


Bailey Stone

The Anatomy of Revolution Revisited

A Comparative Analysis
of England, France,
and Russia



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*A Comparative Analysis of England,
France, and Russia*

BAILEY STONE

University of Houston



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The Anatomy of Revolution Revisited

A Comparative Analysis of England, France, and Russia

This study aims to update a classic of comparative revolutionary analysis, Crane Brinton's 1938 study *The Anatomy of Revolution*. It invokes the latest research and theoretical writing in history, political science, and political sociology to compare and contrast, in their successive phases, the English Revolution of 1640–60, the French Revolution of 1789–99, and the Russian Revolution of 1917–29. This book intends to do what no other comparative analysis of revolutionary change has yet adequately done. It not only progresses beyond Marxian socioeconomic "class" analysis and early "revisionist" stresses on short-term, accidental factors involved in revolutionary causation and process; it also finds ways to reconcile "state-centered" structuralist accounts of the three major European revolutions with postmodernist explanations of those upheavals that play up the centrality of human agency, revolutionary discourse, mentalities, ideology, and political culture.

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This volume is affectionately dedicated to all scholars, teachers, and students in the field of European revolutionary change

Preface

“Comparative historical analysis works best,” Theda Skocpol asserted in 1979 in the Introduction to her landmark study *States and Social Revolutions*, “when applied to a set of a few cases that share certain basic features. Cases need to be carefully selected and the criteria for grouping them together made explicit.”¹ This is excellent advice for any comparativist, especially if he or she is undertaking, as Skocpol did, an analysis of several major sociopolitical revolutions. In *my* particular case, the reader might well ask, why should I devote so much time to reappraising the causation, trajectories, and implications of (specifically) the mid-seventeenth-century English Revolution, the French Revolution of 1789–99, and the Russian Revolution of 1917–29? That these upheavals had previously attracted the attention of an eminent American historian, Crane Brinton, in his pioneering and elegantly written classic *The Anatomy of Revolution*, is all very well and good, and might be seen as providing in itself a rationale for revisiting the subject – if only to produce a badly needed “update” to Brinton’s analysis.² Yet are there *additional* reasons why I, too, should be *that* concerned to draw comparisons and contrasts between these three particular revolutions – as opposed to any others? In this brief Preface to what will be a fairly long work, I would suggest that there are, in fact, several compelling reasons for my doing so.

I could, of course, start off here by noting that I am and have always been a Europeanist – and, at that, a Europeanist with a pronounced weakness for eighteenth-century and revolutionary French history – and that I consequently lack the kind of research competence in (or at least general familiarity with)

¹ Cited from Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 40.

² Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938). Brinton brought out “revised” and “expanded” versions of this book in 1952 and 1965.

areas outside of Europe that many regional specialists, political scientists, and comparative sociologists could legitimately claim. Consequently, because dramatic and violent transformations of states and societies *within* “Europe” lie somewhat more securely within my scholarly ken than do transformative cataclysms in, say, Eastern or South Asia, Africa, or the Americas, they are that much likelier to elicit from me an analytical commentary that (I can only hope) fair-minded readers will be able to find informed and worth pursuing.

Yet other, more substantive considerations have also motivated me in my choice of revolutions to analyze, compare, and contrast. For one thing, as the entire book to come should demonstrate, historians who, like Crane Brinton, have devoted themselves primarily to *European* revolutionary change have quite rightly developed “stage” or “natural life-cycle” interpretations of what, precisely, transpired in England from 1640 to 1660, in France from 1789 to 1799, and in Russia from 1917 to the late 1920s. They have, that is to say, plotted out a general progression in all three cases from violent overthrows of inefficient, antiquated, and noncompetitive “old regimes” to early, hopeful “honeymoon” seasons of reform in state and society to increasingly radicalized, even “terroristic” systems to convalescent “new regimes” in which public policies seem – more or less – to “work better” than in the past. This is to say that, by concentrating on the *process of change* as such, Brinton and like-minded analysts have isolated three periods in European history that are not only amenable to comparative analysis but also are strikingly different from everything before or since, at least in English, French, and Russian history. This in turn means that to analyze these three revolutions in such *processual* terms can allow today’s specialist to distinguish between “revolution” as experienced at length in England during 1640–60 and the much more condensed “Glorious Revolution” of 1688–89; between “revolution” as it unfolded in France during the 1790s and “revolution” as it briefly flared up in 1830, 1848, and 1871; and between “revolution” as it developed in Russia from 1917 to 1929 and the cataclysmic but less “processual” statist developments ensuing under Stalin in the 1930s.³ Again, to hone in on the *process* of revolution during the years 1640–60, 1789–99, and 1917–29 in England, France, and Russia, respectively, can afford the scholar something of a counterweight to analysis of revolutionary *causation* and *consequences*, thereby requiring that he or she confront the actual, flesh-and-blood protagonists in the three revolutions and grapple with issues of personal agency and contingency that are all too easily deemphasized or overlooked altogether in exclusively “structuralist” accounts of these events.

³ This is one reason why I tend – and I explain this in detail in the Introduction and Conclusion – to reject the arguments of Steve Pincus and others minimizing the “revolutionary stature” of the events in England during 1640–60 as compared to those of the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. But for an appetizer, see Steven C. A. Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), esp. the extended historiographical discussion on revolutions in Chapter 2.

Then, again, there is the question of the unique *international context* of these three revolutions. As readers will come to see in Chapter 1, all three of our upheavals, as defined in the preceding paragraphs, occurred within a fiercely competitive “system” of European (or, in Russia’s case, at least European-oriented) states contending for security, survival, and (at times) hegemony – a dynamic, cutthroat system rooted originally in the localized diplomacy of fifteenth-century Italy, but then spilling out into the rest of western and central Europe and, eventually, catching up in its toils all of Eurasia and (by the twentieth century) the entire globe. What this meant most fundamentally was that, in our three successive revolutions, the origins, process, and results of transformative change in both government and society reflected at all times a dialectical relationship between *increasingly severe* external and internal pressures on governance. In other words, as readers move in our analysis from England to France to Russia, they will find diplomats, administrators, politicians, polemicists, and just “ordinary” people entrapped in ever more sharply defined conflicts between statist objectives and concerns, on the one hand, and humdrum domestic concerns of a social, cultural, and economic nature, on the other. Just as all three of our revolutions reveal in the way they unfolded *internally* a roughly similar sequence of events, so they all – and *they alone* – inhabited a world of geopolitics whose “system” of alliances and counter-alliances and imperatives of prestige, security, and hegemonic drives, developing by fits and starts over a span of 450 years or so, and radiating outward from its European epicenter, stamps it as unique in history.

Finally, what helps to distinguish the English, French, and Russian Revolutions, as defined previously, from both earlier upheavals of a less politically and socially *concentrated* nature and later sociopolitical maelstroms in the “extra-European” world is the fact – obvious, perhaps, but significant nonetheless – that they broke out in and (to varying extents) *further modernized* Great Powers that had been recognized for centuries as sovereign states untrammelled by any kind of “colonialist” dependency on other Powers. They stood, in a sense, halfway between the ever-imperiled, semi-dependent city-states and ducal territories of a not-too-distant, medieval European past and the ancient civilizations in Asia, Africa, and the Americas whose territorial integrity, cultural identity and dignity, and very existence were to be so brutally threatened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the seemingly irresistible forces unleashed across continents and seas by what we retrospectively term the “New Imperialism.” In this sense, too, we appear to have a “family” of revolutions distinct both from what had come before in the way of societal change and from what was destined to come in the future.

Of course, writing this Preface is especially pleasurable in that it furnishes me the opportunity to acknowledge some of those individuals without whose personal support, professional counsel, and contributions to the field of

revolutionary studies I could not have possibly written this extended essay of synthesis.

My thanks go first of all to two of my long-standing friends and colleagues, Jack Goldstone and Tom Kaiser. At various critical points over the past ten years, they have encouraged me in my labors on this ambitious project; since early in 2011 they have played an especially indispensable role as careful and judiciously critical readers of my manuscript in its initially completed form. I thank them wholeheartedly for the time they took out of their own busy schedules to assist me in this respect, and can only hope that the arguments I put forth in these pages will in no way cause them to regret the long hours so spent on my behalf!

I have also profited from the advice and ideas of a number of other friends/scholars. Several of my current or past confrères here at the University of Houston have (I trust) enabled me to avoid some misstatements concerning issues of revolutionary causation, process, and consequences in the cases of seventeenth-century England and early twentieth-century Russia, and enriched my knowledge of these two countries: I refer, specifically, to Cathy Patterson, our Tudor-Stuart specialist, and Rick Thorpe, an expert in the performing arts and culture of late Imperial and early revolutionary Russia. I should also acknowledge at this point two University of Houston Faculty Development Leaves: the first one, awarded for the 2002–03 academic year, gave me the time I needed free of the usual teaching and administrative responsibilities to begin seriously to conceive this study, and the second, awarded for 2009–10, made it possible for me actually to undertake (and largely complete) the writing of what has become my longest manuscript to date.

I have also benefited in the usual ways from scholarly exchanges at major conferences I have attended in recent years. In this connection, I would single out for special mention two noteworthy symposia: *Into Print: European Cultures of Enlightenment*, a meeting held at Princeton University in April 2006 to celebrate the accomplishments of my erstwhile mentor Robert Darn-ton; and *Liberty, Monarchy, and Regicide: The Trial and Execution of Charles I*, a symposium sponsored by the Liberty Fund in Cleveland, Ohio, in October 2007. (In the latter connection, I should register special thanks to David Carrithers of the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, who apparently honored me with the assumption that I had something meaningful to say about the English Revolution and the dramatic run-up to the execution of Charles II!) As many of my readers will happily attest, such exchanges can play a crucial role in stimulating scholars to rethink old issues and thus be in a position to frame conventional questions in novel and ultimately revelatory ways.

I am grateful as well to Lewis Bateman, currently Senior Editor of Political Science and History at Cambridge University Press in New York City, and to his editorial associates, for helping me to prepare my manuscript for publication. This will be the third time I have had a book come out with Cambridge; the

relationship has been a fruitful one, and I can only hope that it will continue in the future.

Finally – in connection with this project as with all my earlier works – I owe much to some very special people in the private corridors of my life. As is invariably the case, they know who they are.

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Introduction

From Revolutionary Theory to Revolutionary Historiography: England, France, and Russia

In the ivied towers of history, political science, and sociology, recent decades have witnessed an explosion of literature on the comparative analysis of sociopolitical revolutions. There can be no doubt that, however broadly or narrowly the term "revolution" be construed, theorists in the field will always acknowledge a lasting debt to Crane Brinton. In 1938, this distinguished student of French history first published *The Anatomy of Revolution*.¹ This path-blazing comparison of the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions has long served (in this and subsequent editions) as a standard reference work on the subject of revolutionary change, even as historians, political scientists, and political sociologists have inevitably offered new typologies of and explanations for major upheavals in politics and society.² In light of subsequent scholarship, however, and particularly in the wake of recent earthshaking events in the erstwhile Soviet Union, a follow-up to Brinton's pioneering analysis would seem to be indicated. Such a study, unlike *The Anatomy of Revolution*, could focus exclusively on European revolutions as such, thereby leaving developments in eighteenth-century "British" America to authorities in that field. Before speculating on the organization and interpretative thrust of such a study, however, we should first recapitulate what Brinton actually had to say, and then discuss the extensive theoretical literature on the Brintonian schema and on some of the questions it inescapably raises. After doing so, and after summarily relating the successive schools of thought on the English, French,

¹ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938). Brinton brought out "revised" and "expanded" editions of this work in 1952 and 1965. He died in 1968.

² For a discussion of the scholarship in the field, at least up to the 1990s, refer to Michael S. Kimmel, *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

and Russian Revolutions to evolving revolutionary theory, we can then introduce our own (updated) comparative explanation of the causes, process, and results of Brinton's three classic European upheavals.

Crane Brinton, it is true, was only the most celebrated of those numerous scholars who over the years have sought through the use of metaphors or conceptual schemes appropriated from the natural sciences to illuminate the "life cycles" or "natural" sequences of stages of carefully defined subgroups of sociopolitical revolutions.³ Yet, given the unique resonance of his work in the field, it seems proper at this point to concentrate in particular on the Brintonian construct. Borrowing from the imagery and vocabulary of medical pathology, Brinton likened each of the three European revolutions to "a kind of fever" invading and sorely testing a host (political) organism. First, Brinton presented the "causes" of revolution as a cluster of mutually dependent variables (the so-called "prodromal symptoms" of the impending disease). Then, there followed the successive stages of the "disease" or revolution: that is, the onset of the upheaval, which in its earliest phase briefly featured new forces coalescing against the antediluvian and discredited *ancien régime*; a subsequent headlong plunge into deeper "delirium," with "moderates" being out-manuevered by "extremists;" a veritable crisis or "reign of Terror and Virtue;" and, finally, a restoration of relative stability ("Thermidor" and beyond) revealing a patient – or, in this case, a postrevolutionary society – in convalescence, sadder, perhaps, but wiser. Much as an individual who is able to survive a pathogenic assault emerges from the trauma temporarily weakened yet in a fundamental sense strengthened, so (affirmed Brinton) the government-and-society undergoing the disruptive experience of revolution emerges from it more "functional," more of a going concern, than it was previously. This is true despite the postrevolutionary regime's prolonged susceptibility to "pathological" sequelae, that is, to "a series of lesser revolutions in which the forces present in the initial one are worked out."⁴

Such, in brief, is the schema developed by Crane Brinton to anatomize the "natural" life-cycle of revolution as it ran its course in the countries under consideration. It is a way of conceptualizing revolutionary change that has provided stimulating fare for social scientists in the field whether they have confined themselves to examining meticulously defined subgroups of revolutions or aspired to characterize and account for revolutions of all types in all possible temporal and spatial settings. At the same time, however, such theorists, even if intrigued by Brinton's ideas on the subject, have naturally enough hastened to criticize what they have seen as their problematic aspects.

³ Among other works in the genre are Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938); Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," *Social Forces* 28 (1950): 270–79; and Jaroslav Krejci, *Great Revolutions Compared: The Search for a Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

⁴ See Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, esp. pp. 13–20 and 227–28.

Most of them have granted a qualified pass to Brinton's overall schema, at least where England, France, and Russia are concerned. Chalmers Johnson, for instance, long associated with what some call "systems/value consensus" sociology, once said that while there might be "room to argue over Brinton's descriptions of particular stages and over whether these actually occurred in all . . . of the revolutions he compares," his formulation in general "remains our richest and most elegantly written elaboration of stage theory." For Johnson, the chief problem with Brinton was not so much his choice of conceptual metaphor or his postulating of specific, sequential phases of revolution as it was his failure to account convincingly "for the movement from one phase of revolution to another" – in other words, to furnish for the reader "a model of the revolutionary process that encompasses all the aspects of revolution, incorporates both actor-oriented and structural variables, and is sensitive to the contingencies that may arise when all the different variables are combined." Still, however much Johnson accentuated the need for "a theory . . . that can account for all the major contingencies that arise *during* an actual revolutionary situation," he remained persuaded that "the most famous and still the most powerful stage or life-cycle theory is Crane Brinton's."⁵

Brinton's application of "stage" or "life-cycle" theory to what Johnson in the 1960s had termed the classic "Jacobin" revolutions in Europe has still found some specialist favor in these early years of the twenty-first century. The recently deceased Martin Malia, for example, although complaining at one point that Brinton's conceptual schema lacked substantive "ideological" content and was extended too easily from France to England and Russia, nonetheless admitted at another point that *The Anatomy of Revolution* remained "the work closest to being a classic" and allowed that its organizational scenario "is indeed a commonsense description of what goes on during a major European upheaval." Some of the specific parallels unearthed among these revolutions by Brinton were, said Malia grudgingly, "genuinely illuminating."⁶ Even more recently, sociologist Jack Goldstone has averred that "the best-developed theory of revolutionary processes remains the classic 'natural history' approach;" Brinton, he concedes, "laid out a process of revolution that has become the standard view of revolutionary sequences." True, *The Anatomy of Revolution* provides no explanatory key to the Chinese and other "Third World" revolutions of the twentieth century, and does not, for that matter, even account satisfactorily for all of the complexities encountered in the European revolutions themselves. Nevertheless, Goldstone finds Brinton's analysis to be "fairly accurate in describing the course of those revolutions;" as such, it still merits the attention of those engaged in this field of studies.⁷

⁵ Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 182–84, 187.

⁶ Martin Malia, *History's Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World*, ed. Terence Emmons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006).

⁷ Jack A. Goldstone, "Rethinking Revolutions: Integrating Origins, Processes, and Outcomes," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29 (2009), pp. 18–32. I thank

However reassuring the generally positive tenor of such learned commentary over the years, it offers a cautionary note for any historian wishing to follow in Brinton's footsteps. He or she may hesitate before venturing (in sociologist Michael Kimmel's words) "to overemphasize the French case as the template for all revolutionary events."⁸ Even if the stages sequence theory laid out in *The Anatomy of Revolution* be retained in one form or another, the historian must not allow revolutionary experiences in seventeenth-century England, eighteenth-century France, and twentieth-century Russia to be subordinated too tightly to the temporal requirements of such a theory. Sociologist Kimmel reminds us in this connection that Lyford P. Edwards, a full-fledged member of the "natural history school of revolution" even before Brinton joined the club, warned early on that "it is the easiest thing imaginable to draw up an arbitrary series of stages and then twist and torture the data to fit this Procrustean bed."⁹

It is well to sound Edwards' cautionary note, and indeed the comparative analysis to follow will do so repeatedly. Yet, it is also only fair to note that Brinton, himself, was at all times sensitive to this issue, and was quick to acknowledge the limits as well as the descriptive and explanatory power of the "uniformities" he traced through the English, French, and Russian Revolutions. To argue (as this study will) that in each of these upheavals there was something of a progression from an early "honeymoon" phase of change to a period of radicalization to a "high" season of "virtue and terror" to a "Thermidorian Reaction" of sorts is not by any means to sacrifice a critical perception of *differences among* as well as similarities between these tumultuous sequences of events.

Yet if something of a consensus has emerged and (however tenuously) held among specialists in revolutionary studies regarding Brintonian "life-cycle" theory as applied to the *process* or *course* of revolution in these European settings, there is general scholarly discord when it comes to issues of *causation* and *consequences* of revolution. This is especially the case in connection with the former issue. Indeed, as far back as the 1960s, historian Lawrence Stone, expatiating on and essentially agreeing with the strictures of political scientist Harry Eckstein on this subject, was unsparingly critical of Brinton (and assorted others) who had plunged into the perilous explanatory waters of revolutionary causation. Such authors, Stone complained, had produced conflicting laundry lists of hypothetical intellectual, economic, social, and political "causes" of revolutions. "None of these explanations," he conceded, "are invalid in themselves, but they are often difficult or impossible to reconcile one with another, and are so diverse in their range and variety as to be virtually impossible to fit

Professor Goldstone for referring me to this article. See also Goldstone's earlier full-length comparative study, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

⁸ Kimmel, *Revolution*, p. 52.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

into an ordered, analytical frame-work.”¹⁰ Yet, however “cruelly” Eckstein, Stone and others have exposed the “subjectivity, ambiguity, and partial self-contradiction” of causal analyses adduced by Brinton and others,¹¹ they have at least underscored the importance of the issue of causation and encouraged other theorists to confront it in their work.

The aforementioned Chalmers Johnson, for example, even while eulogizing Brinton as “unique among modern theorists of revolution” for the attention he devoted to ruling classes and to potentially destabilizing divisions in old regime ruling circles, in the same breath found fault with Brinton for his less than “exhaustive” treatment of these and other “prodromal symptoms” of revolution in the cases of Stuart England, Bourbon France, and Romanov Russia. For Johnson, one of the most prominent and prolific “systems/value consensus” or “structural/functionalist” sociologists in the arena of theorized revolutionary change, a vexing question remained in the wake of Brintonian and all other “stages” or “life-cycle” analyses: “Why do some social systems with all these symptoms of dissynchronization still manage to avoid revolution, whereas others succumb?”¹²

Social scientists of one persuasion or another have repeatedly attempted to deal with this generally perceived shortcoming of Brintonian-style explications of revolutionary causation. Many of them have devised ambitious schemata purporting to apply to sociopolitical upheavals in all (or most) “early modern” and “modern” historical situations. Chalmers Johnson, for instance, argued that revolutions have occurred when what he termed “disequilibrated social systems,” weighed down by accumulating “multiple dysfunctions,” and weakened further by their intransigent and incompetent ruling élites, have been propelled toward fatal breakdowns by “accelerators” of various types – factors such as defeats in war, the appearance of truly revolutionary parties, the emergence of charismatic leaders, and so forth. Johnson proceeded on from this position to develop a typology of six forms of insurrection characterized by their targets to be overthrown, their social composition, their motivating ideology and objectives, and their levels of organization, and covering a vast range of societies in several continents over recent (and, in some cases, not-so-recent) centuries.¹³

Other theorists over the years have developed explanations of revolutionary causation focusing primarily on the theme of state modernization. Notable

¹⁰ Lawrence Stone, “Theories of Revolution,” *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (1966): 159–76. See also Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of Internal War,” *History and Theory* 4 (1965): 133–63. Refer also to Perez Zagorin, “Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography,” *Political Science Quarterly* 88, no. 1 (1973): 23–52.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹² Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, p. 184.

¹³ Refer in this connection to Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Studies, 1964), and to *Autopsy on People’s War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

among them have been S. N. Eisenstadt and Samuel Huntington. Eisenstadt's most significant work, entitled *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, maintained that revolutions stem from fateful conjunctures of "structural" features involving the inability of social systems, and especially their ruling classes, to accommodate and master the tensions induced by the onset of modernization. In such an explanatory model, the great European revolutions make up only one of many categories of possible sociopolitical cataclysms.¹⁴ In his somewhat earlier tome, Samuel Huntington had said very much the same thing, arguing that social and economic changes such as "urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion," and so on, undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional statist institutions and "enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness." As a result, "political instability and disorder" arise in such societies; truly revolutionary situations are potentially created as the process of modernization gives rise to a perilous gap between social mobilization and the capacity of traditional political institutions to absorb the increasingly insistent demands of those so mobilized. New expectations and demands are not met; potential challengers to the old regimes are not adequately accommodated; and so revolutions (in this generalized schema) are the result.¹⁵

Yet other specialists endeavoring to account for revolutionary change in inclusive theoretical terms have come up with so-called "aggregate social psychological models" that proceed from observations about the personal motivations of leaders and followers in revolutionary movements rather than from commentary on the processes of state modernization and their impact on selected groups in society. During the 1970s, for example, both James Davies and Ted Robert Gurr resorted to the kind of "relative deprivation theory," with its famous J-curve of frustrated "rising expectations," that obviously harkened back to Tocquevillian insights into the origins of the French Revolution. Davies applied such a theory to a dizzying variety of disparate historical cases ranging from the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century to the American Civil War in the mid-nineteenth century to the Nazi movement, the Egyptian Nasser "revolution," and the American civil rights struggle in the twentieth century.¹⁶ Ted R. Gurr, appropriating these notions for his own purposes, tried to develop "relative deprivation" (i.e., RD) theory into a model that could be used to predict more or less when, and under what kinds of historical circumstances, revolutionary states of mind could reasonably be expected to trigger outbursts of truly revolutionary behavior.¹⁷ At the very least, both scholars managed to

¹⁴ Refer to S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolutions and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978).

¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

¹⁶ See James C. Davies, *When Men Revolt and Why* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

¹⁷ Consult two works by Ted R. Gurr: *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); and *Rogues, Rebels and Reformers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE, 1976).