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# Frontiers of Philosophy in China

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# Frontiers of Philosophy in China

## Selected Publications from Chinese Universities

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We welcome you to the inaugural issue of *Frontiers of Philosophy in China - Selected Publications from Chinese Universities (Front. Philos. China - SPCU)*, a new journal of philosophy in English jointly published by Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag. Its contents will reflect the many advances currently being made in research on great Chinese thinkers and on various aspects of philosophy from Chinese universities. We endeavor to typify the multidisciplinary character of philosophy by providing our readers with a wide range of articles collected from leading Chinese publications.

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We are very proud of our Advisory and Editorial Boards. They represent a panel of well-known experts from China and abroad. We offer special thanks to all who have contributed to this project, in particular the staff at Higher Education Press, and the authors. We hope you enjoy this first issue of *SPCU*, and we hope you consider subscribing to this journal an essential reading on research at Chinese universities. This is truly a "Great News for *SPCU*".

Editorial Office, *Front. Philos. China - SPCU*

# Frontiers of Philosophy in China

## Selected Publications from Chinese Universities

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Han Zhen

## Democracy as a Way to Social Compromise

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**Abstract** In modern society, democracy as a symbol of social civilization and progress is cherished. Any government or organization, whether truly democratic or not, will claim that it is democratic while its opponents are not. However, as a historical notion, democracy does not possess the quality of absoluteness. In my view, democracy, in its original meaning, should be understood as a way to social compromise, whose aim is to guarantee a relatively fair political life.

**Keywords** democracy, compromise, historicity

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The English word *democracy* is derived from the classical Greek word *demokratia*, which means “people” (*demos*) “ruling” (*kratos*). In its proper sense, democracy is not finished reality, but exists as potentiality. But, indeed, people are obviously acquiring more and more democratic rights. Thus considered, democracy is reality.

In modern society, democracy as a symbol of social civilization and progress is cherished. Any government or organization, whether truly democratic or not, will claim that it is democratic while its opponents are not. However, as a historical notion, democracy does not possess the quality of absoluteness. On one hand, in the past, democracy did not work as positively as today; on the other hand, in reality, democracy has never been fully realized and every community enjoys only limited democracy. From my point of view, democracy, in its original meaning, should be understood as a way to social compromise, whose aim is to guarantee a relatively fair political life. This conclusion gets some support from two western scholars.

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Translated from *New Eyesight*, 2004(3) by Dong Lihe

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In *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future*, John Dunn proposed two forms of democracy: real democracy and ideal democracy. According to him, democracy itself is both a utopian ideal and a practical arrangement, although the two forms cannot really be embodied simultaneously in any political activity. In *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl reaches a similar conclusion. Dahl argues that democracy means something different for people situated in different times and places. For instance, in ancient Greece, democracy was only enjoyed by free men; in the early period of US political history, democratic rights were given only to white males in colonies; today, although all citizens have democratic rights in law, what they really have in political life, in fact, are voting rights.

However, there exist some differences between Dunn and Dahl as to the duality of democracy. Dunn is not so confident in the realization of democracy. He maintains that democracy cannot be fulfilled in a postindustrial society, in which citizens are far from fully enjoying the liberty and self-cultivation that ideal democracy promises to provide them. In his opinion, the best democratic system is no more than a way to supervise a ruler's activities, while the worst democratic system is a meaningless daydream. Dahl is more optimistic than Dunn. He insists that democracy can be realized step by step. Historically speaking, democracy has been widening its fields. Poor women minorities are beginning to gain voting rights and have shared more rights to express their views. From Dahl's perspective, ideal democracy performs as a standard by which real democracy can be compared and evaluated. The gap between ideal democracy and practical democracy will never be filled out, but, with people's effort, it is expected to become narrower and narrower.

In my view, both Dunn and Dahl are extremists on democracy. I would like to stand between them. Dunn takes too pessimistic a view of democracy, for, in my opinion, we can achieve democracy to some degree. Dahl goes too far in his confidence on the realization of democracy. In my opinion, the ideal itself is always historically conditioned. Any ideal, if it goes too far from its historical conditions, will degenerate into an illusion. If the standard of the ideal consists in value judgments and the description of reality consists in empirical judgment, then value judgments should always be based on empirical judgments. A value judgment isolated from empirical judgments will be of no significance.

Hence, it follows that any form of democracy depends on historical conditions and, therefore, is not perpetual. Democracy is a compromise designed to balance interests among members of a community.

Firstly, from the perspective of ontology, human beings as a plurality are made up of many different individuals. It is the individuals, not the people as a whole, who think. Similarly, the subject that exerts power is not the people in general but the individuals. Power that is equally held by all individuals will no longer be called power.

Ideal democracy means that every individual should be respected. Such democracy, however, is impractical. It is impossible for all members in a community to reach a complete agreement, especially today when labor division and social structures are becoming more and more complex. In practical life, the tension between different interest groups always exists, so the balance or compromise of different interests is badly needed. After the compromise, a *common understanding* may be reached. Here, common understanding does not mean a complete agreement among all members, but refers to a compromise procedure that most members can accept. A complete agreement does not necessarily produce a good result, and it may give rise to the opposite of democracy—totalitarianism or tyranny.



In political life, it is the number of votes that determines the ruler, who is usually in the majority or is the representative of the majority. Obviously, democracy should be authorized through the number of votes. But even after counting the votes, the compromise is still necessary; otherwise, the majority will degenerate democracy into majority dictatorship. The political elite is empowered by the majority, but they should not exert power only in the interest of that very majority. The group in power must be responsible for the minority as well. The interests of the minority must also be protected. Here, a compromise mechanism is needed. Any individual or any group in power without a sense of compromise tends to ignore the voices of different interest groups.

Secondly, a proper democracy must be able to help the individual transcend his isolated space to go into public life. Democratic politics should be a politics of presence, in which all members (or at least most of them) feel that they are present in the political life. Individuals authorizing their representatives to participate in politics, which is a typical form of compromise, can help achieve their sense of presence. Taking American politics as an example, its democracy is characterized by representatives from different interest groups participating in political decision making. The American Constitution is a text abounding with compromises. For instance, the lower house of the US Congress, in which the number of representatives of each state is decided by its population, and the upper house, to which two members are elected from each state, constitute the Great Compromise. It is through such compromise that American democracy makes steady progress.

Compromise itself is a historical notion and should be discussed under its historical circumstances. In the early developing period of modern democracy, what the people were most concerned with was the ruling class not offending their rights, rather than them actively participating in democracy. In feudal ages, democracy had something to do with struggles for power between the nobles and the emperor. As a result of struggles, a compromise procedure arose. With the development of capitalism in a feudal economy, the middle class was born in the city. From a long-term point of view, the feudal ruling class decided that the middle class should be taxed but cannot be overtaxed, so they compromised with the middle class on taxation policy. This was the starting point of modern democratization.

Thirdly, the vigor of democracy lies on its ability to tolerate dissenting opinions. People aspire for democracy not because it provides absolute agreement by eliminating differences, but because it can achieve compromise and harmony with differences. One of the most conspicuous distinctions between democracy and tyranny is that the former aims at protecting the state of differences while the latter tries to establish complete agreement by suppressing dissenting voices.

Different from some traditional theories of democracy that regard differences as obstacles in the way to realizing genuine democracy, some advocates of multiculturalism and feminism insist that the state of differences as an unavoidable phenomenon is what encourages people to strive for equality and democracy. In a sense, democracy means that people from different interest groups can freely express their voices and protect their own interests. Thus, democracy is an equal dialogue among different interest individuals or groups, and is ultimately a way to compromise.

Not only the democracy within a society but also international democracy and equality must be based on tolerating different voices. The world tends to become a multipoled one, in which each nation must compromise with others in dealing with international affairs. Whichever nation preaches its culture as the only civilized one, thereby imposing its value upon others, will surely be condemned.

Lastly, the development of democracy is an evolutionary process by compromise. In ancient Greece, democracy was a disgrace to some people, and it somewhat meant ruling by the cousins. Aristotle gave little credit to democracy and suggested that democracy is the worst among good polities, although the best among the worst ones. In fact, not until the French Revolution did democracy really become one of the key political ideas in the west. However, Jacobin's terror and Napoleon's military adventures caused many people to doubt democracy. In the USA, democrats were, for a time, damned by the people. It is with the progress of world history and the development of human civilization that democracy is beginning to be accepted by more and more people.

The ups and downs of democracy show that politics is not an either/or choice between tyranny and democracy, but a mutual molding process between political practice and its ideal. Today, the idea of democracy as the opposite of feudal thought has become deeply ingrained in our souls. It is no longer a utopian dream, but has been embodied in political systems all over the world. This is not to say that democracy has come to a satisfying ending. On the contrary, democracy still has a long way to go. But I am certain that democracy, through compromise, will lead to a brighter future.

The compromise alone is far from being democratic, since stable and credible proceedings are also necessary. In practical politics, decision-making tendency is usually determined according to vote number, so authoritative proceedings are needed to effectively guarantee the vote counting and authorizing process. If there are no sound proceedings, some opportunists might unconscionably alter some proceedings to achieve their own ends and, consequently, undermine the whole democratic system. It is by following the proceedings that the majority is empowered. Next, let me further explicate the necessity of the proceedings for democracy.

Firstly, the proceedings are likely to compel the government to make decisions in an orderly way, thereby avoiding radical or extreme actions that tend to cause political disasters. For some people, it is somewhat conservative, but it seems to me that it is a fairly reasonable way to deal with important political issues in an orderly way or through compromise, especially when considering that the world is full of uncertainties.

Secondly, proceedings can help protect the interests of the weak. Properly speaking, the poor have no obligation to obey their government if they have no rights to speak of. Thus, the weak must be given opportunities to voice their opinions, and their rights ought to be exercised through compromise or proceedings; otherwise, they might be deprived of all political rights by strong people in power.

Thirdly, the proceedings of compromise are likely to assure the liberty and rights of the minority. If the proceedings were absent, the minority's culture and value would be damaged and they would fall victim to the majority, hence *the tyranny of the majority*. With the proceedings available, the majority may be compelled to make some concessions to the minority, and something like a common agreement can be reached.

Lastly, a democracy with credible proceedings is apt to be supported by as many people as possible, which is expected to produce a democratic atmosphere and social harmony. In political life, any law that is not supported by public opinion will lose its effect. If, for instance, a policy is supported by 90% and opposed by the other 10%, it is necessary for the policy maker to make a concession to the 10% to show respect to them. In other words, democracy should be a way to compromise, supported by proceedings or a system.

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Yi Junqing

## Dimensions of Modernity and Their Contemporary Fate

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**Abstract** Modernity, a focal point of interest in our time, means the cultural schemata and mechanisms of social action stemming from the Enlightenment and the modernization process. It is a set of new and “man-made” rationalized mechanisms and rules for human societies that naturally grow beyond geographical boundaries. The interrelated dimensions of modernity may be roughly grouped into “intellectual” and “institutional” categories including subjectivity and individual self-consciousness, a spirit of rationalized and contracting public culture, modernity in sociohistorical narratives as an ideology, rationalization of economic operations, bureaucracy in administrative management, autonomy of the public sphere, and the democratization and contraction of public power. Modernity is inherently contradictory and risky, yet until now there has been no sign of an end in sight. It remains to be the major support and dynamic in keeping human society running. Let us beware of superficial judgment when reflecting upon theoretical critiques of modernity and try to grasp the great challenges and opportunities of globalization—essentially a process of modernity.

**Keywords** modernity, intellectual dimension, institutional dimension, reason

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### Introduction

Modernity, without any doubt, is one of the focal points of interest in our time, and it is also a key term that appears frequently in the disputatious speeches of literature, philosophy, sociology, law, and economics. Scholars of different fields have perceived that the many important theoretical and practical issues we are facing today are deeply connected directly or indirectly with modernity. Many famous critical thinkers of the twentieth century, such as Husserl, Weber, Simmel, Lukacs, Gramsci, Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas, Lyotard,

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Translated by Fan Lingmei, from *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 2004:4

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Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Giddens, and Bauman, paid great attention to the issue of modernity in different ways. In fact, issues about the Crisis of European Sciences, the Enlightenment reason, instrumental reason, technical reason, ideology, mass culture, and the modern state can all be summarized as the criticism of modernity. From the practical perspective, the cultural crisis of the Western developed countries in the twentieth century and the debate of values and cultural conflicts of the latter-day developing countries in the process of modernization and globalization, to a great extent, are closely connected with the essence and fate of modernity. Just as what Anthony Giddens affirms, globalization is in a sense the “the globalizing of modernity,” and “modernity is inherently globalizing” ([1], p. 63).

However, we are still at a loss when facing it in spite of the increasing attention and interest attributed to the issue of modernity worldwide. It has not completely disclosed its clear horizon and still is an open, intercontradictory, and interconnected “constellation.” Maybe this stems from the following situation: both the defenders and the critics probe the issue more or less from a general and widespread perspective; hence, they cannot discover how modernity has penetrated ubiquitously and all-pervasively into every level of modern society as a basic schema and mechanism and how it has deeply influenced the existence and life of modern man as a basic pattern of existence. Obviously, the penetration of the issue depends on a patient and thorough reflection in the aspect of its deep mechanism and basis in modern society. Here, a so-called “multidimensional integration” perspective should be adopted. Neither the factual judgment nor the value judgment of modernity should be limited to or satisfied with just one of its characteristics or a simple enumeration and accumulation of its different characteristics. Philosophical, sociological, political, and literary perspectives should be integrated into the study of modernity to reveal its multiple dimensions. The so-called “dimensions of modernity” does not refer to the “manifold modernity” or “plural modernity” but to an organic whole that consists of inherently connected aspects of modernity and penetrates ubiquitously into all the aspects of modern society and the existence of modern individuals as a cultural spirit and internal mechanism.

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### **Multiple dimensions of modernity**

Our purpose here is not to enumerate as many connotations of modernity as possible but to reveal the major dimensions and the organic and essential connections of modernity from the perspective of the operational mechanism of modern society and the way of existence of the modern subject. Obviously, this is the way of thinking of philosophy of culture, because culture, in its deepest sense, is a stable way of existence formed historically, and it is also inherent and mechanical in all social activities and social existences. It, at the deepest level, restricts and influences each individual and every social activity, and the pattern of rational culture, a symbol of modernity, is the leading cultural pattern and cultural spirit.

#### The intellectual dimensions of modernity

When many thinkers reflect on the issue of modernity, their focus lies in the essential qualities of the cultural spirit of modern society, such as Kant’s realization of “enlightenment,” Husserl’s “pure reason,” Horkheimer and Adorno’s “enlightenment reason,” Habermas’

“consciousness of the age,” and Lyotard’s “grand narratives.” It is admitted that modernity, as a kind of rational cultural spirit, has completely accorded with historical logic, because the rational way of existence of modern society is disembedded from the experiential structure of traditional society, and its basic characteristic is that reason or spirit has acquired a kind of consciousness or reflexivity. From the perspective of the connotation of cultural spirit, the intellectual dimensions of modernity include what people have been familiar with, such as reason, enlightenment, science, contract, trust, subjectivity, individuality, freedom, self-consciousness, creativity, consciousness of social participation, critical spirit, etc. From the perspective of the vehicle of cultural spirit, the intellectual dimensions of modernity are embodied in individual subjective consciousness, public cultural spirit and cultural value, systematic historical view, etc. Hence, we should examine the intellectual dimensions of modernity from different perspectives.

### *Individual subjectivity and self-consciousness*

The generation or consciousness of individual subjectivity and self-consciousness is one prescription of the essential quality of modernity and also is the basis and vehicle of all modern cultural spirits. In other words, individualization is the inevitable connotation of rationalization. In the experiential cultural pattern of premodern time, most individuals exist spontaneously according to experience, common sense, custom, and convention. Only when the individual transcends the limits of an everyday unrestrained and spontaneous way of existence or is connected with the reproduction of science, technology, the spirit of reason, or the conscious objectification of the species essence virtually can the disruption between modern society and traditional society take place essentially. In this way, a human being in the modern sense emerges. Foucault has reasons when he expounds on human beings and subjectivity; that is, “human being” is a modern formation and has rational structure.

The process of a human being transforming from the unrestrained and spontaneous way of existence to the free conscious way is a significant event in the history of human society. It is a major factor in the operation of modern society, a source of creativity and vitality, as well as a driving force. What is more important is that this conscious state of the individual is not special to a few social elites since it is a general way of existence for all citizens of modern society. In this sense, many scholars emphasize that religious reformation has a far more important role in enlightening the citizens than the role played by Renaissance in generating modernity. In “What is Enlightenment,” Kant defines enlightenment on the basis of an understanding of individual subjectivity. He emphasizes that enlightenment is man’s leaving his self-caused immaturity. The so-called immaturity is the incapacity to use one’s intelligence without the guidance of another ([2], p. 22).

### *Rational and contractual public cultural spirit*

When subjectivity, individuality, freedom, self-consciousness, creativity, consciousness of social participation, and critical spirit become the essential characteristics and prescriptions of a modern way of existence, the common mentality, value orientation, and cultural spirit will definitely experience a radical change. The premodern cultural genes, based on the patriarchal clan rules and regulations, which were both experiential and of human natural feelings, give

place to a conscious and rational humanism. Against this background, the leading value orientation of public cultural spirit, or “pattern or standard belonging to modern society” proposed by Habermas, must give considerations to two problems. One is how to protect subjectivity, individuality, freedom, self-consciousness, creativity, consciousness of social participation, and the critical spirit of modern individual to a maximum degree; the other is how to form a reasonable and legal community in which individuals could pursue their benefit and self-realization. This gives rise to a humanistic and reasonable social cultural spirit that has equality, contract, and credit as its focal points. This kind of cultural spirit and value orientation will provide an equal environment of competition and development in which individuals can obtain their achievements, a trustworthy basis that makes possible a kind of indirect and non-vis-à-vis communication, and a contractual spirit according to which individuals give up certain amount of rights. Then, a conclusion is reached with the agreement of all the social members.

The rational turn of modern society is based on modern experimental science; thus, the abovementioned humanistic and rationalized social cultural spirit has been penetrated with scientific spirit and technical reason at birth. No matter what the realization of self-designed goals or the formation of equal and contractual cultural spirit is, there cannot be a lack of reason or scientific spirit. As for universal trust, credit spirit, and mechanism, they are in greater need of the support of scientific spirit and technical reason. As what Giddens analyzes about the disembedded modern society, “With the development of abstract systems, trust in impersonal principles, as well as in anonymous others, becomes indispensable to social existence” ([1], p. 120). The necessary abstract systems of modern existence, regardless of the symbolic tokens, which are represented by money, or the omnipresent experts system, are dependent on scientific spirit and technical reason. Therefore, we could adopt humanistic spirit and technical reason to represent the general spirit of reason in modern society. As we all know, Weber differentiates the reasonable spirits of value in modern society into value reason and instrumental reason, and in a certain sense, they are both directly connected with the characteristics of modern cultural spirit.

### *The sociohistorical narrative of ideology*

One of the important characteristics of rationalized modern cultural pattern is its all-inclusive dominance. Specifically, the intellectual dimension of modern culture is not only embodied in the subjective consciousness of the individual and a rationalized social cultural spirit. It can also be integrated into a whole, identical, systematic, theoretical, and programmatic cultural spirit or social value, which is related to the historical evolution, the prospective of the development of the society, and the ultimate goal of human beings. In other words, it will be integrated into a kind of systematic, conscious ideology, a kind of conscious, rational worldview and historical view, and a kind of specifically designed “grand narrative,” which prescribes the goal of human history. In Mannheim’s word, this is an “overall ideological concept,” and it refers to the ideology of an epoch or a specific sociohistorical group ([3], p. 66).

This conscious sociohistorical narrative of ideology is embodied in different forms in modern time, such as the rational design of human freedom and the liberation that is based on enlightenment reason and contractual spirit, the exposition of absolute truth that centers on the universal movement of absolute reason, the historical determinism that is about history in

harmony with its end and in unification with its regularity, etc. The commonalities among them lie in their belief in the omnipotence of reason and in the absolute force of reason as well as in their belief in the goodness of reason, an identification of reason and technology with the affirmation of the essential force, freedom, and comprehensive development of human beings. Furthermore, it supports a kind of optimistic humanism or historicism, which believes in the everlasting progress of human nature and the progress of history of which the misfortunes and malpractice in modern society are temporary historical phenomena or the errors of the age. With the development of reason and technology, human beings can eventually live in good and perfect circumstances.

It should be admitted that the ascension of cultural spirit from the general cultural patterns and value orientation held by the individual and the society to a universal, overall ideological cultural spirit is inherently necessary in the process of rationalization. In a disembedded rational society, the inherent analysis and reflection of reason inevitably lead to a prescription of the behavior and activity of both the individual and the group and an orientation to the social whole and the historical goal. However, when reason reaches its maximum limit, it will result in a kind of tension and “paradox,” and this is the reason for the rise of theoretical critique of ideology of the twentieth century. Lyotard and other postmodernists’ criticism of modernity centers on “grand narrative” or “metanarrative,” and this proves that they realize the importance of the rationalized ideology when related with modernity. He points out that the “metanarratives” he was concerned with in *The Postmodern Condition* are those that have marked modernity: the progressive emancipation of reason and freedom, the progressive or catastrophic emancipation of labor (source of alienated value in capitalism), the enrichment of all humanity through the progress of capitalist technoscience, and even—if we include Christianity itself in modernity (in opposition to the classicism of antiquity)—the salvation of creatures through the conversion of souls to the Christian narrative of martyred love. Hegel’s philosophy sums up all of these narratives and, in this sense, is itself a distillation of speculative modernity ([4], p. 167).

In the analysis mentioned above, we could see the enriching and omnipresent characteristics of the intellectual dimension of modern culture. When analyzing the rational enlightenment of some French thinkers of that period, Engels made a wonderful description. He pointed out that they do not admit any form of authority, no matter which kind; they make a ruthless criticism on religion, view of nature, society, state system; all should defend itself for its existence in the court of reason or give up the right of existence; the meditative enlightenment becomes the sole measurement of all things. At that time, as what Hegel says, it is an era when the world stands on its head ([5], p. 404).

### The institutional dimensions of modernity

Modernity, as a disembedded leading cultural pattern of a rational society, not only penetrates into the behaviors and activities of the individual and the group in the form of cultural spirit and value orientation but also serves as the inherent mechanism and schema in the social operations as a necessary institutional arrangement. In this sense, Giddens affirms, “Modernity refers to social life or organizational pattern,” and Weber analyzes the ethics of modernity and the connotation of cultural spirit from the perspective of “disenchantment” and reveals thoroughly the universality of modernity as a rationalized institutional arrangement from the perspectives of the rationalization of economy and bureaucracy of administration.



In fact, we can only differentiate intellectual dimension and institutional dimension of modernity in a sense of rational analysis, while they are closely connected in the real practice of social operations. On the one hand, the consciousness of cultural spirit constitutes the soul of social operation. On the other hand, the rationalized consciousness of cultural spirit will become rootless if it cannot be the inherent schema and mechanism of social operation arranged by institution. This kind of situation often appears in the process of modernity in many latter-day developing countries. Therefore, we should further reveal the institutional dimension of modernity in the sense of an inherent unification.

### *The rationalization of economic operation*

The rationalization of economic operation is doubtless one of the essential qualities of modern society, compared with everyday self-reliant, self-sufficient, unrestrained, and spontaneous natural economy. Many thinkers notice that modern economy is controlled by inherent scientific reason and principle of calculation. For instance, the monetary economy of Simmel is an important interpretation of economic modernity, and its development is the result of the increase of rationalized thought and action ([6], p. 68). Weber gives a most profound exposition of the rationalized economic behavior or the rationalization of economy. He believes that capitalist enterprises are a kind of reasonable organization and that they are “the rationalized capitalist way of organization of free labor.” This way only appears in the West, and it comes into being with the separation of operation and the family. The striking feature of the rationalization of economy is its calculability, i.e., a reasonable bookkeeping and capital accounts.

It should be emphasized that when Weber expounds the rationalized economic activities, he also analyzes the two bases of the rationalities of economy. One is that economic rationality relies on the development of modern technology and science, and its intellectuality basically relies on the reliability of the most important technical element. However, this means that it relies on modern science, especially on natural science that is based on mathematics and accurate rational experiment ([7], pp. 13–14). The other is that economic rationality relies on the inherent cultural spirit, which is a kind of secularized and rationalized economic ethics deriving from religious reform, i.e., protestant ethics. This kind of secularized protestant stoicism opposes directly the spontaneous rights of property, and it controls consumption, especially the consumption of luxurious goods. On the other hand, it has a psychological effect that can liberate the rights of property from traditional ethics. It legalizes the impulse of profitability and also (in our sense of the discussion) regards it as a direct wish from God ([7], p. 134). It is not difficult to notice that the analysis of Weber reveals the essential connection between rationalized cultural spirit or value ethics and rationalized economic operation.

### *The bureaucracy of administrative management*

The rationality of administrative management of modern society is as important as that of the economic operation. In premodern society, the administrative management of the society could not be a prominent problem. Because in the condition of a self-reliant, self-sufficient, unrestrained, and spontaneous natural economy, the primary experiential structure is not separated from everyday existence, the spontaneous principle of experience or the principle of