

# HOW TO BEAT THE MARKET WITH HIGH- PERFORMANCE GENERIC STOCKS\*

\*Your Broker Won't Tell You About

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AVNER ARBEL

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# **HOW TO BEAT THE MARKET WITH HIGH- PERFORMANCE GENERIC STOCKS\***

**\*YOUR BROKER  
WON'T TELL YOU  
ABOUT**

**Avner Arbel, M.B.A., Ph.D.**  
Professor of Finance Cornell University

William Morrow and Company, Inc. New York

*To my family  
whose prominent desire  
for brand-name products  
made the Generic Stock Investment Strategy  
NECESSARY*

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