DRUNK DRIVING and Related Vehicular Offenses

FIFTH EDITION

Robert S. Reiff




DRUNK DRIVING AND RELATED VEHICULAR OFFENSES

FIFTH EDITION

ROBERT S. REIFF, Esquire With H. Scott Fingerhut, Esquire Contributing Editor

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MATTHEW & BENDER

Dedication

Everything Starts as Somebody's Daydream.

-Larry Niven

A great deal of blood, sweat, (breath) and tears went into putting this book together, from the very first time it was put together in the mid-1990s until today with this Fifth Edition.

I have been fortunate to have had the assistance of many fine people in putting this book together and you'll excuse me if I thank them now.

To H. Scott Fingerhut, not only for his time and dedication in helping me assemble this book, but also for his continued friendship. There are truly few people I have ever known who are as compassionate, principled and hopelessly idealistic as he. This project would not be what it is without him.

To my numerous legal mentors over the years, now-Circuit Judge Bob Scola, Jose Quiñon, G. Richard Strafer, James Jay Hogan, Hy Shapiro, and Kathleen Hoague for helping me become not only the lawyer but also the person I am today.

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To my brother Steve, a fine lawyer in his own right.

At the office, I have been fortunate to have worked with some very capable and caring legal assistants. Two of them, Chava Genet and Maria Landa, are now seasoned lawyers themselves. They, along with Jody Bennett, my current assistant, Jodi Jackson, and my intern Kara Franker, were all instrumental in coordinating the voluminous materials and putting them to paper all of this, mind you, while they helped run our busy law practice.

I also give special mention to Katrina Barcelona, Gina Cambria, Waheedan Jariwalla, Justin Guilder and Sari Goldman, now lawyers in private practice, who spent a good part of their summers off from law school to toil over the myriad legal issues and authorities that were researched in this multi-state guidebook.

For my parents, Seymour and Vivian Reiff, who still amaze me, and who are my heroes, and to my mother (in-law) Natalie.

Dedication

And finally, to my wife, Robbin, a terrifically skilled lawyer in her own right, and my two beautiful children, Marti and Cody, all of whom know well the challenges that this overwhelming project presented. Over the years, they continually put up with the long hours and stresses that I have endured while becoming a successful lawyer. For their love, support and understanding of sacrifice, I am forever grateful.

Bobby Reiff

In Memory of Judith Reiff Weinstein, Alex Weinstein and Sam Weinstein.

A COMPLETE SYNOPSIS FOR EACH CHAPTER APPEARS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHAPTER

CHAPTER 1 FOREWORD

CHAPTER 2	THE BASICS
§ 2-1	The Elements of a Drinking and Driving Case.
§ 2-1(a)	The Unlawful Blood or Breath Alcohol Levels: Drunk
	Driving Bill Sets National Level.
§ 2-2	The Right to a Jury Trial.
§ 2-2(a)	The Right (or Not) to an Attorney in a DUI Case.
§ 2-3	Actual Physical Control.
§ 2-3(a)	Introduction.
§ 2-3(b)	Actual Physical Control as a Critical Element.
§ 2-3(c)	So Just What Is "Actual Physical Control"?
§ 2-3(d)	Operability of the Vehicle.
§ 2-3(e)	The "Stationary Shelter" Doctrine as an Exception to the
N III 14	Rule on Actual Physical Control.
§ 2-3(f)	There Is No Such Crime as "Parking While Intoxicated."
§ 2-3(g)	Some Criteria to Examine in Order to Assess Actual
	Physical Control.
§ 2-4	Corpus Delicti.
§ 2-4(a)	Definitions and Applications.
§ 2-4(b)	Corpus Delicti in the DUI Context.
§ 2-4(c)	Proof of Driving and Hearsay Evidence.
§ 2-4(d)	Proof of Basic Elements.
§ 2-4(e)	A Citation's Facial Defect as a Defense.
§ 2-5	The Accident Report Privilege.
§ 2-6	The Use of Videos in DUI Cases.
§ 2-6(a)	Destruction of Videotaped Evidence.
§ 2-6(b)	The Right to Confrontation.
§ 2-6(c)	Police Abstention from Using Videotape Equipment.
§ 2-6(d)	Interference with the Right to Counsel.
§ 2-7	DUI and the Youthful Offender.
§ 2-8	Is There Such a Crime as "Attempted" DUI?
§ 2-9	Representing Commercial Truck Drivers.
§ 2-10	Representing Airline Pilots.
§ 2-10(a)	The Prosecution of Airline Pilots and the Supremacy
	Clause.

Volume Table of Contents		
§ 2-11	The Representation of Lawyers and Law Students.	
CHAPTER 3	THE INITIAL CLIENT MEETING: HOW TO SELL YOURSELF TO THE CLIENT	
§ 3-1	Getting the Client in the Door.	
§ 3-2	Knowing the Law.	
§ 3-3	The DUI Client Information Packet.	
§ 3-4	The DUI (or BUI) Client Interview Sheet.	
§ 3-5	Promises, Promises, Promises.	
§ 3-6	Get It in Writing!	
§ 3-7	Once Hired, Make Sure You Cover All the Bases.	
§ 3-8	Explaining the Difference Between the Administrative Hearing and the Criminal Case.	
§ 3-9	The Internet and Your Website.	
§ 3-10	Legal Expectations of Attorneys.	
§ 3-11	Tools for the DUI Practitioner.	
CHAPTER 4	THE STOP AND ARREST	
§ 4-1	The Basics of the Traffic Stop: Constitutional Standards.	
§ 4-1(a)	The Prosecution Has the Burden of Proving That the Stop Was a Valid One.	
§ 4-1(b)	<i>Terry v. Ohio</i> : Reasonable Suspicion and the Irrelevance of Good Faith for Traffic Stops.	
§ 4-1(c)	Renewed Emphasis Concerns.	
§ 4-2	When Is a Stop Illegal?	
§ 4-2(a)	As Applied to General Offenses.	
§ 4-2(b)	Purely Innocent Behavior Cannot Justify a Warrantless Seizure.	
§ 4-2(c)	What if the Police Make an Honest Mistake in Pulling the Driver Over for a Traffic Offense the Driver Did Not Commit?	
§ 4-2(d)	On the Matter of Pretext, as Applied to Traffic Offenses.	
§ 4-2(e)	After <i>Whren</i> , What Is Reasonable Suspicion to Stop in a Drunk Driving Case?	
§ 4-2(f)	Lanes and Weaving Violations: The Most Common Police Pretext and How to Combat It.	
§ 4-2(g)	Stops and the Sleeping Defendant: Does an Officer Have the Right to Awaken and Seize a Driver Who Is Sleeping in a Car?	
§ 4-2(h)	Can the Police Stop a Vehicle Based on the Knowledge That the Driver Has a Suspended Driver's License?	

Volume Tabl	le of Contents
§ 4-2(i)	Can the Police Chase a DUI Suspect into a House?
§ 4-3	Anonymous Tipsters.
§ 4-3(a)	Anonymous Tipsters vs. Citizen Informants.
§ 4-3(b)	Florida v. J.L.—The United States Supreme Court
	Clarifies the Issue of Tipsters and "Community
	Caretaking."
§ 4-4	Speeding Offenses and the Use of Detection Devices by the Police.
§ 4-4(a)	Radar Detection Devices.
§ 4-4(b)	Pace Clocking.
§ 4-5	Requesting Field Sobriety Exercises: Do the Police Need Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause?
§ 4-6	Can a Police Officer Enter a Suspect's Home Based on a "Suspicion" That the Driver Is Impaired?
§ 4-7	Probable Cause to Arrest for DUI.
§ 4-7(a)	The Prosecution Has the Burden of Proving the Arrest Was
	a Valid One.
§ 4-7(b)	What Is "Probable Cause" to Arrest?
§ 4-7(c)	Probable Cause in the DUI Context.
§ 4-7(d)	Can the Prosecution Prove That the Defendant Was the
	Driver of the Vehicle by Hearsay Evidence Alone?
§ 4-7(e)	Are Police Reports or Affidavits Made for the Purpose of
	Litigation Still Admissible After Crawford v. Washington?
§ 4-7(f)	Probable Cause and "Surreptitious Sniffing": Can a Police
	Officer Obtain the Evidence to Further a DUI Investigation
	by Sticking His Head, or an "Alcohol Detecting
	Flashlight," Uninvited Inside the Suspect's Vehicle?
§ 4-8	The DUI Arrest and the Misdemeanor Presence Rule.
§ 4-8(a)	The Misdemeanor Presence Rule Defined.
§ 4-8(b)	Legislative Codification and Its Application.
§ 4-8(c)	The Narrow Exceptions to This Statutorily Created
	Prerequisite to Arrest.
§ 4-8(c)(1)	Accident Investigation.
§ 4-8(c)(2)	Necessary Assistance.
§ 4-8(c)(3)	Domestic Violence/Child Abuse.
§ 4-8(c)(4)	Retail Theft.
§ 4-8(c)(5)	Fellow-Officer Rule Amendments.
§ 4-8(c)(6)	Destruction of Evidence.
§ 4-9	DUI Arrests Outside the Officer's Jurisdiction.
§ 4-10	The Citizen's Arrest.
§ 4-11	Unreasonable Delay in Making the Arrest.

CHAPTER 5	PHYSICAL SOBRIETY EXERCISES
§ 5-1	A Little Bit About the Exercises Themselves.
§ 5-2	The Walk and Turn Exercise: Is 68% Reliable Enough?
§ 5-3	The One-Leg Stand Exercise: Is 65% Reliable Enough?
§ 5-4	Improperly Given Exercises and Unreliability.
§ 5-5	Abnormal Tests to Test Normal Faculties.
§ 5-6	Reasonable Suspicion to Request a Defendant to Perform Field Sobriety Exercises.
- § 5-7	Statements Made in the Course of Performing Field Sobriety Exercises.
§ 5-7(a)	Custodial Interrogation and Compelled Self-Incrimination.
§ 5-7(a)(1)	The Privilege.
§ 5-7(a)(2)	What Is Custodial Interrogation?
§ 5-7(b)	On Interrogation During the Course of the DUI Arrest.
§ 5-7(b)(1)	It's All in the Content.
§ 5-7(b)(2)	Schmerber Does Not Apply.
§ 5-8	Establishing Probable Cause: The Proper Use of the Roadside Exercises.
§ 5-9	The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.
§ 5-9(a)	Introduction.
§ 5-9(b)	Is Gaze Nystagmus Evidence Scientifically Reliable?
§ 5-9(c)	Are There Other Causes of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus?
§ 5-9(d)	Attacking HGN Testimony at Hearing or Trial.
§ 5-10	The Finger to Nose Exercise and "Simon Sez."
§ 5-11	Physical Sobriety Exercises and the "Too Drunk" Defendant.
§ 5-12	Refusal to Perform Sobriety Exercises.
§ 5-13	Involuntary Physical Sobriety Exercises.
§ 5-14	Precluding the Use of the Word "Test" Regarding the Physical Sobriety Exercises.
§ 5-14(a)	While the Exercise Itself May Be Relevant, the Use of the
	Term "Test" Is Not.
§ 5-14(b)	Precluding the Prosecution Witness from Rendering an
	Opinion as to the Defendant's Alleged Impairment in Certain Instances.
§ 5-15	Can the Court Require a Defendant to Perform Sobriety
	Exercises Before the Jury?
§ 5-16	Vestibular Disorders and FSTs.
§ 5-16(a)	Perilymph Fistula.
§ 5-16(b)	Ototoxicity.
§ 5-16(c)	Meniere's Disease.
§ 5-16(d)	Mal de Debarquement.
§ 5-16(e)	Labyrinthitis and Neuronitis.

Volume Tal	ble of Contents
§ 5-16(f)	Endolymphatic Hydrops.
§ 5-16(g)	Benign Paroxysmal Positional Vertigo.
§ 5-16(h)	Acoustic Neuroma.
§ 5-16(i)	Monocular Vision Problems.
§ 5-17	United States v. Horn: Are Field Sobriety Exercises
	Admissible as Direct Evidence of Intoxication or
	Impairment?
§ 5-18	Things to Remember When Cross-Examining Police Officers.
§ 5-18(a)	Abnormal Tests to Test for Normal Faculties.
§ 5-18(b)	Guidelines? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Guidelines!
§ 5-18(c)	The First Time Is the Worst Time: The Baseball Analogy.
§ 5-18(d)	One Size Fits All.
§ 5-18(e)	Nothing's Changed Except the Wording.
§ 5-18(f)	Do You Exercise in Dress Shoes (or a Suit for That
	Matter)?
§ 5-18(g)	"Old" Exercises.
§ 5-18(h)	Hello 21st Century.
§ 5-18(i)	No Comparison Point.
§ 5-18(j)	Performance Impaired, Not Prevented.
§ 5-18(k)	Asking About Injuries Before Telling the Suspect What to
	Do Isn't Much Help Either.
§ 5-18(l)	"Well, He Didn't Tell Me There Was a Problem After I
	Gave Him the Instructions."
§ 5-18(m)	"Then Again, How Am I to Know That the Leg I Broke in
	High School Would Impair My Ability to Do the One-Leg
	Stand?"
§ 5-18(n)	Nervousness and Performance.
§ 5-18(o)	Don't Overlook the Mental Case.
§ 5-18(p)	Read the Manuals, Learn the Manuals, Live the Manuals.
§ 5-18(q)	Has Anyone Ever "Passed" the Officer's Tests?
§ 5-18(r)	What Is a Passing Grade?
§ 5-18(s)	NHTSA Should Be Glad That They Are Not Under the
8.5.10()	FDA's Auspices.
§ 5-18(t)	Home Field Advantage.
§ 5-18(u)	The Right Tools for the Job!
§ 5-18(v)	Remember, Choose Your Words Carefully!
CHAPTER 6	ROADBLOCKS
§ 6-1	A Roadblock Requires Special Scrutiny Because of the
	Warrantless Seizure of Random Citizens.
§ 6-2	Genesis: At the Border.
	iv

Volume Table	of Contents
	Random Driver's License Checks.
§ 6-3	Drug Interdiction Checkpoints: A Lesson from the Supremes.
§ 6-4	Roadblocks and the Use of Guidelines to Police the Police.
§ 6-5 § 6-6	The Prosecution Has the Burden of Overcoming the
	Presumptive Unlawfulness of a Warrantless Seizure Via DUI Roadblock.
§ 6-6(a)	DUI Roadblocks and Selective Enforcement.
§ 6-7	Roadblocks and the Legislature.
§ 6-8	Too Many Cooks Spoil the Roadblock: Can Multiple Purposes of a Roadblock Make it Too Broad to Be Constitutional?
§ 6-9	Does the "Good Faith" Exception Save an Otherwise Unlawful Checkpoint?
§ 6-9(a)	Who Authorized This Roadblock?
§ 6-9(b)	Roadblocks to Find Witnesses?
§ 6-10	Is Questioning a Driver at a Tollbooth the Same as Conducting a Roadblock?
§ 6-11	The Constitutionality of Ruse or Deceptive Checkpoints.
§ 6-12	Merely Avoiding a Roadblock Does Not Necessarily Justify a Traffic Stop.
CHAPTER 7	BREATH AND URINE TESTING
§ 7-1	Introduction.
§ 7-1(a)	The Basics of Chemical Testing.
§ 7-1(b)	Factors Affecting Breath Test Accuracy.
§ 7-2	The Science of It All.
§ 7-2(a)	The Principle of Retrograde Extrapolation.
§ 7-2(b)	Not All Alcohols Are Alike.
§ 7-2(b)(1)	Organic Alcohols.
§ 7-2(b)(1)(i)	Methyl Alcohol/Methanol.
§ 7-2(b)(1)(ii)	Ethyl Alcohol.
§ 7-2(b)(1)(iii	
§ 7-2(c)	Absorption.
§ 7-2(d)	Distribution.
§ 7-2(e)	Metabolism.
§ 7-2(f)	The Effect of Alcohol on the Human Body.
§ 7-2(g)	Breath Testing: It's All About Light and Darkness.
§ 7-2(h)	The Statutes.
§ 7-2(h)(1)	Administrative Regulations.
§ 7-2(i)	Reading and Understanding the Breath Maintenance Documents.

Volume Table	of Contents
§ 7-2(i)(2)	Standard Solutions and Margin of Error.
§ 7-2(i)(3)	Testing for Acetone.
§ 7-2(i)(4)	Radio Frequency Interference.
§ 7-2(i)(5)	Computer Source Codes.
§ 7-2(j)	The Intoxilyzer 8000: Is Newer Better?
§ 7-3	Arrest Prior to Request to Submit to Breath Test.
§ 7-3(a)	The Statutory Prerequisite: Arrest Before Request.
§ 7-3(b)	Breaking the Rule: Requisite for Suppression of the
	Evidence.
§ 7-4	Breath Test Results and "Presumptions."
§ 7-5	Breath Test Results Obtained at a Time Far Removed from
A = 2	the Operation of the Vehicle.
§ 7-5(a)	All Relevant Evidence Is Admissible Unless Otherwise
0.5.54	Prohibited.
§ 7-5(b)	The Breath/Blood Alcohol Result and the DUI Prosecution.
§ 7-5(c)	Though Regrettably Most States Don't Extrapolate, Time
9.7.6(.)(1)	Is Still of the Essence.
§ 7-5(c)(1)	State v. Haas.
§ 7-5(c)(2)	Despite the Lack of a Duty to Extrapolate, in Order to Be
	Relevant Evidence, the Breath Test Must Be Performed
8 7 F()(0)()	Within a Reasonable Time After Driving.
§ 7-5(c)(2)(i)	Considering Statutes with Time Limits
§ 7-5(c)(2)(ii)	
§ 7-5(c)(3)	States That Do Not Incorporate a Specific Time Period
977	Requirement.
§ 7-6	The Right to Consult with an Attorney Prior to the Breath
§ 7-6(a)	Test: It Only Exists in Some States.
3 / O(a)	Police Misconduct and the Right to a Private Consultation with an Attorney.
§ 7-7	Breath Tests and Use of the Custodian of Records to
3 / /	Introduce Breath Test or Breath Test Maintenance Records.
§ 7-7(a)	The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment:
	Fundamental Protections.
§ 7-7(a)(1)	The Constitutional Guarantees.
§ 7-7(a)(2)	The Protection of a Core Value, Not a Trivial Right.
§ 7-7(b)	The Prosecution's Reliance upon a Custodian of Records to
	Admit Breath Test Results or Breath Test Maintenance
	Records May Violate a Defendant's Right to
	Confrontation.
§ 7-7(c)	No "Guilt by Affidavit."
§ 7-7(c)(1)	Breath Test Documents Do Not Fall Within a Firmly
	Rooted Hearsay Exception.

Volume Table	of Contents
§ 7-7(c)(1)(i)	What Underlies the Public Records Exception?
§ 7-7(c)(1)(ii	
	Prosecution Disqualifies Such Documents from
	Consideration as Public Records.
§ 7-7(c)(2)	Breath Test Documents Contain Hearsay Too Far
	Removed to Assure the Accused, in the Absence of the
	Right to Confront the Author, a Guaranty of
	Trustworthiness Sufficient to Satisfy the Prosecution's
	Significant Burden of Proof.
§ 7-7(c)(3)	Are Breath Test Result Affidavits Still Admissible After
	Crawford v. Washington?
§ 7-8	Breath Test Results Obtained as a Result of Improper
	Coercion.
§ 7-8(a)	Implied Consent and the Rights of Refusal: Definitions.
§ 7-8(b)	The Enticement: Violations of Due Process and
	Fundamental Fairness.
§ 7-8(b)(1)	Introduction.
§ 7-8(b)(2)	Consent Not Freely and Voluntarily Given Is No
	Consent at All.
§ 7-8(b)(3)	The Standard of Proof.
§ 7-8(b)(4)	It Is for the Prosecution to Establish Voluntariness
	Without Taint.
§ 7-8(c)	The Miranda Requirements.
§ 7-8(d)	When the Equivocal Defendant Meets the Coercive
	Examiner.
§ 7-8(d)(1)	The Basics.
§ 7-8(d)(2)	Voluntariness Overcome.
§ 7-8(e)	The Effect of Threats or Erroneous Advice in the DUI
	Context.
§ 7-8(e)(1)	On the Irrelevance of Bad Faith.
§ 7-8(e)(2)	In Other Words, the Duty Is Not to Interfere.
§ 7-8(f)	Implied Consent and Improper Warnings.
§ 7-8(g)	Failure to Give Implied Consent Warnings.
§ 7-8(h)	Failure to Warn That Registering a Breath Test Result at or
	Above the Legal Limit Will Cause the Suspension of the
	Driver's License.
§ 7-9	Breath Test Results and Trial.
§ 7-9(a)	Breath Tests: "Blowing Your Life Away."
§ 7-9(b)	"Machines That Go Kaplooie in the Night."
§ 7-9(c)	"If They Don't Trust It, Why Should We?"
§ 7-9(d)	The 2100-to-1 Ratio and the "Average" Person.
§ 7-9(e)	Error Is a Factor.

Volume Tabl	le of Contents
§ 7-9(f)	When Is High Too High?
§ 7-9(g)	Extrapolate This!
§ 7-9(h)	Prosecution Efforts to Limit Cross-Examination at Trial.
§ 7-9(h)(1)	The Prosecution's Evidence Cannot Go Unquestioned.
§ 7-9(h)(2)	Breath Means Nothing Without Blood.
§ 7-9(h)(3)	Orwell Was Right.
§ 7-9(i)	BACs Under the Legal Limit.
§ 7-9(j)	Admissibility/Inadmissibility of Breath Test Results at
	Trial.
§ 7-9(j)(1)	Experts and Their Knowledge (or Lack Thereof!).
§ 7-9(k)	The Alcotest.
§ 7-10	The Right to an Independent Test.
§ 7-10(a)	Are the Police Required to Advise a Defendant of the Right to an Independent Test?
§ 7-11	Preliminary Breath Tests and Admissibility in Evidence.
§ 7-11(a)	A Statutory Prohibition Against the Prosecution's Use of
	Evidence Does Not Similarly Preclude a Defendant's Use
	of That Evidence.
§ 7-11(b)	A Defendant's Admission of the PBT Results Is Consistent
	with the Defendant's Right to Challenge the Evidential
	Breath Test.
§ 7-12	Security and the Breath Machine.
§ 7-13	The "Low Volume" or "Deficient Sample."
§ 7-14	Urine Tests ("Oh, What a Waste").
§ 7-14(a)	How Long Is Marijuana Detectable in the Urine?
§ 7-14(b)	Does the Presence of Cocaine in the Urine Indicate Recent
	Use?
§ 7-14(c)	Why Urine Tests Should Be Excluded.
§ 7-14(d)	Ensuring That the Urine Testing Complies with Approved
	Methods for Chemical Testing.
§ 7-14(e)	Are Urine Tests Conducted at a Hospital Protected by the
	Patient-Physician Privilege?
§ 7-15	Breath Testing and Schmerber.
§ 7-16	The CMI Intoxilyzer 8000: Issues to Consider When
0 = 4 <	Investigating the Breath Test Results.
§ 7-16(a)	Permit? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Permit!
§ 7-16(b)	Combating the "He didn't blow hard enough or long
0716	enough" Allegation.
§ 7-16(c)	It Is Not a Refusal!
§ 7-16(d)	"Volume Not Met": The Low Volume Sample.
§ 7-16(e)	Diagnostics Checks.
§ 7-16(f)	The Information "Dump."

CHAPTER 8	REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE BREATH TEST
§ 8-1	Introduction.
§ 8-2	The Rationale for the Law of "Implied" or "Express" Consent.
§ 8-2(a)	Implied Consent and Incomplete Warnings: The Failure to Notify Defendants of All of the Consequences of Their Actions.
§ 8-2(a)(1)	Are the Implied Consent Warnings Legally Insufficient?
§ 8-2(a)(2)	Ohio and the Need to Advise the Defendant of Reinstatement Fees
§ 8-2(a)(3)	Incomplete Warnings May Also Be Incorrect Warnings.
§ 8-2(a)(4)	Does the Failure to Notify the Defendant of License Reinstatement Fees Require Suppression of the Refusal in the Criminal Case?
§ 8-2(a)(5)	Implied Consent Warnings and Commercial License Holders.
§ 8-2(b)	Implied Consent and the Hearing Impaired or Non-English Speaking Defendant.
§ 8-2(c)	Implied Consent Warnings Must Be Specific.
§ 8-2(d)	Implied Consent Warnings and Out-of-State Drivers.
§ 8-3	When a Refusal Really Isn't.
§ 8-3(a)	Implied Consent Statutes Require Merely That One Submit to, Not "Pass," the Breath Test.
§ 8-3(b)	The Non-Refusal.
§ 8-3(b)(1)	Actions Speak Louder Than Words.
§ 8-3(c)	Who Chooses Which Test Complies with the Implied Consent Statute: The Officer or the Driver?
§ 8-4	Refusal to Submit to the Breath Test and the Doctrine of Confusion.
§ 8-4(a)	Introduction.
§ 8-4(b)	Miranda and Implied Consent Warnings: An Understandable Confusion.
§ 8-4(c)	From Confusion Arises the Duty to Inform and to Explain: Preserving Due Process.
§ 8-4(d)	When Is a Refusal Not a Refusal? When It Is Based Upon Misinformation.
§ 8-4(e)	Malicious Intent by the Police to Trick the DUI Accused Is Not Required.
§ 8-4(f)	Even if the Refusal Is Admissible, the Reason Why the Defendant Refused to Submit to the Test May Be Admitted, By the Defense, to Negate Its Weight.

Volume Table o	of Contents
§ 8-5	Can a Refusal be Cured? The Equitable Doctrine of Cure.
§ 8-6	Should a Defendant's Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test on an "Unapproved" Machine Be Admissible?
§ 8-6(a)	An Introduction to Law and Administrative Rule.
§ 8-6(a)(1)	The Basics of Chemical Testing.
§ 8-6(a)(2)	The Price for the Privilege: The Requisite Approved Test.
§ 8-6(a)(3)	A Brief Focus on the Administrative Rules.
§ 8-6(a)(4)	Implied Consent, Rights of Refusal, and the
	Voluntariness of It All.
§ 8-6(a)(4)(i)	The Legal Fiction Begins.
§ 8-6(a)(4)(ii)	Consent Not Freely Given Is No Consent at All.
§ 8-6(a)(4)(iii)	The Fiction Continues: Consent Is at Issue, Be It
	Either Consent to Submit to or Consent to Refuse the
	Test.
§ 8-6(b)	Refusal Versus Consent: Applying the Legal Fiction
	Across the Board.
§ 8-6(b)(1)	If It's an Unapproved Test, It's an Unapproved Test.
§ 8-6(b)(2)	The Logical Conclusion?
§ 8-7	Refusal to Submit to a Breath Test and Motions for Judgment
	of Acquittal.
§ 8-7(a)	Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence.
§ 8-7(b)	The Prosecution's Special Burden in a Circumstantial
	Case.
§ 8-7(c)	In Refusal Cases, the Prosecution's DUI Case Against the
	Defendant Is Usually Entirely Circumstantial.
§ 8-7(d)	In Refusal Cases, the Prosecution May Not Be Able to
	Exclude the Defendant's Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence.
8-8	Refusals and Incriminating Statements.
	The state of the s

	11
§ 8-6(b)(2)	The Logical Conclusion?
§ 8-7	Refusal to Submit to a Breath Test and Motions for Judgment
	of Acquittal.
§ 8-7(a)	Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence.
§ 8-7(b)	The Prosecution's Special Burden in a Circumstantial
	Case.
§ 8-7(c)	In Refusal Cases, the Prosecution's DUI Case Against the
	Defendant Is Usually Entirely Circumstantial.
§ 8-7(d)	In Refusal Cases, the Prosecution May Not Be Able to
	Exclude the Defendant's Reasonable Hypothesis of
	Innocence.
§ 8-8	Refusals and Incriminating Statements.
§ 8-8(a)	Neville and Refusals.
§ 8-8(b)	Does a Request for a Breath Test Compel a Testimonial
	Response?
§ 8-8(c)	Are a Defendant's Statements Made in Refusing a Breath
	or Urine Test Admissible in Evidence Against Her?
§ 8-9	Excluding Evidence of the Civil Penalties for Refusing to
	Submit to a Breath or Urine Test.
§ 8-9(a)	Does the Law Authorize the Admission of What Amounts
	to a "Double Refusal" by Permitting the Prosecution to
	Offer Evidence of the Civil Penalties for Refusing a Breath
	Test?
	xv

§ 8-10

The Criminalization of the Refusal to Submit to a Breath or Urine Test.

CHAPTER 9	BLOOD TESTS
§ 9-1	Blood Tests and the DUI Case.
§ 9-1(a)	The Probable Cause Requirement.
§ 9-1(a)(1)	Exigent Circumstances and Special Needs Doctrines.
§ 9-1(b)	The Causation Requirement.
§ 9-1(c)	Relevancy and Blood Test Results.
§ 9-1(c)(1)	Blood Tests and the Presence of Drugs.
§ 9-1(c)(2)	Blood Tests Taken Late in Time.
§ 9-1(d)	Laboratory Methods.
§ 9-1(e)	Chain of Custody.
§ 9-1(f)	Consent to Draw Blood.
§ 9-2	Blood Drawn for Medical Purposes.
§ 9-2(a)	Medical Blood: Incorporation by Statute.
§ 9-2(b)	The Causation Requirement.
§ 9-2(c)	Using the Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule
	to Admit Medical Blood Test Results in Criminal Cases.
§ 9-3	Medical Blood and the Physician/Patient Medical Records Privilege.
§ 9-3(a)	Hospital Regulation and Patient Records: The Concepts
	Defined.
§ 9-3(b)	What Are Medical Records?
§ 9-3(c)	Why the Privilege?
§ 9-3(d)	Blood Samples Are Subject to the Medical Records
	Privilege.
§ 9-3(d)(1)	Drawn Under Fire.
§ 9-3(d)(2)	The Logical Conclusion: Both Product and Source
	Qualify as Privileged.
§ 9-3(d)(3)	Medical Blood and the Admission of Blood Test Results
	by Hearsay Reports.
§ 9-3(d)(4)	Are Blood Test Reports Still Admissible Hearsay After
	Crawford v. Washington?
§ 9-3(e)	Emergency Personnel Exception Statutes.
§ 9-4	Blood Serum Versus Whole Blood: Why Medical Blood
	Tests Are Artificially High.
§ 9-4(a)	Serum Blood Versus Whole Blood.
§ 9-4(b)	A Margin for Error That Cannot Be Excused.
§ 9-4(c)	Don't Forget the Chain of Custody.
§ 9-5	Do the Police Have the Authority to Request Multiple Blood Samples?