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**FORCE AND
STATECRAFT**

Diplomatic Problems
of Our Time

Second Edition

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GORDON A. CRAIG
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Preface

In the more than eight years that have passed since the first edition of this book was completed, much has happened in the world, and there have been several new, and not entirely expected, developments in the international system. In this second edition we have made an attempt to take note of these. Thus, in addition to making corrections and small changes throughout, we have revised Chapters 8 and 11 extensively in order to provide, among other things, an account of the origins and evolution of the United Nations in its first forty years, its difficulties with the superpowers, and its accomplishments and growing stature in recent years, as well as a tentative assessment of tendencies in European politics that were still latent in 1981 and of the impact on international politics of the latest developments in the Soviet Union. To complement the chapter on crisis management, we have added one on crisis prevention that includes an account of progress made during the last decade in Soviet–American security cooperation. Finally, without attempting to be comprehensive, we have expanded the bibliographical essays at the ends of the chapters in order to include the most important recent works on international affairs and diplomacy.

Stanford, Calif.
February 1989

G. A. C.
A. L. G.

Introduction

Since the emergence of war as a feature of relations between communities, reflective and concerned persons have had apocalyptic visions of its potentiality for destruction and have searched for ways to prevent conflict. In general, they have placed their hopes on five different means: on (1) religious and moral codes forbidding resort to war; on (2) agreements to restrict or abolish the use of certain kinds of weapons; on (3) agreements to limit military operations or to regulate the usages of war; on doctrines designed to make war more efficient, to (4) match the level of violence to the political objective and thus to avoid unnecessary destruction; and, finally, on (5) political systems designed to reduce the friction between groups or nations to the point where wars would be unprofitable or dangerous to the aggressor.

With the first four of these experiments, only modest success has been achieved. Religion has not only failed to discourage war but has often motivated it; attempts at arms control and disarmament have had minor successes that all too often, once achieved, encouraged evasion; the rules of war that alleviated the brutalities of eighteenth-century conflict are clearly ineffective in an age of nuclear weaponry; and recent experience hardly encourages one to believe in the capacity of modern governments to employ war strictly as an instrument of policy, restraining its inherent expansive tendencies. In the history of the West from the Middle Ages to the present, the most effective restraint upon the warlike tendencies of the individual, group, or state has been the pressure exerted by external forces, and the periods least affected by inter-

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state violence have been those in which there existed a viable international community and an accepted body of law and custom to guide and control it. ~hard to achieve-

Such periods were to be sure, at least before the nineteenth century, brief and far between, the age of the Italian city states before the papacy of Alexander VI and the period sometimes called the age of Walpole in the first half of the eighteenth century are lonely exceptions in a long history of disorder and armed tumult. But after the twenty-five years of warfare caused by the French Revolution and the ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 created an international system that secured the peace for two generations and then, as modified by Bismarck, for most of the rest of the century. That example has served, if not as a model, at least as an admonition to later statesmen. After World War I, Woodrow Wilson attempted to establish a new system of collective security to replace the one that had finally collapsed so disastrously in 1914, and during World War II Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to set the stage for a postwar system that would extend into peacetime the cooperative working relations that characterized the wartime alliance of the United States with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to develop a relationship with the Soviet Union that would serve as the foundation for an international system that would overcome the strains of the Cold War; although their success was brief, the end of the 1980s saw a renewal of this effort, the initiative being taken this time by Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Both the fact that it took until the nineteenth century for the European states to create an effective concert of powers and the failure of recent attempts to achieve the relative success of that earlier experiment can be explained by the requirements of a viable international system. These are threefold: (1) an agreement among the principal states concerning aims and objectives that reflects the dominant values that they are seeking to preserve and enhance in creating and participating in the system; (2) a structure appropriate to the number of states interacting with each other, the geographical boundaries or scope of the system, the distribution of power among member states, and the stratification and status hierarchy among them; and (3) commonly accepted procedures—that is, norms, rules, practices, and institutions for the achievement of the aims and objectives of the system. During the long stretch of time that intervened between the breakdown of the authority

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of the Holy Roman Empire and the religious wars that followed the Reformation, centuries in which Europe was composed of a welter of political units of indeterminate sovereignty and ill-defined borders, not even the most gifted political leaders could be expected to conceive of, let alone develop, anything so systematic. As will become apparent, it was only in the seventeenth century, when modern states came into existence that possessed efficient institutions, strong armed forces, and a rational theory of statecraft, that any progress toward effective collaboration became possible, and even then it took a century of intermittent conflict and the threat of domination by a single power before the major European states were able to achieve an agreement with respect to basic objectives and the structural and methodological requirements of a viable system.

The eventual collapse of the nineteenth-century experiment and the twentieth-century failure to find a substitute for it can be explained by another characteristic of an effective international system, namely, that it must be able to adapt to environmental developments and to internal changes within its member states that affect its performance and its ability to maintain itself. The modern period has been one of profound and continuing changes in socioeconomic organization, military technology, transportation, and communication, to say nothing of those mutations in the internal political structure of states that have resulted from the rise of public opinion, the emergence of a large variety of organized interest groups, and the increasing scope and complexity of governmental organization. It has also been an age of intense nationalism, which has been reflected in the breakup of the old colonial empires and the multiplication of new sovereign states, and of ideological conflict on a global scale. All of these forces, singly and in combination, have had an impact upon international politics that amounts to a diplomatic revolution; and this has made it increasingly difficult to maintain old structures or to devise new ones. Adaptation to accelerated change has become the major problem of modern statecraft, testing the ingenuity and the fortitude of those charged with responsibility both for devising means of controlling international violence and for maintaining the security of their own countries.

The first part of this book deals with the emergence of the modern states, the conflict in the eighteenth century between their desire for order and their anarchic tendencies, the laborious and painful birth of the nineteenth-century system, its procedures, and the various changes

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in its structure before its collapse in 1914. But its more particular theme is the impact of the diplomatic revolution just alluded to, and the ways in which this crippled the system-building experiments of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their successors.

Because statesmen have not succeeded in inventing the perfect international system, interstate violence remains a major factor in contemporary world politics, and the period since 1945 has seen three major conflicts in the Far East, four short but destructive wars in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states and another between Iran and Iraq, numerous civil and interstate conflicts in Latin America, a war in the South Atlantic between Great Britain and Argentina, a protracted struggle in Afghanistan, touched off by the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979, an irregular war on the frontier between the Union of South Africa and Angola, in which Cuban troops played a significant role, and a muddled conflict in the western Sahara between Morocco and Algerian-backed guerrillas. Nor is this list exhaustive.

This book will not attempt to deal with the causes or the operational and strategical aspects of these confrontations or of military conflict in general. Nevertheless, international violence is never remote from the heart of its concern, and Part II focuses upon the uses of force as an instrument of statecraft. One of the marked characteristics of our time is the frequency with which states employ threats of force to deter or to halt encroachments on their interests, a practice that, in the pages that follow, will require some analysis of the techniques of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

Again, competition and rivalry between states, abetted sometimes by misperceptions and miscalculations, often plunges them into tense diplomatic confrontations and brings them to the brink of war; and the problem of protecting their essential interests in such situations, without warfare and without escalation of low-level military conflict, poses a difficult dilemma for policy makers. In the age of thermonuclear weapons, the successful management of crises is more critical than ever, and an appropriate theme for special attention, the more so because crises not only pose threats but often offer opportunities for constructive change in interstate relations. Indeed, the potentially constructive role of crises in international relations has led some observers to argue that in the present age crises have become a substitute for war. If so, it is hardly necessary to enjoin policy makers to take seriously the requirements and modalities of crisis management, but it is

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certainly permissible in a book like this to try to analyze them in such a way as to make it possible to distinguish between effective and faulty procedure.

{ Finally, because, as we have discovered to our cost, nations do get into wars, } it is necessary to consider the best ways of getting out of them. Terminating a conflict by means short of surrender is often much more difficult than starting one, and because the process has received so little analytical attention, it seemed advisable to include here an examination of the forces that prolong wars and of the conditions and processes that seem, on the basis of experience, best designed to lead to cease-fires and peace agreements.

Tensions that arise in interstate relations do not, fortunately, always lead to war. A dangerous crisis may have a sobering effect on both sides and create a mutual desire to relax tensions, and this may be followed by diplomatic efforts to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation or a resolution of conflicting interests. One side may recognize the legitimacy of some of its adversary's grievances and seek to appease it; as the two sides resolve their salient disagreements, they may also recognize interests that they have in common and work out the basis for a cooperative relationship. The reorientation of the relationship from one of initial hostility to cooperation is generally, in our day, called *détente*, although, as we shall see, it is an imprecise and ambiguous term. For that very reason, however, and because the process has become a point of contention between the United States and its European allies, it requires analysis.

~~Fundamental to all of these diplomatic procedures—to deterrence and coercive diplomacy, to crisis management and war termination, and to *détente*—is negotiation, as vital to the relations of contemporary great powers, and as worthy a subject for study and reflection, as it was in the days of Machiavelli and Wicquefort and Callières. Because of its central importance, it is the first of the topics considered in the second part of the book.~~

Finally, at a time when increasing numbers of citizens have religious or conscientious doubts about the tendencies, the methods, and the dangers of contemporary international relations, it seemed appropriate to include in Part III two admittedly tentative chapters on the difficult problem of the role of ethics and morality in world politics.

This book grew out of the authors' long-standing concern over the challenging tasks confronting American foreign policy and their con-

this class

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viction that it would be worthwhile to examine the kinds of problems of force and statecraft that confront policy makers from the combined perspectives of the diplomatic historian and the specialist in strategy. Accordingly, we developed a course with these objectives in mind and have taught it together several times at Stanford University. In our course, as in this book, we selected for controlled comparison a wide variety of case studies drawn from the diplomatic history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in order to throw some light upon contemporary problems of foreign policy. It was our intention there—and this was the reason for employing the comparative method—to make some tentative generalizations about the diplomatic procedures and techniques that we discussed with our students. In the pages that follow, and particularly in Parts II and III, we have carried our classroom conclusions a bit further and have had the temerity to formulate theories about the requirements of successful employment of the instruments and techniques under discussion, as well as about their appropriate uses and limitations.

It need hardly be added that these formulations are in the nature of working hypotheses that are subject to modification and elaboration. Still, we do not apologize for offering them to our readers. This is a time for serious reflection upon foreign affairs and, if these pages help to provoke it, we shall be satisfied even if our views suffer serious correction.

DISCIPULIS NOSTRIS
QUORUM INDULGENTIA ET SEDULITAS
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I

The International System from the Seventeenth Century to the Present

1

The Emergence of the Great Powers

I

Although the term *great power* was used in a treaty for the first time only in 1815, it had been part of the general political vocabulary since the middle of the eighteenth century and was generally understood to mean Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This would not have been true in the year 1600, when the term itself would have meant nothing and a ranking of the European states in terms of political weight and influence would not have included three of the countries just mentioned. In 1600, Russia, for instance, was a remote and ineffectual land, separated from Europe by the large territory that was called Poland-Lithuania with whose rulers it waged periodic territorial conflicts, as it did with the Ottoman Turks to the south; Prussia did not exist in its later sense but, as the Electorate of Brandenburg, lived a purely German existence, like Bavaria or Württemberg, with no European significance; and Great Britain, a country of some commercial importance, was not accorded primary political significance, although it had, in 1588, demonstrated its will and its capacity for self-defense in repelling the Spanish Armada. In 1600, it is fair to say that, politically, the strongest center in Europe was the old Holy Roman Empire, with its capital in Vienna and its alliances with Spain (one of the most formidable military powers in Europe) and the Catholic states of southern Germany—an empire inspired by a militant Catholicism that dreamed of restoring Charles V's claims of universal dominion. In comparison with Austria and Spain,

France seemed destined to play a minor role in European politics, because of the state of internal anarchy and religious strife that followed the murder of Henri IV in 1610.

Why did this situation not persist? Or, to put it another way, why was the European system transformed so radically that the empire became an insignificant political force and the continent came in the eighteenth century to be dominated by Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia? The answer, of course, is war, or, rather more precisely, wars—a long series of religious and dynastic conflicts which raged intermittently from 1618 until 1721 and changed the rank order of European states by exhausting some and exalting others. As if bent upon supplying materials for the nineteenth-century Darwinians, the states mentioned above proved themselves in the grinding struggle of the seventeenth century to be the fittest, the ones best organized to meet the demands of protracted international competition.

The process of transformation began with the Thirty Years War, which stretched from 1618 to 1648. It is sometimes called the last of the religious wars, a description that is justified by the fact that it was motivated originally by the desire of the House of Habsburg and its Jesuit advisers to restore the Protestant parts of the empire to the true faith and because, in thirty years of fighting, the religious motive gave way to political considerations and, in the spreading of the conflict from its German center to embrace all of Europe, some governments—notably France—waged war against their coreligionists for material reasons. For the states that initiated this wasting conflict, which before it was over had reduced the population of central Europe by at least a third, the war was an unmitigated disaster. The House of Habsburg was so debilitated by it that it lost the control it had formerly possessed over the German states, which meant that they became sovereign in their own right and that the empire now became a mere adjunct of the Austrian crown lands. Austria was, moreover, so weakened by the exertions and losses of that war that in the period after 1648 it had the greatest difficulty in protecting its eastern possessions from the depredations of the Turks and in 1683 was threatened with capture of Vienna by a Turkish army. Until this threat was contained, Austria ceased to be a potent factor in European affairs. At the same time, its strongest ally, Spain, had thrown away an infantry once judged to be the best in Europe in battles like that at Nördlingen in 1634, one of those victories that bleed a nation white. Spain's decline began not with the failure of the Armada, but