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The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics

〔美〕彼得·卡赞斯坦 主编
Peter J. Katzenstein

国家安全的文化： 世界政治中的规范与认同



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by Peter J. Katzenstein

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出版说明

引进和交流,是国际研究诸学科发展壮大所不可或缺的一环和纽带。没有引进和交流,学术就难以活跃,也不易创新。每一位从事世界政治与国际关系研究的学者、每一位学习世界政治与国际关系的学生,无不深感阅读外文原文文献的重要性,他们都深知,原文的报刊、教材和专著,是获取最新国际信息、最新理论论争、最新参考资料的必不可少的重要来源,而获得这样的原文文献的机会是不均等的,因此,他们极其渴望更为方便地直接接触到原文文献。而在目前不易直接在国内购买原版书籍的情况下,采取原版影印的方式引进国际上的优秀教材和专著是解决问题的一条捷径,如此就可以使国内普通读者方便地获得最有权威的原文读物,从而可以快速了解国外同行的教学和学术成果,为深入学习和研究、为开展有效的对外学术交流、也为国际关系诸学科在我国的发展打下更坚实的基础。

这套《世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书》,正是基于上述认识而组织出版的,并且得到了我国国际关系教学与科研领域最有权威的专家教授们的认可,他们分别来自于北京大学国际关系学院、复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院、中国人民大学国际关系学院、外交学院、清华大学国际问题研究所、中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所、中共中央党校战略研究所等单位,作为本套丛书的学术顾问,他们愿意向我国该学科及相关领域的广大学者和学生共同推荐这套丛书。

本丛书第一批先行选入了一些经典文献选读性质的国外优秀教材,也包括美国大学中的一些知名国际关系学教员所编著的教材,内容主要在国际关系理论方面,也包括国际政治经济学和比较政治学方面的优秀教材。它们皆可称为原文中的精品,值得研读和收藏,不仅如此,由于它们本身在国外的大学课堂里都是应用较广的教材和读物,所以特别适合作为我国国际关系与世界政治专业大学教学中的参考读物,甚至可以直接作为以外文授课的课堂教材。在每本书的前面,我们都邀请国内比较权威的专家学者撰写了精彩的导论,以指导读者更好地阅读和使用这些文献。

根据读者的反映和我国建设中的国际关系学科的发展需要,我们决定在上述影印图书的基础上,开辟一个“学术精品系列”,以让我国国际关系专业的学者和学生有机会更方便地接触到那些堪称“精品中的精品”的学术书籍,比如摩根索的《国家间政治》、沃尔兹的《国际政治理论》和基欧汉的《权力与相互依赖》等等。这些作品大都已经有了中文译本,而且有的还不只一种中译本,它们的学术和学科地位是不言而喻的,在中国读者心目中也已有着持久深入的影响,正因如此,在这个新系列的每一种图书前面我们没有再烦请学术顾问们撰写导言。我们相信,如此有生命力的作品,当它们以新的面目出现在中国读者面前时,一定会引发新的阅读感受、新的理论遐思和新的战略决策思考。至少,

它们可以带给我们真正原汁原味的享受,让我们更加贴近当代的国际关系理论和国际关系理论家。

今后,我们会陆续推出更新、更好的原版教材和专著,希望广大读者提出宝贵意见和建议,尤其欢迎更多的专家学者向我们推荐适合引进的国外优秀教材和专著,以帮助我们完善这套丛书的出版,并最终形成一套完整的世界政治与国际关系及其相关学科适用的原文教学研究参考书系。

最后也要特别提醒读者,我们引进这套丛书,目的主要在于推动学术交流、促进学科发育、完善教学体系,而其作者的出发点和指导思想、基本观点和结论等,则完全属于由读者加以认识、比较、讨论甚至批评的内容,均不代表北京大学出版社。

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Preface

The revolutionary changes that have marked world politics in recent years offer scholars an extraordinary opportunity for reflection and critical self-appraisal.¹ This is true, in particular, for scholars of international relations. One observer has likened the embarrassment that the end of the Cold War caused us as scholars of international relations and national security to the effects the sinking of the *Titanic* had on the profession of naval engineers. Although our analytical coordinates for gauging global politics have proven to be inadequate for an analysis of a world in rapid change, there has been remarkably little rethinking of our categories of analysis. Instead, in the first half of the 1990s North American scholarship on the theory of international relations was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of realism or liberalism offered a superior way for explaining the world. Considering the dramatic international developments occurring during these years, many of the academic debates looked arcane to the interested bystander. For it is hard to deny that existing theories of international relations have woefully fallen short in explaining an important revolution in world politics.

What the writer Peter Schneider said of the German Left is also appo-

1. See, for example, the symposium on prediction in the social sciences introduced by Michael Hechter in the *American Journal of Sociology* 100,6 (May 1995): 1520–1527.

site for the field of national security studies: it slept right through a revolution. While the balance between demand and supply effected significant changes among security specialists working in think-tanks and, more slowly, even inside government, remarkably little changed in the academy. In a recent review of the scholarship published between 1989 and 1994 in *International Security*, one of the premier journals in the field, Hugh Gusterson concludes that “old stories have been bent to new times rather than questioned or cast away.”² He identifies only one article between 1989–94, published by a historian, which asks the obvious question—why and how virtually all of the established theories could have been so wrong.

Scholars have made some adjustments in their research. Various forms of realist theorizing, for example, have rediscovered nationalism and ethnicity and are doing so with a breath-taking lack of analytical discomfort. Ever since Kenneth Waltz published his seminal *Theory of International Politics*, this book had been invoked as a text that provided the field of national security studies with a firm base. However, Waltz was very clear that the internal characteristics of states were irrelevant to his theory. The analysis of nationalism and ethnicity thus is a sharp turn for those who previously had written on national security informed by this variant of realist theorizing. It is especially surprising that realists, with their natural focus on states, have not inquired more systematically into the effects of changes in state identity, for example from warfare state to welfare state in Western Europe, that have altered traditional conceptions and instruments of national security.

A second adjustment has been to look for new areas to apply realist theory. A spirited debate about the conditions of peace in Europe has led to an examination of those conditions in other regions of the world. Realist theory, for example, rediscovered in Asia the balance of power and the instabilities of multipolarity which so unexpectedly were missing in Europe in recent years. It was, however, odd that realist analysis continued to neglect domestic politics and transnational relations, the very factors that had much to do with the unexpected end of the Cold War. A style of analysis that had proven to be inadequate in Europe was not refurbished but, implausibly, simply reapplied to Asia.

These adjustments in the core paradigm informing national security

2. Hugh Gusterson, “Reading International Security after the Cold War,” paper prepared for the second workshop on Culture and the Production of Security/Insecurity, Kent State University, April 28–30, 1995, p. 6.

studies have left unimpressed a growing number of graduate students and younger scholars unpersuaded because, in part, their political and intellectual sensibilities are more firmly grounded in circumstances that differ from those experienced by their elders. The younger generation lived through the waning of the Cold War, not its exacerbation. It was exposed to new intellectual currents in the humanities and cultural studies. And as had been true before, this was an impatient cohort, eager to push ahead.

This volume represents and speaks to these intellectual currents. It reports the results of a project conducted under the auspices of the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research Council and funded by the Council through a grant from the MacArthur Foundation. The project was deliberately designed to expose the participants to different intellectual climates at different universities. Workshops held at Cornell University, the University of Minnesota, and Stanford University, attended by the project participants as well as graduate students and faculty members from the respective host institutions, elicited different reactions, depending on the local intellectual culture and the list of participants. The tenor of the discussions at the Cornell meeting, with a heavy representation of realists, was “why this effort?” At Minnesota, a stronghold of cultural and post-modern approaches, the reaction was “show us how!” And at Stanford, in the presence of sociologists and theorists of rational choice, both reactions were articulated at the same meeting. To say that the debates at these meetings were spirited would be misleading. The intellectual level of discussion was extraordinarily high and so was the emotional pitch of the participants. Differences in arguments mattered both substantively and personally.

“Identity” theory, in particular, is deeply contested because it raises for scholars of national security directly and unavoidably pressing moral issues. Even though all of the contributors to this volume show in their scholarship that they regard evidence to be of critical importance in adjudicating competing analytical and political claims, realists and rationalists, at times, tar their sociologically minded critics with the brush of being the vanguard of a new wave of intellectual fascism. The critics, less powerful and more polite, view these scholars at times as the vanguard of political and intellectual conservatism. Does truth speak to power? Does power exploit knowledge? For more than an hour the Stanford meeting erupted into an emotionally charged discussion of these issues, illustrating vividly, painfully and usefully for everyone around the table the magnitude of the intellectual, political, and moral stakes that are involved for all scholars,

whether they choose to adhere to or depart from the conventional view of national security.

This project expresses an explicit commitment to engage realism on its own terms. Scholars tend to shy away from conversations that pose fundamental disagreements, preferring instead to live in the comfortable cocoon of the like-minded. Talking across deep intellectual divides is always difficult, often uncomfortable and occasionally hurtful. It is also a useful reminder of the pervasiveness of power in the world of scholarship, of the primacy of institutionally backed validity claims among competing analytical possibilities. Even when such confrontations do not lead to intellectual conversions, they help in sharpening key arguments and circumscribing general claims. Without the willingness of some distinguished scholars of national security to generously commit themselves and their time, this confrontation of perspectives could not have occurred.

In the view of these scholars this was, from the beginning, a fundamentally flawed enterprise. The critics argued that the issues raised in this book have been addressed by the extant literature in a promising way which is leading cumulatively to a theory of national security framed by neo-realist and realist writings. In their reading this volume offers no more than an intellectually incoherent mixture of postmodern interpretivism, nonfalsifiable claims, *ex post facto* description, and insignificant embellishments of what mainstream realism analyzes elegantly and with precision. I report these objections here and let the reader be the judge.

Science is a social process that develops, refines, and rejects ideas. It is not a football game in which players protect turf—intellectual and otherwise. Hence the inclusion in this volume of the self-critical chapter 12. Some colleagues supportive of this project have urged me quietly to drop this chapter. And, unsurprisingly, the vociferous critics of this book's approach uniformly have applauded it as the most compelling piece in the entire collection. Both reactions are besides the point. The chapter points to some of the most noticeable weaknesses of this book and suggests some avenues for future improvement. This self-critical stance, not the waving of new flags or the dogged defense of received dogma, I take to be the task of an empirically oriented social science.

This project could not have been carried out without the generous support of the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research Council. I would like to thank my fellow committee members for their vote of confidence in funding the project and for their useful counsel in its initial stages. I am also deeply indebted to the staffs at

the Social Science Research Council and at Cornell University, the University of Minnesota and Stanford University for carrying the administrative burden involved in organizing the three workshops. And I would like to thank the many graduate students and faculty members at these three universities who were active participants and whose comments, criticisms and suggestions were indispensable for shaping my thinking on a broad range of issues. Without their intellectual energy and commitment all of us would have learned much less in the process, and the ultimate product would have been worse.

My special thanks go to the staff of Columbia University Press: to Kate Wittenberg for her strong interest in this project from the very outset; to two readers who gave detailed and searching suggestions that helped the authors to sharpen their arguments; to Jan McNroy for her extraordinarily careful work as copyeditor; to Alan Greenberg for putting together the index in record time; and to Leslie Bialler for much more than his humor and wit along the way.

Most importantly I would like to thank the project participants for their intellectual engagement and enthusiasm; for their ability to cooperate in friendship; for their willingness to disagree in civility; for their hard work; and for their toleration of an "old fogey" in their midst.

I dedicate this volume to all the graduate students at Cornell with whom I have worked over the years. I have learned an enormous amount from you. And without you I could not have conceived of this project. Contradicting current wisdom about the relation between research and teaching, it was our individual discussions and seminars as well as your research papers and dissertations that made me read in unfamiliar fields and thus lure me in new directions in both research and teaching.

Peter J. Katzenstein
May 1996

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1 • Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security

Peter J. Katzenstein

It is always risky to pronounce a verdict of death on ideas, even after an extended period of apparent lifelessness, but I predict that we have seen the last of the "sociologists" in political science. . . . What has happened is that others too have penetrated the characteristically sloppy logic and flabby prose to discover the deeper problems of circularity and vacuousness inherent in the approach.

—Brian Barry

Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy

This is a book written by scholars of international relations rummaging in the "graveyard" of sociological studies. Since research and teaching is an eminently social process, it is perhaps understandable that changing political circumstances and intellectual fashions reopen controversies that appeared to some to have been already settled. This process can lead, in the best of circumstances, to what we might call intellectual progress: the diminishing of sloppy logic, flabby prose, circularity in reasoning, and vacuousness of insight.

Put briefly, this book makes problematic the state interests that predominant explanations of national security often take for granted.¹ For example, in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, why do the interests of some powerful states in the 1990s, but not in the 1930s or the 1890s, make them intervene militarily to protect the lives and welfare of

For their careful readings and critical comments of previous drafts I would like to thank the members of the project; the participants at the Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Workshops at the University of Minnesota and Stanford University in 1994; and Emanuel Adler, Thomas Christensen, James Goldgeier, Peter Haas, Gunther Hellmann, Ronald Jepperson, Mary F. Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Jonathan Kirshner, Atul Kohli, Charles Kupchan, John Odell, Judith Reppy, Shibley Telhami, Stephen Walt, Alexander Wendt, and two anonymous readers for Columbia University Press.

1. Although, properly speaking, I am referring to state security, I am adhering to the conventional usage in the field of national security studies.

citizens other than their own? Why did the Soviet Union consider it to be in its interest to withdraw from Eastern Europe in the late stages of the Cold War, while it had rejected such suggestions many times before? Answers to such questions are nonobvious and important. State interests do not exist to be “discovered” by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. “Defining,” not “defending,” the national interest is what this book seeks to understand.²

In the context of a bipolar, ideological struggle, the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors offered important insights. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming more salient. An institutional perspective permits us to investigate more closely the context, both domestic and international, in which states and other actors exercise power.

This book offers a sociological perspective on the politics of national security. It argues that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. This does not mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is unimportant for an analysis of national security. States and other political actors undoubtedly seek material power to defend their security. But what other kinds of power and security do states seek and for which purposes? Do the meanings that states and other political actors attach to power and security help us explain their behavior? Answers to such questions, this book argues, raise issues of both theory and evidence.

Our point of departure is influenced greatly by the inability of all theories of international relations, both mainstream and critical, to help us explain fully what John Mueller aptly calls a quiet cataclysm:³ the dramatic changes in world politics since the mid-1980s, which have profoundly affected the environment for the national security of states.⁴ The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and its successor states, organized in the

2. See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

3. John Mueller, *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

4. This project thus resembles others that seek to reevaluate or refine international relations theory in light of recent events. See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Miles Kahler, ed., *Liberalization and Foreign Policy* (forthcoming); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).