

Edited by JUSSI HAUKIOJA

ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY  
SERIES EDITOR: JAMES R. BEBBE


ADVANCES  
IN EXPERIMENTAL  
PHILOSOPHY  
OF LANGUAGE

BLOOMSBURY

# Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language

Edited by  
Jussi Haukioja

Advances in Experimental Philosophy



Bloomsbury Academic  
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

B L O O M S B U R Y  
LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY

**Bloomsbury Academic**

An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square  
London  
WC1B 3DP  
UK

1385 Broadway  
New York  
NY 10018  
USA

**www.bloomsbury.com**

**BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc**

First published 2015

© Jussi Haukioja and Contributors, 2015

Jussi Haukioja has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author.

**British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-4725-7073-4  
ePDF: 978-1-4725-7075-8  
ePub: 978-1-4725-7074-1

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Advances in experimental philosophy of language / edited by Jussi Haukioja.  
pages cm. – (Advances in experimental philosophy)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4725-7073-4 (hardback) – ISBN 978-1-4725-7074-1 (epub) –  
ISBN 978-1-4725-7075-8 (epdf) 1. Language and languages—Philosophy.

I. Haukioja, Jussi, editor.

P107.A39 2015  
401—dc23  
2014045776

Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India  
Printed and bound in Great Britain

## ***Advances in Experimental Philosophy***

### **Series Editor:**

James Beebe, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, USA

### **Editorial Board:**

Joshua Knobe, Yale University, USA

Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh, USA

Thomas Nadelhoffer, College of Charleston, UK

Eddy Nahmias, Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University, USA

Jennifer Cole Wright, Psychology, College of Charleston, USA

Joshua Alexander, Siena College, USA

Empirical and experimental philosophy is generating tremendous excitement, producing unexpected results that are challenging traditional philosophical methods. *Advances in Experimental Philosophy* responds to this trend, bringing together some of the most exciting voices in the field to understand the approach and measure its impact in contemporary philosophy. The result is a series that captures past and present developments and anticipates future research directions.

To provide in-depth examinations, each volume links experimental philosophy to a key philosophical area. They provide historical overviews alongside case studies, reviews of current problems and discussions of new directions. For upper-level undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals actively pursuing research in experimental philosophy these are essential resources.

### **Titles in the series include:**

*Advances in Experimental Epistemology*, edited by James R. Beebe  
*Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology*, edited by Hagop Sarkissian  
and Jennifer Cole Wright

*Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology*,  
edited by Jennifer Nado

*Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Justin Sytsma

*Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy*,  
edited by Helen De Cruz and Ryan Nichols

## List of Contributors

**Daniel Cohnitz:** Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu.

**Max Deutsch:** Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong.

**Michael Devitt:** Philosophy Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York.

**Jussi Haukioja:** Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

**Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss:** Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.

**Edouard Machery:** Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh.

**Genoveva Martí:** Department of Philosophy, Western University and ICREA, University of Barcelona.

**Mark Phelan:** Department of Philosophy, Lawrence University.

**Ángel Pinillos:** School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Arizona State University.

# Contents

List of Figures	vi
List of Contributors	vii
1 Introduction <i>Jussi Haukioja</i>	1
2 Kripke's Gödel Case <i>Max Deutsch</i>	7
3 Testing Theories of Reference <i>Michael Devitt</i>	31
4 A Rylean Argument against Reference <i>Edouard Machery</i>	65
5 The Metaphilosophy of Language <i>Daniel Cohnitz</i>	85
6 Experimental Semantics: The Case of Natural Kind Terms <i>Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss</i>	109
7 Ambiguity and Referential Machinery <i>Ángel Pinillos</i>	139
8 General Terms, Hybrid Theories and Ambiguity: A Discussion of Some Experimental Results <i>Genoveva Martí</i>	157
9 Testing Transparent Ascriptions: A Plea for an Experimental Approach <i>Mark Phelan</i>	173
Index	203

# List of Figures

4.1 Results from Machery et al. (2004)	70
4.2 Results of Machery et al. (2009) and of Machery and Olivola (unpublished)	72
4.3 Results of Machery et al.'s (forthcoming) Study 5	73
9.1 Mean saying scores	187
9.2 Percentage of transparency assessments per vignette	188
9.3 Mean saying/conveying scores across first- and third-person vignettes	191
9.4 Mean overall agreement with meaning equivalence statements	194
9.5 Mean agreement with meaning equivalency statements for those who judged the hedged claim was conveyed	195

# Introduction

Jussi Haukioja

Experimental philosophy has, in the last ten years or so, caused a wide variety of reactions, ranging from excitement and elation to irritation and exasperation. More and more experimental work is being done on intuition and judgement concerning values, free will, consciousness, and so on – and last but not least, language. Whatever view one takes on the relevance of experimental data, it is undeniable that experimental philosophy has contributed enormously to the recent interest in metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology, and thereby to increased self-reflection in analytic philosophy.

One should resist the urge to make sweeping generalizations about philosophical methodology, whether one is defending the armchair or throwing it away. As Daniel Cohnitz stresses in his contribution to this volume, it is by no means obvious – or even likely – that the same kind of reaction to the use of experimental methods is justified *across all subfields* of philosophy (even of analytic philosophy). Different subfields are concerned with different questions, and may even have different explanatory goals. In philosophy of language, many questions are concerned with how *our* language functions, rather than with how *all* languages *must* function. As a consequence, empirical considerations and also experimental methods may well be more directly relevant here than in other areas of philosophy. Thus, philosophers who are otherwise sceptical of experimental philosophy may well think that in the case of the philosophy of language, experimental results do have a role to play. Given the difficulty of drawing a clear line between philosophy of language and linguistics, this should not be surprising.

Indeed, many philosophers of language – most likely the majority – do acknowledge that experimental data *can* be relevant to questions that are typically thought to belong to philosophy of language, but they disagree on



which questions should be studied experimentally, and in particular, as *what kind of data* is relevant. Many theorists appear to feel that the kinds of survey studies currently available, while perhaps interesting in many ways, do not really tell us anything interesting about *semantics* but acknowledge that future studies, perhaps using different methodologies, might be able to do so.

The methodological battles continue, then, as new experimental data keeps coming in. Unlike in (many areas of) linguistics, there is no consensus on what kind of data is relevant, and for which questions. Experimental philosophy of language is, in many ways, still in its early stages. This volume reflects this. All of the papers engage, more or less directly, in the methodological debates surrounding experimental philosophy of language. At the same time, two of the papers present new data, two others discuss results that are as of yet unpublished, and the remaining four discuss the conclusions (if any) that can be drawn from existing studies, and suggest ways of improving on current experimental methods.

## 1. How it started: MMNS 2004 and the challenge to traditional armchair methodology

Much of the current interest in experimental philosophy of language is due to Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich's (MMNS) provocative 2004 paper "Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style". MMNS presented an experimentally based challenge to what they take to be the standard methodology in philosophy of language in general (and in much of analytical philosophy outside philosophy of language) and theories of reference in particular. As they see it, theories of reference have been formulated by appealing to philosophers' own *intuitions* about reference: such intuitions have been taken to be the primary *evidence* that a theory of reference should adequately capture in order to be successful. MMNS went on to present experimental data gathered on vignettes closely modelled after Kripke's Gödel/Schmidt example and claimed their results show that the kinds of intuitions that have been taken to be evidence in theorizing about reference are culture-relative and, thus, far from as universal as philosophers of language have been assuming.

MMNS's paper created a voluminous discussion that is still ongoing. Various aspects of the original study have been criticized, but Machery and other experimental philosophers have been remarkably quick in coming up with new experiments to improve on the earlier ones. (For helpful summaries of the state of the research, see Genone 2012; Hansen forthcoming.)

Yet doubts remain about the assumption underlying the experimental project, as described by MMNS. In his contribution to this volume, Max Deutsch argues that MMNS, as well as many of their critics, are simply *wrong* in assuming that Kripke and other philosophers of language have been centrally relying on intuitions in theorizing about reference. Deutsch argues that the sections of Kripke (1980) that are often taken to signal an evidential appeal to intuitions have been misinterpreted and that the primary evidence for causal-historical theories is to be found in our ordinary, empirical knowledge about language and the world (cf. also Deutsch 2009; Cappelen 2012). Consequently, if it is intuitions that experimental philosophers such as MMNS are probing in their studies, their results are simply not directly relevant to theories of reference.

Michael Devitt, however, accepts that intuitions have played a central role in theorizing about reference, also in Kripke's groundbreaking work. Having said that, Devitt urges that philosophy of language should mature in its methodology and adopt experimental methods to study, not intuitions, but *linguistic usage*. In his "Testing Theories of Reference", Devitt summarizes his argument for this view, presented earlier (e.g. Devitt 1996, 2011). He then goes on to discuss in more detail exactly how theories of reference *should* be empirically tested, suggesting the use of corpus studies and/or elicited production. He also reports on a study he carried out with Wesley Buckwalter and Kate Devitt (unpublished), where they attempted to use the method of elicited production to study the reference of proper names. This study was unsuccessful but informative, in uncovering some pitfalls that should be avoided by future work.

In "A Rylean Argument against Reference", Edouard Machery develops further a particular strand in his earlier argumentation. Machery's attention here is on the notion of *type* reference rather than *token* reference – on the relation between a *type* of proper name and a particular. After reviewing experimental data (some of it new and as of yet unpublished) that appears to indicate substantial demographic variation in speakers' judgements about reference, he focuses on a particular kind of response that has seemed promising to many philosophers: claiming that the data does not need to be taken seriously because the folk have at best confused concepts of reference and extension. Machery argues that this move comes at a significant cost: theories of reference and extension could no longer be seen as dealing with a subject matter that is pre-theoretically grasped. The burden of proof, Machery claims, is now on the theorist of reference, to show that the relations of (type) reference and extension are real and that theorizing about them serves some explanatory purpose.

Daniel Cohnitz argues in his contribution that experimental work may have more promise of giving directly informative results in philosophy of language, and philosophical semantics in particular, than in other subfields of philosophy. Drawing on the meta-internalist perspective on reference developed in earlier work (Cohnitz and Haukioja 2013 and forthcoming), he claims that the intuitive application and interpretation of language should be seen as *constituting* the relevant semantic facts rather than *tracking* an independently existing realm of facts. Empirical data about our semantic dispositions will then be immediately relevant to theorizing about reference, at least to the extent that we expect theories of reference to play a role in explaining successful linguistic communication between speakers. Cohnitz goes on to suggest that experimental philosophers should adopt methods from psycholinguistics to get more informative data. For example, eye-tracking studies have been used with success to study the reference of anaphoric pronouns. This methodology could also be used by philosophers to study the intuitive application and interpretation of referring expressions, as well as to study related issues such as the discrimination between speaker's reference and semantic reference.

## 2. Beyond proper names

The focus on proper names in recent experimental philosophy of language is understandable, given the origin of the recent debates. But reference (though central) is just one among many philosophically interesting linguistic phenomena, and proper names (though important) are just one class of referring expressions. Both Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) took the central ideas in the new causal-historical theory of reference also to apply to natural kind terms – indeed, Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment has been just as central and influential in recent philosophy of language as Kripke's Gödel/Schmidt experiment is (if not more so).

In their “Experimental Semantics: The Case of Natural Kind Terms”, Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss distinguish between various different things that might be meant by “semantic theory”, and discuss the role of both empirical evidence and theoretical expertise in the construction of theories according to each way of construing the central questions. Informed by this, they then go on to review the existing evidence concerning the semantics of natural kind terms, presented from the armchair *and* from experimental studies, as well as from the history of science. Häggqvist and Wikforss argue that, contrary to widespread

impressions, this evidence lends some support to *cluster* theories of natural kind terms, but more evidence, and more carefully designed experiments, are sorely needed.

Ángel Pinillos suggests in his contribution that perhaps *both* main contenders, descriptivist theories *and* causal-historical theories, are (partly) correct when it comes to the reference of natural kind terms and proper names. He reviews the data from a recent study on natural kind terms (Nichols et al. forthcoming) and concludes that the view that natural kind terms are *ambiguous* between descriptivist and causal-historical readings at least deserves to be taken seriously. Pinillos then goes on to present new experimental data, where he explores a similar theory for proper names, and argues that his data lends support to the view that names are, indeed, ambiguous in the same way.

In her “General Terms, Hybrid Theories and Ambiguity: A Discussion of Some Experimental Results”, Genoveva Martí also discusses theories of this kind, as well as the theory (also experimentally motivated) presented by Genone and Lombrozo (2012) for a *hybrid* semantics for natural kind terms. Martí finds the motivation for such theoretical moves wanting. Even if the data turns out to support a hybrid theory, or an ambiguity theory, this does not represent a radical departure from the causal-historical theories that have been formulated during the last decades. Traditional descriptivist theories were driven by the assumption that all reference has to be *mediated* by descriptions, and any causal-historical theorist will agree that *some* terms, or some uses of terms, have their reference determined by descriptions. A hybrid theory, or an ambiguity theory, will then *agree* that not all reference has to be mediated, and only represent a minor adjustment to the causal-historical picture rather than a wholesale rejection of it.

### 3. Beyond reference and extension

Appeals to ‘what we would say’ in philosophy of language are not limited to theories of reference and extension. It is therefore to be expected that empirical data can be highly relevant for a number of other projects in philosophy of language. However, the precise relevance of experimental results of a given kind to a given problem will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

The final paper in this book, Mark Phelan’s “Testing Transparent Ascriptions: A Plea for an Experimental Approach” tackles the problem of first-person belief attributions. Do utterances of the form “I believe that *p*” always directly express

the mental state of the speaker, and only *imply* information about the non-psychological world (as Grice 1989 would have it)? Or do they on some occasions express the speaker's belief states, and on others hedged information about the world (the 'direct expression' view)? Phelan clarifies the two competing theories and presents the data from a series of experiments he conducted, finding *prima facie* support for the direct expression view.

## References

- Cappelen, H. (2012), *Philosophy without Intuitions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohnitz, D. and Haukioja, J. (2013), 'Meta-externalism vs meta-internalism in the study of reference'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 91, 475–500.
- Cohnitz, D. and Haukioja, J. (forthcoming), 'Intuitions in philosophical semantics'. *Erkenntnis*.
- Deutsch, M. (2009), 'Experimental philosophy and the theory of reference'. *Mind and Language*, 24 (4), 445–466.
- Devitt, M. (1996), *Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Devitt, M. (2011), 'Experimental semantics'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXXXII, 418–435.
- Genone, J. (2012), 'Theories of reference and experimental philosophy'. *Philosophy Compass*, 7, 152–163.
- Genone, J. and Lombrozo, T. (2012), 'Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference'. *Philosophical Psychology*, 25, 717–742.
- Grice, P. (1989), *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hansen, N. (forthcoming), 'Experimental philosophy of language'. *Oxford Handbooks Online*.
- Kripke, S. A. (1980), *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. P. (2004), 'Semantics, cross-cultural style'. *Cognition*, 92, B1–B12.
- Nichols, S., Pinillos, A. and Mallon, R. (forthcoming), 'Ambiguous reference'. *Mind*.
- Putnam, H. (1975), 'The meaning of "meaning"', *Philosophical Papers Vol. 2: Mind, Language, and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# Kripke's Gödel Case

Max Deutsch

## 1. Introduction

In earlier work (Deutsch 2009), I argued that Saul Kripke does not, in *Naming and Necessity* (henceforth, “*NN*”), treat intuitions about his famous *Gödel Case* as evidence for what he takes to be true in the case. I claim that this shows that empirical data collected by experimental philosophers of language, to the effect that speakers from different cultural backgrounds have conflicting intuitions about the case<sup>1</sup>, does not in any way affect Kripke's argument for his conclusion about the case. One thing I emphasized in my earlier work is that there really is an *argument* in Kripke's book, as opposed to a simple appeal to intuition, for what he takes to be true in the Gödel Case.

I have two aims in the present chapter. First, I aim to bolster the argument I've made for the view that there are no evidential appeals to intuition in Kripke's argument for his conclusion about the Gödel Case. The argument needs bolstering, apparently; despite my earlier efforts, there are still many philosophers (and not just experimental ones) who insist that Kripke makes such appeals in arguing for that conclusion. Second, I aim to discuss a passage in *NN* that has been interpreted by many commentators as indicating an explicit endorsement, by Kripke, of the metaphilosophical view that intuitions are evidence for philosophical claims. I will argue that this is misinterpretation; reading the passage in context reveals that it is very likely not intended as such an endorsement.

## 2. The case

The thesis that Kripke means to establish in the passages in which the Gödel Case appears is the anti-descriptivist thesis that the reference of an ordinary

proper name is not determined by definite descriptions that users of the name associate with it. The Gödel Case is intended to reveal a counterexample to descriptivism; it involves an ordinary proper name, “Gödel”, which, relative to the circumstances Kripke hypothesizes in the case, does not, Kripke claims, refer to the object to which it *would* refer if its reference were determined by associated definite descriptions. Here is the case as Kripke presents it:

### The Gödel Case

Let’s take a simple case. In the case of Gödel that’s practically the only thing many people have heard about him – that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Does it follow that whoever discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is the referent of “Gödel”?

Imagine the following blatantly fictional situation. (I hope Professor Gödel is not present.) Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A man named “Schmidt”, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then, when our ordinary man uses the name “Gödel”, he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description, “the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic”. Of course you might try changing it to “the man who *published* the discovery of the incompleteness of arithmetic”. By changing the story a little further one can make even this formulation false. Anyway, most people might not even know whether the thing was published or got around by word of mouth. Let’s stick to “the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic”. So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about “Gödel”, are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not. (Kripke 1980, pp. 83–84)

Kripke’s conclusion about his example is that, in the hypothesized “blatantly fictional” circumstances, “Gödel” refers to the man who stole the incompleteness proof, namely Gödel, not to the man who discovered the proof, Schmidt. If this conclusion is correct, then the Gödel Case is a counterexample to those varieties of descriptivism that imply the opposite. Henceforth, I will refer to Kripke’s conclusion about the Gödel Case as the *Gödel Judgement*.

### 3. Evidential appeals to intuitions

The question I turn to in the next section is *how* Kripke means to establish the truth of the Gödel Judgement. A very common view is that he means to do so at

least in part by making an evidential appeal to his own and his readers' *intuition* that the Gödel Judgement is true. I will argue that that this common view is mistaken, but before turning to that argument it will be helpful to get clearer about what, exactly, constitutes an evidential appeal to an intuition.

Fortunately, despite many disagreements over details, there has emerged something of a consensus about the nature of intuitions. For example, there is widespread agreement that "intuition" names a kind of *propositional attitude*; one intuits *that p*, where "p" names the propositional content that individuates the intuition. Another point of (more or less) agreement is that intuition is a species of *non-inferential* propositional attitude; that is, when one intuits that *p*, this is not in virtue of inferring *p* from other attitudes one holds. A last point of agreement is that intuitions are not perceptions, memories, or introspections; they have their own source, perhaps 'rational insight' (though how to positively characterize this other source is more controversial).

As I understand it in this paper, to make an *evidential appeal* to an intuition thus characterized is to treat the *having*, or *instantiation*, of the intuition that *p* as evidence for *p* itself. So, on this understanding, Kripke makes an evidential appeal to an intuition in defence of the Gödel Judgement just in case he treats the instantiation (in him and perhaps his readers) of a propositional attitude – whose content matches that of the Gödel Judgement's – as evidence for the truth of that very content.<sup>2</sup>

But what is it to treat the instantiation of such a propositional attitude as *evidence* for the content of that very attitude? There are several possibilities here. For example, it might be to treat the instantiation of the attitude as *increasing the likelihood of its content's truth*. Alternatively, it might be to treat the instantiation of the attitude as *justifying a corresponding belief in, or judgement of, the truth of its content*. I will remain neutral among these and other possibilities and will content myself with saying what I mean to be compatible with all of them, namely that to treat the having of an intuition that *p* as evidence for *p* itself is to treat it as bestowing some kind of *positive epistemic* status on belief in *p* (should one form that belief on the basis of having the intuition).<sup>3</sup>

#### 4. The argument

I have said that it is common to hear Kripke's method in presenting the Gödel Case described as making an evidential appeal to the intuition that the Gödel Judgement is true. A first point to make about this common view is that *if* there is such an appeal, it is not explicit in the passages that constitute the presentation



of the Gödel Case. Neither “intuition” nor a cognate appears in the passages, and there is no other language in them that suggests that Kripke intends to be citing evidence for the truth of the Gödel Judgement via an appeal to the fact that he or his readers instantiate a propositional attitude with the Gödel Judgement’s content.

Some will say: “But what of Kripke’s use of ‘seems’ in the penultimate sentence of the presentation of the Gödel Case – ‘But it seems that we are not’? Isn’t that ‘intuition talk’, suggestive of an evidential appeal to an intuition? Indeed, doesn’t Kripke fairly clearly intend, in the transition from this sentence to the last – ‘We simply are not’ – to be moving from the fact that it is *intuitive* that the Gödel Judgement is true to the fact that it *is* true?”

I have heard this complaint many times in informal conversations with other philosophers, and, in John Bengson’s (2014) recent commentary on Herman Cappelen’s (2012) *Philosophy without Intuitions*, the complaint has now made it into print. The problem with the complaint is that there is a better interpretation: Kripke’s use of “seems” at the end of the presentation of the Gödel Case is a *hedging or understating* use; it expresses less than full commitment to the Gödel Judgement, a commitment that is then strengthened in the final, “seems”-free sentence of the presentation. Kripke, on this better interpretation, is doing something very different, in the last two sentences of the presentation of the Gödel Case, from providing evidence for the Gödel Judgement. Instead, he is simply asserting its truth, less committedly at first, and then more firmly a sentence later.

Support for this interpretation comes from Kripke himself, in a precursor to *Naming and Necessity*, his paper, “Identity and Essence”. There, Kripke comments on his own use of “seems”, writing, “I, like other philosophers, have a *habit of understatement* in which ‘it seems plainly false’ means ‘it is plainly false’” (Kripke 1971, p. 6; my emphasis). I don’t claim that this constitutes proof that Kripke is using “seems” in the presentation of the Gödel Case in this hedging or understating way. But I do think the quotation from “Identity and Necessity” shows that this is far more likely than an interpretation that takes Kripke to be making an explicit evidential appeal to intuition in support of the Gödel Judgement.

Such an appeal could be implicit, however, and evidence for an implicit evidential appeal to intuition would be lack of genuinely argumentative support for the Gödel Judgement. However, Kripke offers a complex (and, to my mind, highly compelling) argument for the Gödel Judgement. The argument does not appear in the presentation of the Gödel Case itself. Instead it appears in the