerals and metals, and the report also quantified earth moved during all construction activities (highway, public, and private and also for dredging), soil erosion losses in agriculture, and waste from synthetic organic chemicals and from the pharmaceutical industry. But, unlike the original study, the 2000 report also included data on additional inputs (oxygen in combustion and in respiration) and outputs, including the total output of CO₂ from respiration and water vapor from all combustion, and it separated waste streams into three gateways: air, land, water. The air gateway quantified gaseous emissions (CO₂, CO, SO_x and NO_x, volatile organic carbohydrates) including oxygen from all combustion, the outputs to land included municipal solid waste, industrial wastes, and dissipative flows to land (manure, fertilizers, salt spread on roads, worn tire rubber, evaporated solvents), and water outputs, trace organic load, and total nitrogen and phosphate burdens.

Eurostat has been publishing annual summaries of domestic material consumption for all EU countries since the year 2000, disaggregating the total flows into fossil fuels, biomass (crops and forest products), metal ores, and nonmetallic minerals (European Commission, 2001; Eurostat, 2013). Eurostat's methodological guides for economy-wide material flow accounts offer detailed procedures for the inclusion of biomass (food, feed, fodder crops, grazed phytomass, wood, fish, hunting, and gathering activities), metal ores and nonmetallic minerals, and for all forms of fossil fuels as well as for all dissipative uses of products, including organic and mineral fertilizers, sewage sludge, compost, pesticides, seeds, road salt, and solvents (Eurostat, 2009; Schoer *et al.*, 2012). Eurostat aggregates also include unused materials (mining overburden, losses accompanying phytomass production, soil excavation, dredging, and marine by-catch), and quantify emissions (CO₂, water disposal, and landfilled wastes) but leave out oxygen and water.

In 1882, the US Congress mandated the annual collection of statistics for mineral commodities produced and used in the country. The US Geological Survey was responsible for this work, then the US Bureau of Mines, and since 1995 the task has reverted to the USGS. These statistics were the basis for preparing the first summary of America's material flows aggregated by major categories and covering the period between 1900 and 1995 (Matos and Wagner, 1998). An updated inventory, with data for aggregate categories extending until 2006, was published in 2009 (Matos, 2009) and data on individual elements, compounds, and materials are updated annually (USGS, 2013).

The USGS choice of items included in its national material accounts is based on concentrating only on the third class of the material triad; leaving out food and fuel and aggregating only the materials that are used domestically in all branches of the economy. The series offers annual totals for domestic production, exports, imports, and domestic consumption; it excludes water, oxygen, hidden material flows, and all fossil fuels and it includes all raw materials produced by agricultural activities (cotton, seeds yielding industrial oil, wool, fur, leather hides, silk, and tobacco), materials originating in forestry (all kinds of wood, plywood, paper, and paperboard), metals (from aluminum to zinc), an exhaustive array of nonmetallic minerals (be they extracted in their natural form – such as gypsum, graphite, or peat – or processed before further use – such as crushed stone or cement – or synthesized, such as ammonia) and nonrenewable organics derived from fossil fuels (asphalt, road oil, waxes, oils, and lubricants and any variety of solid, liquid, or gaseous fossil fuel used as feedstock in chemical syntheses).

Very few of these inputs are used in their raw, natural form as virtually all of them undergo processing (cotton spinning, wood pulping, ore smelting, stone crushing, or cutting and polishing) and, in turn, most of these processed materials become inputs into the manufacturing of semi-finished and finished products (cotton turned into apparel, pulp into paper, smelted metals into machine parts, crushed stone mixed with sand and cement to make concrete). This compilation of agriculture- and forestry-derived products, metals, industrial minerals, and nonrenewable organics gives a fairly accurate account of annual levels and long-term changes in the country's material flows. While all imports and exports of raw materials are accounted for, the series does not include materials contained in traded finished goods: given their mass and variety their tracking would be very difficult.

Where does this leave us? Those material flow studies that conceive their subject truly *sensu lato* (that is as virtually any substance used by humans) include everything with the notable exception of water; that is not only biomaterials used in production of goods, all metals, nonmetallic minerals, and organic feedstocks, but also all agricultural phytomass (harvested food and feed crops, their residues, forages, and grazed plants), and all (biomass and fossil) fuels and oxygen needed for combustion. Slightly more restrictive studies exclude oxygen and all food and feed crops, and consider only those agricultural raw materials that undergo further processing into goods, but include all phytomass and fossil fuels. In contrast, the USGS series exemplifies a *sensu stricto* approach as it includes only raw biomaterials used for further processing and excludes oxygen, water, all fuels (phytomass and fossil), and all hidden (and always tricky to estimate) material flows. My preferences for setting the analytical boundaries are almost perfectly reflected by the USGS selection, but instead of simply relying on that authority I will briefly explain the reasons behind my exclusions.

Leaving out oxygen required for combustion of fuels is a choice that is easily defensible on the basis of free supply of a virtually inexhaustible atmospheric constituent. Claims about the danger of serious O₂ depletion through combustion were refuted a long time ago (Broecker, 1970). Complete combustion of 1 kg of coal carbon consumes 2.67 kg of oxygen, and burning of 1 kg of hydrocarbons requires 4 kg of O₂. Global combustion of about 8 Gt of fossil carbon in 2010 thus claimed about 21 Gt of O₂ or about 0.0014% of the atmosphere content of 1.5 Pt of O₂ – and even a complete combustion (a clear impossibility) of the generously estimated global resources of fossil fuels would lower the atmospheric O₂ content by no more than 2%.

There is thus no danger of any worrisome diminution of supply (to say nothing of exhaustion) of the element, and yet, once the choice is made to include it in material flow accounts, it will dominate the national and global aggregates. For example, as calculated by the comparative WRI study, oxygen was 61% of the direct US processed material output in 1996, and in Japan in the same year the element's share was 65% (Matthews *et al.*, 2000). Consequently, magnitudes of national material flows that incorporate oxygen needs would be nothing but rough proxies for the extent of fossil fuel combustion in particular economies.

The reasons for excluding hidden flows from the accounts of national material flows are no less compelling: after excluding oxygen they would dominate total domestic material output in all countries that have either large mineral extractive industries (especially surface coal and ore mining) or large areas of cropland subject to heavy erosion. Not surprisingly (after excluding oxygen), in the WRI analysis these hidden flows account for 86% of the total domestic material output in both the USA and Germany, but with much less mining and with limited crop cultivation the rate was lower (71%) in Japan (Matthews *et al.*, 2000). The undesirable environmental impacts of these associated flows should not be ignored when analyzing particular extractive or cropping activities, but the flows cannot be quantified with high accuracy. They are dominated by unusable excavated earth and rocks, mine spoils, processing wastes, and eroded soil; and earth and rocks moved around as a part of construction activities will make up a comparatively small share.

But the principal problem with the inclusion of hidden flows is not their unsurprising dominance of domestic output of materials in all large, diversified economies, but the indiscriminate addition of several qualitatively incomparable flows. An unusable mass of stone left in a quarry after it ceases its operation may be no environmental burden, even no eyesore, and once the site is flooded to create an artificial lake that hidden material flow may be truly hidden as part of a new, and pleasing, landscape. On the other hand, bauxite processing to extract alumina (to give one of many possible common examples) leaves behind toxic waste (containing heavy metals) that is also often slightly radioactive waste and is very caustic (high pH).

And no less fundamental is the difference between *in situ* hidden flows generated by mineral extraction (abandoned stone, gravel and sand quarries, and coal and ore mines with heaps, piles, layers, or deep holes or gashes full of unusable minerals or processing waste) and by rain- and wind-driven soil erosion that transports valuable topsoil not just tens or hundreds but as much as thousands of kilometers downstream or downwind. The first kind of hidden flow may be unsightly but not necessarily toxic, and its overall environmental impact beyond its immediate vicinity may be negligible or nonexistent, but erosion is a globally important, often regionally highly worrisome, and locally devastating process that reduces (or destroys) the productivity of crop fields, silts streams, contributes to eutrophication of fresh and coastal waters, and creates lasting ecosystemic degradation and substantial economic losses.

My reasons for excluding water are based on several considerations that make this indispensable input better suited for separate treatment rather than for inclusion into total material requirements of modern economies. The first, obvious, reason is, once

again, quantitative: with the exception of desert countries, water's inclusion would dominate virtually all national material flow accounts and would misleadingly diminish the importance of many inputs whose annual flows are a small fraction of water withdrawals but whose qualitative contribution is indispensable. For example, in 2005 the total water withdrawals in the USA were just over 5 Gt (Kenny *et al.*, 2009), while all materials directly used by the country's economy (the total dominated by sand, gravel, and stone used in construction) added up to less than 3.8 Gt (USGS, 2013).

Moreover, there are fundamental qualitative differences between these two measures. The most voluminous water withdrawal (accounting for nearly 60% of the total), that of cooling water for thermal electricity-generating stations, is not a consumptive use because all but a small (evaporated) fraction of that water becomes available almost instantly for further downstream uses. In contrast, materials that become embedded in long-lasting structures and products are either never reused or are partially recycled only after long period of being out of circulation. And the majority of the second most voluminous water use, about 30% of the US 2005 total used for irrigation, is also nonconsumptive: all but a tiny fraction of the irrigation water is evapotranspired by growing plants, re-enters the atmosphere, and eventually undergoes condensation again and is precipitated. And if the inclusion of water were driven by resource scarcity concerns, then a critical distinction should be made between water supplied by abundant precipitation and water withdrawn at a high cost from deep and diminishing aquifers that cannot be replenished on a civilizational timescale.

At this point, it might be useful to call attention to yet another (comparatively minor) problem with aggregate measures of material flows that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been raised by any assembler of national and global accounts: that of the water content of sand and of harvested biomass. Even when looking just at those biomaterials that are used as industrial inputs, their water content ranges from less than 15% for raw wool to more than 50% for freshly cut tree logs (the range is wider for food crops, ranging from only about 5% for dry seeds to more than 90% for fresh vegetables).

Freshly excavated sand can contain more than 30% water, purified sands contain 15–25%, storage in drainage bins reduces that level to about 6%, and drying in rotary bins or in fluidized bed dryers expels all but about 0.5% of moisture for sands used in such processes as steel castings or hydraulic fractioning under pressure. Obviously, the best solution would be to report the masses of any moisture-containing materials in terms of absolutely dry weight in order to make their flows comparable to those of materials that contain no moisture. This is not the case in practice, and hence all national material aggregates contain far from negligible shares of water.

Foodstuffs and fuels are obviously indispensable for the survival of any civilization, and their flows have been particularly copious in modern high-energy societies enjoying rich and varied diets, while traditional biofuels remain important in many low-income countries. Moreover, unlike water or oxygen, their inclusion would not dwarf all other material flows combined: for example, even in the fuel-rich USA the mass of annually consumed coal, crude oil, and natural gas is equal to about 50% of all nonenergy minerals. So why leave them out? Exclusion of food and fuel is justified not only because these two large consumption categories have been traditionally studied in separation (resulting

in a rich literature on achievements and prospects) but also because they simply are not *sensu stricto* materials, substances repeatedly used in their raw state or transformed into more or less durable finished products.

Unlike raw biomaterials (wood, wool, cotton, leather, silk), metals, nonmetallic minerals, and nonrenewable organics (asphalt, lubricants, waxes, hydrocarbon feedstocks) foodstuffs and fuels are not used to build long-lasting structures and are not converted or incorporated into the still increasing array of ephemeral as well as durable industrial, transportation, and consumer items. Foods are rapidly metabolized to yield energy and nutrients for human growth and activity; fuels are rapidly oxidized (burned) to yield, directly and indirectly, various forms of useful energy (heat, motion, light): in neither case do they increase the material stock of modern societies.

Finally, I must defend a conceptual change that concerns the handling of materials placed into the category of dissipative flows by the EU's material balances. According to the EU definition, the eight categories of dissipative losses are a collection of disparate residuals: some of them add up to small total flows (think about solvents escaping from dry cleaning or about rubber tires wearing away on roads), others are more substantial (manures, sewage sludge, and composts applied to cropland) but dissipative losses contributed by both of these material categories are not monitored and are very difficult to quantify. The USGS approach accounts for the largest flows in this category (salt and other thawing materials – including sand and grit – spread on winter roads, nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers, and potash applied to crops and lawns) by including them in the industrial minerals group.

While salt and sand are abundant materials whose production is not energy-intensive, inorganic fertilizers are critical material inputs in all modern societies that cannot be ignored and that will receive a closer look when I examine advances in the production of synthetic materials. But I would argue that most of the remaining dissipative flows add up to relatively small amounts whose inherently inaccurate quantification appears to outweigh any benefits of including them in any grand total of consumed materials. And while manures and sludges represent relatively large volumes to be disposed of, they are more about recycling water than biomass: sludge contains least 80% water, fresh manures 70–85%; moreover, in many (perhaps most) instances, sewage sludge should not be recycled as it contains heavy metals, pathogens, pesticide and drug residues, steroids, and hormones.

This leaves me with an argument for a single addition to the USGS list, for the inclusion of industrial gases. Although air (oxygen) is needed for combustion of fossil fuels, the dominant energizer of modern civilization, adding air to the total material input would have (as I have already explained) a skewing and confusing effect similar to that of counting all uses of water; but assessing the use of gases separated from the air in order to enable many industrial processes is another matter. In simple quantitative mass terms the global use of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and rare gases such as argon or xenon constitutes only a minor item, but in qualitative terms their use is indispensable in industries ranging from steelmaking (basic oxygen furnaces are now the principal means of producing the metal) to synthesis of ammonia (using nitrogen separated from air and hydrogen liberated from methane) and efficient lighting.

2

How We Got Here

The Earth's biosphere teems with organisms that use materials for more than just their metabolism; moreover, in aggregate mass terms the material flows commanded by humanity do not appear to be exceptionally high when compared with the work of marine biomineralizers. But it is the combination of the overall extent, specific qualities, and increasing complexity of material uses (extraction, processing, and transformation to particular inputs destined for infrastructures and myriads of products) that is a uniquely human attribute. To set it into a wider evolutionary perspective, I will first note some of the most remarkable material uses by organisms ranging from marine phytoplankton to primates, those distinguished either by the magnitude of their overall fluxes or by their unique qualities.

Afterwards I will proceed with concise chronological surveys of human use of materials, focusing first on the milestones in our prehistory, above all on those still poorly explained feats of megalithic construction that required quarrying, transportation, and often remarkably accurate placement of massive stones. Then I will review and quantify some notable deployments of traditional materials (stone and wood) during antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern era (1500–1800), concentrating on the advances in building roads, aqueducts, ceremonial and religious structures, and ships; on the origins and developments in metallurgy; and on materials used by households.

I will close the chapter with two closely related sections that will describe the creation of modern material civilization during the nineteenth century and its post-1900 spatial expansion and growth in complexity. I will focus on key quantitative and qualitative advances in the use of materials that laid the foundations for twentieth societies as they supported fossil fuel extraction, industrialization, urbanization, and evolution of modern transportation modes on land, water, and in the air. These developments were based on materials whose production required high energy inputs and whose introduction and use have been dynamically linked with enormous advances in scientific and technical capabilities. In turn, new materials have been the principal drivers of increased food production and improvements in sanitation that led to unprecedented gains in quality