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

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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

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MEVLEVÎ. The Mevlevî, a Turkish/Ottoman Ṣūfī order known also by its Arabic name Mawlawīyah, takes its name from the epithet of its founder Muḥammad Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207–1273). He was the son of the famed scholar Bahāʾ al-Dīn Valad, and migrated as a child with his father from Balkh (in modern Afghanistan) to

Mevlevî Dervishes. Anonymous colored engraving, c. 1810. Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz / Art Resource, NY

Mevlevî Dervishes. Dervishes in Istanbul celebrate the 800th birthday of the poet Rūmī in late 2007. Photograph by Murad Sezer / AP Images

Konya in Rum (the Seljuk Sultanate in Anatolia). The officials of Rum welcomed Bahāʾ al-Dīn and gave him the post of professor (*müderris*) in an institution of Islamic learning. In his early twenties Jalāl al-Dīn succeeded his father as teacher. The title *Mevlâna* (Arabic, *mawlānā*, our master) by which Rūmī became known to later generations betokens his brilliance not only in emulating his father but in surpassing him in the exposition of the spiritual and esoteric teachings of Islam. In contrast with the legalistic Islamic thinkers of his time, Rūmī was able through his poetic treatment of mysticism to attract a wider and more permanent audience. He also laid the foundations for an Islamic humanism that endured until the secularization of learning in twentieth-century Turkey. Rūmī's elaboration of the mystical "path of love" has attracted Muslims in modern Turkey and Iran and has also stirred interest in the West. His works, including the *Dīvān* (Collected Poems), the *Mas_navī* (Rhyming Couplets), and the *Fīhi mā fīhi* (In It What's In It, i.e., It Is What It Is), have been translated from the original Persian into Turkish and Western European languages.

The disciples of Mevlana became organized during the time of Rūmī's son Sulṭā Valad (d. 1312). The order, that of the Mevlevî dervishes, spread through Anatolia and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. All Mevlevî lodges (*tekke*) were responsible to a *çelebi* who resided in Konya and was chosen from among Mevlâna's descendants. The influence of the order grew in spite of the *ʿulamāʾ*'s interdiction of the teaching of Persian—the language of Rūmī's poetry—in *madrasahs* (Islamic schools). The Mevlevîs' influence attracted the attention of the Ottoman government, which was suspicious of potential rivals to the state. Only with the government's control of the pious foundations that provided the income of the order was the situation stabilized.

Another aspect of the Mevlevîs' political role was their attempt to achieve influence in palace circles beginning in the seventeenth century. They seem finally to have

secured this role during the nineteenth century, when they figured as "those who gird on the sword" at the enthronements of the of Ottoman sultans. In these years they received the support of Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–1861) and (with some caution) of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1876) and Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909–1918). Mevlevî lodges acted as cultural centers in Ottoman cities and were a key influence in the development of Ottoman upper-class culture. Some Mevlevî leaders are known to have been sympathetic to the Young Turks. Along with all other religious orders, they were disbanded in Turkey in 1925.

The Mevlevîs became well known to Europeans through their unorthodox use of music and dance—a feature they shared with the Bektāshī order—thus acquiring the name "whirling dervishes." Although the lodges were closed after 1925, their ceremonial practices were allowed again after 1950, and a yearly Mevlevî celebration now takes place in Konya. The attendance of a much wider audience at these tourist-oriented performances may not lower the quality of Mevlevî ceremonies, but it certainly detracts from their original mystical substance.

[*See also* Mawlawīyah.]

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ŞERIF MARDIN

MIGRATION. Migration is a central theme in Islam and Muslim history in religious terms, in the expansion of Islam and the internal processes of the Muslim world, and in the place of Islam in the contemporary world. It acquires its religious associations from the role of Prophet Muḥammad's migration, *hijrah*, from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. and the establishment there of the early Muslim community.

Migration has been an important dimension of the history of the Muslim world. This has taken the form both of collective "mass" migrations (*Völkerwanderungen*) and the migration of individuals on a significant scale. The early expansion of Islam was carried by the migration of Arab tribes from the Arabian peninsula into the surrounding territories as far as Central Asia in the seventh century. Across North Africa it was adopted by Berber tribes who carried Islam into Spain in the eighth century. The Arab origin of this phase of migration and conquest was regularly recalled in later eras when local conflicts were described in terms of inherited Arab tribal rivalries, typically between Qays and Kalb, in Muslim Spain and in Lebanon as late as the nineteenth century. The movement of Turkish peoples out of Central Asia, starting in the ninth century, took place initially by recruitment into the ʿAbbāsid armies, followed by what became a major migration southwards into the Indian subcontinent and westwards ultimately into Anatolia and southeastern Europe. This process left its mark in the expansion of rule by Turkish dynasties across much of the Muslim world, as early as the coming to power of Ibn Ṭūlūn in Egypt in 868 C.E. and culminating with the Ottoman empire until its downfall at the end of the first world war. Tribal migration acquired a conceptual significance from the attention given by Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1382 C.E.) to the migration of the Banū Hilāl, originally from the Arabian peninsula, from Egypt across North Africa under the Fāṭimids in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Of equal significance to mass migrations was that of individuals. The most notable form of individual migration is recorded in the travel accounts that developed into a particular form of literature, the *riḥlah*, the most famous of which were those of Ibn Jubayr (d. 1217 C.E.) and Ibn Bāṭṭūṭah (d. 1368–1369 or 1377 C.E.). The religious symbolism of participation in the annual pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) in Mecca is often a central element of this literature, and the *ḥajj* was the route of significant numbers of immigrants to Mecca and the Hejaz region over the centuries. Two social groups that were major participants in migration were traders and scholars, *ʿulamāʾ*, often carrying with them the piety and organization of the Ṣūfī traditions. Traders and Ṣūfīs were the main route through which Islam spread into the Malay peninsula and the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagoes, during the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Scholarship was also an important route for social and geographical mobility. Renowned *ʿulamāʾ* attracted students from all over the Muslim world, and the graduates of the great centers of learning could find work everywhere—this was how a traveler like Ibn Bāṭṭūṭah worked his way from Spain to the east and back. It has thus been shown that in the thirteenth century only about one-third of the *ʿulamāʾ* of Damascus were natives of the city, and in the fifteenth century Aleppo was one of the important sources of recruitment for the *ʿulamāʾ* class of Cairo. More difficult to document directly is the migration of craftsmen seeking work, a movement that was marked at times when rulers instigated major prestigious building projects. But such movement can be traced indirectly in the geographical transfer of design and technology and in the traces of family names in later periods.

The expansion of European colonial powers from the sixteenth century established new routes for Muslim migration, both within the traditional Muslim territories but also, more significantly, from them into non-Muslim lands. Traders and social elites started visiting the imperial centers at an early stage, but large scale migration only commenced toward the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in France (from Algeria), Britain (from Yemen and Somalia via Aden), and the United States and parts of South America (from the east Mediterranean). Economic migration took off after 1945, involving Arabs from North Africa to France and neighboring countries and South Asians to Britain. Through a series of formal labor treaties, Turkish migration to Germany as well as other countries was established during the 1960s. The majority of these immigrants had their origins in the countryside and provincial towns. They were, in fact, a small dimension of the much larger domestic migration from the countryside to major cities throughout this period. In 1962 Britain introduced strict immigration controls, as did the rest of western Europe in 1973–1974, a result of which was a new process of family reunion by which Muslim communities with their various cultural and religious institutions were established. Subsequently the main source of Muslim immigration to Europe has been refugees from all the major trouble spots in the Muslim world. A similar migration process has taken place to Australia after that country's "whites-only" policy was abandoned in the early 1970s. Muslim migration to the United States since 1945 has been distinguished by the high proportion of professionals with high levels of education, compared to the mainly rural and low-educated immigrants into Europe.

The presence of major permanently settled Muslim communities as minorities outside the Muslim majority regions is driving a range of significant Muslim debates at the center of which are, in essence, disagreements over whether they should consider themselves temporary exiles, diasporic or native. Since most of the migration has been voluntary in search of improved living conditions, the traditional distinction of *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* has become awkward, as theoretically it would require Muslims' stay to be only temporary and as soon as possible end with a return to Muslim territory. Building on traditional thinking, the category of *dār al-ṣulḥ, dār al-amān*, or *dār al-ʿahd* (territory of treaty or safe conduct), often attributed to al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820 C.E.), has been revived in some quarters to cover the new situation. Others have suggested a new category of *dār al-daʿwah* or *dār al-shahādah* (territory of witness). From such backgrounds come also initiatives to develop a new trend in *fiqh*—some call it a new *madhhab*—namely *fiqh al-aqallīyāt*, a *fiqh* for minorities. On the other hand, smaller marginal groups adhere to a view that their land of settlement is *dār al-ḥarb* and that the correct Islamic response, if emigration is not realistic, should be to campaign for the Islamization of the majority and its political and social structures, as is the

view of Hizb ut-Tahrir, or to seek as complete as possible an isolation from the surrounding society and internal autonomy, as is the practice of many Salafī groups. Many Muslim thinkers, however, have suggested that working in such categories is no longer relevant; they prefer a focus on concepts of citizenship (*muwāṭin*) to be applicable throughout the world.

[*See also* Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; Diaspora and Exile; Hijrah; Law, *subentry on* Minority Jurisprudence; Minorities, *subentry on* Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Societies; *and* Muhajirun.]

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MILLET. This term is most commonly used in Islamic history to mean "religious community." It is derived from the Arabic word *millah*, which was employed in the Qur'ān to mean "religion." Later, the Qur'ānic usage was extended to include religious community and especially the community of Islam. By the time of the Ottoman Empire (1300–1918), its sense had expanded widely to include non-Muslim religious communities and, in the period of Ottoman decline, foreign merchants who entered the empire under special treaties called capitulations. During the nineteenth century a fundamental change in its usage occurred when the concept of nationalism entered the empire and Ottomans used the word to mean both "religious community" and "nation." With the collapse of the empire in 1918 and the division of its territories into nation-states, *millet* acquired its modern Turkish meaning of "nation," with only a vestige of the old religious sense.

The system of *millet*s was the institutional means by which the agriculturally-based empires of Islam accommodated religious diversity. Its religious foundation rested on the concept of Islam as the culmination of a prophetic tradition emanating from Judaism and Christianity. Because Jews and Christians would eventually see the truth of Islam, their place in an Islamic society became one of subordinate and protected religious communities. Over centuries of expansion into non-Muslim lands the application of this institution created an elaborate structure of fairly autonomous communities whose religious leaders developed formal relations with the rulers of Muslim empires in a manner that guaranteed imperial peace at the price of religious and social fragmentation.

What completely transformed the Islamic system of handling religious diversity was the importation into the Muslim world of nationalism. This political ideology was brought into the Ottoman Empire and other Muslim areas from Europe in the nineteenth century, largely by non-Muslims, and was introduced to populations that had no previous experience with the separation of politics from religion or with the secular ideas associated with the European Enlightenment. It therefore followed that national movements, if they were to have any social basis at all, quickly became embedded in the *millet* system; and where Europeans did not establish a colonial regime, they had the opportunity to split up Islamic states along religious lines.

By the turn of the twentieth century the successes—and even the failures—of national movements within the Ottoman Empire had all but destroyed the idea of religious coexistence. Meanwhile, the political supremacy available to a centralizing, industrial European nation-state capable of mobilizing its culturally homogeneous populations encouraged national ideas to spread among the Ottoman elite. In this same period, Ottoman intellectuals became aware of the pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Alienated from an ineffectual government and armed with the image of a glorious national past, young army officers developed the foundation for Turkish nationalism during the last hours of the empire. When World War I resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1918) and the rise of a Turkish opposition under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the dismemberment of the

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core, Turkish-speaking regions of the empire, a Turkish elite appeared with a new politics and a new social framework for which the language was national rather than religious. Under these conditions the word *millet* came, after 1923, to mean "nation" in modern Turkish.

[*See also* Capitulations; Dhimmī; Nation; Ottoman Empire; *and* Pan-Turanism.]

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ANDREW C. HESS

MILLÎ NIZAM PARTISI. *See* Refâth Partisi.

MILLÎ SELAMET PARTISI. *See* Refâh Partisi.

MINA. *See* Ḥajj.

MINARET. A minaret is a tower attached to a mosque, from which the muezzin (*mu'adhdhin*), today commonly supplanted by a loudspeaker, gives the call to worship (*adhān*) before the five daily prayers. Along with the dome, the slender tower of the minaret is the most conspicuous sign of the presence of Islam in a community, giving a typically "Islamic" character to such cities as Istanbul and Cairo. Traditionally, minarets can be of virtually any height and shape, ranging from the relatively squat square towers of West Africa and the tall square shafts of North Africa, through the tall cylindrical shafts found in Turkey and Iran, to the tapering cylindrical shafts of Central Asia and the multistoried pagoda-like structures of China. In Egypt, minarets often had three superposed stories successively square, circular, and polygonal in plan, whereas in other parts of the Muslim world, such as East Africa, Kashmir, and southeast Asia, the minaret was conspicuous by its absence. In the twenty-first century, however, the growth of communication, whether photographs or easier travel, has homogenized regional architectural styles into an international "Islamic" norm of domes paired with soaring slender towers.

Although the mosque tower is properly called a *mi'dhanah* (place for the call to prayer), in many parts of the Muslim world it is commonly known as a *manārah* (Pers. *manār*; Turk. *minare*). The latter term referred originally to a "place or thing that gives light" (and is a cognate of the Hebrew *menorah*) and is the source of the European term "minaret." In parts of North Africa the tower was known as a *ṣawma'ah*. (Old Spanish *zoma*), a term referring originally to the cell of a Christian monk.

These variant names have given rise to many theories about the origins of the minaret and the reasons for its variant shapes. It has long been recognized that the first mosques did not have towers, although they may have had small shelters on their roofs to protect muezzins from the sun or rain. It is unclear exactly when the first mosque towers were built, but from the ninth century mosques were normally built with a single massive tower opposite the *qiblah*, or direction of prayer, as at the mosque founded in the mid-ninth century by the 'Abbāsid caliph al-Mutawakkil. The tower, built at Samarra, Iraq, has a 164-foot (50-meter) spiral tower built of brick. While many scholars have sought the origin of the minaret in earlier architectural traditions, ranging from the victory columns of the Romans to the commemorative pillars of India, Bloom (1989) suggested that the single tower was introduced in the 'Abbāsid period to signal the growing importance of the congregational mosque as a religious institution and center for the *'ulamā'*, the class of religious scholars that was crystallizing at this time. Although some Muslims, particularly the *Shī'ī*, maintained that the tower was an impious innovation, by the twelfth century it had become popular throughout the Islamic lands, although it was not always used for the call to worship. In Ṣafavid

Minaret of Jam. Twelfth century, Afghanistan. David Thomas, MJAP 2005

Iran, for example, mosques were often graced with slender towers, but the call to worship was normally given from an open pavilion on the roof known as a *gul-dastah* (bouquet).

Everywhere builders experimented with the tower's form, building them higher, more slender, and more decorated than before. Perhaps the most notable example of this trend in the medieval period is the 213-foot (65-meter)

minaret at the remote site of Jam in Afghanistan, an extraordinary brick tower dating from the twelfth century that is decorated with the entire *Sūrat Maryam* from the *Qur'ān* worked in cut brick. Builders also experimented with multiple minarets, with groups of two, four, six and even eight framing portals, buildings, courtyards, and domes. In the Ottoman empire, multiple minarets on a mosque were a clear sign of royal patronage, with four minarets on the mosque of the sultan Süleyman (1566) and six on the "Blue Mosque" of Ahmed I (1617), both in Istanbul. As the Masjid al-Ḥarām, the mosque surrounding the *Ka'bah* in Mecca, had only seven minarets, patrons were usually reluctant to equal or surpass that number, although the dome on the early fourteenth-century mausoleum of the Ilkhanid ruler Uljaytu at Sulṭānīyah, Iran, was surrounded by eight slender cylindrical towers.

Minarets are often placed for maximum visibility. In crowded Cairo, for example, Mamlūk builders placed minarets where they could best be seen from the bustling street. In Casablanca, Morocco, the minaret of the new Ḥasan II mosque stands on a promontory overlooking the Atlantic. At 689 feet (210 meters), its decorated square shaft is the tallest structure in Africa; at night a laser beam indicates the direction of Mecca. And in 2007, two 755-foot (230-meter) minarets were under construction in Tehran, Iran.

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JONATHAN M. BLOOM

MINORITIES. [*This entry contains two subentries:*

Minorities in Muslim Societies
Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Societies]

MINORITIES IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES

The status and treatment of minorities in Muslim societies (or, more generally, under Islamic law) has always been of special concern to outside powers seeking to establish themselves as their protectors. It has also been a favorite subject of Western Orientalists who perceived it as a major source of internal schism. Non-Muslim neighbors and observers in the modern age no longer content themselves with traditional notions of tolerance and the absence of persecution, but expect full social, political, and legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. Their critical regard has called forth strong reactions from many Muslims who try to show that Islam has in fact a much better record of protecting minority rights than have other civilizations, particularly the West. The subject therefore continues to be sensitive, raising considerable controversy.

Classical Legal Doctrines. The status and treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim societies (*dār al-islām*) have varied greatly over time and space. Legal theory has never been uniform throughout the Muslim world and has often been far removed from practice. Traditional rules and regulations clearly show the impact of history, particularly the experience of Prophet Muḥammad and the conditions of Muslim conquest. Whereas relations between Muḥammad and his followers and their polytheist neighbors had almost from the outset been tense, if not openly hostile, relations with the Jews and Christians of the Arabian Peninsula passed through phases of understanding and cooperation to growing distrust, animosity, and in some cases confrontation.

Muḥammad had originally hoped to be acknowledged as Prophet by the guardians of all the monotheist traditions. After his move (the Hijrah) to Medina in 622, Muslims entered into a formal alliance with the local Jewish and polytheist tribes, which was documented in the so-called Constitution (*ṣaḥīfah*) of Medina, granting all allies internal autonomy with Muḥammad acting as supreme head and arbiter of the newly established community. When recognition of his prophethood was denied and when the political loyalty of some Jewish tribes appeared to be in doubt, Muḥammad turned against them until they had been expelled or killed. The Constitution of Medina has come to be widely regarded by contemporary Muslims as the blueprint for a political community (*ummah*) that is based on the Qur'an and includes as its citizens both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Mirroring the concerns of the young and vulnerable community, the Qur'an touches repeatedly on the

question of whether it is lawful for Muslims to entertain friendly relations (*muwālāh*) with unbelievers. The guiding principle (see *sūrah*s 3:28, 5:51, 29:46 and 60:8–9) is that the believers should treat the unbelievers decently and equitably as long as the latter do not act aggressively toward them. A reactive principle linking the treatment of non-Muslims to their behavior toward the Muslims, this clearly reflects the conditions of the early period, when Muslims were still a small minority facing large and partly hostile non-Muslim majorities.

The reactive principle appears less prominently in the provisions of Islamic law (*fiqh*). Beneath the apparently rigid division between *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* (non-Muslim lands) concerning territory, and between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning people, one finds the fine distinctions characteristic of Islamic legal reasoning. The basic distinction was between polytheists or nonbelievers on the one hand—with whom there was to be no social interaction (e.g., shared food, intermarriage) and who were to be fought until they either converted, entered into a treaty agreeing to protect the rights of Muslims and their clients within their realms, or were killed or enslaved—and the "People of the Book" (*ahl al-kitāb*) on the other, whose faith was founded on revelation, who were to be granted protection, and with whom social intercourse was allowed. In the course of Muslim conquest and expansion, the people counted as "People of the Book" increased beyond the Jews, Sabaeans, and Christians mentioned in the Qur'an to include Zoroastrians (Majus) and eventually Buddhists and others.

The Ḥanafī law school extended protection to non-Arab pagans, and Mālik ibn Anas (d. 796), founder of the Mālikī school, even included Arab polytheists provided that they did not belong to the clan of the Prophet, the Quraysh. As a result, the category of polytheists was steadily reduced until, in the modern era, it had lost all practical relevance. At the same time, the state of those monotheist groups (e.g., the Bahā'īs in Iran or the Aḥmadīyah-Qādiānīs in India and Pakistan) that developed after Islam and were regarded by the respective Muslim majorities as renegades or apostates remained precarious. In legal theory, they had to be fought until they repented and (re-)converted or were killed.

The status of the "People of the Book" was secured by a contract of protection (*dhimmah*), which in principle was unlimited and which, in accordance with the Qur'anic injunction (*sūrah* 2:256), "No compulsion in religion," guaranteed their life, body, property, freedom of movement, and religious practice (if carried on discreetly). Protection was granted against the exaction of tribute, dues, and taxes of various kinds. Out of these dues and taxes two main inconsistently defined categories evolved: a land tax (*kharāj*) often to be paid in kind, which soon came to be imposed on all owners of land thus categorized irrespective of their religious affiliation; and a poll tax (*jizyah*) levied on all able-bodied free adult *dhimmī* males of sufficient means. The various law schools varied considerably as to the definition of the legal rights and obligations of the protected people (*dhimmī*s). The most liberal among the Sunnī schools was the Ḥanafī (dominant in the Ottoman Empire among other places), which granted *dhimmī*s equal rights with regard to property and parts of criminal law (notably *diyah*, or blood money), but not in the domains of family law, inheritance, or testimony.

The primary purpose of all practical measures and legal provisions seems originally to have been to mark unmistakably the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. Basing themselves on the notoriously unclear text of *sūrah* 9:29 ("fight the infidels until they pay the *jizyah* out of their hands while they are small/humble"), Muslim jurists tended to translate the submission of non-Muslims to Muslim rule into the requirement of humility and humiliation. Prevailing norms and expectations were mirrored in the so-called Pact of ʿUmar (*al-shurūṭ al-ʿUmarīyah*), attributed to the second caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 634–644), but probably not formulated before the eighth century. This laid down a number of restrictions regarding dress and hairstyle, worship, the construction and repairing of churches and synagogues, the height of houses, the use of animals, and so forth, which served not only to identify the *dhimmī*s, but also to discriminate against them. Shīʿī thought and law went further in that it considered non-Muslims to be ritually impure (*najis*), thereby banning (at least theoretically) social interchange and intermarriage altogether.

Practice. Practice, however, frequently did not conform to the restrictive notions of the *ʿulamā'* (religious scholars). The actual situation of the *dhimmi*s was more closely conditioned by the economic and political

circumstances prevailing within various Islamic territories and by their relations with the major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation still largely valid in the modern age. Yet the legal norms retained their normative force well into the twentieth century, and if at any time the *dhimmi*s or individual members of their elites did in fact enjoy better conditions than those prescribed by the jurists, it was condemned as a deviation from the way things ought to be. Umayyad Spain and Fāṭimid Egypt are widely seen as the golden age of harmonious coexistence among Muslims, Christians, and Jews, whose cultures and heritage were mutually enriched. The putative deterioration of intercommunal relations beginning in the thirteenth century has been attributed to the impact of the Mongol invasion rather than the Christian crusades. By that time, the gradual spread of Islam had reduced the *dhimmī* populations of the Middle East from majorities to minorities. Still, community structures were left essentially intact.

In return for submission to Muslim rule, non-Muslims enjoyed considerable autonomy in personal-status law, worship, and education; they formed largely self-contained units with separate religious, legal, social, educational, and charitable institutions. Although there was in most areas no forced segregation in terms of residence or occupation (Morocco and Iran at certain periods excepted), there was often professional specialization, which has been characterized by modern scholars as "ethnoreligious division of labor." Non-Muslims fulfilled complementary economic roles and functions, some of which were regarded as undesirable, lowly, or unclean by Muslims. Most importantly, non-Muslims were incorporated into Muslim society not as individuals but as members of their religious communities. The principle found its clearest expression in the Ottoman *millet* system (derived from the Turkish term for an ethnoreligious group or community) as it had evolved by the nineteenth century. It exerted administrative control through a number of legally recognized religious communities—notably the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians as well as the Rabbanite Jews—headed by their clergy with autonomy compensating for the absence of equal status and the denial of political rights.

In the nineteenth century, European influence and expansion, internal migration, social differentiation, and cultural change began to affect the *dhimmī*s' legal status, communal organization, and place in society. The Ottoman reform edicts of the Tanzimat period (issued in 1839 and 1856) proclaimed the principle of legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and replaced the *jizyah* with general conscription or with the payment of an exemption tax (*bedel-e asker*). Religious personal-status law as a powerful marker of communal separateness, however, was retained. Within the Ottoman and Persian empires, European powers assumed the role of protector of specific religious communities. Individual Christians and Jews managed to benefit from increased educational and economic opportunities, gaining access to legal protection (foreign passports) and privilege (under the system of capitulations). Within the various communities, a rising commercial and professional middle class began to challenge the rule of the clergy and notables. The communities as a whole broke out of the place assigned to them under the old order, but sociocultural change and closer contact also resulted in growing friction and competition, occasionally exploding into intercommunal violence. Even among the cosmopolitan elites, the vertical element of religious and ethnic identification became increasingly superseded but never fully supplanted by the horizontal element of social class.

With the rise of European colonial activity in the Muslim world, the role of non-Muslims as intermediaries facilitated their economic advancement but also exposed them as dependents—now on the colonial system rather than on the Muslim ruler. The rise of nationalism and independence movements made the non-Muslims' position difficult, if not untenable. When religious and ethnic affiliation tended to merge, religious communities could be transformed into nations, and *millet*s turned into minorities. Although certain nationalist movements, such as the Wafd Party in Egypt or the Congress Party in India, attempted to overcome religious divisions and to unite Muslims, Christians, Jews, or Hindus under the banner of national unity, the tie between nationalism and religion was never entirely dissolved. It became more marked in the course of what has been widely termed the assertion, or surge, of political Islam that since the 1970s has made itself felt in the entire Muslim world.

Most written constitutions of Muslim states now confirm the principle of equality of all citizens irrespective

of religion, sex, and race. At the same time, however, they usually declare Islam to be the state religion and the *shariʿah* (the divine law) the principal (or even exclusive) source of legislation. The exception to this rule is Lebanon, where the constitution allocates the presidency to a Maronite Catholic, and after the 1989 Taʾif Accord, divides parliament into sixty-four Christian and sixty-four Muslim seats. In all other Arab and Muslim countries, the head of state must be a Muslim, although in Jordan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, non-Muslim and other minority groups are guaranteed a fixed share of seats in representative political bodies.

Contemporary Debates. Under the impact of political Islam, suspicion of non-Muslims has reemerged, although individual thinkers, groups, and activists have adopted widely divergent views. Certain militant Islamic groups, such as al-Jihād in Egypt, are hostile toward non-Muslims and advocate the reimposition of the *dhimmah* regulations. They refer themselves to the medieval scholar Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328), who conditioned the toleration of non-Muslims on their utility to the Muslim community, and to the Indo-Pakistani activist Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī (1903–1979) and the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966). Some also engage in physical violence aimed at the regimes in power as much as at the minorities attacked. During World War I, Christian minorities (Greek, Armenian, and Assyrian) were persecuted in some parts of the Ottoman Empire. An estimated 1.5 million Armenians were killed in a campaign which the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge as genocidal, and the Young Turk Government expelled most American Christian missionaries from the country. In Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq, Christian and Jewish minorities were often singled out for harsh treatment, many being forced to pay *jizyah*.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are Muslim intellectuals seeking ways to legitimize full legal and political equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic terms. They clearly perceive the need for radical *ijtihād* (individual inquiry into legal issues) that takes into account the spirit or *maqāṣid* (intentions) of *shariʿah* rather than the details of *fiqh*, looking at the public good (*al-maṣlaḥah al-ʿāmmah*) rather than the letter of the law. Their primary concern is to preserve the unity of the national or territorial community and to avoid *fitnah* (disorder) in its modern guise of sectarian violence. The dilemma rests in the fact that on this particular issue, *shariʿah* would, in order to allow for equality, have to be purged of the provisions of *fiqh*, whose primary function is to fix a boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims and to ensure the superiority of the former.

Between the two extremes there is what might be called a mainstream position that proclaims the principle of "same rights, same duties" (lahum mā lanā wa ʿalayhim mā ʿalaynā), but limits legal equality to the "non-religious domain." The decisive questions are how the religious sphere is defined and whether non-Muslims can hold public office in an Islamic state which has as its primary raison d'être the realization of the rule of Islam. Faced with the double challenge of traditional restrictive norms and modern egalitarian demands, some Muslim reformists resort to a historical-functional approach: the *jizyah* is interpreted as the functional equivalent of a military tax—here they have historical evidence on their side—and national liberation as the modern equivalent of *jihād* (war against nonbelievers). If and when non-Muslims participate in national defense or liberation, the *jizyah* is no longer incumbent on them, nor do they require any specific kind of protection. They can therefore be granted citizenship in the Islamic state, including the right to vote and to participate in political decision-making, but they continue to be debarred from the highest political, military, and judicial functions.

The commonly used term *muwāṭin*, therefore, is understood in its literal sense of non-Muslims as compatriots sharing the same *waṭan* (homeland) as Muslims, not as citizens sharing the same legal and political status. The emphasis is on justice that gives to everyone his or her due, rather than on equality which, so it is argued, attempts to make equal what should be kept apart.

[*See also* Christianity and Islam; Conversion; Dhimmī; Jizyah; Judaism and Islam; Millet; *and* People of the Book.]

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