



WHAT ANIMALS MEAN IN THE FICTION OF MODERNITY

Philip Armstrong

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What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity

'What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity is a fresh and incisive contribution to scholarship in human-animal studies: intelligent and theoretically informed, engaging and highly readable...What *do* animals mean? The animal question is a fascinatingly important one, and Armstrong has done as much as is humanly possible to help answer it.'

Randy Malamud, *Georgia State University, USA*

What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity argues that nonhuman animals, and stories about them, have always been closely bound up with the conceptual and material work of modernity.

In the first half of the book, Philip Armstrong examines the function of animals and animal representations in four classic narratives: *Robinson Crusoe*, *Gulliver's Travels*, *Frankenstein* and *Moby-Dick*. He then goes on to explore how these stories have been re-worked, in ways that reflect shifting social and environmental forces, by later novelists, including H.G. Wells, Upton Sinclair, D.H. Lawrence, Ernest Hemingway, Franz Kafka, Brigid Brophy, Bernard Malamud, Timothy Findley, Will Self, Margaret Atwood, Yann Martel and J.M. Coetzee.

What Animals Mean also introduces readers to new developments in the study of human-animal relations. It does so by attending to the significance of animals to humans, and to animals' own purposes or designs; to what animals mean to us, and to what they mean to do, and how they mean to live.

Philip Armstrong teaches at the University of Canterbury, Aotearoa, where he is Co-Director of the New Zealand Centre for Human-Animal Studies.

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What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity is fundamentally concerned with sympathy, sentiment and human-animal relationships, so my greatest debts are to those who have influenced me in these areas of thought and feeling. Profound thanks are due to my immediate family, Ian, Doff, David and Susan Armstrong, and to my friends Anthony Terry, Nichola Kriek, Hans Kriek, John O'Connor and Faith Potts. I want to acknowledge with sorrow several who passed away while I was writing this book: Justin Lalor, whose love for nature was an early influence on mine; Matthew Oswin, who I remember coolly liberating a frog from our school science class; and also Cody, Dodos, Mottie and Tui, who each taught me a thing or two about animal agency.

Most of all I am indebted to Annie Potts, without whose inspiration and influence I would never have attempted such a book, and to Lola, who kept me company during long hours of reading and writing. *What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity* is dedicated to them.

Parts of this volume have appeared elsewhere. Chapter 3 draws together arguments from the following publications: "'Leviathan is a Skein of Networks': Translating Nature and Culture in *Moby-Dick*", *ELH*, 71 (2004): 1,039-63; '*Moby-Dick* and Compassion', *Society and Animals* 12, 1 (2004): 19-38; and 'What Animals Mean, in *Moby-Dick*, for Example', *Textual*

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Introduction

An animal sits at a desk, writing. A common enough scene, but seldom described that way. What does this animal writing mean? Perhaps, among other things, it means to remind us of our debt to other animals, materially and conceptually.

In studies of literature and the visual arts, in cultural history and the analysis of popular culture, the extent to which human–animal relations have been central to the mission of modernity is becoming apparent. As a resource for thought and knowledge, the generic notion of ‘the animal’ has provided modernity with a term against which to define its most crucial categories: ‘humanity’, ‘culture’, ‘reason’, and so on. Meanwhile, in material terms, the use and pursuit of actual animals has facilitated and motivated the unrelenting expansionism of modern cultures.

For many contemporary scholars the starting place for considering the relationship between modernity, animals and cultural representation is John Berger’s essay ‘Why Look at Animals?’ (1980). From his Marxist perspective, Berger argues that the relation between human and animal was utterly reconfigured by the emergence of industrial capitalism. In particular he suggests that a profound separation between humanity and the natural world was instituted, resulting in the alienation of modern citizens from a working engagement with nature, the isolation of urban dwellers, the artificiality of contemporary relations to animals, and the degradation of the non-human world by industrial technologies. Like all large histories this account is too generalizing, partial and tendentious to be trusted without question. Subsequent work in this area has therefore worked hard to complicate and revise Berger’s view of modernity in various ways.¹

In Renaissance studies, for example, scholars have explored how the emergence of an early modern cultural and material economy, and a concomitant reinvention of the human, was already producing complex reconfigurations of received understandings of animals before the heyday of either capitalism or industrialization (Fudge 1999). Others have demonstrated that the separation from the animal, which underwrote the ascen-

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dancy of the modern subject during the Enlightenment, must be seen as both recent and in many ways extremely fragile (Thomas 1984, Bate 2000). Further studies have shown how the representation, consumption and management of animals in the nineteenth century did not always facilitate, but sometimes resisted European imperialism, scientific empiricism and capitalism, along with their more oppressive counterparts: colonial racism, slavery, indigenous dispossession and environmental depredation.² Reassessments and reinterpretations of the animal's place in contemporary contexts are also proliferating.

The aim of this book is to contribute to this unfolding cultural history of the human-animal relation in the context of globalizing modernity. It will seek to do so both horizontally and vertically, to explore the terrain both topographically and geologically, as it were. Thus, although it progresses from the eighteenth century to the twenty-first, *What Animals Mean* treats a relatively small number of literary texts as core samples whose examination permits a more layered analysis of human-animal relations in specific times and places than a broader survey might allow. My approach will be contextual, with a particular focus on three elements: the relationship between human-animal narratives and the social practices and conditions from which they emerge; the evidence of exchanges between human and non-human forms of agency; and the documentation of shifts in the emotional and affective engagements between humans and other animals.

By means of these three emphases I hope to go beyond reading animals as screens for the projection of human interests and meanings, which until recently was the predominant way of treating cultural representations of animals. Claude Lévi-Strauss famously declared animals 'good to think with' (1963: 89), implying that animality mediates the construction of humanity, so that animals mean whatever cultures mean by them. Scholars in the rapidly-developing field known as 'Animal Studies' or 'Human-Animal Studies', however, reject the anthropocentric assumptions of such an approach. They are interested in attending not just to what animals mean to humans, but to what they mean themselves; that is, to the ways in which animals might have significances, intentions and effects quite beyond the designs of human beings. The possibility of treating non-humans as something other than passive objects of study was anticipated in a paper by Donna Haraway that espoused the recognition of the non-human world as a 'witty agent and actor', a 'coding trickster', an active collaborator in the construction of meaning, or a rebellious obstacle to it (1991: 201). As Erica Fudge puts it, in this type of analysis, '[w]hat is at stake ultimately is our own ability to think beyond ourselves' (2002a: 22). Similarly, Steve Baker describes 'the postmodern animal', which 'does not so much set itself against meaning as operate independently of it' (2000: 82).

Of course novelists, scientists and scholars can never actually access, let alone reproduce, what other animals mean on their own terms. Humans can 'only represent animals' experience through the mediation of cultural encoding, which inevitably involves a reshaping according to our own

intentions, attitudes and preconceptions. Hence, in seeking to go beyond the use of animals as mere mirrors for human meaning, our best hope is to locate the 'tracks' left by animals in texts, the ways cultural formations are affected by the materiality of animals and their relationships with humans (Simons 2002: 5–6, 85–7). As human–animal geographers Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert argue:

If we concentrate solely on how animals are represented, the impression is that animals are merely passive surfaces on to which human groups inscribe imaginings and orderings of all kinds. In our view, it is also vital to give credence to the practices that are folded into the making of representations, and – at the core of the matter – to ask how animals themselves may figure in these practices. This question duly raises broader concerns about non-human agency, about the agency of animals, and the extent to which we can say that animals destabilize, transgress or even resist our human orderings, including spatial ones (2000: 5).

But to speak of 'non-human agency' immediately invites the allegation of anthropomorphism. Surely such a notion imputes to non-humans a capacity – traditionally considered unique to human beings – for conscious planning, decision-making and choice? However, as Jonathan Burt points out, mobilizing a concept of animal agency need not imply 'assumptions about what specifically constitutes animal subjectivity or interiority, nor that there is necessarily a sense that the animal wills any specific change in human beings' (2002: 31). Indeed, Philo and Wilbert turn the charge of anthropomorphism on its head, asking instead whether evidence of animal resistance in cultural texts and practices might not destabilize taken-for-granted assumptions about how agency works in the first place: 'many people (outside the West, but in it too) have started to deconstruct seemingly obvious claims about the privileged status of the human, in contradistinction to the animal, as *the* source of agency in the world' (2000: 15–16). Moreover, they argue, the assumption that agency – the capacity to effect change – necessarily requires a combination of rational thought and conscious intention depends in the first place upon an Enlightenment humanist paradigm within which these traits came to define the human as such. Hence, the allegation of anthropomorphism itself derives from an anthropocentric and ethnocentric understanding about what agency is. A reconceptualization of agency, on the other hand, might facilitate a mode of analysis that does not reduce the animal to a blank screen for the projection of human meaning, and might offer productive new ways of accounting for the material influence of the non-human animal upon humans, and *vice versa*.

The ways in which animals are understood and treated by humans must also be considered in relation to the ways we feel towards them. In documenting the potent but sometimes evanescent dispositions that link

humans and animals over time, the study of fiction has a special role to play. For Raymond Williams, literature provides 'often the only fully available articulation . . . of structures of feeling which as living processes are much more widely experienced' (1977: 133). Literary texts testify to the shared emotions, moods and thoughts of people in specific historical moments and places, as they are influenced by – and as they influence – the surrounding sociocultural forces and systems. Williams introduces the phrase 'structure of feeling' to denote a 'lived' or 'practical consciousness' of meanings and values, prior to their explicit articulation, definition, classification or rationalization in fixed or official ideologies: 'it is a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material but each in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange' (130–1). In what follows, I will be concerned to identify the various structures of feeling that characterize human–animal relations during the emergence, zenith and decline of Western modernity.

In order to achieve coherence while attempting to move between a very broad cultural history and very specific examples, I have chosen familiar texts, classics in many cases, which however share two features: the inclusion of human–animal relations as significant components of their representational structures, and an engagement with the outwardly expanding, imperialist or globalizing dimension of modernity. My opening chapter examines the two most famous eighteenth-century narratives, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*. The second and third chapters analyse similarly exemplary fictions from the nineteenth century by Mary Shelley, Herman Melville, and H. G. Wells. And the last two chapters survey how the human–animal narratives dealt with so far – the Robinsonnade, the Swiftian reversal, the Frankensteinian experiment and the hunt for the White Whale – influence and are reshaped by modernist and postmodern writers during the twentieth century and at the start of the twenty-first.³

1 The Inhuman Fictions of Swift and Defoe

Two travellers go on separate journeys. Both are marooned on alien shores, where they encounter exotic peoples and species. They have to make do with unfamiliar foods, company and clothing. They consume the animals they discover and use their skins for clothing, but also, seeking consolation for the absence of other humans, befriend them. One keeps pets, the other is kept as a pet; one uses empirical observation to master the natural world, the other is scrutinized as a natural-historical specimen; one breeds a stock of domesticated animals, the other is offered a mate to establish a breeding stock of his own kind.

Comparison between the adventures of Robinson Crusoe and Lemuel Gulliver highlights two features integral to Enlightenment modernity.¹ The first is mobility. By turning their gaze beyond Europe, towards unfamiliar lives and locations, Enlightenment thinkers developed their notions about the world and the place of humans in it. The epistemological movements of the period were inextricably entwined with material expansion: trade, navigation, cartography, colonialism, slavery. And the fictional voyages created by Defoe and Swift drew extensively upon the experiences of real-life travellers – for example those of explorer, adventurer, trader, slaver and pirate William Dampier, and of Alexander Selkirk, the marooned Scottish sailor who survived four years alone on one of the Juan Fernandez Islands (Rowse 2000: 59–60).

The second feature of Enlightenment modernity demonstrated by all these adventures is the formative role played by human–animal relations. Whether as a concept (*animality*) or as a brute reality (*actual animals*), non-humans play a constitutive role in the preoccupations of the modern enterprise: its relentless mobility (spatial, social, economic and epistemological), its development of commodity culture, its promotion of new scientific paradigms and its determination to reconceptualize the human. The animal imagery created by Defoe and Swift – Crusoe in his goatskins with his parrot and dog; Gulliver swallowing forkfuls of tiny cows, struggling in the affectionate grip of a gigantic monkey, or talking politics with well-bred horses – have enduring appeal because they embody this relationship.²

The Beast-Machine

It was as a comment on *human* nature that the concept of 'animality' was devised (Thomas 1984: 41).

It is possible to oppose man to other living things, and at the same time to organize the complex – and not always edifying – economy of relations between men and animals, only because something like an animal life has been separated within man, only because his distance and proximity to the animal have been measured and recognized first of all in the closest and most intimate place (Agamben 2004: 15–16).

As Keith Thomas concludes, the rethinking of human nature during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries occurred in reference to animality as its accompanying term. In this sense modern 'man' depends upon what Giorgio Agamben refers to as 'anthropophorous' animality: the conceptual animal that produces or bears the concept of the human as such (2004: 12).

In medieval Europe the security of the division between human and animal rested upon theological and moral qualities. Christian dogma, exemplified by Augustine and Aquinas, saw human nature as a conflict between the animal passions of the mortal body and the divine aspirations of the immortal soul, and as subject to an eschatological imperative to transcend the former in favour of the latter. This version of humanity was guaranteed by a divinely created chain of being that ordered the world, material and immaterial, into a hierarchy which placed animals below humans, and angels above. Hence, while in the mortal, fallen world humanity was constituted by an animality at once beneath and internal to it, the true and immortal nature of the human was emphatically non-animal. Theology licensed, indeed demanded, the subjugation not only of the human's own animality, but also of the non-human animals over whom Adam and Eve were granted dominion (Thomas 1984: 17–30, 36–41).

Humanism, however – first emerging within Christian philosophy, but eventually arrogating the cultural dominance of its theological parent – required a reconfiguration of this bifold nature of 'man'. Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the growing authority of science and philosophy gradually but inexorably shifted the distinction between the human animal and all others away from the former's unique access to divine grace and possession of an immortal soul, towards a more anthropocentric concept of mind, as characterized by the capacity for rational thought. Again, animals were integral to this movement – literally, as tools for scientific experimentation, and conceptually, as a control group against which to prove the uniqueness of human intellect and agency.

René Descartes provided the paradigm for this extreme remaking of the human via manipulation of the animal. *Cogito ergo sum*: for Descartes the ability to think is the precondition for human being, and in order to appre-

hend the distinctive nature of human thought, Descartes produces his infamous comparison with animals. The exceptional esteem accorded to a particular species of human intellect demands a correlative underestimation of the cognitive capacities of non-human animals, who are thus reduced to mindless automatons, indistinguishable from perfectly crafted machines. Animals 'have no intelligence at all' writes Descartes; when they act, it is merely 'nature working in them according to the disposition of their organs', just as a machine operates not of its own volition but according to the design of its maker: '[t]hus a clock, composed only of wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure the time' (1960 [1637]: 81–2). As Thomas points out, many early modern intellectuals, inspired by a new 'host of mechanical marvels – clocks, watches, moving figures and automata of every kind – [were] well prepared to believe that animals were also machines . . .' (1984: 33–4). The attractiveness of Descartes' comparison was that it caught the flavour of modernity, and in particular the preoccupation with technological and temporal advancement. More importantly, the material agenda of early modern and Enlightenment culture required this kind of absolute distinction: 'Descartes' explicit aim had been to make men "lords and possessors of nature"', and 'the most powerful argument for the Cartesian position was that it was the best possible rationalization for the way man actually treated animals' (34). Accordingly, in the century following Descartes, the definition of modern 'man' according to a strict demarcation between animals and humans, and predicated on the possession or absence of rationality, achieved a growing authority in scientific and philosophical circles (Hulme and Jordanova 1990).

Yet as Thomas also argues, the extent and manner of the adoption of the Cartesian paradigm within the larger cultural milieu must be measured with great care. In Britain, a flurry of interest in this topic was given added momentum by the publication of a popular English translation of Descartes in 1694 (Shugg 1968). But while some devout proponents of the 'new science' advanced the Cartesian model, the greater part of English writing on the topic scrutinized it sceptically and, more often than not, rejected it. The rhetorical vehicle for this debate was provided by narratives about humans and animals, especially those that carried traces of dirt and blood from material relationships between species.

Non-Apes, Non-Horses, Non-Humans

The commonest of such vehicles was the horse. According to a long-standing convention, a man on horseback represents reason reins in the passions, while the inverted form, a horse comically riding a man, signifies the overcoming of reason by the passions (Rivero, in Swift 2002 [1726]: 192). Either way, the relation between the human and the equine provided an immediately recognizable image of the bifold nature of the human as it was commonly understood: animal flesh and immortal soul; brute body and knowing, judging mind. It recurred as a syllogism commonly used in

schools: '[m]an is a rational animal. No horse is rational. Only rational animals are capable of discipline' (Weiner 2000: 15). '*Homo est animal rationale*: no one could study elementary logic anywhere in the British Isles in the generation before *Gulliver* without encountering this formula', most often 'given without comment or explanation as the obviously correct formula for man's distinctive nature' (Crane 1962: 245). Such micro-narratives – man rides horse, horse rides man – often inform and give shape to philosophical abstractions, but they always owe their self-evident authority to human-animal practices. Prior to the nineteenth century, no animal was more central to the commerce of everyday European life than the horse, as a mode of transport, agricultural machine, agent of communication, weapon of war and tool of colonization. European states rode to national prosperity and global power on the back of the horse (Wintle 1994).

Gulliver's Travels deploys the inverted form of this long-established emblem. In Book 4, it is not *homo* but the equine Houyhnhnm that is *animal rationale* – 'their grand Maxim is, to cultivate *Reason*, and to be wholly governed by it' – in contrast to the hominid Yahoo, whom Gulliver portrays as the embodiment of irrational, carnal appetite (Swift 2002 [1726]: 219–23, 225). Although the reader is never actually asked to imagine a Houyhnhnm astride the back of a Yahoo, Gulliver does see an 'old Steed, who seemed to be of Quality', riding in a sledge pulled by four of his Yahoo beasts of burden (196). Swift suggests the reversal linguistically as well. 'Houyhnhnm', presumably, should be pronounced like the word 'human' (with the final consonants swapped) as if spoken by a horse. And just as the equine whinny provides a language for the Houyhnhnms' perfectly rational horse-sense, human speech transforms into the irrational vocalizations that give the Yahoos their name.

This apparently simple reversal of the conventional emblem, however, proves on examination to be fraught with complexities. Some scholars consider that Swift intends Gulliver's high estimation of Houyhnhnm society to be taken seriously, as a neo-Stoic utopia based on the rational disposition of civic virtue. Others point out that Gulliver has become, in the course of his travels, a wildly unreliable observer, whose perceptions are distorted to the point of insanity after the first three voyages. According to this perspective, when considered outside the narrator's idealized view of them, the Houyhnhnms are ascetic fascists, exemplars of a dispassionate extremism resulting from a moral code dependent on strict ratiocination.³ I suggest that the meaning of Swift's extended portrait of equine rationality can be clarified only by placing it in context: first in relation to the preceding three parts of the *Travels*, and second within a wider cultural debate regarding the superimposed binary oppositions: reason/passion and human/animal.

Gulliver's third voyage, for example, provides the most direct satire against Descartes and other proponents of the new science, and the concomitant exaggeration of the distinction between animal body and rational mind. The most evidently Cartesian culture anywhere in the

Travels is that of Laputa, the flying island founded upon a scientific imperative to transcend the material world, whose gentry have their heads permanently 'reclined either to the Right, or the Left; one of their Eyes turned inward, and the other directly up to the Zenith'. Preoccupied by 'intense Speculation', obsessively contemplating the worlds of inner thought or transcendent space, the Laputans so neglect their material conditions that they require servants to strike them with rattles periodically to remind them of their proximity to other people or to physical risks. Without this, the typical Laputan is 'so wrapped up in Cogitation, that he is in manifest danger of falling down every Precipice' (Swift 2002 [1726]: 133–4). The subjectivity proposed by the Cartesian *cogito* here reduces the human body to an inconvenient drag on the mind, an unfortunate material residue capable only of precipitating a distracted intellect into physical pratfalls.

Even when the Laputans are forced to deal with any aspect of the body, they do so according to mathematical principles. For example, diet: Gulliver is served 'Mutton, cut into a Aequilateral Triangle, a piece of Beef into a Rhomboides, and a Pudding into a Cycloid', resulting in an 'Indisposition that held me some Days' (Swift 2002 [1726]: 135–6). The same problems occur with clothing: the king's tailor measures Gulliver's 'altitude' with a quadrant and 'the Dimensions and Out-Lines' of his body with a ruler and compass, but when the clothes come they are 'very ill made, and quite out of shape' (136). As for Laputan architecture: '[t]heir Houses are very ill built, with Walls Bevil, without one Right Angle in any Apartment, and this defect ariseth from the Contempt they bear to practical Geometry' (137). Laputan intellectual calculus proves imperfect in proportion to its engagement with the material body and environment.

However the divorce between mental and bodily phenomena on Laputa merely exaggerates Gulliver's own tendency to lapse into a kind of body dysmorphia. Returning from Brobdingnag, his psychological sense of his own anatomy is skewed. Having grown accustomed to the gigantic proportions of those around him, he keeps overestimating his own stature – bending down to enter his house for fear of striking his head, stooping below his wife's knees to embrace her, and attempting to pick up his daughter by the waist in one hand (Swift 2002 [1726]: 124–5). Similarly, coming home from Houyhnhnmland after his long immersion in equine culture, he speaks in a whinnying tone and trots like a horse (235, 241). In this regard, Gulliver – 'a Person of much Curiosity and easy Belief' (151) whose name hints at his gullible introjection of the values of the two alien cultures he admires most – provides another instance of that disease of modern humanity which Swift diagnoses in Laputa: the devaluation of the body at the expense of an abstract notion of intellectual transcendence. Gulliver's own growing contempt for human flesh is evident in his horrified depictions of dermatological pathologies in Brobdingnag, and his disgusted anatomization of the Yahoos (93–4, 98–9, 189–90).

The Yahoo–Gulliver–Houyhnhnm relation thus occurs as a culmination of Swift's critique of the opposition and hierarchy put in place by the

Cartesian view of the relationship between reasoning mind and sensual body. But it must also be considered in the light of a related challenge that targets the Cartesian distinction between human and animal on the basis of the former's unique possession of rationality. Throughout the *Travels*, and most obviously in the fourth voyage, Swift destabilizes the privileged relationship between reason and the human that provides the crux of Descartes' formulation. He does this in two symmetrical ways: through Gulliver's portrayal of the Houyhnhnms as a species embodying virtuous reason conjoined to an indisputably non-human body, and through his attitude to the Yahoos, in whom, despite their hominid forms, Gulliver can recognize no sign of any rational or moral capacity whatsoever.⁴

A sustained inter-implication of the two anti-Cartesian conceits described above – one that mocks the supremacy of reason, and another its unique possession by humans – thus structures Gulliver's final voyage. It is within this context, I suggest, that the moral character of the Houyhnhnms must be considered, since they represent both aspects of Swift's anti-Cartesianism simultaneously. While clearly embodying the displacement of rationality from the human form, they also demonstrate its unreliability as an ultimate source of virtue. The faults apparent in Houyhnhnm society, indeed, arise from an overestimation of rationality as the basis for social division. Just as certain strains in Enlightenment thought took rationality as the measure of full humanity, thereby excluding those found wanting (women, the poor, non-Europeans), the Houyhnhnms believe that 'it is *Reason* only that maketh a Distinction of Persons', using abstract ratios and principles to regulate marriage, the production and distribution of offspring, the education of the young, and servant-master relationships (Swift 2002 [1726]: 226).⁵ The same application of rationality as the measure of all things applies to the Houyhnhnms' treatment of others, most obviously the Yahoos. Given the anthropomorphism with which the latter are described, the discussion in the Houyhnhnm General Assembly of a plan to exterminate them cannot help but evoke genocidal implications – an effect not far removed from the black humour of Swift's 'Modest Proposal' (1969 [1729]), which recommended the consumption of Irish infants as a way of easing that country's poverty while at the same time answering its demand for food (Hawes 1991; Rawson 2001).

Ultimately, when placed alongside the Cartesian debates characteristic of English letters during the first part of the eighteenth century, neither Yahoos nor Houyhnhnms should be considered as portraits of *the human*, ideal or otherwise, in the sense given to that term by the Enlightenment. Neither indeed are they *animals*, according to the Enlightenment understanding of that accompanying term. They are something more like Locke's 'shape of an ass with reason', which the philosopher insists must be considered 'different from either that of man or beast . . . a species of an animal between, or distinct from both' (1997 [1689]: I, 134).⁶ Furthermore, having lived so long and so gullibly with these two (non-species, Gulliver also is no longer human; neither has he become an