WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS



WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Why America's Rejection?

Edited by RALPH A. STONE

Miami University

ROBERT E. KRIEGER PUBLISHING COMPANY
HUNTINGTON, NEW YORK
1978

Original Edition 1967
Reprint 1978

Printed and Published by
ROBERT E. KRIEGER PUBLISHING CO., INC.
645 NEW YORK AVENUE
HUNTINGTON, NEW YORK 11743

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Stone, Ralph A., editor
Wilson and the League of Nations.

Reprint of the edition published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, in series: American problem studies.
Bibliography: p.
SUMMARY: Examines the 1919-1920 fight over American entry into the League of Nations and includes recent, as well as standard, interpretations as to why the leaders and the people thought and acted as they did.
1. Wilson, Woodrow, Pres. U.S., 1856-1924. 2. League of Nations—United States. 3. United States—Politics and government—1913-1921. [1. League of Nations. 2. Wilson, Woodrow, Pres. U.S., 1856-1924. 3. United States—Politics and government—1913-1921] I. Title.
[E766.S88 1978] 973.913 78-8323
ISBN 0-88275-679-6

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The fight over the League of Nations from 1918 to 1920 is a dramatic and significant chapter in recent American history. The drama lies principally in the struggle's many conflicts—between personalities, ideas, institutions, political parties, and branches of government—and the significance in the impact of those conflicts on subsequent events and in the nature of the issues raised during the fight. Because scholars differ over the reasons for the League's defeat, because they cannot agree on the fight's significance, and because many of the issues are still relevant and unresolved, we have a problem worthy of consideration. This book of readings is about that problem.

It will be helpful to look first at the leading personality of the fight since he is at the center of so much of the controversy. The League of Nations and the name Woodrow Wilson will always be joined. Wilson made the League his greatest cause. He became an early convert to the idea of collective security and around it shaped many of his policies both before and during participation of the United States in World War I. After the war he represented the United States at the peace conference, where he succeeded in making the idea a reality and in getting the League incorporated as an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty was, of course, much more than just the League of Nations. Its articles concerning territorial divisions, reparations, and war guilt, to mention only three examples, aroused considerable debate in their own right. Certain immigrant groups disliked the articles that drew European boundaries not in keeping with the principle of self-determination. Liberals protested the violations of self-determination and the harshness of the terms for Germany. Wilson himself realized there were weaknesses in the Treaty, but he saw in the League, tied as it was to the rest of the Treaty, an instrument for rectifying some of the past mistakes and preventing future ones. Thus, his final effort: to persuade the American people and through them the Senate to approve the Treaty and thereby bring the United States into the League. In this he failed. His strenuous speaking tour around the nation proved futile. If fires were lighted in the hinterland, they failed to reach Washington with enough heat to affect senators. And the tour almost proved fatal when Wilson suffered a massive stroke. Shortly thereafter the Senate

rejected the Treaty, on three separate votes in November 1919, and finally in March 1920. If this was not the *coup de grâce,* the election in November 1920 of Warren G. Harding as president surely was. Wilson's crusade, which had begun on a high note of optimism, ended as a bitter and tragic failure.

Some writers see great irony in Wilson's failure. The League's most ardent champion, they point out, was also its worst enemy. Whether from his physical breakdown or from his single-minded determination to see the League approved, or from a combination of these and other causes, Wilson was unable to compromise. When it became apparent that the Senate would not accept the Treaty unless reservations were added, Wilson should have made concessions. Other writers, however, praise Wilson for the concessions he did make to his opponents and for not compromising further when to do so would have destroyed the substance of what he sought to achieve. Why Wilson refused to accept an accommodation and whether his decision was, in retrospect, a wise one are questions that go to the heart of the problem.

One man's tragedy is often another's triumph. If Woodrow Wilson comes first to mind when the League is mentioned, Henry Cabot Lodge follows close behind. The contest between these two protagonists colors almost every aspect of the fight. As Senate majority leader of the Republican party and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Lodge held a position of power and responsibility second only to the president. At one time he had shown interest in a league, but by 1918 his interest had begun to wane. Whether his change of mind owed more to an intense dislike of Wilson as a man and to the Democrats as a party than to a sincere ideological antipathy to Wilson's version of collective security is a moot point. Separating a man's motives is at best a difficult task and in Lodge's case it might be impossible. Perhaps a more meaningful question would be: how well did the Massachusetts senator fulfill his duties as a responsible opposition leader? Involved here are related questions concerning the proper function of an opposition party and its leader and the meaning of bipartisanship in foreign affairs.

Wilson and Lodge merit close attention, but to understand why they acted as they did one must analyze the underlying and more impersonal forces at work. There were many such forces and, as in the case of personalities, writers do not always see eye to eye on their relative importance. Some historians, for example, have argued that the Constitution of the United States was the biggest obstacle to the League's acceptance. According to this view, it was the Constitution's separation of powers, especially its failure to define clearly the respective treaty-making powers of the President and Senate, which created suspicion and jealousy between the two branches, thus lessening the chance of an agreement. Aggravating this inherent difficulty was the resentment felt by many senators toward Wilson as a result of the wartime expansion of executive powers. Even more significant was the Congressional election of 1918

which gave both houses of Congress to the Republicans. Thereafter, with Republicans in control of the Senate but with Democrats still holding the executive branch, the Constitutional checks and balances would operate even more effectively to block the Treaty's approval.

Another and quite different interpretation assigns less weight to the Constitutional barrier than to the basic ideological differences between the opponents and supporters of the League. One can argue that the clash pitted isolationism, a deeply rooted tradition which drew strength from its association with the revered Founding Fathers and its long record of success in the nineteenth century, against internationalism, a newly planted policy which had yet to demonstrate its viability for the twentieth century. So strong was the isolationist tradition that, as suggested by one historian, it may not be amiss to say that men long dead who were isolationists in a past context—Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe were the most venerated—had as much to do with the League's defeat as some men very much alive in 1920. More recently, however, it has been asserted that the ideological division was not between isolationists and internationalists but between two or more species of internationalists.

One of the interpretations still most widely held attributes the League's defeat to the partisan political atmosphere of the time. There is no doubt that politics had "reconvened" with a vengeance in late 1918, though actually politics were never "adjourned" during the war as Wilson had requested. Both parties thought the League might have a crucial bearing on their political futures. Republicans, eager to follow up their Congressional victory by capturing the White House in 1920, feared that Wilson and the Democrats would take credit for the League's creation; but even greater was their fear that the League issue would split their own party and ruin their chances in 1920. Democrats, well aware that their victory in 1912 was due to the Roosevelt-Taft split, feared that Republicans would try to avert a repetition of that disaster by uniting on an anti-League policy or at least taking credit for "Republicanizing" the League with amendments and reservations. The fears of both were exaggerated but not unfounded.

Since the main battleground of the fight was the Senate, it is well to note that august body's structure as it affected the League's defeat. The Republican majority was only 49 to 47 (one seat reversed would have meant a tie, which Vice-President Marshall could have broken in the Democrats' favor), but it was enough to give the party solid control over the committees. The key Foreign Relations Committee, through which the Treaty must pass, numbered 10 Republicans and 7 Democrats, whereas a more accurate reflection of the overall membership ratio would have been 9 to 8. Another advantage of the majority party was Senate rule 37. That much criticized rule permitted a simple majority of senators, in this case almost all Republicans, to attach reservations to the Treaty that were unacceptable to Wilson, hence to almost

all Democrats, without whose votes the Treaty could not obtain the final two-thirds approval. After the Treaty had been voted down decisively in November 1919, about half of the Democrats switched to support the Treaty with reservations. However, enough Democratic senators followed Wilson's advice so that when the final vote came in March 1920, these "loyal" Democrats, in concert with the irreconcilables (who had helped attach reservations), rejected the Treaty by 7 votes.

In searching for answers to the question of responsibility for the League's defeat, few writers have failed to point out lessons that the great debate offers to the student of American foreign policy and political institutions. Different generations have seen different lessons, just as they have found somewhat different answers to the question of responsibility. In the 1930s historians often stressed the political and Constitutional aspects of the struggle and what they could mean for the future; during World War II writers were inclined to place the blame for the breakdown of the peace setttlement on failure of the United States to join the League; in the 1950s and 1960s, from the perspective of a Cold War, the League fight seemed to have more meaning for what it revealed about American attitudes toward fundamental concepts of international relations. So in the readings here selected one sees not only the different analyses of the League controversy but also the pattern of shifting historiography.

In the opening selection George H. Haynes presents a summary of the fight within the framework of the Constitutional conflict between the Senate and the President. Each side in the struggle, states Haynes, and in particular the two protagonists, knew well the difficulties presented by the Constitution's separation of powers. Wilson had carefully studied the problem of treaty making in his writings as a historian and political scientist. Lodge knew from his long service in the Senate just what was involved. Yet instead of facilitating cooperation, this intimate awareness seemed to make each side more ready to use "extraordinary methods to bend the other to its will," more anxious to point out the other's failures to act in the proper spirit. Neither side tried sufficiently hard to overcome the inherent obstacles imposed by the system. There was not enough "loyalty to a common master," the United States as a whole.

The next four authors reject, either explicitly or implicitly, the Constitutional interpretation in favor of an ideological or political explanation. Roland N. Stromberg disagrees with those who doubt the loyalty or good intentions of the participants. "A sounder interpretation," he believes, "would be one that portrayed men of reasonably good will struggling to decipher the meaning of the League system and to reconcile it with legitimate national interest—and in the end finding themselves baffled." In analyzing the reaction to Article 10, the heart of the League, he has sympathy for Republicans who

grappled with the ambiguities and confusions in Wilson's concept of collective security. By the same token he is severely critical of Wilson's failure to do more to clarify the nature of Article 10's obligations. He maintains that "It seems time to lay to rest the legend of Republican 'isolationism' in 1919" and that Republican internationalists, such as Roosevelt, Root, and Lodge, performed a service by exposing the "fuzziness" of Wilsonianism.

Stromberg's book, published in 1963, is concerned almost solely with ideology. Writing exactly thirty years earlier, W. Stull Holt focused on the politics of the League fight. Party politics killed the League, he asserts; politics were the major theme that blended together all the minor themes. His central point is that in voting on the Lodge reservations senators, with a few exceptions, followed party lines. Republicans supported the reservations; Democrats opposed them. There never was any agreement because each party, in particular the Republican party led by Lodge, wanted to discredit the other.

Selig Adler agrees with both Holt and Stromberg to a point. Politics were present, he grants, but politics do not explain the widespread disenchantment with collective security. The answer is to be found in ideological differences, but not the kind described by Stromberg. In Adler's view a coalition was emerging between 1917 and 1920 composed of liberals, immigrant groups, and "blatant nationalists." Differing on many issues, this coalition nevertheless united in opposition to the Treaty and helped provide the impetus to the isolationist resurgence of the 1920s and 1930s. The most important group were the nationalists, led by William E. Borah and some of his irreconcilable colleagues, in the Senate. Much more powerful than their numbers alone would indicate, the irreconcilables not only marshaled anti-League opinion around the country but also brought pressure on Lodge whenever he seemed about to yield to moderate Republican internationalists. Adler concedes that internationalists did have a voice within the party, but he contends that isolationists were in control, especially after the election of 1920. Is the disagreement between Adler and Stromberg partly semantic? If so, what criteria should be used to define isolationism, internationalism, nationalism, and other such abstractions?

A chapter from John Chalmers Vinson's book, *Referendum for Isolation*, concludes the group of selections on politics and ideology. Vinson, like Adler and Stromberg, stresses ideological causes in the League's defeat, but he has something unusual to say about the election of 1920. Most historians, however they view the League fight, have described the presidential contest between Warren G. Harding and James Cox as inconclusive in demonstrating much about the American people's attitude toward the great issue of the day. There were so many other campaign issues competing for attention and so much political doubletalk that the public was either confused or bored by the candidates' statements on the League. The election certainly was no "solemn

referendum," as Wilson had said it should be; and Harding's victory, enormous as it was, constituted no mandate for the president-elect's funeral oration two days after the returns when he declared that the League was "now deceased." Vinson challenges this prevailing interpretation. While he admits that there was much confusion, he maintains that one fact stood out clearly: the people rejected Article 10 of the League. However much they favored the idea of a league, they did not want to assume the commitments and obligations they thought inhered in this Article. The campaign statements of both Harding and Cox, the opinion of the contemporary press, and the events of the next two decades are sufficient evidence for saying that the election was a referendum, a "referendum for isolation."

Let us now look more closely at the role of Wilson and Lodge within the context of the preceding selections. The student will want to consider what part personal antagonism played in their actions, if either made a sincere effort to compromise, whether each had an equal responsibility to compromise. These questions are taken up in the next group of readings, first by Thomas A. Bailey in a selection from *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal.* In this volume, published in 1945, and in the companion volume, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace,* which appeared a year earlier, Bailey broke new ground. While sympathetic to Wilson's goals, he rejected the generally accepted view that Wilson was less guilty than Lodge for the League's defeat. Lodge certainly was not blameless, Bailey says, but his errors were not as serious as Wilson's. The magnitude of their culpability was proportionate to their responsibility for getting the Treaty passed. Wilson as leader of all of the people had a greater responsibility than did Lodge as leader of a party. Wilson should have compromised. He should have accepted the Lodge reservations, which did not, as he believed, emasculate the Treaty. Better yet he should not have put himself in the position of having to accept the Treaty with the Lodge reservations or of rejecting the whole; he could have avoided this position by cooperating with the mild reservationists. Why did he refuse to compromise? Why was there, ultimately, a failure of leadership? Bailey offers a variety of reasons: his principles, conception of duty, Scotch-Irish blood, hatred of Lodge, pride, sickness. The next two essays try to pinpoint the answer.

Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, a husband and wife team, have made an intensive personality study of Wilson. Their thesis is that he, having experienced "crushing feelings of inadequacy" as a child, sought to attain political power and to exercise that power in such a way as to compensate for his early "failures." These internal pressures which were the source of his strength were also the cause of his undoing; they "crippled his capacity to react objectively to matters at hand." When Lodge challenged the League of Nations, which was the quintessence of Wilson's effort to prove his worthiness (as a man even more than as a politician), Wilson reacted

blindly. He was driven irrationally into making the ill-fated "swing around the circle" instead of searching for a compromise. It was Wilson's personality weaknesses, understood and cleverly exploited by Lodge, that caused the defeat of the League.

Perry Laukhuff, by contrast, stresses the physical as opposed to the psychical causes of Wilson's failure. It was not megalomania, he states, or any other personality defect that primarily explains the lack of leadership. Rather, it was his physical breakdown on the Western trip. At the crucial point in the fight Wilson fell, sick and disabled. Out of touch with key advisers, deprived of his power of eloquence, unable to consult personally with senators, he simply could not give the brilliant leadership he had shown in the past. If Wilson was "emotionally unable" at this time to lead, as Laukhuff concedes at the end of his article, it was due to his paralyzing stroke. A physically healthy president, he concludes, would have carried the United States into the League.

The interpretations of Bailey and the Georges picture Wilson as extremely uncompromising. A recent article by Kurt Wimer undertakes to disprove this charge by showing that Wilson, during the critical months of July and August of 1919, did try to reach an agreement with the Senate. Wimer believes that Wilson's individual conferences with Republican senators and his proposed "adjustment" on the matter of reservations to the Treaty represent a serious effort at conciliation and even compromise. Does Wimer's evidence support his conclusions? Was Wilson's "adjustment" realistically designed to win over the Republican mild reservationists or was it a way to force Lodge and his followers into the same position in which the Democrats had been placed by Lodge? Were the mild reservationists under Lodge's control, as Wimer implies? These questions suggest that the key to the parliamentary struggle in the Senate lay within the Republican party. Thus we come to the role of Lodge, which is discussed in the next group of readings.

To Woodrow Wilson's supporters, Henry Cabot Lodge has often been the villain of the piece. This hostile view is presented by Denna Frank Fleming, who might be considered the dean of historians of the League fight. His was the first full-length treatment, and until Bailey's books appeared it received no serious challenge. Its influence is apparent in the books by Holt and Haynes. An ardent champion of collective security, Fleming has few kind words for those who question Wilson's ideas. He recognizes that Wilson made certain tactical mistakes, but he leaves no doubt that it is Lodge, not Wilson, who deserves censure.

One of Lodge's persistent defenders has been his grandson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., himself once a senator and, perhaps ironically, ambassador to the United Nations under Eisenhower. In John Garraty's biography of the elder Lodge, the grandson offers his comments. Garraty, utilizing manuscript sources

hitherto unavailable, finds Lodge guilty of partisanship, pettiness, and hatred; but his biggest failing was his refusal "to assume any responsibility." While admitting the desirability of a league, he refused to do anything positive toward creating one that was "workable." Lodge, Jr., disputes these criticisms and argues that his grandfather's reservations prove he was a responsible, constructive critic. His closing remarks draw comparisons between the League and the United Nations. One among many pregnant questions raised by this selection is: what was—and is—a "workable" system of collective security?

And today? Has Wilson's vision now been vindicated? The final group of selections addresses this question. William G. Carleton opens the debate with a ringing affirmative. Wilson deserves to be ranked among the three greatest presidents, Carleton states, and "if rated solely on the basis of long-range impact on international relations, Wilson is the most influential of all. . . ." Only carping critics whose standards for judging Wilson are higher than for judging other similar figures have prevented his reputation from soaring to its rightful niche. Wilson was a true realist in foreign policy: he combined the balance of power with collective security, realizing that the latter would gradually replace the former. Today, the long-time policy of the United States is still a Wilsonian policy. Wilson's solutions are more prophetic and urgent than ever.

Robert E. Osgood is similarly concerned with Wilson's place in history, but his concern is not that Wilson's reputation has been unfairly lowered but that it has been raised by naïve admirers who fail to understand the distinction between what Wilson preached and today's statesmen practice. Wilson's conception of collective security, Osgood writes, is not being practiced today by American statesmen. Neither in organizations such as NATO nor even in the United Nations have his ideas become reality. Rather than depending upon universal obligations of a legal and moral nature, policy makers have rightly acted from considerations of power and self-interest. Yet the Wilsonian ideal has been so strong that Americans still talk—and to some extent think—in the language of universal law and morality. The obvious danger is in confusing myth with reality. By viewing Wilson in the proper perspective, Osgood concludes, we can improve our own vision of the world.

It is fitting that Arthur S. Link, Wilson's eminent biographer, should have the last word. Link's position is somewhere between Carleton and Osgood: he praises Wilson's concept of collective security, arguing that the occurrence of World War II was due not to the fault of the League but to the failure of people to meet their responsibilities; at the same time he admits that only regional organizations such as NATO, the kind Wilson denounced, have been at all promising as security systems. Whether Wilson's ideas and ideals will ever be realized only the future can tell. "One thing," however, "is certain, now that men have the power to sear virtually the entire face of the

earth: The prophet of 1919 was right in his larger vision; the challenge that he raised then is today no less real and no less urgent than it was in his own time."

It is on this note of challenge that the readings end. There are, it is clear, many interpretations of who or what killed the League of Nations, just as there are many lessons to be drawn from its defeat. The interpretations often clash, but they sometimes complement one another; the same is true of the lessons. In wrestling with the interpretations, the student will face the complexities that confront anyone who examines the past. In comparing the lessons, he may come to appreciate the statesman's task of *having* to learn from history. In attempting to reach his own answers for his own generation, he will rely not only upon his knowledge of the past but also upon his understanding of the present and his vision of the future.

In the reprinted selections footnotes appearing in the original sources have in general been omitted unless they contribute to the argument or better understanding of the selection.

The Controversy in Brief

Party Politics Killed the League

"Throughout the entire proceedings runs the theme of party politics. . . . It can be asserted with as much certainty as is possible in human affairs that a sincere belief based on the merits of the issue was not the dominant cause of the Senate's action."—W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate* (Baltimore, 1933).

Article 10 Was the Stumbling Block

"Article 10 was the stumbling block that prevented attachment to the League. The ensuing long and bitter debate over its meaning was often obscure, yet none the less real. Men *felt* that a vital issue was involved."—Roland N. Stromberg, *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy, From the League of Nations to NATO* (New York, 1963).

The Constitution Was to Blame

"For this whole fateful series of events history is likely to place the chief blame upon the Constitution. . . ."—Charles P. Howland, *Survey of American Foreign Relations 1928* (New Haven, Conn., 1928).

Wilson's Illness Was Responsible

"Woodrow Wilson's physical disability deprived the country of leadership, the lack of leadership kept us out of the League of Nations, and quite possibly our absence from the League made possible the Second World War."—Perry Laukhuff, "The Price of Woodrow Wilson's Illness" [*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXXII (Autumn, 1956)].

Lodge's View of Wilson and Lodge's Biographer's View of Lodge

"It was killed by Wilson. He has been the marplot from the beginning. All the delays and all the troubles have been made by him. . . ."—Henry Cabot Lodge to Elihu Root, December 3, 1919, as quoted in John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge, A Biography* (New York, 1953).

"To Henry Cabot Lodge the success of the Republican Party was of paramount importance. . . . In the last analysis, Lodge preferred a dead league to the one proposed by Wilson."—John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge, A Biography* (New York, 1953).

The People's Verdict

"One of the most enduring myths in American history is that the election of 1920 was a solemn mandate from the American people to have no traffic with the League of Nations."—Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York, 1945).

"In retrospect it is clear that America's final rejection of Article Ten, as well as the balance of the League of Nations Covenant, came November 2, 1920, with the landslide of Harding to the Presidency. . . . The people concurred in this judgment." John Chalmers Vinson, *Referendum for Isolation, Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant* (Athens, Ga., 1961).

Woodrow Wilson and Today's World

". . . a faithful interpretation of Wilson's view of an association of nations reveals how poorly his conception of collective security fits contemporary American practice and how badly the prevailing American conception of collective security is distorted by the efforts to reconcile the two."—Robert E. Osgood, "Woodrow Wilson, Collective Security, and the Lessons of History" [*Confluence*,V (Winter, 1957)].

". . . the chief claim of Wilson to a superlative place in history . . . is that he, more than any other, formulated and articulated the ideology which was the polestar of the Western democracies in World War I, in World War II, and in the decades of Cold War against the Communists."—William G. Carleton, "A New Look at Woodrow Wilson" [*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXXVIII (Autumn, 1962)].

The Constitutional interpretation is an old one. According to this view, the League was defeated principally because of executive-legislative jealousy, suspicion, and hostility arising from the Constitution's separation of powers, exacerbated by the forced cooperation of the two branches during the war and by the presence of strong-willed leaders on both sides. It was advanced as early as 1919–1920 and it continues to have its adherents. In this selection GEORGE H. HAYNES (1866–1947), for fifty years professor of economics and government at Worcester Polytechnic Institute and the author of many books and articles on representation, suffrage, and the initiative and referendum, as well as a two-volume study of the Senate, from which this selection is taken, emphasizes the Constitutional obstacles that blocked the League's acceptance. His interpretation should be compared especially with W. Stull Holt's, whose similar approach results in somewhat different conclusions.*

The Executive-Legislative Conflict

The unique conditions which the Senate's constitutional powers impose upon treaty-making between the United States and other nations are strikingly illustrated in the history of Senate action upon some treaties negotiated for the settlement of critical international issues at the end of the World War. In no other period have the questions at stake been so momentous and in none have the Executive and the Senate each used such extraordinary methods to bend the other to its will.

Breaking the precedent of six score years, President Wilson appeared in person before the Senate, January 22, 1917, to make a communication concerning the country's foreign relations. He stated his purpose as follows:

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come, when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundation of peace among the nations. . . . This Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. . . . No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the

* From George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States, Its History and Practice* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938), vol. 2, pp. 694–703, 713–718. Footnotes omitted.

peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power.

It is not necessary here to set forth the program which he then presented. The point to be noted is that nearly three months before the United States even entered the war, President Wilson felt it his duty to disclose to the Senate his thought and purpose as to this country's taking its place in a League for Peace. January 8, 1918, in an address before Congress he enunciated the "fourteen points" which it seemed to him should be considered as essentials in ending the conflict, and these and the principles set forth in two later addresses were put forward by the Germans in asking for an armistice, and were accepted with qualifications by the Allies as a basis for negotiation. It was because of this tentative acceptance of proposals which he himself had framed that President Wilson felt it his duty to go to Paris to take part in the peace negotiations. In announcing this determination at the opening session of Congress, December 2, 1918, he assured his hearers: "I shall be in close touch with you, . . . and you will know all that I do." Two days later he sailed for France.

A fortnight before the Armistice was signed, on the eve of the national election President Wilson had appealed thus to his countrymen:

> If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both Senate and the House.

The response from the country should have disillusioned him, for the election returns showed that the new Senate, which would pass upon the treaty to be negotiated at Paris, would be controlled by a Republican majority, a result which he himself had said would be interpreted abroad as a repudiation of his leadership. Moreover, despite the theoretical objections that had repeatedly been urged against the service of Senators on peace missions, there was evident resentment among the Senators that none from their number had been included in the group of men—not submitted to the Senate for confirmation—whom the President had named as his colleagues.

He sailed for France, therefore, knowing that the Senate was to be controlled by the Republicans, that in its new organization the chairmanship of its dominant Committee on Foreign Relations would doubtless go to Senator Lodge than whom no one in the country stood more jealously for the Senate's constitutional share in the "making" of treaties, and that there was grave dissatisfaction with the makeup of the Peace Mission, because it included no member of the Senate, no representative member of the party which was to control the Senate, and no other American who in the mind of the people was of commanding eminence.

In the early weeks of the Congress little was heard of what was being done at Paris, but the most influential Senate leaders at once made plain their belief that a distinct and separate Treaty of Peace should first be made and that the formulation of a Covenant for a League of Nations should be postponed to a later time when its problems could be studied more dispassionately.

February 14, 1919, on the morning of the day when President Wilson was to read to a plenary session of the Peace Conference the newly completed draft of what he called "a constitution for a League of Nations," he cabled from Paris to Washington an invitation to the