
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


Criminal Procedure

Steven L. Emanuel

Contains

- Flow Charts
- Capsule Summary
- Exam Tips
 - Short-Answer Q&As
 - Essay Q&As



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Law & Business



CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SIXTH EDITION

STEVEN L. EMANUEL

Harvard Law School, J.D. 1976 Founder & Editor-in-Chief, Emanuel Bar Review Member, NY, CT, MD and VA Bars

The CrunchTime® Series



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Preface

Thank you for buying this book.

The *CrunchTime*[®] Series is intended for people who want Emanuel quality, but don't have the time or money to buy and use the full-length *Emanuel*[®] *Law Outline* on a subject. We've designed the Series to be used in the last few weeks (or even less) before your final exams.

This book includes the following features, most of which have been extracted from the corresponding *Emanuel* **Law Outline:

- Flow Charts We've reduced many of the principles of Criminal Procedure to a series of six Flow Charts, created specially for this book and never published elsewhere. We think these will be especially useful on open-book exams. The Flow Charts begin on p. 1.
- **Capsule Summary** This is an 80-or-so-page summary of the subject. We've carefully crafted it to cover the things you're most likely to be asked on an exam. The Capsule Summary starts on p. 41.
- Exam Tips We've compiled these by reviewing dozens of actual essay and multiple-choice questions asked in past law-school and bar exams, and extracting the issues and "tricks" that surface most often on exams. The Exam Tips start on p. 127.
- Short-Answer questions These questions are generally in a Yes/No format, with a "mini-essay" explaining each one. The questions start on p. 161. The answers begin on p. 193.
- **Essay** questions These questions are actual ones asked on law school exams. They start on p. 215. A sample answer follows each question.

We hope you find this book helpful and instructive.

Good luck.

Steve Emanuel Larchmont NY October 2009

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
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
Was the Search or Seizure a Violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Use this chart to determine whether an alleged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. D is the person who is claiming that the search/seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights (whether or not D is a criminal defendant). Remember that the general rule is that a search warrant and probable cause are <u>both</u> required; the chart helps you figure out whether one or both of these requirements are dispensed with in a particular situation.



See footnotes beginning on p. 7 of chart.


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See footnotes beginning on p. 7 of chart.

Figure 1 (Cont.)


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
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See footnotes beginning on p. 7 of chart.

Figure 1 (Cont.)

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See footnotes beginning on p. 7 of chart.

Figure 1 (Cont.)

Was the Search or Seizure a Violation
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



Figure 1 (Cont.)

Was the Search or Seizure a Violation of the Fourth Amendment? (p. 7)



Notes

- Examples of situations where D will probably be found to have had no actual subjective expectation of privacy: (1) <u>abandoned property</u>, such as trash; (2) things a person says or does in public.
- Example: D puts dead marijuana leaves in a garbage bag at the edge of his lawn, so that sanitation workers will pick it up. The police, acting on a tip,

ransack the bag before it's picked up, and seize the plants as evidence that D is cultivating marijuana in his house. Even if D subjectively believed that no one would open up the bag (i.e., he had a subjective expectation of privacy), this expectation of privacy was not a "reasonable" one. (See Cal. v. Greenwood.) Therefore, you'd

Notes continue on next page.

Notes to Figure 1 (Search and Seizure)

- answer "no" to the question in box [2]. Consequently, no Fourth Amendment search would be deemed to have taken place.
- In other words, the plain-view doctrine applies only to things that would otherwise be searches, not things that would otherwise be seizures. Example: O, a police officer, responds to a call that a domestic disturbance is occurring at D's house. As D is standing in the open doorway, O looks over D's shoulder and sees a brightly lit table in D's living room, containing what appear to be marijuana plants. D cannot rely on the plain-view doctrine to permit him to go into the room and seize the plants, even though he saw them in plain view. (But see next footnote for how the plain-view doctrine would apply on these facts.)
- ⁴ Example: Same facts as prior example (marijuana plants in living room). O's view of the plants is covered by the plain-view doctrine (since O was standing in a place he had a right to be -- the open doorway, following the disturbance call -- and since O only saw, rather than seized, the plants). Now, what O saw can supply probable cause for O to obtain a search warrant, which when issued would permit O to seize the plants. Furthermore, O would be entitled to remove D from the premises while a warrant was being sought, so that D couldn't destroy the evidence. (See boxes [25]-[28]).
- ^{4a} "Probable cause" now seems to mean merely a "<u>reasonable likelihood</u>," <u>not</u> "more likely than not." Cf. <u>Maryland v. Pringle</u>. So to have probable cause to make the search or seizure, the police must be in possession of facts causing them to believe that it is reasonably likely that (1) the items to be searched for or seized are <u>connected with criminal activities</u>, and (2) those items will be found in the place to be searched.
- The remaining boxes cover various exceptions to the warrant requirement (e.g., stop-and-frisk, consent, search-incident-toarrest, exigent-circumstances, automobilesearches, etc.)
- ⁶ Example: Suppose that a properly-issued

- search warrant authorizes search of the "bedroom" of D's apartment. The police ransack D's living room, and find a hidden stash of cocaine. On these facts, you'd answer "no", because the search exceeded the scope of the warrant.
- ⁷ Example 1: V tells O, a police officer, that she was just mugged by a tall thin white male wearning a blue windbreaker. 2 blocks away and 10 minutes later, O sees D, a tall thin white male wearing a windbreaker. On these facts, you'd answer "yes" to box [13].
 Keep in mind that if D engages in a number of acts in sequence, each of which is innocent in itself, there will still be grounds for a stop if the acts taken together would create reasonable suspicion that D is engaged in wrongdoing.
 - Example 2: D is driving near the border with Mexico, in a rural area known for smuggling. When O, a border patrol agent, drives near D, D slows down dramatically. D is driving a minivan (a type of vehicle known to be used frequently for smuggling). D is following a route, and at a particular time of day, that is not used by many people except smugglers. O radios in a check of D's license plate, and finds that it's registered to an address that's in an area known for housing smugglers. Even though each individual fact observed by O is innocent. all of the facts viewed together probably justify O in having a reasonable suspicion that D is smuggling, and therefore justify O in stopping D's vehicle. [Cf. U.S. v. Arvizu]
- Example: Same basic facts as Example 1 in note 7. Now, assume that O stops D to ask him some questions. If, prior to the questions, O does a pat-down of D's outer clothing to see if D is carrying a weapon, you would answer "yes" to box [14]. Then, if O discovered a gun (not licensed as required) during the pat-

Notes (cont.) to Figure 1 (Search and Seizure)

down, O would be able to seize the gun, and arrest D for carrying it without a permit. The initial stop, although a Fourth Amendment "search," would not be a Fourth Amendment violation, because even though it was done without either a search warrant or probable cause, it qualifies under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.

In the case of a <u>vehicle stop</u>, the police may pat down either the <u>driver</u> or a <u>passenger</u>, if they have reason to believe that the person may be <u>armed or dangerous</u>. They may do the pat-down even if they have <u>no reason to suspect</u> the driver or passenger of <u>wrongdoing</u>. [Ariz. v. Johnson]

- Example: H and W are husband and wife. O, a police officer, suspects that H has been growing marijuana in his garage. O knocks on the door of the house, and W answers (H is not home). O explains that he's heard a tip that H may be growing pot. W is angry at H because he's been having an affair, so W gives permission to O to do the search. Assuming that the garage is an area used by both H and W, W has authority to consent to the search. [Cf. U.S. v. Matlock] (But if H was present and objected, W's consent wouldn't be effective as against H. [Ga. v. Randolph])
- In other words, a warrantless search can be performed incident to a proper arrest for even a minor violation. Example: P, while driving, is stopped by Officer for not signalling while changing lanes. Officer examines P's driver's license, and finds that it has expired. Officer arrests P for this very minor violation. Officer will then be entitled to search P's person incident to this arrest (and will also be entitled to search the passenger compartment of P's car, as described in box [24]).
- Most importantly, this means that the arrest must itself be supported by probable cause to believe that D committed the offense in question. So if, at trial (or at a pre-trial suppression hearing) D can establish that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make the arrest, the search incident to that arrest will be invalid, and its fruits will normally have to be suppressed.

By the way, the police can have probable cause to arrest for Offense A even if they tell the suspect, at the time of the arrest, that the arrest is for Offense B. So as long as the police at the time of arrest were in possession of facts making it reasonably likely that D committed Offense A, that will make the arrest valid even if they subjectively believed (and told D) that they were arresting for Offense B, for which they later turned out not to have had probable cause. Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford.

Example: D is arrested in the front hall of his house. The police then search the entire house, even though they have no reason to believe that anyone else is present. In the bedroom, they look into a chest of drawers that is too small to hold a person, and in one drawer they find heroin. This search will not be justified by the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, because it was not even theoretically within D's reach after the arrest.

Note that where an arrest occurs in the suspect's home, the police may make a "protective sweep" of all or part of the premises, if they have a "reasonable belief" based on "specific and articulable facts" that another person who might be dangerous to the officer may be present in the areas to be swept. [Maryland v. Buie]. So on the facts of the above example, if the arresting officers knew that D's wife, W, was present, they would be entitled to do a sweep through the house to make sure that W was not present and dangerous. (But this would not justify the police in looking in places too small to contain W, such as the drawers above.)

Where the arrest is of a <u>driver</u>, it's now the case that the same "within the arrestee's reach" requirement applies, a big change from pre-2009 law. So if the driver has been, say, <u>handcuffed</u> and placed in the patrol car, the police can no longer automatically search the passenger compartment incident to the arrest. See note 13 for more about this.

Notes continue on next page.