GLOBAL TRADE LAW SERIES

PROTECTING INVESTMENT IN SERVICES

INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION VERSUS WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Martín Molinuevo





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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BCC Banque Commerciale Congolaise

BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement

CAFTA-DR Central American Free Trade Agreement

CAN Comunidad Andina

CIRDI Centre international pour le règlement des différends relatifs

aux investissements

CNUDCI Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial

international

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPC United Nations Central Product Classification

CTS Council for Trade in Services

DS Dispute Settlement

DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSM Dispute settlement mechanism

DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

Settlement of Disputes

EAC East African Community (EAC)

EC European Community / European Communities

ECT Energy Charter Treaty

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EFTA European Free Trade Association EPA Economic Partnership Agreement

EU European Union

FDI Foreign direct investment
FET Fair and equitable treatment

List of Abbreviations

FIPA Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement

FTA Free Trade Agreement

FTC (NAFTA's) Free Trade Commission

FTEPA Free Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 GATT1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947

GPA Agreement on Government Procurement

ITO International Trade Organization ICC International Chamber of Commerce

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

ILC United Nations International Law Commission

LDC Least Developed Country

MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment

MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur MFN Most favoured nation

MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NGO Non-governmental organization

NT National treatment

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration
PTA Preferential trade agreement

SAR (China's) Special Administrative Region SCC Stockholm Chamber of Commerce

SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

TBR Trade Barriers Regulation

UK United Kingdom UN United Nations

UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

US or USA United States of America

USC Unites States Code

USTR Unites States Trade Representative

WTO World Trade Organization

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Part I Presentation and Background



Chapter 1 Introduction

I. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW VERSUS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

In the last half a century, no area of international law has grown as much in terms of geographic coverage and substantial scope as international economic law.

In the mid-twentieth century, in an attempt to find the formula to prevent the outbreak of prior wars, whether military or economic, about 20 countries promoted the creation of the International Trade Organization (ITO) – an international institution with the mandate to monitor and govern all central aspects of international economic relationships, including international commerce, flow of international investment, and the movement of workers across borders.

The ITO never came into being, and the interested countries had to find a way to address the void left by its failure. The countries saved what they could from it in an instrument that set out a framework for negotiating trade concessions and, importantly, a set of rules that barred governments from raising barriers to the other members of the privileged club. Within a few years the membership to such instrument, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), had multiplied. Today, over 150 countries, totalling over 95% of the global GDP, are governed by those rules.¹

Roughly one decade later, another trend emerged to fill yet another part of the void: the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) designed to protect investors and attract investment flows into locations of comparatively low international standing. Those instruments proved extremely popular. In about 50 years,

^{1.} On the development of international trade law, see generally, Jackson, J.H., *The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations* (1997), 31–78.