

# Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators

## A Comparative Law Study

Allan R. Brewer-Carías

# CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS

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**CAMBRIDGE**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,  
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press  
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9781107011656](http://www.cambridge.org/9781107011656)

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First published 2011

Printed in the United States of America

*A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data*

Brewer Carias, Allan-Randolph.

Constitutional courts as positive legislators : a comparative law study / Allan Brewer-Carias.  
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-107-01165-6 (hardback)

1. Constitutional courts. 2. Legislative power. 3. Judicial review. 4. Comparative law.

I. Title.

K3370.B735 2011

347'.035-dc22 2011002968

ISBN 978-1-107-01165-6 Hardback

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