TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

UNDERSTANDING THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

READINGS & INTERPRETATIONS

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Revised and Updated

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Foreword

On September 11, 2001, the United States was confronted with the stark reality of modern terrorism. The brutal murder of thousands of innocent lives stripped away our ability to ignore the threat posed by the emergence of transnational terrorist organizations. The terrorism we witnessed on September 11 was a giant escalation of an evolving threat. Prior to these tragic attacks, Americans had witnessed a steadily growing series of violent attacks culminating in more than 5,000 casualties in the terrorist bombings of our East African embassies in 1998. Now the question is not *if* further terrorist attacks will occur in the United States, but *when* and to what magnitude. One thing is certain, terrorists will continue to try to adapt to the changing counterterror security environment.

Terrorism, at its very roots, centers on fear and targets our liberal democratic values. The fear generated by terrorism speaks to our vulnerabilities and the government's apparent lack of ability to stop further attacks. The current proliferation of lethal technologies, combined with radical ideologies, potentially presents truly horrific scenarios. We will continue to witness new forms of terrorism, be they viruses that selectively attack target populations or suicide bombers attempting to slaughter our children in our nation's schools. It is imperative for all of us to study and learn about these new threats. We will be driven to understand why terrorism occurs and how best to counter terrorism's driving forces. The goal of this superb collection is to heighten the reader's awareness of the critical issues related to the threat of terrorism. Although it is impossible for any single work to address the entire breadth of the terrorism field, this volume captures the most salient pieces on the subject.

There are many terrorism experts in academia. However, there are only a handful of individuals who combine impressive academic credentials with extensive special operations combat and training experience. The editors of this compilation, Colonel Russ Howard and Major Reid Sawyer, are two distinguished scholars who have also spent careers on the cutting edge of U.S. military special operations. Their combined experience of over 30 years in the front lines of the struggle to prevent terrorism provides them with a distinct and uniquely informed perspective on the current war on terrorism. Together they have gathered and edited the best works of more than 15 of the leading commentators on terrorism at a critical time in our nation's history.

This superbly researched book also reflects their experience in teaching security-related courses in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Colonel Howard and Major Sawyer have refined their thinking on the topic by their experimentation with the curriculum in these national security courses. We suggest that students of national security polity will find this book to be a unique combination of well-known and astute thinkers who have articulated the current and future policy implications of terrorism. The relevant experience of both Howard and Sawyer as editors places them in the best position to "connect the dots" of this wide-ranging material.

There is much uncertainty about the future. However, we are sure that only through diligent and creative study can America effectively address this very real asymmetrical threat to our national security. We are challenged to develop a conceptual framework to re-evaluate the security environment. Clearly we must craft flexible and effective counterterrorism strategies. The policy solutions to this complex threat of terrorism do not lie solely with our military, or even our government. Instead, we must create cooperative efforts to find a national solution to manage the terrorist threat that involves a partnership with the international community combined with an integrated and coherent strategy, which unites community, state, and federal authorities supported by business, the health professions, and academia. We also cannot allow ourselves to become trapped in overly simplistic views of the threat. Our challenge is to dramatically embrace our domestic security while carefully preserving our precious freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, as well as the safety and dignity of foreigners living among us.

Through the thoughtful study of the definitions, issues, and recommendations provided by these accomplished authors and the editors, we can hopefully move toward a better understanding of terrorism and its causes.

Barry R. McCaffrey

Preface

T he haunting image of New York's falling twin towers defined for the world the reality of the "new terrorism." Americans had faced terrorism before September 11. However, terrorism's previous incarnations, were not nearly as organized, deadly, or personal as the attacks inflicted on New York City and Washington, D.C., or on that remote Pennsylvania field.

In 1984 when I first became involved in the antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts, most international and national terrorism was ideological. It was part of the East versus West, left versus right confrontation—a small but dangerous side-show to the greater, bipolar, Cold War drama. In the past, terrorism was almost always the province of groups of militants that had the backing of political forces and states hostile to American interests. Under the old rules, "terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."[1] They did not want large body counts because they wanted converts. They wanted a seat at the table. Today's terrorists are not particularly concerned about converts and don't want a seat at the table, "They want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it."[2]

What is new to me and my generation, but not to Reid Sawyer and his, is the emergence of terrorism that is not ideological in a political sense. Instead it is inspired by religious extremism and ethnic-separatist elements, who might be individuals such as the Unabomber, or like-minded people working in cells, small groups, or larger coalitions.[3] They do not answer completely to any government, operate across national borders, and have access to funding and advanced technology.[4] Such groups are not bound by the same constraints or motivated by the same goals as nation-states. And, unlike state-sponsored groups, religious extremists, ethnic separatists, and lone Unabombers are not susceptible to traditional diplomacy or military deterrence. There is no state with which to negotiate or to retaliate against. And, today's terrorists are not concerned about limiting casualties. Religious terrorists, such as al Qaeda in particular, want casualties—lots of them.[5]

The new terrorism is not an ideological ism like communism or capitalism whose value can be debated in the classroom or decided at polls. It is an ancient tactic and instrument of conflict. Terrorism today has a global reach that it did not have before globalization and the information technology revolution. It can ride the back of the Web, use advanced communications to move immense financial sums from Sudan to the Philippines, to Australia, to banks in Florida.[6] And, for $28.50, any Internet surfer can purchase *Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America*, which shows how to grow deadly bacteria that could be used in a weapon of mass destruction.

Clearly, the United States and its citizens are favored targets of the new terrorists. Many wonder why. "Why do They Hate Us?" was the banner headline in *Newsweek* and the *Christian Science Monitor* soon after 9/11. Why should Islamic extremists hate us? After all, was it not United States that saved those who follow the Islamic faith in Kuwait, liberated them in Iraq, and continues to protect them in Bosnia and Kosovo? Is it a Jihad, a

war of faiths between Christians and Muslims as some suggest? Or is the United States a target because of the resentment it has spread through societies demoralized by their recent history. As one knowledgeable journalist put it, "A sense of failure and injustice is rising in the throats of millions," because Arab nations have lost three wars against Israel, their arch-foe and America's ally.[7]

Many also believe that globalization is not only a technological tool for terrorists, but that it is a root cause of terrorism either separately or in conjunction with religious extremism. Extreme Muslim fundamentalists and others who have missed the rewards of globalization worry that unbridled globalization exploits workers and replaces ancient cultures with McDonald's and Mickey Mouse.[8] According to some, globalization is based on the American economic system, and because the United States is the dominant world power, it has succeeded in expanding the reach of its version of globalization to more and more areas of the world. As the gap between the rich and poor has grown wider during the last twenty years of U.S.-led globalization the poor have watched American wealth and hegemony expand, while they, themselves, have received little or no benefit.[9]

There are other theories about rising terrorism and future targets, many of which will be covered in this book. One thing is certain however, America is a target. It has been attacked and will be again unless the attacks can be prevented or preempted. Rudi Giuliani made this very clear to West Point's 2002 graduating class when he was the guest speaker at their final dinner banquet. He theorized that America was attacked for a number of reasons: it prizes political and economic freedom, elects its political leaders, and has lifted people out of poverty; it also has religious freedom, respects human rights as well as the rights of women. America's adversaries do not, and they are threatened by the freedoms we have. "We are right and they are wrong," Giuliani said to thunderous applause. "There is no excuse and no justification for these attacks," he said. The mayor told the cadets that America has already won the war on terrorism. "We still have a lot of battles to win, but we have actually won the war on terrorism because the terrorists tried, but could not break our spirit."

This book, edited at West Point, will address those "battles to win"—how to fight and win them, and why America and the free world are in the dubious position of having to fight the battles in the first place. Why edit the book at West Point? More importantly, why have two career soldiers edit the book? Brigadier General Dan Kaufman, West Point's dean, answered these questions in a Los Angeles Times interview. "Suddenly, now the world is a much more dangerous place," he said. "The nation is at risk again. The notion that the American homeland is vulnerable is new to all of us. Given where West Point sits—fifty miles from ground zero—there is a sense of immediacy here."[10]

Organization

Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Readings and Interpretations, is in two parts. Part I analyzes the philosophical, political, and religious roots of terrorist activities around the world and discusses the national, regional, and global effects of historical and recent terrorist acts. In addition to material on the threats from suicide bombers, as well as from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, there are also important contributions analyzing new and growing threats: narcoterrorism, cyberterrorism, and genomic terrorism.

Part I

Part I contains six chapters. *Chapter 1* consists of articles by Bruce Hoffman, Paul Pillar, and Eqbal Ahmad, who define terrorism and address several specific questions, in some cases from very different perspectives: What is terrorism? What is counterterrorism? Who is a terrorist? Who are terrorists? And, why do these questions matter? Hoffman's "Defining Terrorism" emphasizes the changing nature of terrorism. He succinctly defines its past and present, explains its evolution, and predicts where it might be headed in the future. His offering is an important primer that will prepare the reader for the rest of the book. In his article, "The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism," Paul Pillar considers what terrorism is and why it is a real problem. As the title suggests, however, Pillar goes further and identifies the necessary elements and limitations of any counterterrorism policy. Pillar, a CIA veteran, believes counterterrorism policy should not stand alone but be part of a broader effort to maintain national security and that it needs to be integrated into all foreign policy decision-making. Ahmad's "Terrorism: Theirs & Ours," like Hoffman's article, also emphasizes change. "To begin with," writes Ahmad, "terrorists change. The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today." His example is Osama bin Laden, who was once an American ally in the fight against the Soviet Union and is now public enemy number one.

What motivates people to turn to terrorism is examined in *chapter 2*. Articles by professional colleagues Martha Crenshaw and Louise Richardson look at more than the traditional psychological, cultural, and socioeconomic reasons for terrorism. Addressing terrorism in a greater globalization context in "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," Crenshaw shows that terrorism is a perfectly rational and logical choice for some individuals and groups: "The central problem is to determine when extremist organizations find terrorism useful.... Terrorism is not the only method of working toward radical goals, and thus it must be compared to the alternative strategies available to dissidents."

Louise Richardson's "Global Rebels" also helps the reader distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence, especially political violence. In so doing she also analyzes the different types of terrorist-sponsored relationships between terrorists and "axis of evil" states.

Chapter 3 explores the rise and impact of new terrorism in greater depth and then looks at some of the technological and control mechanisms that make today's ethnonationalist terrorists more difficult to detect and defeat than the left-wing and right-wing terrorists of earlier eras.

I begin the dialogue in "Understanding al Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism" by outlining the six ways today's terrorism differs from that of the Cold War. Specifically, the new terrorism is more violent, and better financed than in the Cold War era. The new terrorists operate globally, are better trained, more difficult to penetrate, and have access to and say they will use weapons of mass destruction. My article discusses the advantages present-day terrorists, particularly al Qaeda, have over their counterparts in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.

A trio of RAND specialists, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, suggest in "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism" that a new type of enemy and warfare will be the product of the information revolution, including the rise of new, more

complex forms of terrorism. New systems and organizations and modes of conflict used by modern-day terrorists will inevitably affect the nature and styles of warfare. Using "netwar" and "cyberwar" as weapons, these terrorists will attack modern societies' vulnerabilities. The authors recommend that new organizations, strategies, technologies, and doctrines will be required to defeat this new form of enemy.

Brent Ellis's article, "Countering Complexity: An Analytical Framework to Guide Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making." ends *chapter 3*. True to its title, Ellis provides an analytical framework for assessing the new terrorism. He agrees with Hoffman that policy makers must have a more comprehensive understanding of terrorism in all its dimensions, including an understanding of the nuances of specific terrorist groups. The framework presented in Ellis's article assesses terrorist groups according to the nature of their motivation, their level of organization and of technological sophistication. He is optimistic and believes that countering the terrorist threat is not beyond our capabilities.

An old saying I learned as a child is that "More people have been killed in the name of God than for any other reason." Things have not changed. Indeed the articles in *chapter 4* argue that religious terrorism is on the rise and is unprecedented in its militancy and activism. "Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s," writes Magnus Ranstorp, "the number of fundamentalist movements of all religious affiliations tripled worldwide." In his article, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," Ranstorp explores the reasons for the dramatic increase of religious-motivated terrorism and identifies the causes and enemies that promote violence out of religious belief in both established and newly formed terrorist groups. The post-Cold War security environment figures prominently in his analysis. Mark Juergensmeyer's "Logic of Religious Violence" uses the struggle of the Sikhs in India as a case study to suggest why some religions "propel the faithful rather easily into militant confrontation" while others do not. "The pattern of religious violence of the Sikhs could be that of Irish Catholics, or Shi'ite Muslims in Palestine, or fundamentalist Christian bombers of abortion clinics in the United States." He argues that violence associated with religion is not an aberration but arises from the fundamental beliefs of all the world's major religions.

The final article in *chapter 4*, Adam Dolnik's "All God's Poisons: Re-evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism," takes issue with the common assertion that religious terrorist groups are more likely to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than their secular counterparts. Unfortunately, writes Dolnik, the logic of the assertion is greatly simplified and inaccurate. In his view, religious terrorists are essentially very similar to other secular terrorists: narrow-minded individuals who fail to see alternative perspectives on the issues they are fighting for. Dolnick reaches the conclusion that conducting a "superterrorist" attack with biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological weapons would be extremely difficult for any terrorist group, religious or secular, and asserts the likelihood of a successful mass-casualty attack remains low.

Chapter 5 explains why (WMD)—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—are becoming the weapons of choice among terrorist organizations and some governments. Jessica Stern's "Getting and Using the Weapons" shows how chemical and biological weapons, along with a simple nuclear device that spews radioactive isotopes, are ideal terrorist tools. She argues, however, that "despite the evidence of such weapons as instruments of terror, terrorists have seldom used them" because the technical obstacles of acquiring the weapons and disseminating or exploding them are considerable.

The contributors to this chapter agree that lumping all WMD weapons in one category is probably a mistake. MacArthur Foundation Fellow Christopher F. Chyba makes this point in his post-September 11 article, "Toward Biological Security." A former member of the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, Chyba points out that WMD weapons differ greatly: "Put simply, biological weapons differ from nuclear or chemical weapons, and any biological security strategy should begin by paying attention to these differences." According to him, "An effective strategy for biological security will encompass nonproliferation, deterrence and defense, but the required mix of these components will be very different from those in strategies for nuclear or even chemical weapons."

In "The Bioterrorist Threat in the United States," Richard Pilch formalizes the way to assess the current bioterrorism threat to the United States by using a simple formula: Threat = Vulnerability x Capability x Intent. Pilch emphasizes the major technical hurdles involved in acquiring, producing, and delivering a potential biological warfare agent. The article uses a crop-duster scenario for a case study and concludes that while the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack is small, policy makers must take a worst-case scenario seriously.

Chapter 6 identifies nontraditional forms of terrorism and potential terrorist weapons that could be used with deadly results. In "Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime: The Convergence Phenomenon," which has been updated for this book, General Barry McCaffrey and Major John Basso use case studies from different world regions to illustrate the insidious and debilitating nature of narcoterror. McCaffrey, former drug czar in the Clinton administration, is the ideal person to address this issue and is still passionate about halting the flow of drugs into America and stopping drug production in the less developed world.

Martha Crenshaw's article defines the "logic of terrorism" in strategic terms. Bruce Hoffman's complimentary piece "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," in this chapter, describes how the tactics of terrorists, particularly suicide bombing, are also very logical. Written in easily understood, cost-benefit terms, Hoffman explains that "the fundamental characteristics of suicide bombing, and its strong attraction for the terrorist organizations behind it, are universal: Suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective." Hoffman's syntax forces one to rethink modern warfare's technological jargon. According to him, suicide bombers are the ultimate smart bomb. They guarantee media coverage and are less complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations. Hoffman uses Israel, which has more experience with suicide bombers than any other place, as the case study for his article. Hoffman notes that Israel is not the United States, but says Americans can take precautions to substantially reduce the threat of suicide bombing in America based on Israel's experience.

In "Terrorism and IT: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organizations Online," Maura Conway asserts that the information revolution is driving dramatic changes in political, diplomatic, military, economic, social and cultural affairs, which can be both good and bad. Conway, points out that just as the ability of the Internet to communicate words, images, and sounds underlies the power to persuade, inform, witness, debate, and discuss, it also underlies the ability to slander, propagandize, disseminate bad or misleading information, and engage in mis-information and/or disinformation. Terrorists understand this and are availing themselves of the opportunity to connect. In particular, says Conway, "both substate and non-state actors are said to be harnessing—or preparing to harness—the power of the Internet to harass and attack their foes."

Madeleine Gruen reminds us that not all terrorism is inflicted on the United States by Islamic extremists and that the homegrown variety is as adept at using information technology as their Middle East counterparts. In "White Ethno-Nationalist and Political Islamist Methods of Fundraising and Propaganda on the Internet," Gruen explores three main uses of the Internet by domestic and international terrorist groups: propaganda, furthering resistance, and fundraising. Perhaps the greatest cause for concern in the article is her description of the exponential growth in "hate sites" on the Internet. According to Gruen in 1995 there was only one problematic hate site on the Internet; now there could be as many as 300,000. She concludes by offering "some solutions for change." Like many of the authors featured in this book, Gruen believes the solutions for control and change must be multilateral, and that both state and private agencies have an important role in limiting terrorists' ability to further their agendas via the Internet.

"Terrorism in the Genomic Age," by John Ellis paints a frightening picture of the possible misuse of the human genome. Breaking the DNA code has many positive possibilities writes Ellis, a biological terrorism expert and Pulitzer Prize nominee for his work at the *Boston Globe*. It also has many liabilities. Consider narcotics. Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the *New York Times* reported that Osama bin Laden had funded an effort to develop a genetically modified "super heroin." In theory, genetically modified poppy plants could lead to the development of an instantly addictive and wildly potent heroin product that could be introduced to a much broader market segment. If the number of junkies doubles or triples, narcoterrorism becomes seriously destabilizing. Ellis also argues that breaking the DNA code will allow terrorists to identify racial vulnerabilities and to attack them.

Part II

Part II of this book deals with past, present, and future national and international responses to terrorism and defenses against it. Organized into three chapters, the essays and articles in Part II analyze and debate the practical, political, ethical, and moral questions raised by military and nonmilitary responses, including preemptive actions outside the context of declared war. In addition, two detailed appendices—"Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations" and "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2001"—are provided at the end of Part II.

Chapter 7 examines the challenge to democratic and human rights norms that democracies must contemplate when facing terrorist threats. It also examines the "just war" theory as it might apply to protracted warfare with nonstate actors.

Laura Donohue explains in "Fear Itself: Counterterrorism, Individual Rights, and US Foreign Relations post 9-11" that public sentiment generally supports counterterrorism measures. However, she notes, "Following a significant terrorist attack, a liberal, democratic government, forced to respond and yet also forced to balance the tension between liberal democratic values and the possible security threat faced by the state and the population, will often introduce 'temporary' counterterrorist measures." "The difficulty," she says, "is that in the face of terrorism, it can be extremely difficult to repeal temporary provisions." They risk becoming permanent and counter to liberal democratic values.

In his final article in this book, "A Nasty Business," Bruce Hoffman notes the difficulty intelligence organizations in democracies have in collecting intelligence against

terrorists: "Gathering 'good intelligence' against terrorists is an inherently brutish enterprise, involving methods a civics class might not condone." Hoffman also advances the question asked by many after September 11: How much of their civil rights, liberties, and freedoms are Americans willing to give up in order to prosecute the war on terrorism?

In his speech to West Point's 2002 graduates, President George W. Bush spoke of preemption as a means of dealing with terrorists. "Our security," said President Bush, "will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." Historically, Americans have been leery of using military force for preemptive purposes, because "just war" doctrine justifies the use of force only after one is attacked.

Two just war articles clarify the doctrine when applied to terrorism, non-state actors, and weapons of mass destruction. "Terrorism and Just War Doctrine," by Anthony Clark Arend concludes that "the nature of terrorists and terrorist actions raises a number of critical challenges for just war doctrine, and that doctrine offers a great deal of guidance for counterterror operations." At the same time, Arend also seems to support President Bush's "preemptive action" comments by suggesting a state has the right to preempt terrorist actions if it can show that an attack is imminent, and if its response is proportionate to the threatened attack.

In "NBC-Armed Rogues: Is there a Moral Case for Preemption?" Brad Roberts supports the notion of "preemptive action," particularly if it would stop a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. However, while agreeing that there is a moral case for preemption, Roberts asserts that "it is not quite as tidy as policy-makers might desire."

The selections in *chapter 8* discuss grand strategies (or the lack thereof) executed by the United States and its opponents in terrorism and counterterrorism warfare. In "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Richard Betts asserts that a strategy of terrorism "flows from the coincidence of two conditions: intense political grievance and gross imbalance of power." Says Betts, terrorism "may become instrumentally appealing by default—when one party in conflict lacks other military options." "This is why terrorism is the premier form of 'asymmetric warfare,' the Pentagon buzzword for the type of threats likely to confront the United States in the post-Cold War world."

Jim Robbins agrees and further explains in "Bin Laden's War" that bin Laden fully understood that the United States was not a weak adversary—it was powerful, too much so to be attacked frontally." In fact, says Robbins, bin Laden's 1996 Declaration of War against the United States "explicitly stated the need for asymmetric engagement." Robbins masterfully lays out bin Laden's strategy to defeat the United States before explaining that bin Laden's fatal error was misperceiving America's courage and the willingness of Americans to fight. Robbins also argues that Bin Laden "allowed his capabilities to outpace his strategy." "He discovered and exploited seams in American security to conduct a brilliant, innovative and stunning act of violence, but in so doing deviated from the long-term strategy necessary to pursue a successful guerrilla struggle."

"The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for Doctrine of Striking First" by Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt argues—unsurprisingly—that the events of 9/11 were partly the result CIA and FBI intelligence and coordination failures. Information concerning the attacks was in the hands of both agencies before 9/11, say Shultz and Vogt, but the two organizations failed to share the information and put "two and two together." However, the authors also maintain that the intelligence failures went well beyond simple

analysis and coordination problems. They contend that the FBI, CIA, and the Pentagon did not understand terrorism as a strategy for a new type of "fourth generation" warfare. Before 9/11, "terrorism was seen as a secondary national security challenge—not a clear and present danger—even after the deadly 1998 East Africa embassy bombings." Fortunately, the authors believe that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld understand what fourth generation warfare is and have a doctrine to fight it. The new "Bush Doctrine," first articulated by Bush at West Point, emphasizes preemption over deterrence and containment, two key components of Cold War doctrine and thinking.

In "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," Barry Posen asserts that the United States should pursue a comprehensive strategy of selective engagement to prosecute its campaign against terrorism. Posen introduces the idea that special operations forces are the ideal for executing a selective engagement strategy. "Flexible, fast, and relatively discriminate forces are essential," Posen argues, and "the United States has large special operations forces well suited to the counterterror mission."

Wyn Q. Bowen argues in "Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism" that there is still a role for deterrence in a counterterror strategy. Unlike some contributors to this book who believe deterrence has nothing to offer as an element of a broader, comprehensive strategy for preventing mass casualty terrorism, Bowen believes deterrence still works, and that credible deterrent strategy requires knowing enemy motives, worldview, resolve, capabilities and vulnerabilities. It also requires the capability to deliver on the deterrent message.

Organizing to fight is the topic of *chapter 9*. Specifically, which organizations should be charged with fighting the terrorist threat and how must they adapt for the fight? Although written before 9/11, Martha Crenshaw's "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process" describes how difficult it is for any president, including George W. Bush, to implement a coherent counterterrorism policy. "Due to pressures from Congress," says Crenshaw, "the president will not be able to set the agenda for counterterrorism policy with as much freedom as he can in other policy areas." Crenshaw also contends that implementing counterterrorism policy decisions will "also be affected by controversy, due to rivalries among agencies with operational responsibilities." Thus, she correctly predicted before 9/11 that "it will be difficult for any administration to develop a consistent policy based on an objective appraisal of the threat of terrorism to American national interests."

Dick Betts does not necessarily disagree, but he is not sure reorganizing America's intelligence apparatus will alleviate interagency rivalries. In "Fixing Intelligence," Betts argues that reorganizations usually prove to be three steps forward and two back, because the intelligence establishment is so vast and complex that the net impact of reshuffling may be indiscernible. Reforms that can be undertaken now will make the intelligence community a little better," writes Betts however, "equal emphasis must go to measures for civil defense, medical readiness, and 'consequence management,' in order to blunt the effects of the attacks that do manage to get through."

Jeff H. Norwitz, author of "Combating Terrorism: With a Helmet or a Badge?" believes the Bush administration not only needs to rethink (and reorganize) its intelligence-gathering capabilities, but must also rethink its approach to defeating terrorism. Norwitz's essay examines old terrorism paradigms and offers a perspective on how "criminal approaches" have not grasped the nature of the war on terrorism. According to Norwitz, "terrorism challenges the categories of what is legal and illegal," so that the normal rules of evidence are difficult to apply. "Good intelligence is the cornerstone for dealing effectively

with terrorism," says Norwitz, "and the U.S. intelligence community, heavily dependent on technical collection means, is almost omniscient." Nowritz advocates a greater role for the Department of Defense in the war on terror, particularly in the American homeland: "Only the military can truly deal with catastrophic evens such as biological, chemical, and radiological attacks and consequence management."

In "The Limits of Military Power," Rob de Wijk states that "the West's armed forces are fundamentally flawed. Conceptually, the focus is still on conventional warfare, but the new wars will be unconventional." "The West needs special forces to confront unconventional irregular fighters such as terrorists, and those forces are not available in large quantities." Nevertheless, de Wijk contends that the military, including special forces, cannot win the war on terrorism alone. There also must be a "campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic people."

David J. Rothkopf also believes that the military, particularly special forces, cannot win the war on terror alone. In "Business versus Terror," he explains that an alliance of doctors, venture capitalists, and corporate project managers—the private-sector army—is the United States not-so-secret weapon and best hope. "Its best troops," says Rothkopf, "will be regiments of geeks rather than the special forces that struck the first blows against the Taliban in Afghanistan."

About three-quarters of the offerings in this eclectic reader on terrorism were written after September 11 and because of that terrible event. The others were obviously written before the event. Interestingly, and eerily, almost all of the pre-September 11 articles either predict, or speak about the likelihood or possibility of a catastrophic terrorist event occurring on American soil. No one paid attention. Let's hope some pay attention to the insights in this book and the others like it that are sure to come.

—Russell D. Howard

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