UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts

Adekeye Adebajo

A PROJECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE

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Preface

In 1991, while a graduate student at Oxford University, I took a course by a genial historian, Geoffrey Best, on "The Politics of the United Nations and Its Agencies." In the "city of lost causes," I also witnessed Africa's first UN Secretary-General, Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali, deliver the Cyril Foster lecture on "The Diplomatic Role of the UN Secretary-General" in 1996, and a Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, give the Evan Luard memorial lecture on "The UN and the Muslim World" a year earlier. These were all formative experiences that stirred my intellectual interest in the world body. Like many Africans of my generation, however, it was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994—when an estimated 800,000 people were killed while the UN shamefully withdrew most of its peacekeepers—that shaped my thinking about the global apartheid that lies at the heart of the world body. The concept underlines the political and socioeconomic inequities within the UN and suggests that some lives often appear to be worth more than others in a grisly aristocracy of death. This watershed event strengthened my resolve to study and improve the peacekeeping efforts of fledgling regional organizations in Africa to *complement* rather than to *replace* UN peacekeeping on the continent.

Encouraged by an early mentor, Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria's permanent representative to the United Nations at the time, my first practical experience with the UN occurred when I served for three months in 1994 as an electoral observer in South Africa. There, I personally witnessed the revered Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nelson Mandela's victory as the first democratically elected leader of a liberated South Africa. Many of the diplomatic battles to impose sanctions on apartheid South Africa had been fought within the institutions of the UN led by dedicated African diplomats, often supported by other members of the global South, the Eastern bloc, the Nordics, and later Canada. Between 1994 and 1995, I served with the UN mission in

Western Sahara—Africa's "last colony"—where I again witnessed a visit by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Tragically, the self-determination referendum being prepared for that country has still not been held, sixteen years later. My third UN stint involved spending six months as a geographical observer in Iraq in 1997, traversing that country's eighteen governorates while monitoring implementation of the country's humanitarian oil-for-food program.

Between 1999 and 2003, I worked at the International Peace Institute (IPI)—then known as the International Peace Academy (IPA)—in New York, which provided me a front-row seat to the "sacred drama" that is the United Nations. As director of IPI's Africa program, I sought, with my dedicated African colleagues, as well as the organization's dynamic Canadian president at the time, David Malone, to serve as a bridge between the UN and Africa's regional bodies and actors. We produced academically rigorous and policy-relevant knowledge on security issues on the continent with the world's largest UN peacekeeping presence. My time at IPI also coincided with the leadership of the second African Secretary-General, Ghana's Kofi Annan, whom I encountered at annual IPI board dinners, which he attended as the honorary board chairman at the time.

Returning to my own continent in 2003 as executive director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, I sought to continue strengthening the conflict management capacity of African institutions and actors and to establish CCR as one of the very few centers of excellence on the United Nations in Africa. The Centre has published a thirty-chapter volume on the UN's relations with Africa and another on Africa's stake in UN reform efforts in 2004–2005. CCR has also worked with UN bodies in supporting the world body's work on mediation, peacebuilding, human rights, and the impact of conflicts on women and children. With its great convening power, IPI has always generously provided CCR with an influential platform to disseminate its work—produced on the ground in Africa—among the UN community in New York.

* * *

Many personal debts have naturally been accumulated over this period. As always, first I wish to acknowledge the incredible support of my family—"Auntie," Tilewa, Kemi, and Femi—who sustained my efforts. I would also like to thank the teacher of my UN course at Oxford, Geoffrey Best, who consistently encouraged me to pursue both the theoretical and practical aspects of the UN. At IPI, David Malone (himself, a leading scholar on the UN Security Council) was a formidable mentor. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Aida Mengistu, and John Hirsch were pillars of the Africa program. Olara Otunnu (a former IPI president), Margaret Vogt (the first director of its Africa program), and Musifiky Mwanasali (a committed

scholar-practitioner) had earlier laid the foundation for IPI's Africa program. I also benefited immensely at the institute from the knowledge of a "golden generation" of young, dynamic researchers that included Karen Ballentine, Simon Chesterman, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, and Chandra Sriram, who produced a bountiful harvest of research.

John Hirsch generously read the manuscript of this book and offered useful suggestions for strengthening the work, as did two anonymous external reviewers. Sierra Leone's former UN undersecretary-general for political affairs and a thirty-year veteran of the world body, James Jonah, deserves special gratitude for contributing a substantive foreword that places the study in a solidly pan-African context, having already provided useful comments on several chapters. I must also thank all the other mentors, friends, teachers, and colleagues who generously read earlier drafts of parts of the manuscript, offered insightful suggestions, and, I hope, helped me to avoid errors of fact and judgment: Hamid Abdeljaber, Ngozi Amu, Patrick Cammaert, Devon Curtis, Francis Deng, Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Page Fortna, Solomon Gomes, Alem Habtu, Ruth Iyob, Erik Jensen, George Joffé, Gilbert Khadiagala, Lansana Kouyaté, Daniel Large, David Malone, Ian Martin, Aida Mengistu, Musifiky Mwanasali, Chris Saunders, Sharath Srinivasan, Paul Williams, and Dominik Zaum. I have also benefited over many years from the insights, many reflected in this book, of the following collaborators on UN-related issues: Adebayo Adedeji, Olu Adeniji, Martin Agwai, Aldo Ajello, Henry Anyidoho, Mats Berdal, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Simon Chesterman, Mary Chinery-Hesse, Sam Daws, Berhanu Dinka, Felix Downes-Thomas, Comfort Ero, Emmanuel Erskine, Ibrahima Fall, Ibrahim Gambari, Trevor Gordon-Somers, David Keen, Abdul Lamin, Chris Landsberg, Garth Le Pere, Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Victor Malu, Khabele Matlosa, Gloria Ntegeye, Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Francis Okelo, 'Funmi Olonisakin, Chris Olukolade, Adetunji Olurin, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Salim Ahmed Salim, Amos Sawyer, Tor Sellström, Martin Uhomoibhi, Margaret Vogt, and Agostinho Zacarias.

I wish to place on record my immense gratitude to the International Peace Institute for sponsoring this publication, written by a member of its "extended family." Adam Lupel, the institute's editor, deserves particular praise for his unstinting support, cajoling, and encouragement, which ensured that this project was successfully completed. Ellie B. Hearne, IPI's former publications officer, ably assisted Adam with the preliminary editing, formatting, and compilation of the bibliography, for which I am most grateful. IPI's former vice president, Ed Luck, was an early and consistent supporter of the project and has been a close collaborator (along with the UN Secretary-General's special adviser for the prevention of genocide, Francis Deng) on other projects. Adonia Ayebare, former director of the Africa program, similarly backed this project strongly and consistently. I am

also grateful to IPI president Terje Rød-Larsen, under whose leadership the book is being published.

I thank Lynne Rienner, Karen Williams, and their team in Boulder, Colorado, with whom I have published three earlier books. Russell Clarke and Bridget Impey at Jacana in Johannesburg, South Africa, also deserve praise for their role in shepherding the production of an African edition of the book. Finally, at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town—my current employer—I would like to thank the staff and board (particularly board chair Yasmin Sooka, herself a "UN insider") for the support that allowed me to complete the project. I must especially acknowledge the tremendous research support of CCR researchers Dawn Nagar and Elizabeth Otitodun and the tireless efforts of the Centre's librarian, Margie Struthers. I also wish to thank the main funders of CCR's Africa program, who are supporting dissemination of the African edition: the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, three countries that have traditionally provided substantial support to UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

Foreword

Terje Rød-Larsen
President, International Peace Institute

The International Peace Institute (IPI) is proud to present this book by Adekeye Adebajo on *UN Peacekeeping in Africa.* In this sweeping volume of fifteen case studies, Adebajo brings a combination of practitioner insight and academic analysis to bear on the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping in Africa, especially during the post–Cold War period.

During 2000–2003, Adekeye Adebajo was the director of the Africa program at IPI (then known as the International Peace Academy). Much of the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of UN peacekeeping in Africa in this volume began with IPI's work with the Organization of African Unity and Africa's major subregional organizations from the mid-1990s onward. As Adebajo recalls, peacekeeping in the 1990s was often ad hoc for both the UN and African organizations. The subregional organizations (the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development), originally established to promote economic integration, were suddenly called on to respond to the new challenges of intrastate conflicts that were often fueled by mineral resources in states from Sierra Leone to Angola to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Such challenges stood in marked contrast to the UN's first generation of relatively simpler, interstate peacekeeping experiences. The new generation of peacekeeping required the five permanent members of the Security Council to work together with African regional organizations to adapt quickly to their new peacekeeping responsibilities. In looking at these cases, Adebajo has highlighted the need for scholars and practitioners to develop a comprehensive analytical overview that includes an appreciation of all these domestic, regional, and external forces.

Adebajo's book traces the trajectory of UN peacekeeping from the tragedies of Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s to the most recent operations

in Burundi, the DRC, and Sudan. The UN has largely recovered from the setbacks of the 1990s by undertaking several reform initiatives—from the 2000 "Brahimi Panel" to the New Horizon agenda in recent years—to strengthen its capacity to deploy peacekeeping operations in Africa more effectively. At the same time, the number of conflicts on the African continent actually declined following peace agreements and democratic elections in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone, while most of Southern Africa has remained at peace following UN missions in Namibia and Mozambique. There is also stronger cooperation between the UN and the African Union, as reflected in their partnership to develop a new peace and security architecture, including the African Standby Force, and to address postelection challenges from Guinea to Côte d'Ivoire.

Due in part to their success, several large UN peace operations in Africa have now shifted focus from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction, as reflected in the revised roles of the UN in Southern Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Adebajo argues that by working in a pragmatic and cooperative spirit, international and African officials can overcome many—if not all—the dysfunctions, operational failures, and shortcomings of earlier peace operations in Africa.

The International Peace Institute continues its work today both on peace operations and the unique security challenges on the African continent. As IPI's longest-running regional program, the Africa program maintains an ambitious agenda of cooperation and capacity-building efforts with the African Union. Meanwhile, IPI's work on UN peacekeeping enters its forty-first year focused on strengthening partnerships between the UN and other peacekeeping stakeholders, while developing innovative policy ideas and tools to improve the overall effectiveness of UN and other multilateral peace operations.

As Adebajo reminds us, UN Secretaries-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, as well as a host of distinguished African political and military leaders serving as UN special representatives or force commanders, have been at the helm of most UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Africa has not been merely the passive recipient of international support but has also made "immense conceptual and practical contributions to the birth, development and growth of UN peacekeeping over the last five and a half decades." For all these reasons it is particularly valuable to have the perspective that this volume provides.

Foreword

James Jonah
Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs

This book, written by an African author who over the years has passionately analyzed the involvement of the United Nations on the African continent, is a remarkable addition to the literature on UN peacekeeping operations. Having served on UN missions in Western Sahara, South Africa, and Iraq, Adekeye Adebajo brings to this vital task a wealth of experience with how the United Nations works, combined with a profound knowledge of many of the UN's peacekeeping actors. His book represents the first comprehensive historical and analytical review of the engagement of the UN's peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Audacious and vigorous in articulating an African perspective on these various peacekeeping operations, the book is a breath of fresh air. Adebajo tackles head-on many of the myths surrounding UN peacekeeping in Africa and lays bare the often parochial national interests of the major powers involved. It is understandable that the reflection of a strong African perspective may contradict or diverge from the analyses and approaches that are common in the academic literature. But this makes it all the more important for scholars, politicians, diplomats, and others to absorb the assessment and understanding of a knowledgeable African analyst.

The book serves as an excellent point of departure for reviewing the enormous impact of UN peacekeeping in Africa. It is helpful that Adebajo commences his exercise with the first-ever armed UN peacekeeping mission—in the aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956—allowing us to see how the concept of peacekeeping has evolved over the past five and a half decades. The UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) (1956–1967), deployed in the Sinai, allowed Britain and France to withdraw relatively gracefully from the Canal Zone that they had occupied. It was also the first time that a UN Secretary-General—Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld—made use of the provisions of Article 98 of the UN Charter to plan and execute a peacekeeping operation.

It is often forgotten in today's climate that the first peacekeeping operation after the outbreak of the Suez crisis of 1956—as distinct from UN observer missions—was authorized by the UN General Assembly and not by its powerful Security Council. Under the broad powers of the General Assembly as set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly was barred from taking any action in the field of security. But the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, which was intended to prevent the Soviet Union's use of its veto in the Security Council to stop the US-led force in Korea (a force that had been authorized during the absence of the Soviet Union from the Council), allowed the General Assembly to take action on peace and security matters and thus magnified its role. This was a godsend to emerging African states, as the new situation made it possible for them to play a far more critical role within the UN than their size or influence would otherwise have allowed.

But the empowerment of the new African states was soon tempered by the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960–1964. This mission raised particular challenges for African states as they witnessed the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—using Africa as a battleground for their ideological and geostrategic struggles. The death in 1961 of Congolese premier Patrice Lumumba—who was supposed to be under the protection of the UN—and the failure of the United Nations to assist in halting the attempted secession of the diamond-rich Katanga province convinced African leaders that there were enormous risks in inviting the UN to deploy its peacekeeping forces to the continent. It was this fundamental concern that prompted Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and others to call for a continental military force, the African High Command, and to advocate for the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was born in 1963. A consensus emerged among African leaders that henceforth African problems were to be resolved by Africans themselves. This attitude, known as the "Congo allergy," prevailed for nearly three decades, as a result of which no major UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in Africa between 1964 and 1989.

Although some scholars refer to "complex peacekeeping operations" as a development of the post–Cold War period, ONUC was in fact the force behind this concept. UNEF I had been a rather simple operation: an interposition force was deployed between two hostile armies, and as long as those opposing armies respected the authority of the UN force, relative peace could be maintained. Under those circumstances, peacekeeping was seen as a regime that would support peacemaking activities. ONUC, on the other hand, was a messy operation that was deployed in a country bedeviled by secessionist tendencies and civil conflict. The command structures of the warring parties were weak, and there was a lack of respect for the UN's own command structure. This represented a "complex peacekeeping operation."

In the wake of ONUC, the Soviet Union and France, by their refusal to contribute toward the costs of further peacekeeping operations, created a financial crisis that almost destroyed the UN in the mid-1960s. The United States threatened to invoke the sanctions of Article 19 of the UN Charter, which would have deprived these two veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council of their votes in the General Assembly. To resolve the crisis, the famous Committee of 33 on Peacekeeping Operations was created in 1965. This body spent many years attempting to resolve the three issues that were raised as a result of ONUC: the authorization, financing, and management of peacekeeping operations. The Soviet Union strongly opposed any role for the UN Secretary-General in the management of peacekeeping operations, arguing that all such management should be left to the UN's nearly defunct Military Staff Committee. In contrast, almost all of the Western powers were opposed to any peacekeeping role for the Military Staff Committee. This serious dispute precluded any peacekeeping operations, with the sole exception of the Cyprus mission, which was authorized in 1964 under special arrangements such as limited mandates and financing by voluntary contributions. It was only with the establishment of UNEF II in the Sinai in 1973 that the technical and political issues of peacekeeping were resolved in a landmark report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council.

The end of the Cold War did not immediately energize the major powers to deploy peacekeeping operations in Africa. Indeed, Egyptian UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at the outset of his term of office in 1992, complained bitterly that the Western powers were interested in tackling "rich men's wars" in the Balkans to the detriment of Africa's "poor men's wars" in places like Somalia and Liberia. Truth be told, the Western powers were dragged "kicking and screaming" into supporting efforts to authorize peacekeeping operations in Africa. The halfhearted approach that they took to grappling with the tragic genocide in Rwanda (in which about 800,000 people were killed, despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission) was telling. Then, the experience of the United States as a troop-contributor to the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1993 led to the Bill Clinton administration's May 1994 issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which signified the US determination to end UN peacekeeping operations in Africa due to the costs and dangers involved. By the turn of the century, however, the Security Council displayed a new propensity to deploy peacekeeping forces to Africa. There have been some successful peacekeeping cases on the continent, such as Namibia, Mozambique, and eventually Sierra Leone and Burundi, but there also have been serious failures and mistakes, for example, Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola.

Decades of UN peacekeeping in Africa have broken new ground in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. In the early phase of UN peacekeeping

operations in Liberia, the world body cooperated for the first time with the forces of a subregional organization when the Security Council authorized a small UN observer force in 1993 to work alongside the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group in the disarmament and demobilization of rebel forces. Similarly, the United Nations and the African Union—which succeeded the OAU in 2002—deployed a hybrid force in Sudan's volatile Darfur region in 2007. The operation of this latter force was experimental, and lessons learned in the operation may improve future coordination and control between the United Nations and regional organizations. However, the refusal of the Security Council to financially support any peacekeeping operation that it does not control continues to hamper the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping operations, as evidenced by East African efforts (involving Ugandan and Burundian troops) in 2010–2011 to stabilize Somalia through the African Union mission in Somalia. Without a strong regional capacity, it is difficult to envision reliable and effective peacekeeping operations in Africa.

I am hopeful that this book will trigger wider debates and discussions on the whole range of issues examined by the author. Even though conflicts in Africa have been reduced over the years, there are still dangers ahead as witnessed by the sporadic violence in Sudan's Darfur region and the DRC's Kivu province, the postelection violence in Côte d'Ivoire beginning in December 2010, and the fragile postreferendum situation in Southern Sudan since January 2011. There is more than enough substance in the pages that follow to assist efforts to strengthen the capacity of both the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as Africa's evolving peace and security architecture.

Contents

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Introduction: Blue Berets, Burning Brushfires

> As Secretary-General I was duty-bound to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council to the letter. But as a lifelong student of international law, I lamented this situation, which both disparaged international law and displayed the United Nations not as an organisation of sovereign states equal under the Charter but as a political tool of the major powers.
> —*Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, 1992–1996*[1]

This book is about the games that great powers play. These games often determine the outcomes of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere. After the first armed UN peacekeeping mission was deployed to end the Suez crisis of 1956, the politics of the Cold War would truly overshadow future missions, as most dramatically illustrated by the Congo crisis four years later. The first armed UN mission in Egypt had been created as a result of the machinations of Britain and France. Future peacekeepers would also succeed or fail based on these same machinations, for good or for ill. The Suez crisis of 1956, to a large extent, set the tone for the later Congo crisis. The United States and Britain lined up on the side of pro–Western Congolese leaders and sought to use the UN peacekeeping mission to oppose the "radical," nationalist prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in order to prevent the spread of Soviet communism (which was supporting Lumumbist elements) to this huge country at the heart of Africa. France refused to pay any peacekeeping dues and, later, from the 1970s, would attempt to draw the Congo into its neocolonial francophone sphere of influence in Africa.

More positively, the end of the Cold War and increased cooperation between the United States and Russia facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia. None of these

missions would have been possible during the Cold War era of proxy wars waged by the superpowers. During UN missions in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire after 2000, the British and French still demonstrated some residual colonial attitudes of guilt and possessiveness in their former colonies. Historical ties largely determined US support for the UN mission in Liberia, a close Cold War ally during the 1980s. The Russians, under Mikhail Gorbachev, were able to nudge former Marxist allies in Angola and Mozambique to the negotiating table as they sought improved ties with the West in the late 1980s. China similarly pushed the government of Sudan—its third-largest trading partner in Africa—to accept a UN peacekeeping force in the volatile Darfur region in 2007. The games that these powers play, which I have described elsewhere as creating a system of "global apartheid,"[2] must always be placed at the center of any analysis of UN peacekeeping missions, for it is often these games that help determine the course and outcome of these interventions. The apartheid system that I describe here is of course different from the legalized racism in South Africa or the pre–civil rights United States and focuses more on the fact that the majority of populations in much of the Third World live in widespread poverty as a result partly of the global structures of political and economic power. Like domestic structures in racist societies in South Africa and the United States of the past, however, the consequences of apartheid are similar in terms of darker populations in the Third World suffering the worst forms of an oppressive, unjust system. Peacekeeping has often operated on the basis that those who mostly pay the piper also call the tune, and Western interests (the Permanent three [P-3] of the United States, Britain, and France) have tended to dictate where and when these missions are deployed and for how long.[3]

The five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5) of the anachronistic UN Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France—still largely reflect the alliance of victors dating from the end of World War II in 1945. The Council must thus be urgently democratized to ensure stronger permanent membership from Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. While the formal use of the veto by the P-5 has declined, it is still effectively used in the closed-door consultations of the Council, which is where much of its serious business occurs. Many of the archaic procedures and policies of the Council are well known to the five permanent members, who also have privileged access to UN documents through Secretariat staff. Decisions are often based on complex and not always visible trade-offs between members of the P-5 that have been worked out over many years. Since no written records of these closed-door consultations are kept, the five permanent members represent the Council's institutional memory, giving them a huge advantage over the ten rotating members—sometimes dismissed as "tourists" by P-5 members—who only serve two-year terms.[4] In this study, I have sought to assess the views of key P-5 representatives.[5]

The need for a book that assesses UN peacekeeping in Africa over the past five and a half decades is clear: between 1948 and 2011, about 40 percent (27 out of 65) of the UN's peacekeeping and observer missions were deployed in Africa; nearly half of the fifty UN peacekeeping missions in the post–Cold War era have occurred on the continent; the "Katanga rule" (peacekeepers using force in self-defense and to assist missions to fulfill their tasks) and the "Mogadishu line" (peacekeepers avoiding "mission creep") were both influenced by African cases; Africa hosted the most numerous and largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world in December 2010; much of the UN's socioeconomic and humanitarian efforts are located in Africa; and the world body has established subregional offices in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Central Africa, as well as peacebuilding offices in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Two Africans—Egypt's Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ghana's Kofi Annan—were Secretaries-General during the critical post–Cold War years of 1992 and 2006, while Boutros-Ghali, Annan, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, and Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng were involved in leading some of the most important conceptual debates and initiatives on UN peacekeeping and interventions after the Cold War. In June 2011, six out of fourteen UN peacekeeping missions were in Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], South Sudan, and Darfur), while about 70 percent of its personnel were deployed on the continent. Sixty percent of the UN Security Council's deliberations also focus on Africa.

But despite the importance of the UN to Africa, there has been no exclusive study that has assessed the UN's peacekeeping role on the continent over the past five and a half decades. This book represents an effort to fill this gap. Other studies by Mats Berdal, William Durch, Lise Howard Morjé, Roland Paris, Paul Diehl, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, and Page Fortna[6] have covered some of this ground but have not focused exclusively on African cases and are not based on the same practical experiences and African insights.[7] In fact, although many of the peacekeeping missions in the world in recent times have been deployed in Africa and other developing countries, this literature, though generally insightful, has been Western-centric and self-referential, almost as if the thinking and experiences of scholars and practitioners living on continents where the missions take place are not worth reading. Many Western scholars also often pull their academic punches when discussing the role of their governments in abysmal failures such as Somalia and Rwanda. I have tried to criticize these great powers where necessary, and to praise them where appropriate. It is, however, important that Western scholars avoid labeling the genuine criticisms of scholars from the "global South" who wish to expose the transparent double standards of the powerful as "polemical." As Palestinian American scholar