# Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

A Comparative Law Study


Allan R. Brewer-Carías

# CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS

# A Comparative Law Study

## Allan R. Brewer-Carías

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