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Individual Rights

Fifth Edition

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Preface

Most of us arrive at law school with at least a minimal awareness of our constitutional system of government. We know generally that the national government is divided into three branches and that the Bill of Rights protects our fundamental freedoms. That awareness probably began with elementary school Thanksgiving Day pageants, developed substance through various American history and government classes in high school, and finally, for some of us, is topped by an undergraduate course in constitutional law. Outside the educational setting, constitutional law issues ripple through the popular media with frequent references to abortion, free speech, religion, racial and gender discrimination, gay rights, and so forth.

As law students, however, we learn very quickly that the study of constitutional law is anything but a meditation on the commonplace. And therein lies the treachery. The familiar quickly blends with the arcane, and we are forced to grapple with a tumult of doctrines, distinctions, and qualifications. Indeed, the familiar may soon disappear as we trek through justiciability, the commerce power, state action, and various other subjects that never seem to make the headlines. Even those topics that strike a common chord are presented with a treatment that is most uncommon. Add to this a bevy of wavering doctrines, concurring or opposing opinions, and the changing personnel of the Supreme Court, and the complexity can become overwhelming.

We're here to help. We have written two volumes designed to give you a foundation in the doctrines and methods of constitutional law and constitutional argument. The first, National Power and Federalism, covers the powers of the federal courts, Congress, and the President; the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism; and some of the limitations that the Constitution imposes on state power. The second volume, Individual Rights, covers the provisions of the Constitution that protect us against the government, including the Takings and Contracts Clauses; the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; and the Speech, Press, and Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

These books try to provoke you into thinking about the larger issues of constitutional law with some depth and perception. They are not outlines. Nor are they research treatises on all the nuances of constitutional law. Rather, they present a problem-oriented guide through the principal doctrines of constitutional law—those covered in typical constitutional law courses—with an emphasis on how one might think about issues that

Preface

arise within the various contexts in which these doctrines operate. Lawyers, after all, are problem solvers. These books are tools for constitutional law problem solvers (and students confronted with the reality of final exams).

We must include the usual caveat. Our books are not a substitute for your constitutional law class or for a basic casebook. Nor are they a substitute for reading those cases. We hope, however, that they will make the classroom experience richer and more accessible. In fact, our experience is that students who have read these materials along with traditional cases have found the cases more understandable and more easily digested. They have also found that class participation is less threatening and more fruitful. We are confident that you will have the same experience.

The approach we suggest is quite simple. As you begin a new topic in your constitutional law course, read the related chapter in either National Power and Federalism or Individual Rights. This will give you an overview of the area and a preliminary sense of how doctrines are applied within the area. In reading the chapters, however, don't just read the problems — do them! In other words, consider the problem and try to anticipate how it will be solved before you read the accompanying explanation. This will develop your analytical skills. Next, as you read your cases, refer back to the related chapters and chapter sections and assess how each case fits into the overall framework developed by the Court. See if the case comports with the problems and explanations. Be critical. Finally, when you complete the coverage of a topic, review the chapter again. This will give you confidence that you know the material. Students have also found these materials useful as study aids when preparing for their final exams. After all, finals are simply problems to be solved. In any event, don't just read these books; use them to develop your understanding and your skills.

Good luck in your studies and in your careers as problem-solving students of the Constitution.

Allan Ides Christopher N. May September 2009

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Constitutional Law Individual Rights

Summary of Contents

Contents		X
Preface		XX
Acknowledgm	ents	xxii
Chapter I	Introduction to Individual Rights	1
Chapter 2	Substantive Due Process	57
Chapter 3	The Takings Clause	131
Chapter 4	The Contracts Clause	159
Chapter 5	Procedural Due Process and Irrebuttable Presumptions	173
Chapter 6	Equal Protection: Ordinary, "Suspect," and "Quasi-Suspect" Classifications	203
Chapter 7	Equal Protection: Fundamental Rights	281
Chapter 8	The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and of the Press	331
Chapter 9	The First Amendment: Freedom of Religion	449
Chapter 10	The Right to Keep and Bear Arms	505
Table of Cases	5	513
Index		527

Preface Acknowledgn	nents				xxi xxiii
Chapter	1	Intro	oductio	n to Individual Rights	1
		§1.1	Introduc	ction and Overview	1
		§1.2	The Fou	rteenth Amendment: An Introductory	
			Overviev	w	3
				The Text of §1 of the Fourteenth	
				Amendment	3
				A Brief Historical Survey	5
				Early Judicial Trends in Construing the	
				Fourteenth Amendment	8
		§1.3	The Inco	orporation Doctrine	9
		§1.4	The State	e Action Doctrine	13
			§1.4.1	The Categorical Approach	16
				Private Performance of a Public Function	16
				The Judicial Enforcement of Private	
				Agreements	20
				Joint Activity Between a State and a	
				Private Party	23
				State Endorsement of Private Conduct	28
			§1.4.2	The Two-Part Approach	29
				A State Actor Anomaly	36
		§1.5		sional Enforcement of the Civil War	
			Amendn		37
				Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment	38
			§1.5.2	Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment	41
				Parallel Enforcement	43
				Nonparallel Enforcement	44
			S1 E 2	Congressional Interpretation Enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment	52 53
			§1.5.3	Emorcement of the Fifteenth Amendment	33
Chapter :	2	Subs	tantive	Due Process	57
		§2.1	Introduc	tion and Overview	57
		J		The Origins of the Due Process Clause	57
				Procedural versus Substantive Due Process	58

		Executive Abuse of Power	59
		Standards of Review	60
		Economic versus Noneconomic Due Process	61
§2.2	The Ris	e and Fall of Economic Due Process	61
	§2.2.1	Economic Due Process in the Lochner Era	61
	1,771	Liberty to Contract	62
		The Decision in Lochner v. New York	62
	§2.2.2	The Demise of Lochner	65
	§2.2.3	Property and Economic Liberty Today	67
		Punitive Damages	70
§2.3	Noneco	nomic Liberty from Lochner to Carolene Products	75
	§2.3.1	The Lochner Era and Noneconomic Liberties	75
	§2.3.2	Carolene Products' Footnote Four	76
§2.4	Griswold	and the Reemergence of Unenumerated	
	Libertie	s	78
	§2.4.1	Penumbras and Emanations	78
	§2.4.2	Alternative Approaches: Liberty and the	
		Ninth Amendment	80
	§2.4.3	The Risks in Protecting Unenumerated	
		Rights	81
	§2.4.4	The Fundamental Rights Model with	
		Variations	83
		The Basic Fundamental Rights Model	83
		The Concept of Impingement	84
		Variations on the Basic Strict Scrutiny Model	85
§2.5	The Rig	ght of Privacy and Personal Autonomy	86
	§2.5.1	Marriage	86
	§2.5.2	Family Integrity	90
		Family Living Arrangements	90
		The Parent-Child Relationship	92
		Nonparental Visitation Statutes	94
	§2.5.3	Intimate Association	97
	§2.5.4		99
		Roe v. Wade and the Trimester Framework	99
		Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the End of the	
		Trimester Approach	101
		The Undue Burden Test	103
		Facial versus As-Applied Challenges	107
	§2.5.5	Sexual Intimacy	110
	§2.5.6	Medical Treatment	112
		A Right to Choose Certain Medical	
		Treatment?	112
		The Right to Reject Unwanted Medical	
		Treatment	114

		§2.5.7 The Right to Refuse Lifesaving Hydration	
		and Nutrition	115
		§2.5.8 Suicide and Physician-Assisted Suicide	118
	§2.6	Other Protected Liberty Interests	120
		§2.6.1 Freedom of Movement	120
		Freedom from Physical Restraint	120
		Freedom to Move About	122
		§2.6.2 The Rights to Protection and Care	125
		§2.6.3 Access to Courts	127
	§2.7	What Happened to Life?	128
		Abortion	128
		Subsistence Benefits	128
		The Death Penalty	129
		Death Caused by Government Officials	130
Chapter 3	The	Takings Clause	131
	§3.1	Introduction and Overview	131
	§3.2	Condemnation and Inverse Condemnation	131
	§3.3	The Requirement of Public Use	133
	§3.4	An Approach to Analyzing Inverse	
		Condemnation Problems	136
	§3.5	The Difference Between Physical Occupation and	
		Regulation	137
	§3.6	Physical Occupations and Invasions	138
	§3.7	Regulatory Takings	141
		§3.7.1 Destroying All Use or Value	142
		Real Property	142
		Personal Property	144
		Measuring Loss in Value: The	
		Denominator Problem	144
		§3.7.2 Partial Deprivations	146
		§3.7.3 The Nuisance Exception	149
		§3.7.4 Remedies for Temporary Regulatory	
		Takings	151
	§3.8	, •	152
		§3.8.1 Only Certain Types of Conditions Qualify	153
		§3.8.2 The Essential Nexus Requirement	154
		§3.8.3 The Rough Proportionality Requirement	155
		The Nature of the Condition	155
		The Extent of the Condition	156
Chapter 4	The	Contracts Clause	159
	§4.1	Introduction and Overview	159

xiii

	§4.2	The Preliminary Questions	160		
		§4.2.1 Is There a Contractual Obligation?	160		
		Implied Contractual Obligations	161		
		State Law as an Implied Contractual			
		Obligation	162		
		§4.2.2 Does a Change in State Law Impair a			
		Contractual Obligation?	163		
		§4.2.3 Is the Impairment Substantial?	164		
	§4.3		166		
	§4.4	The Special Problems of Contracts to Which a			
	-	State Is a Party	169		
Chapter 5	Proc	Procedural Due Process and Irrebuttable			
	Pres	Presumptions			
	§5.1	Introduction and Overview	173		
	§5.2	A Protected Liberty or Property Interest?	175		
		§5.2.1 What Constitutes Liberty?	175		
		§5.2.2 What Constitutes Property?	178		
		§5.2.3 The Relevance of Custom and Practice	182		
	§5.3	What Constitutes a Deprivation?	183		
	§5.4	-	185		
	§5.5	What Kind of Hearing Must Be Afforded?	186		
		§5.5.1 The "Bitter with the Sweet" Approach	186		
		§5.5.2 The Mathews v. Eldridge Test	187		
		§5.5.3 The Requirement of a Prior Hearing	189		
		§5.5.4 Exceptions to the Prior Hearing Requirement	191		
		§5.5.5 The Formality of the Prior Hearing	195		
	§5.6	Possible Postdeprivation Remedies Where No			
		Liberty or Property Interest Exists	196		
	§5.7	The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine	197		
	9	§5.7.1 Rebuttable and Irrebuttable Presumptions	198		
		§5.7.2 The Doctrine in Its Prime	199		
		§5.7.3 The Doctrine Today	200		
Chapter 6	Eau	al Protection: Ordinary, "Suspect,"			
F		"Quasi-Suspect" Classifications	203		
	§6.1	Introduction and Overview	203		
	§6.2	Equal Protection: General Principles	206		
		§6.2.1 Detecting Discrimination: Facial,			
		Design, and Applied	206		
		Facial Discrimination	206		
		Discrimination by Design	207		
		Discriminatory Application	207		

	§6.2.2	The Prima Facie Case	208
		Disproportionate Impact	208
		Discriminatory Purpose	210
		Legislative History	212
		The Manner of Adoption	212
		Inferring Purpose from Impact and Other	
		Circumstantial Evidence	213
		Inferring Intent from Application	214
		The Keyes Presumption	214
		Difficulties with the Purpose Element	216
	§6.2.3	Rebutting the Prima Facie Case	217
§6.3	The Rat	tional Basis Equal Protection Test	220
§6.4	Classific	cations on the Basis of Race or National	
	Origin		223
	§6.4.1	Race as a Suspect Classification	223
		The Court's Early Treatment of Race	223
		The Rationale for Strict Scrutiny	225
	§6.4.2	Strict Scrutiny as a Measure of	
		Constitutionality	227
		Compelling Interest	227
		Narrowly Tailored	228
	§6.4.3	Racial Segregation of Public Schools	230
		Brown v. Board of Education	230
		Implementing Brown	231
	§6.4.4	Interdistrict Remedies	233
		Proving an Interdistrict Violation	234
		Responding to White Flight	235
	§6.4.5	Remedying Segregation at the College Level	237
	§6.4.6	Other Limitations on Desegregation Orders	239
		Minimizing the Degree of Federal	
		Interference	239
		Duration of Federal Desegregation Orders	241
	§6.4.7	Affirmative Action	244
		Strict Scrutiny for Affirmative Action	244
		Compelling Interests	246
		Narrowly Tailored	250
§6.5	Classific	cation on the Basis of Alienage	255
	§6.5.1	The Standard for State and Local Laws	255
		The Reason for Strict Scrutiny	255
		Governmental or Political Functions	257
		Undocumented Aliens	258
	§6.5.2	The Standard for Federal Laws	260
§6.6		cation on the Basis of Gender or Legitimacy	260
	86.6.1	Gender as a Quasi-Suspect Classification	260

XV