

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT FORTY

EDITED BY

PETER H. MERKL



THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT FORTY

**EDITED BY
PETER H. MERKL**



NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York and London

Copyright © 1989 by New York University
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Federal Republic of Germany at forty/edited by Peter H. Merkl.
P. cm.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-8147-5445-7 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-8147-5446-5

(pbk.: alk. paper)

1. Germany (West)—Politics and government. I. Merkl, Peter H.

DD258.75.F43 1989

943—dc20

New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper,
and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability.

Book design by Ken Venezia

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT FORTY

**Sponsored by the Conference Group on
German Politics**

CONTRIBUTORS

GERARD BRAUNTHAL teaches at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and is the author of articles and books on West German domestic politics, such as *Socialist Labor and Politics in Weimar Germany: The General Federation of German Trade Unions* (1978) and *West German Social Democrats, 1969–1982: Profile of a Party in Power* (1983).

WILLIAM M. CHANDLER teaches at McMaster University, Ontario, and is the author of several books on Canadian politics and parties public policy, and federalism, and on German politics, most recently of *Federalism and the Role of the State* (with F. Bakvis).

RUSSELL J. DALTON, Florida State University, focuses his research on political change in the Federal Republic and other European democracies; his recent books include *Politics in West Germany* (1989), *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (1988), and *Germany Transformed* (1981).

WERNER J. FELD, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, has published a number of books and articles. His most recent books are *Arms Control and the Atlantic Community* and *International Organizations* (2d ed.).

LILY GARDNER FELDMAN, Tufts University is Peace Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. She is author of *West Germany and Israel: A Special Relationship*.

ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, University of Richmond, Virginia, is the author of *Local Government in the German Federal System* (1986) and the contributing editor of *Local Government Reform and Reorganization: An International Perspective* (1981). He is also the author of numerous articles on West German local government, federalism, and political parties.

M. DONALD HANCOCK, Vanderbilt University, is the author of various books and articles on Sweden, Germany, and comparative public policy, including *West Germany: The Politics of Democratic Corporatism* (1989).

ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, Washington University, wrote books on comparative public policy, party finance, corruption and other subjects, including *The Governments of Germany* (4th ed. with Donald Kommers). His first book on the FRG was *Adenauer and the CDU* (1960).

JUTTA A. HELM, Western Illinois University, has written on protest, participation, and workplace democracy in West Germany. She currently is working on a study of the British and West German coal industries.

MICHAEL G. HUELSHOFF, University of Oregon, has worked on energy policy and is the author of "International Dimensions of Adjustment Strategies: Linking Corporatism to International Regime Theory," and "The Political Economy of the SPD" in the 1980s.

EMIL J. KIRCHNER teaches at the University of Essex and is the author of books and articles on the European Community and European liberal parties; including *Liberal Parties in Western Europe* (1989).

GERALD R. KLEINFELD, Arizona State University, has been founder of the German Studies Association, Editor of *German Studies Review*, and Director of Consortium for Atlantic Studies, author of articles on the German question and German-American relations.

DONALD P. KOMMERS teaches at Notre Dame University and is the author of books and articles on the West German Federal Constitutional Court and on German politics; including *Judicial Politics in West Germany* and, with A. J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*.

ANDREI S. MARKOVITS, Boston University and Center for European Studies, Harvard University, has published extensively on social democracy and labor politics in the Federal Republic. His *Politics of the West German Trade Unions: Strategies of Class and Interest Representation in Growth and Crisis* (1986) was also published in Spanish. He is currently concluding a study (with Philip Gorski) entitled *The West German Left: Red, Green and Beyond*.

PETER H. MERKL teaches at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is the author of books and articles on German politics, comparative parties, and most recently *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations* (1986), and *When Parties Fail . . .* (with Kay Lawson) (1988).

RICHARD L. MERRITT, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, focuses his research on international political communication, especially using quantitative approaches. His recent books on Germany include *Living with the Wall* (1985) and *Berlin Between Two Worlds* (1986).

JOYCE M. MUSHABEN teaches at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Her recent publications have focused on youth and peace movements in both Germanies, Green politics, and "German identity," including a book in progress, *The Post-Postwar Generations: Changing Attitudes Towards the National Question and Changing Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance in the FRG*.

WILLIAM E. PATERSON is Reader in German Politics at Warwick University and cofounder and former Chairman of the British Association for the Study of German Politics. He is the author of *The SPD and European Integration* (1974), coeditor with Alastair H. Thomas

of *The Future of Social Democracy* (1986), with S. Bulmer of *The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community* (1987), and with W. Grant and C. Whitston, *Government and the Chemical Industry: A Comparative Study of Britain and West Germany* (1988).

ANN L. PHILLIPS, Ford Foundation Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, is a specialist on Soviet-GDR relations, author of *Soviet Policy Toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* (1987) and a forthcoming monograph on the SED-SPD Dialogue, among others.

GORDON SMITH, London School of Economics, has written extensively on West German and European politics including *Democracy in Western Germany* (3d ed. 1986) and *Politics in Western Europe* (5th ed. 1989). He also coedits the journal *West European Politics*.

CHRISTIAN SØE teaches at California State University, Long Beach. He has written extensively on the FDP and German political liberalism. He is the editor of the annually revised anthology, *Comparative Politics*, and is director of the Pacific Workshop on German Affairs.

JAMES CLYDE SPERLING, University of Akron, recently completed his dissertation, "Three-Way Stretch: The Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic Economy, 1969–1976" (University of California, Santa Barbara), and has reviewed literature for the *American Political Science Review* and *Journal of Politics*.

CONTENTS

Contributors ix

Introduction: Forty Years and Seven Generations

Peter H. Merkl 1

I VALUES AND THE GERMAN IDENTITY

1. The German Question, Yesterday and Tomorrow
Gerald R. Kleinfeld 19
2. Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West German Identity
Andrei S. Markovits 35
3. A Changing Social Consciousness
Russell J. Dalton 55
4. Feminism in Four Acts: The Changing Political Identity of Women in the Federal Republic of Germany
Joyce M. Mushaben 76
5. The Protestant Church in Divided Germany and Berlin
Richard L. Merritt 110

II THE POLITICAL RULES OF THE GAME

6. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany: An Assessment After Forty Years
Donald P. Kommers 133

vi *Contents*

- 7.** West German Corporatism at Forty *Michael G. Huelshoff* 160
- 8.** The Ambivalent Insider: The DGB Between Theory and Reality *M. Donald Hancock* 178
- 9.** Structural Change in the Ruhr Valley: What Price Social Peace? *Jutta A. Helm* 193
- 10.** Adenauer's Legacies: Party Finance and the Decline of Chancellor Democracy *Arnold J. Heidenheimer* 213
- 11.** The Financing of German Political Parties *Arthur B. Gunlicks* 228

III THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

- 12.** The "Model" West German Party System *Gordon Smith* 249
- 13.** The Social Democratic Party: Reformism in Theory and Practice *Gerard Braunthal* 265
- 14.** The Christian Democrats *William M. Chandler* 287
- 15.** "Not Without Us!" The FDP's Survival, Position, and Influence *Christian S  * 313
- 16.** The Greens: From Yesterday to Tomorrow *William E. Paterson* 340

IV THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

- 17.** The Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and the Atlantic Economy *James Clyde Sperling* 367
- 18.** The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO *Werner J. Feld* 391

- 19.** The West German Social Democrats' Second Phase of Ostpolitik in Historical Perspective *Ann L. Phillips* 408
- 20.** The Federal Republic of Germany in the European Community *Emil J. Kirchner* 425
- 21.** German Morality and Israel *Lily Gardner Feldman* 442
- Conclusion: Were the Angry Old Men Wrong?
Peter H. Merkl 464
- Index 499

INTRODUCTION: FORTY YEARS AND SEVEN GENERATIONS

Peter H. Merkl

At first glance forty years for the Federal Republic may not seem a venerable age. In the twentieth century, however, the most dramatic changes have happened in ever-shorter time spans. Consider for example how the role of the United States in the world and its internal life changed from 1898 to 1938: From the days of the Spanish-American war when we were hovering timidly at the edge of an entirely new role as a world power—through the upheavals of the First World War which left us the prosperous heir apparent of British economic power in the world—to the nadir of the Great Depression and the rise of the New Deal. Or the forty-year span, say, since 1944 when the wartime alliance of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union against Germany and its Axis friends had gloriously turned the tide and confronted the lion in his continental den. The end of World War II left America, at least for a while, in a position of global hegemony. The next decades put this country on a veritable rollercoaster ride of changing policies toward defeated Germany and, more important, the Soviet Union. With the latter we soon went from wartime alliance to cold war confrontation, and after a respite of *détente* back to the cold war rhetoric of 1984. With Germany the ride followed contrapuntal lines. The vengeful mood of the Morgenthau Plan and the beginnings of denazification and democratic reeducation soon changed to lenience and, increasingly, a supportive partnership with a West German state arose from the ashes of World War II. The trajectory of U.S.-German relations climbed to such heights as permitting West Germany to participate in the Marshall Plan, underwriting its new currency and, eventually, sup-

2 *Introduction: Forty Years and Seven Generations*

porting rearmament and the absorption of the new German armed forces into NATO. The partnership reached its highest point in the age of Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor (1949–1963) of the Federal Republic (FRG) and a remarkable European statesman who managed, under American tutelage, to rehabilitate at least West Germany in the eyes of the world from the deep disgrace and hostility of the Nazi years. Adenauer dissolved a heritage of German nationalism into the larger communities of Franco-German reconciliation, the European Community, and the Atlantic partnership. The fourteen years of Adenauer's rule were about the same length as the lifetime of the fateful Weimar Republic (1919–1933), Germany's first try at democracy, and yet the period was long enough to witness the beginnings of a relative decline in the warmth of the U.S.-German relationship. The American superpower had accomplished containment of Soviet expansion by consolidating Western Europe, including the Federal Republic, and turned to other global preoccupations and economic problems at home and abroad. Ten years later, after the debacle of America's intervention in Vietnam, observers on both sides of the Atlantic began to notice the passing of a generation which, in the United States and in Europe, had brought about and maintained its close collaboration against the Soviet challenge to the war-ravaged continent. "Successor generations" on both sides of the Atlantic, they feared, no longer fully shared the convictions and experiences of the postwar years. The botched gesture of President Reagan's visit to the Bitburg military cemetery in 1985 was, among other things, meant to salve symbolically the wounds of this growing estrangement.

LIFE CYCLES AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY

As we contemplate the forty years of the Federal Republic (1949–1989), we should not overlook the cataclysmic changes in the German history of the preceding forty years, 1909–1949, either, since some of the significance of the peaceful and relatively settled life of West Germany lies precisely in its avoidance of the extremism and nationalism of the past. The average duration of a human life, whether it is that of a political leader or of an average German, is much

longer than the fourteen years of Weimar or the twelve years of the Third Reich. More important still, as individual lives link eras of contemporary German history, their individual life cycles often tend to replicate in adulthood, or in the mature years of a statesman, what the individuals may have learned in their formative years—say, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five. Transmitted by this life cycle replication, the historical experiences of one era thus may pattern the responses of leaders and masses in a later period.¹ The leaders, furthermore, may pass on the formative experiences of their own youth decades later to those growing up then.

1909 was the last year in office of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow (1900–1909) who, more than any other figure before Adolf Hitler, embodied the German imperialistic obsession with his slogans of a German “place in the sun” and a major role in “world politics.” He was born in 1849 and grew up in the heady days of Otto von Bismarck’s wars of national unification (1864–1871) which kindled his lifelong nationalist enthusiasm and may have persuaded him to view himself as a second Bismarck who would lead his nation into the glorious role of a world power, promoting German naval expansion to compete with Britain on the high seas and rivaling the colonial empires of his day. Von Bülow’s successors, von Bethmann-Hollweg, Georg Michaelis, Kaiser Wilhelm II himself, and most of the important German generals of the disastrous bid for world power in World War I were born within ten years of von Bülow and shared the formative experience of growing up in the enthusiastic days of the foundation of the German nation-state.

By way of contrast, World War I and the decade prior to its outbreak were the formative period of most of the leaders of the Third Reich who evidently absorbed both its Pan German and *völkisch* obsessions and, as soldiers in the war, the desperate determination of many to fight on to the bitter end, unwilling to seek a peace of reconciliation or to concede defeat. World War II and the goal of the racial empire of a German master race was their way of winning at last what they could not win twenty years earlier. Other members of the World War I generation, of course, reacted to the experience with pacifism and a desire for international understanding. But, in the meantime, the mass of average Germans who had been in the First World War had been voters and joined movements

4 *Introduction: Forty Years and Seven Generations*

and parties throughout the Weimar years which perpetuated the wartime nationalism throughout the Weimar Republic and eventually helped the Nazis into power. The soldiers of World War II, on the other hand, were of later generations, born mostly between 1902 and 1928 and growing up politically in the turbulent confrontations of the republic or the orchestrated patriotism of the Third Reich.

Political Generations of Post-1945 Leaders

Because of the way individual lives overlap these historical periods (see table I.1), an account of the major post-World War II generations has to begin with people born long before 1945, both at the level of the masses of Germans and of their postwar leaders. Konrad Adenauer (born 1876) was atypical in that he really belonged to the generation that until 1930 produced most Weimar chancellors and, in fact, he came close to becoming a chancellor himself during those days. A few post-1945 German leaders such as Ernst Reuter, Kurt Schumacher, Carlo Schmid, Ludwig Erhard, and Walter Ulbricht were of the World War I generation, which is not to say that they absorbed quite the same message as the leaders of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, the wounds received in that great patriotic struggle may explain, for example, the nationalistic undertones in Schumacher's socialist rhetoric as well as Erhard's frequent appeals to "the German people," a phrase not heard for nearly twenty years after 1945. Other postwar leaders such as Willy Brandt, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Gerhard Schröder, Franz Josef Strauss, and Erich Honecker were born in the first post-World War I generation (1902–1915) that grew up amidst the political confrontations of Weimar. Of this generation, many joined militant groups ranging from the communist Red Front to the bourgeois youth leagues of the Right and the Nazi storm troopers.

A more recent set of West German leaders, such as Helmut Schmidt, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Wolfgang Mischnick, Egon Bahr, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Rainer Barzel, Gustav Heinemann, Friedrich Zimmermann, Annemarie Renger, Liselotte Funke, Katharina Focke, Hildgard Hamm-Brücher, Horst Ehmke, Alfred Dregger, and Gerhard Stoltenberg are of the World War II generation (born especially 1916–1928, but also earlier)² and very likely shared the experience

Table I.1

German Political Generations in the Twentieth Century

-
1. *World War I leaders: born 1845–1860, formed 1860–1885 (during national unification).*
Weimar Republic leaders: born 1865–1880, formed 1880–1905 (peace time); Post-1945 leaders: Adenauer (born 1876), Heuss (1884).
 2. *World War I “Front Generation”:*
 - (a) *Masses born 1890–1901, formed 1905–1926 (during imperialistic adventures and war), served in war, suffered deprivations during and after war; voted 1919–1933 and supported the Third Reich 1933–1945.*
 - (b) *Most Nazi leaders were born of this generation (Hitler 1889).*
 - (c) *Some post-World War II leaders also (Erhard, Schumacher, Ulbricht).*
 3. *Post-World War I Generation: born 1902–1915, formed 1917–1940 (during civil disturbances, inflation, depression, Third Reich at peace)*
 - (a) *They joined Nazi storm troopers, Communist fighters, other paramilitaries and other parties; supported Third Reich.*
 - (b) *Some postwar leaders: Brandt, Strauss, Honecker.*
 4. *World War II Generation:*
 - (a) *Masses born 1916–1928, formed 1931–1953 in the Third Reich and WW II, and in immediate postwar ruins (or in POW camps).*
 - (b) *Produced some West German leaders of the last ten years: Helmut Schmidt, Genscher, Lambsdorff, Vogel, Richard von Weizsäcker.*
 5. *First Postwar Generation: born 1928–1940, formed 1943–1965 (during reconstruction from ruins to prosperity); Voted since 1948, supporting democracy, Western alliance, restitution to Jews.*
 - (a) *A generation of nonjoiners, “Count-me-out.”*
 - (b) *Produced recent leaders: Helmut Kohl, Johannes Rau, and Hans Apel.*
 6. *Second Postwar Generation: born 1941–1959, formed 1956–1984 (during age of reforms, also television, civic education).*
 - (a) *A highly “critical” and rebellious generation, politicized, and mobilized in student revolt, citizen initiatives, Jusos, and neo-Nazi NPD.*
 - (b) *Produced leaders of Greens, feminists, peace movement.*
 7. *Third Postwar Generation: born 1960–1970, formed 1975–1995 (during oil crises, economic slowdown, structural unemployment).*
 - (a) *Today’s environmentalist Greens, feminists, peace movement, and other new social movements.*
-

6 Introduction: Forty Years and Seven Generations

of the final verdict on the German pursuit of world power and its catastrophic aftermath. So, of course, did most of the German masses in 1945. When we look at some of the early post-1945 surveys in Western occupation zones and in the first years of the Federal Republic and notice that, in the early fifties, as many as 12–15 percent of the people still expressed Nazi views and a nostalgia for the prewar Third Reich, we have to remember their generational composition. In 1950, more than two-thirds of the West German population and three-fourths of the voters belonged to the World War II and earlier generations who had once given the Nazi regime enthusiastic majorities even if many of them had become disillusioned after 1943. Millions of Nazis had to be resocialized and absorbed among the voters—many of the less important ex-Nazis even regained civil service positions and pension rights under Article 131 of the Basic Law—or at least were persuaded not to band together against the democratic regime in Bonn. To have the Federal Republican python swallow the huge ex-Nazi pig without noticeable indigestion was one of the greatest achievements of Chancellor Adenauer's powerful political machine. Without this the FRG might long ago have succumbed to the same fate as the Weimar Republic.

The First Postwar Generation

The first postwar generation (born between 1929 and 1940) came to political maturity in the twenty years after the war and its formative experiences ranged from the earliest postwar phase amid ruins and masses of hungry, downtrodden people to the years of successful rebuilding and the “economic miracle.” Politically, its members grew up in the middle of an intense withdrawal from political engagement (other than voting) in the “count-me-out” (*Ohne-mich*) generation that was mostly interested in the pursuit of private happiness, careers, and prosperity. They were glad that the date of their birth had spared them involvement with the Nazis and their antagonists, the *Gnade der späten Geburt* (the unearned grace of having been born too late—or, there but for the grace of God . . .), as Chancellor Helmut Kohl was to put it in a much-resented phrase on the occasion of a recent state visit to Israel. Kohl indeed is of this first postwar generation and represents its viscerally pro-American