


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Donald C. Blaisdell
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CASES ON PARTY ORGANIZATION

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M c G R A W - H I L L B O O K C O M P A N Y , I N C .

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CASES ON PARTY ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is the first fruit of the intention of the sponsors, organizers and advisers of the Eagleton Case Studies Program to publish collections of the cases in permanent form. Other collections will follow, drawing upon the cases published since the program got underway in 1958. A concern for the two-party system and an interest in the internal operations of parties and party-related groups have been close to the hearts of those associated with the program. For this reason, and to encourage further work on the tasks of the party, it seemed well to devote the first permanent collection of Eagleton cases to party organization.

Problems of party organization—those of the care and feeding of political parties—are only rarely sufficiently discrete to justify separate consideration. Most of the other cases in this series shed light in one way or another on political organization. Only those in this volume appear to deal primarily with organizational issues, to the subordination of nominating and campaigning or tracing out the legislative process.

The first problem in party organization is that of identification of the individual with something called “the party.” For this reason, the present volume includes James Rosenau’s *The Nomination of “Chip” Bohlen*, because in connection with this nomination, United States Senators were compelled to define the meaning of party for themselves and to defend their definitions.

In most areas of life, organizational problems are desiccated, frustrating and uninteresting. This is not so much the case with political organization, and an organizational sense appears almost to be prerequisite to political participation at any level beyond passive observation or dutiful ballot casting. Without being mystical about it or asserting that there is an organic entity which can or should be studied apart from the individuals who make it up, the party organization consists of those professionals who make the party their business 365 days a year. They stand out especially because they are active during the periods between election campaigns. In one sense of the word (perhaps the most meaningful sense), they are “the party.” If one wishes to share the power of the party, one must participate in this activity and become a member of the organization in that sense.

In this connection, the importance of having a voice in the selection of the party’s candidates can hardly be overemphasized, for the nominating process seems central to the control of the political organization. It follows that a device which permits control of nominations may permit control of the party in other respects. The utility of such a device has suggested itself in the last ten years to hundreds of thousands of citizens interested in effecting

reform in their civic lives. Francis Carney's study of the rise of the Democratic clubs in California is matched with Donald C. Blaisdell's account of the recognition of the Riverside Democrats as one of the highly successful reform clubs in Manhattan. In California, the clubs at their peak were influential in the selection and election of Edmund "Pat" Brown as Governor. On the other side of the continent, in New York, the reform clubs, including the Riverside Democrats, in 1961 brought about the eclipse of the Tammany leadership of Carmine G. DeSapio. These clubs have simply given one of the elementary principles of human organization—the fact of minority control—a new application in the political sphere. The club movement is ideal for the association of like-minded citizens in politics. The club can keep track of the large party organization, and it can exist only so long as its own leadership resembles its mass membership base in intention and in expectations about politics. If club leaders do not become corrupt and selfish, there is a possibility that the club organizations themselves will be responsible and responsive, not merely effective.

Three cases in this collection deal with the national party organizations: Philip Wilder's sensitive and sympathetic chronicle of the trials of Meade Alcorn, Republican National Chairman in the disastrous year of 1958; Abraham Holtzman's solid account of the loyalty pledge controversy in the Democratic national party; and Bernard Hennessy's lively step-by-step rendering of the efforts of Democrats in 1959 to raise a large amount of money from small donations. These cases illuminate the relationships between the state and local parties on the one hand and the national parties on the other. Hennessy's case suggests the break is well-nigh absolute, as though the wires of communication had been cut. Holtzman's account gives rise to an image of spheres which occasionally overlap, while Wilder's presentation suggests that the national chairman suffers considerably from the great disparity between his responsibilities and his power. The upshot is that local parties can affect the destinies of the national group rather more than the reverse.

The last case in this collection—Kenneth Vines' study, *Two Parties for Shreveport*—broke new ground by giving the first thorough account of the efforts of Republicans to organize south of the Mason-Dixon. Vines' story points out under what circumstances Republicanism becomes attractive to Democratic voters, the obstacles in the way of their organizing such a party, and how, in this instance, national events quickly destroyed the carefully built-up basis for Republican organization at the local level.

Each of these authors has approached his materials in the way that seemed best to him. No effort was made to obtain the use of a common methodology or framework of analysis. Because the cases are primarily aids to teaching and for reasons of space, conclusions, moral-painting and lesson-drawing have been held to a minimum. Meaning, therefore, is largely implicit. Reflection on these cases and other published studies, however, emphasizes that little is known about party organization, especially at the state and local levels. What appears to be the least-developed level—the national—seems to have attracted most scholarly attention. Future cases will make it possible to discuss the sources of party managers, techniques of party management, questions of form and function, and the impact of law on party structure and partisan conflict.

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THE NOMINATION OF "CHIP" BOHLEN

James N. Rosenau

On September 19, 1952, George F. Kennan, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, left Moscow for brief consultations with colleagues in the West. Upon landing in Berlin, Kennan made a short statement before the assembled reporters in which he contrasted his current situation in the U.S.S.R. with his wartime internment in Nazi Germany. On October 3rd, citing these remarks as offensive, the Russians declared Kennan *persona non grata*.

The next few months were a time of upheaval in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. held its first general Congress in thirteen years; a virulent "Hate America" campaign was conducted; evidence appeared of a major shake-up of Soviet leaders; purges and the "doctor's plot" marked the Soviet scene; and, in early March, an era came to an end with the death of Stalin. During this entire period Kennan was not replaced and the United States was represented in Moscow by a *chargé d'affaires*.

Ordinarily, an ambassadorial appointment is perfunctorily approved by the Senate. The President submits a name for confirmation, the Senate holds brief committee hearings, confines floor debate to a few words of praise by a Senator from the nominee's home state, and completes the formality by a unanimous voice vote of a handful of Senators. The appointment of Kennan's successor, however, did not unfold in this routine way. It was not until April 11, 1953, that the new ambassador arrived in Moscow to take up his duties.

Kennan's ouster occurred in the middle of the 1952 presidential campaign. Ever since the nominating conventions of the previous July the normal processes of government had been grinding to a halt. With the election of the first Republican President in twenty years, the outgoing Truman administration continued to mark time until January. Inexperienced with the day-to-day tasks of government, confronted with enormous transitional problems, the Eisenhower administration moved slowly after its inauguration. Five weeks passed before the President submitted to the Senate a nominee for the vacancy in Moscow.

These very early days of the Eisenhower administration were devoted to bolstering harmony among Republicans. Although its differences were buried during the campaign, the party had been badly split at the July convention. Eisenhower was nominated on the first ballot, to be sure, but only after a bitter struggle with Senator Robert A. Taft, who had the support of nearly half of the delegates. Separated by seemingly wide ideological and temperamental

differences, these two wings of the party said some very unpleasant things about each other before and during the convention. The Taft faction was vehemently opposed to the vast social services and foreign commitments undertaken during previous Democratic administrations. Steeped in the traditions of midwestern conservatism, these orthodox Republicans accused Eisenhower and his backers of being sympathetic to the policies of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, of "me-tooism," of betraying the great principles of their party. Taft's supporters also claimed that since their candidate had endorsed the investigatory tactics of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, he was especially prepared to rid the government of Communists and other security risks.

On the other hand, Eisenhower's backers contended that their midwestern colleagues refused to face realities of post-war life. They granted that Democratic excesses necessitated an overhauling of the government, but argued that the Taft wing would go too far in this respect. They accused the Taft faction of wanting to return the American people to a way of life which had long since been rejected. Eisenhower advocated an updating of Republicanism which would appeal to many voters who, he contended, had voted Democratic for lack of a better alternative.

Faced with the prospect of losing the election through disunity, the two factions tried to close ranks after the convention. Instead of concentrating their fire on each other, they turned upon the Democrats and stressed themes which all Republicans could support. A vigorous campaign was waged in which the Democrats were castigated for tolerating corruption in government, for allowing security risks to infiltrate administrative agencies, for permitting the Soviet Union to expand its influence, and for involving the United States in a war in Korea. Foreign policy grievances were symbolized by a single word: Yalta. It was at this seaport on the Black Sea that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin held their last wartime conference and reached decisions concerning the future of Eastern Europe, China, and the United Nations. For years the Republicans had claimed that Yalta was responsible for much that was undesirable in the post-war world. It was argued that, in return for Stalin's agreement to enter the war against Japan, Roosevelt had acquiesced to Russian domination of Eastern Europe and China. This "blunder" was said to have greatly facilitated the emergence of Russia as a threat to world peace and American security. Indeed, Republicans had become so sensitive to this issue that their 1952 campaign platform carried the pledge that "the Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements."

In addition to focusing on Yalta and other issues for which they commonly blamed the Democrats, each Republican faction took certain steps to placate the other and thereby strengthen the bonds of unity. Taft himself, early in the campaign, conferred with Eisenhower and announced his "complete" support of the General's candidacy. Subsequent to the election, Taft went even further and agreed to serve as Majority Leader of the Senate, a position in which he had to take major responsibility for shepherding the Eisenhower program through the Senate. Eisenhower, for his part, made a number of concessions to the orthodox wing of the party, including that of signing his name to a

document which Taft had written articulating his philosophy of government. Upon entering the White House, Eisenhower sought to maintain party unity by, among other things, appointing R. W. Scott McLeod as chief security officer of the State Department. McLeod had been legislative assistant to a leading Taft supporter, Senator Styles Bridges, and had acquired a reputation for being an energetic champion of efforts to uncover security risks. His appointment thus encouraged the orthodox wing of the party to believe that Eisenhower was ready to cleanse the government of undesirables in the manner which they advocated.

Despite these varied attempts to achieve harmony within the party, it remained to be seen how well the two factions could stick together when the time came to administer concrete policies and enact specific legislation. Closing ranks for election purposes was not necessarily the same as agreeing on how the nation should be governed. A number of incidents in the early weeks of 1953 indicated that the party divisions had not been completely bridged and that the wounds incurred at the Chicago convention had not fully healed. One hint of latent differences occurred late in February when the Eisenhower administration asked Congress to approve a resolution that condemned the Soviet Union for violating the Yalta agreement. The orthodox Republicans, led by Taft himself, objected to the wording of the resolution on the ground that it did not directly repudiate what had transpired at Yalta. The Democrats in Congress, unwilling to support any wording which indirectly denounced Roosevelt, refused to accept Taft's proposed amendment. Since the administration could not risk the potential loss of Democratic support on future foreign policy proposals, the matter was never pushed to a vote and was allowed to die a quiet death.

But this preservation of Republican unity was short-lived. For, on February 27, Charles E. Bohlen was nominated as ambassador to Russia. The pages which follow tell the story of what Republican Senators did when their own President asked them to confirm a man who, among other things, had been at Franklin Roosevelt's side throughout most of the Yalta conference.

THE NOMINEE

Called "Chip" by both friend and foe, Charles E. Bohlen entered into his lifetime work, the Foreign Service, in 1929. In the early '30's, along with George Kennan, he had been given intensive training in the Russian language. When diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in 1934, Bohlen was assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow. He spent about five of the next seven years there as vice consul. Thus, by the time he returned to the State Department in 1942, Bohlen had become one of the nation's very few experts on Russia. He subsequently held various posts in the Department, moving up steadily from expertise to policy-making positions. From 1949 to 1951 he held the assignment of Minister to France and in this capacity became a golfing companion of N.A.T.O.'s Supreme Commander, Dwight Eisenhower. At the time of his selection as Kennan's successor, Bohlen was serving as counselor to the Department of State, a high-ranking job for which he had been unanimously confirmed by the Senate in 1951.

BOHLEN AT YALTA

Although Bohlen's close association with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the conduct of foreign policy during the latter years of the Truman administration irritated many Republicans, it was his attendance at the wartime conferences with Russia that they found most distasteful. Indeed, the very first question posed at the hearings on his nomination indicates the large extent to which attention focused upon this one aspect of his career: "What was your position at Yalta?" Bohlen's reply was equally straightforward:

. . . at the time of Yalta, I was an assistant to the Secretary of State and one of my duties was to serve as liaison officer with the White House. . . . At Yalta I served primarily in the capacity of an interpreter for President Roosevelt. . . .¹

Throughout the hearings, in response to Senators who found it difficult to believe that his role at Yalta was confined to interpreting, Bohlen reiterated that he had not participated substantively in the deliberations, noting that it would have been "very unusual for an interpreter to, so to speak, interrupt the President of the United States when he is in discussion with the head of a foreign country."

BOHLEN DEFENDS THE YALTA AGREEMENTS

Events subsequent to the hearings on March 2 might have been much different if Bohlen had accepted the view that the Yalta agreements were a grave mistake which altered the course of history. Time after time Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee, led by Ferguson of Michigan, invited him to denounce what had happened at Yalta. But Bohlen would not yield, insisting instead that the agreements made sense at the time they were concluded. Only from the perspective of "hindmyopia," he argued, did Yalta seem ill advised. He freely conceded that mistakes had been made and that the wording of the agreements was perhaps disadvantageous to the United States. At the same time he repeatedly asserted that it was Russia's violation of the agreements, and not Yalta itself, which led to the loss of China and Eastern Europe. This typical excerpt from the hearings indicates the firmness with which Bohlen defended what transpired at Yalta:

SENATOR FERGUSON. Well, wouldn't you say that the Yalta agreement . . . is now the basis of the situation in Europe?

MR. BOHLEN. No, sir; I would not.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Both East and West?

MR. BOHLEN. I would not.

¹ All quoted material is from the following sources: *Hearings on the Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen*, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Senate, March 2 and 18, 1953, pp. 1-128; the *Congressional Record*, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 99, Part 2, March 20, 23, 25, 27, 1953, pp. 2156, 2187-2208, 2277-2300, 2374-2392. Quotations and actions otherwise attributed to Senators, the President, and the Secretary of State have been obtained from the *New York Times* dispatches for the day cited.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You would not?

MR. BOHLEN. I would not, sir. I believe that the map of Europe would look very much the same if there had never been the Yalta Conference at all.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You don't say then that these agreements are the cause of this enslavement?

MR. BOHLEN. I don't sir. I say it is the violation of them.

SENATOR FERGUSON. That is what I say.

MR. BOHLEN. What I am saying, sir, I think in this business just because a policy failed doesn't mean it was a wrong one. In other words, I don't think the men who backed the League of Nations were necessarily wrong, despite the fact that the League of Nations failed to prevent World War II.

Doubt about Bohlen's ability to render faithful service to a Republican President was another recurring theme that marked the hearings on his nomination. Given his strong defense of Yalta and his close association with the Truman administration, some Senators wondered how he could possibly be loyal to the new directives that Eisenhower would issue, especially those which might constitute a reversal of the policies previously pursued by the Democrats. Questioning along this line was also led by Ferguson, who again found that Bohlen was not lacking in a precise point of view:

SENATOR FERGUSON. Do you feel that in view of what has happened in the past, as a policy-maker or as an adviser, your opinion would not be colored on the question of a new policy?

MR. BOHLEN. I do not think so, no; because I conceive . . . that the function of a professional Foreign Service officer, or an ambassador for that matter is that of an executor of policy. He does not determine policy. Policy is determined by the President of the United States and the Secretary of State . . . I was not a hundred percent in agreement with many of the things I saw during the war, but I know this much, that my duty and my oath of office make it perfectly plain that I carry out the policies laid down by the constituted authorities of the United States. If I disagree so deeply with them, I always have the prospect of resignation.

SENATOR FERGUSON. You have the right to resign.

MR. BOHLEN. The right to resign, but I do not anticipate anything of that nature . . .

DULLES EXPLAINS HOW BOHLEN WAS SELECTED

On the surface it may seem strange that the President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, should have risked the hard-won unity of their party on such a relatively minor issue as the ambassadorship to Russia. Knowing that Bohlen's record and his refusal to condemn Yalta would be offensive to the Taft wing, presumably they could have chosen a person of equal competence and greater acceptability. Or, even if they failed to anticipate the ensuing controversy, at least they could have withdrawn Bohlen's name as soon as it became apparent that Republican harmony was threatened by the nomination. The President and the Secretary did not, however, follow either of these alternatives. They not only selected Bohlen for the Moscow post, but they stood firmly behind their choice in the face of mounting demands that they reconsider the matter.

Perhaps the best explanation for the selection of Bohlen is to be found in the fact that party unity was not the only dilemma confronting the President and the Secretary. In this particular case they also had to consider the attitudes of two other groups. One was the Foreign Service, which was reportedly demoralized by McLeod's zealous pursuit of security risks in the State Department. The Secretary was said to be anxious to bolster departmental morale by giving Bohlen, one of the most highly respected members of the Foreign Service, a new position commensurate with his experience and talent. Dulles was alleged to recognize that his subordinates would be dismayed by an obscure assignment for Bohlen. They would interpret it as an inexcusable surrender to political expediency even though they did not question his desire to put his own man into the top policy-making job of counselor.

The Democrats in Congress were another group that had to be considered. Party strength in both the House and the Senate was so evenly matched that the success of future legislative proposals was partly dependent upon the number of Democrats who sided with the President. With few exceptions, the Democrats would have been antagonized if Bohlen had been abandoned in response to Republican demands. Most of them believed that Bohlen's association with the Roosevelt and Truman administrations only added to his qualifications for the ambassadorship. Thus, although they remained silent while Republicans publicly fought each other, the Democrats were almost unanimously committed to the nomination. Perhaps they even viewed it as a test of whether the President would meet them halfway on foreign policy matters.

Although he did not refer directly to these larger questions of administrative and legislative strategy, Dulles implicitly took note of them when events compelled him to testify at a second hearing on the nomination. In his opening remarks to the Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles explicitly asserted that both he and the President knew Bohlen personally and regarded him highly. He further defended the selection by noting that an advisory committee of three distinguished former members of the Foreign Service had "unanimously concurred in the view that Mr. Bohlen was uniquely qualified for this particular position." Dulles also made it easier for Republican Senators to support the nomination by emphasizing that Bohlen's new assignment removed him from the high policy-making post of counselor, while at the same time it placed him in "a position where his unique capacity to understand Soviet communism could be put to service of our Government."

Despite the assurance that Bohlen was being transferred away from a policy-making position, Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee pressed Dulles on the question of whether faithful service could be expected from a person who had such close ties with previous Democratic administrations. Like Bohlen, Dulles firmly insisted that he foresaw no difficulties in this respect:

SENATOR FERGUSON. From your experience and knowledge of the facts you feel that you could rely upon the information that he would give you, notwithstanding his former connections with policy?

SECRETARY DULLES. Yes. In the past, while he has been loyal to policies that I did not entirely agree with, he has proved over the period of years since

I have seen him and worked with him, . . . a reliable contact with the Russians. That is particularly what we want at Moscow today.

SENATOR FERGUSON. From your knowledge of the facts then you would say that you could trust Mr. Bohlen to interpret facts in the future without being bound by his previous policymaking or interpretation?

SECRETARY DULLES. Yes; I believe that Bohlen will be loyal to the administration that he serves, and that he is not so emotionally dedicated to policies of his own invention so that he cannot shift his allegiance to new policies.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE DELAYS

Unprepared for Bohlen's extraordinary defense of Yalta, the Foreign Relations Committee did not vote on his nomination at its March 2nd meeting. Three days later Stalin died. In response to this momentous event, Dulles issued a plea for quick action by the committee so that Bohlen could get to Moscow to observe the unfolding situation at first hand. The Secretary's appeal was, however, rejected: on March 10, meeting in closed session, the committee turned to seven pending diplomatic appointments, approving six and putting off Bohlen's confirmation for at least a week. When the members of the committee emerged from the meeting, reporters learned that two Republicans, Ferguson and Knowland of California, had insisted on the delay. The former explained that he had done so because he wanted to question Bohlen about "certain papers" pertaining to Yalta which had not yet arrived from the State Department.

Committee Democrats, on the other hand, came out of the meeting angry that immediate action had not been taken on the nomination. Humphrey of Minnesota was quoted as saying "there is no more important diplomatic post in the world today than in this time of change in Russia." This comment evoked a retort from the committee's Republican chairman, Wiley of Wisconsin, to the effect that it was legislative custom to defer action on the request of even one Senator.

THE CONTROVERSY BECOMES EXPLICIT

Before the Foreign Relations Committee met again on the nomination, opposition to it developed openly. Heretofore, like the lull before a storm, only rumors and a sense of impending battle marked the Washington scene, with Republican Senators avoiding any public announcement of how they intended to vote. Then, on March 13, the first winds of conflict were stirred by Bridges of New Hampshire, a prominent Republican who was president *pro tem.* of the Senate and chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Bridges told reporters that "top" officials in the administration had been asked to contact the President and to urge upon him withdrawal of the nomination. Although stressing that it was not he who had asked the White House to recall Bohlen's name, Bridges made the cryptic comment that he would not be "surprised to see very formidable opposition if the nomination were put to a vote in the Senate." Reporters could not get Bridges to explain what he meant by the use of the word "if."

Two other leading Republicans also entered the fray on the 13th. At several interviews during the day McCarthy of Wisconsin, then becoming ever more powerful as the chairman of the Senate Permanent Investigating subcommittee, made it plain that he would fight the Bohlen nomination. The other Senator was "Mr. Republican" himself, Taft of Ohio, the Majority Leader and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. That evening, perhaps sensing that the party he valued dearly was about to be split, Taft swallowed his distaste for anything related to Yalta and let it be known that he intended to vote for Bohlen's confirmation. Adding that he was unaware of any possibility that the White House might withdraw the nomination, Taft thus brought the full weight of his prestige to bear upon a situation that his biographer later called "one of the most unpleasant incidents of his life."²

During the week end of March 14-15, Senators continued to maneuver for position by giving statements to the press. On the 14th, Taft, still trying to avert a fight among Republicans, told reporters that while he did not concur in Bohlen's selection, he would vote for confirmation because the issue was not of "sufficient importance to have a battle about." "Our Russian Ambassador can't do anything," he asserted. "All he can do is observe and report. He will not influence policy materially."

Taft's decision to exercise his majority leadership in support of the President undoubtedly came as a jolt to his orthodox followers. However, the foes of the nomination were not silenced. Apparently hoping to engender enough controversy to induce Eisenhower to withdraw the nomination, they alluded to unspecified reasons why Bohlen was unfit for the ambassadorship. On the 15th Bridges conceded that Bohlen "probably would be confirmed as of today," but he insisted that sentiment against the nomination was "mushrooming" and that conceivably it might be withdrawn in the light of subsequent developments. Bridges also took direct issue with Taft, declaring that he did "not think Bohlen is the man we should put in the most delicate spot in the world right now." When asked whether he would bring up the matter with Eisenhower at the White House legislative conference scheduled for the 16th, Bridges replied in the negative. But, he added, "If the President asks me about it, I'll certainly recommend that he withdraw Bohlen."

Two other Senators joined the ranks of the opposition on the 15th. Young of North Dakota, a Republican, gave no particular reason for his decision, but McCarran of Nevada, the one Democrat who actively opposed confirmation, provided a succinct explanation. A powerful figure in the Senate who frequently sided with orthodox Republicans, McCarran said that Bohlen's connection with Yalta was "enough for me."

Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the other hand, spent the week end avoiding a commitment. Ferguson announced that he would not join any effort to seek withdrawal of the nomination, contending that such action was "entirely a matter for the President to decide." Noting that he still had many questions to ask Bohlen at the next meeting of the committee, Ferguson said that he had not yet decided how he would vote. Knowland also declined to make known his position, and even the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee refused to commit himself. Rather, Wiley

² William S. White, *The Taft Story* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 236.

observed that early committee action depended on the success of efforts "to cut through rumor and get at the facts." "We want the facts and not a lot of rot," Wiley repeated. He declined to elaborate on the nature of the rumors.

THE PROSPECTS BRIGHTEN

Despite the flurry of week-end maneuvering, prospects for quick confirmation brightened considerably in the next few days. On Monday, March 16, the President held his regular weekly meeting with Republican Congressional leaders. Upon emerging from the White House, Taft implied that Eisenhower was standing firm behind the nomination. He reiterated his own support of Bohlen and predicted that the Senate as a whole would vote its approval. Although still unwilling to indicate how he would vote, Ferguson also predicted that Bohlen would be confirmed by a "substantial" majority. These forecasts by powerful Republicans led veteran observers of the Senatorial scene to speculate that opposition to the nomination was dissipating, that the Foreign Relations Committee would clear it handily on Wednesday, and that the Senate would take final action before the end of the week.

Further weight was added to this interpretation on the 17th when both Bridges and McCarthy also predicted favorable action by the Senate. Bridges claimed that 15 to 20 votes would be cast against Bohlen. McCarthy conceded that the opposition did not have enough votes to block Senate approval. "But," he added, "I am going to oppose the nomination on the ground that Bohlen was too important a part of the old Acheson machine in the State Department to properly represent the Administration, especially in this key spot. Dulles is making a great mistake in pressing to have this nomination approved."

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE DECIDES

When the Foreign Relations Committee met on the 18th, Dulles was called as a witness and, at the request of the committee, he engaged in the unprecedented act of personally evaluating the summary report which the Federal Bureau of Investigation had made of Bohlen's loyalty and security. Previously the committee had approved all diplomatic appointees without regard for the FBI report, relying on Dulles' assurance that nothing was known to reflect adversely upon the nominees. However, so as to dispel the rumors which had circulated over the week end, Dulles consented to break with precedent and to summarize and appraise the FBI report. In so doing, he left no doubt as to Bohlen's loyalty and security:

SECRETARY DULLES. . . . I received a day ago a summary of the report of the FBI. The approving evidence has not been summarized except by a long list of distinguished people who gave a complete clearance, and expressed high approval of Mr. Bohlen. There is no derogatory material whatsoever which questions the loyalty of Mr. Bohlen to the United States, or which suggests that he is not a good security risk, which suggests he is in any manner one who has leaked or been loose in his conversation or anything of that sort.

THE CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that there is no definite concrete evidence or what a lawyer would consider proof of any dereliction?

SECRETARY DULLES. Absolutely none whatsoever, not an iota.

SENATOR TAFT. Do you think there is anything that creates even a prima-facie case of such dereliction?

SECRETARY DULLES. No, none whatsoever.

Not entirely satisfied with this exchange, another Republican member of the committee, Hickenlooper of Iowa, pressed Dulles for clarification of his position:

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. As I understand it, you stated to us that you feel there is no security or loyalty risk involved in this appointment.

SECRETARY DULLES. No, I would not say that about anybody. I have had too much experience with people who seem to be 100 percent ever to say that in my opinion there is no risk. I do not think any human being on this earth is so absolutely—

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. May I put it another way? Do I understand you, then, to assure the committee that you believe Mr. Bohlen, based on the full field investigation and whatever you know about the situation, is a good security and loyalty risk?

SECRETARY DULLES. Yes . . .

Thus reassured by the Secretary, the Foreign Relations Committee proceeded to approve Bohlen's nomination. And it did so by an unanimous vote of 15 to 0, which meant that such key figures as Taft, Knowland, and Ferguson had sided with the President.

OPPOSITION CONTINUES

The committee's action was a major setback for the opposition. Upon being informed of the vote, McCarthy was described as "hard hit" by the fact that not a single anti-Bohlen vote had been registered in the committee. He indicated, however, that he would continue to combat the appointment even though he would not "have time" to compile a major case against the nomination before it was brought to the Senate floor. McCarthy asserted:

It's a tremendous mistake for Dulles to shove this appointment—an appointment which looks bad on its face—through the Senate . . . I urge that Dulles have President Eisenhower examine the entire file on Bohlen. If the President does that, though ordinarily I know it would be a tremendous imposition on his time, I feel reasonably certain that he will withdraw the appointment.

Nor was Bridges persuaded by the unanimous committee vote:

On the basis of the information I have now, I am still opposed to Bohlen. The Foreign Relations Committee, of course, has had the opportunity to go over such evidence as was presented to it. I think, however, the committee should have the benefit of the full FBI report on Bohlen and not an evaluation of that report by the man [Dulles] who made the appointment. My opposition to Bohlen is based upon his intimate association with the Truman-Acheson-Bohlen policies which I thought the people acted upon in the election of last November.

Notwithstanding McCarthy's declared intention of continuing to fight the nomination, and despite the mysterious reference which he and Bridges made

to the "entire" FBI file, it seemed unlikely on the 18th that anything could prevent immediate Senate approval of Bohlen. Moreover, with the White House standing firm, with the Foreign Relations Committee in unanimous agreement, with the Secretary of State on record as clearing Bohlen's loyalty, and with the Senate leadership, except for Bridges, solidly behind confirmation, Republican unity seemed assured. Even the opposition conceded the outcome and seemingly only a few critical speeches on the Senate floor and a final vote would precede Bohlen's departure for Moscow.

FROM McLEOD TO McCARRAN TO McCARTHY

On Friday, March 20, noting that "what I am about to say gives me no joy," McCarran rose to his feet on the Senate floor. After referring briefly to several State Department loyalty cases, McCarran turned to the main subject of his remarks:

I shall not mince words, Mr. President; I refer to the case of Mr. Charles Bohlen, sometimes called "Chip" Bohlen. This case came to the desk of Mr. McLeod, the now head of the Bureau of Security; and with the case came the report of an FBI investigation. . . . On the basis of the information thus furnished to him, Mr. President, Mr. McLeod concluded that he could not clear Mr. Bohlen. He reported this conclusion to the Secretary of State. I do not know, Mr. President, what the Secretary of State told the Committee on Foreign Relations [during the still unpublished hearings]; but I am confident that he did not tell the committee that Mr. McLeod had reported to him that he, McLeod, could not clear Bohlen. The current understanding is that the Secretary of State told the Foreign Relations Committee the FBI report cleared Mr. Bohlen completely. If that is what he did say, he said it knowing that his own security chief, the man brought into the Department to do the job of cleaning out the Department, had reported he could not clear Mr. Bohlen on the basis of the FBI report . . . Mr. President, no attempt was made by Mr. McLeod to take over the prerogatives of the Secretary of State. Mr. McLeod was only expressing the judgment for which he was hired, when he conveyed his recommendations in this matter to the Secretary. Yet Mr. McLeod's judgment was summarily overridden.

Calling the Bohlen case "the acid test" of whether the Eisenhower administration would carry out its campaign promises to "clean out" the State Department, McCarran concluded his remarks by suggesting that the Senate "refuse to pass on this appointment until there is made available, for the inspection of any Senator who desires to see it, the full and complete FBI file on this nominee.

Repercussions from McCarran's speech followed quickly. With Chairman Wiley sitting at his side, Dulles hurriedly called in the press for a conference. In a manner described by reporters as making it plain that he recognized the gravity of the situation, Dulles abandoned his usual placating approach to Congressional criticism and pointedly denied McCarran's charges. He opened the conference with a formal statement which stressed that the FBI and the State Department security officer merely reported "danger signals" and that it was his responsibility to evaluate loyalty information. Noting that he found