

# Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance

A comparative study

Beatrice de Graaf



Contemporary Terrorism Studies

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Translated by Leonie Abels

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# Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance

This book offers a new model for measuring the success and impact of counterterrorism strategies, using four comparative historical case studies.

The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures is hard to assess, especially since the social impact of terrorist attacks is a fundamental and complex issue. This book focuses on the impact of counterterrorist measures by introducing the concept of the performative power of counterterrorism: the extent to which governments mobilize public and political support – thereby sometimes even unwittingly assisting terrorists in creating social drama. The concept is applied to counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s.

Based on in-depth case study research using new primary sources and interviews with counterterrorist officials and radicals, a correlation is established between a low level of performative power and a decline of terrorist incidents. This is explored in terms of the link between social drama (as enhanced by counterterrorist measures) and ongoing radicalization processes. This book demonstrates that an increase in visible and intrusive counterterrorist measures does not automatically lead to a more effective form of counterterrorism. In the open democracies of the west, not transforming counterterrorism into a performance of power and repression is at least as important as counterterrorism measures themselves.

This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counterterrorism, discourse analysis, media and communication studies, conflict studies and IR/Security Studies in general.

**Beatrice de Graaf** is a Historian and Associate Professor at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University, Netherlands.

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Countering terrorism is not merely a bureaucratic profession. Research into its instruments and impact goes deeper than just calculating the sum of resources, methods and corresponding arrests. That was the first lesson I learned when I embarked on this project in 2005. At that time, in-depth counterterrorism research had hardly been conducted in the Netherlands. I had ventured into this area after completing my PhD thesis on – among other issues – attempts by the East German secret service – the Stasi – to undermine dissident groups and thwart their activities. After publishing my PhD thesis in 2004, I received letters from various sources pointing out that Western services had also used some very intrusive intelligence methods against dissident groups in the 1970s. This stimulated me to begin research on how our democracies, held to be superior to the dictatorships of Eastern Europe, defended themselves against ideological assaults and attacks, but also how Western intelligence and security services had operated and ‘performed’.

In 2005 the shock caused by the murder of Dutch filmmaker and publicist Theo van Gogh was still reverberating, but a counterterrorism infrastructure was yet to be constructed. It seemed a good moment to begin research on evaluating the performance of Western intelligence and security services dealing with terrorists. A great deal had been written on terrorism, but counterterrorism still remained a black box. Means and methods were kept secret, money was lavished, but the results were not easily established. This was how I began my journey, exploring various archives, discussions with judges, intelligence officials, and even former radicals at home and abroad; but the topic only became more complicated. Numerous persons, however, helped me to reach my goal.

I would first of all like to express my gratitude to all the counterterrorism officials in the judicial, intelligence, police, political and other

security-related fields who patiently, or with passion and emotion, told me about the unruly practice of counterterrorism in daily life. German public prosecutors, Italian judges, American intelligence officials and the Dutch police were willing to share their experiences and sometimes even their personal archives with me. Not all of them are mentioned in this volume, or wish to be, but they know I am very grateful.

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From 2009 onwards, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) supported my research into the construction and communication of national security ideas and instruments, and enabled me to set up my own research group, including two PhD students. The completion of this book benefited highly from this research support.

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to my family – my husband, our two little daughters, and my parents – who supported me endlessly, not in the least by carrying my paperwork around the world, and tolerating the intrusion of terrorism research in their lives.

# Abbreviations and acronyms

ACS	<i>Archivio Centrale dello Stato</i> (National Archive)
AIVD	<i>Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst</i> (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service)
ASTA	<i>Ambtelijke Stuurgroep Terroristische Acties</i> (Official Steering Group Terrorist Actions)
AVRO	<i>Algemene Vereniging Radio Omroep</i> (General Association for Radio Broadcasting)
BA-SAPMO	<i>Bundesarchiv-Stiftung Archiv der Arbeiterparteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR</i> (National Archive – Foundation Archive of the Worker’s Party’s and Mass Organisations of the former German Democratic Republic)
BfV	<i>Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz</i> (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
BBE	<i>Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid</i> (Special Assistance Unit, consisting of three joint counterterrorist units of the Dutch Police and Armed Forces)
BGF	Black Guerrilla Family
BHIC	<i>Brabants Historisch Informatiecentrum</i> (Brabant Historical Information Centre)
BKA	<i>Bundeskriminalamt</i> (Federal Criminal Police Office)
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i> (Federal Intelligence Service)
BPP	Black Panther Party for Self Defense
BR	<i>Brigate Rosse</i> (Red Brigades; Italy)
BRD	<i>Bundesrepublik Deutschland</i> (Federal Republic of Germany)
BStU	<i>Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR</i> (The Office of the Federal Commissioner (BStU) for the Records of the Ministry for State Security of the former GDR, or the Stasi Archive’)
BVD	<i>Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst</i> (Domestic Security Service of the Netherlands)

BZC	<i>Bijzondere Zaken Centrale</i> (Centre for Special Affairs, a Dutch counterterrorism centre within the police forces)
CDA	<i>Christen-Democratisch Appèl</i> (Christian Democratic Appeal)
CDU	<i>Christlich-Demokratische Union</i> (Christian Democratic Union)
CESIS	<i>Comitato esecutivo servizi di informazione e sicurezza</i> (Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COINTELPRO	Counter intelligence program
CPN	<i>Communistische Partij Nederland</i> (Communist Party of the Netherlands)
CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States of America
CSU	<i>Christlich-Soziale Union</i> (Christian Social Union)
CRI	<i>Criminele Recherche Informatiedienst</i> (Criminal Investigation and Information Bureau)
CT	Counterterrorism (also ct)
D66	<i>Democraten 1966</i> (Democrats 1966)
DC	<i>Democrazia Christiana Italia</i> (Christian Democrats)
DDR	<i>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</i> (German Democratic Republic)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FALN	<i>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña</i> (Armed Forces of National Liberation of Puerto Rico)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDJ	<i>Freie Deutsche Jugend</i> (Free German Youth)
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i> (Free Democratic Party)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
ETA	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> (Basque Homeland and Freedom)
GIS	<i>Gruppo d'Intervento Speciale</i> (Special Intervention Unit, a counterterrorist unit of the Italian carabinieri)
GSG9	<i>Grenzschutzgruppe 9</i> (Border Control Guard 9, the elite counterterrorism and special operations unit of the German Federal Police)
HDA	<i>Het Drents Archief</i> (The Drenthe Archive)
HTK	<i>Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal</i> (Transactions of the Second Chamber of the States-General of the Netherlands)
HUMINT	Human intelligence
ICBZ	<i>Informatiecentrale Bijzondere Zaken</i> (Information Centre for Special Affairs, a Dutch counterterrorism centre within the police force, former called 'BZC')
IDB	<i>Inlichtingendienst Buitenland</i> (Foreign Intelligence Service of the Netherlands)
IISH	International Institute for Social History

KGB	<i>Komitet Gosoedarstvennoj Bezopasnosti</i> (Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union)
KMar	<i>Koninklijke Marechaussee</i> (Royal Marechaussee of the Netherlands)
KRO	<i>Katholieke Radio Omroep</i> (Catholic Radio Broadcasting Company)
KVP	<i>Katholieke Volkspartij</i> (Catholic People's Party)
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LBT	<i>Landelijk Bijstandsteam Terreurbestrijding</i> (National Support Team Counterterrorism of the Dutch police force)
LKA	<i>Landeskriminalamt</i> (Regional Criminal Office)
MdI	<i>Ministero dell' Interno</i> (Ministry for Internal Affairs)
MfS	<i>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit</i> (Ministry for State Security)
MSI	<i>Movimento Sociale Italiano</i> (Italian Social Movement, a neofascist party)
NAP	<i>Nuclei Armati Proletari</i> (Proletarian Armed Squads)
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTb	National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
NOCS	<i>Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza</i> (Central Security Operations Service of the Italian police)
NSA	National Security Archives
NSC	National Security Council
OM	<i>Openbaar Ministerie</i> (Office of the Public Prosecutor)
OSINT	Open sources intelligence
PCC	<i>Partito Comunista Combattente</i> (Fighting Communist Party)
PCI	<i>Partito Comunista Italiano</i> (Italian Communist Party)
PCM	<i>Presidente dei Consiglio dei Ministri</i> (President of the Council of Ministers)
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFOC	Prairie Fire Organizing Committee
PID	<i>Politie</i> (also Local or Political) <i>Inlichtingendienst</i> (Police/Local/Political Intelligence Service, intelligence units within the Dutch police, operation for the Domestic Security Service)
(P)IRA	(Provisional) Irish Republican Army
PPR	<i>Politieke Partij Radicalen</i> (Political Party of Radicals)
PRI	<i>Partito Radicale Italia</i> (Italian Radical Party)
PSDI	<i>Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano</i> (Italian Social Democrat Party)
PSI	<i>Partito Socialista Italia</i> (Italian Socialist Party)
PSP	<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i> (Pacifist Socialist Party)

PvdA	<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i> (Labour Party)
RAF	<i>Rote Armee Fraktion</i> (Red Army Faction; Germany)
RAI	<i>Radiotelevisione Italiana</i> (Italian Public Broadcasting Company)
RJ	<i>Rode Jeugd</i> (Red Youth; Netherlands)
RMS	<i>Republik Maluku Selatan</i> (South Moluccan Republic)
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RVF	<i>Rood Verzetsfront</i> (Red Resistance Front; Netherlands)
RZ	<i>Revolutionäre Zellen</i> (Revolutionary Cells)
SAC	Special Agent in Charge
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDS (USA)	Students for a Democratic Society (USA)
SDS (BRD)	<i>Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund</i> (German Socialist Student Union)
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SG	Secretary General
SID	<i>Servizio Informazioni Difesa</i> (Military Intelligence Service)
SIFAR	<i>Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate</i> (Military Intelligence Service)
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SIM	<i>Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali</i> (Imperialist State of the Multinationals)
SISDE	<i>Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica</i> (Intelligence and Democratic Security Service, the domestic intelligence agency)
SISMI	<i>Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare</i> (Military Intelligence and Security Service)
SLA	Symbionese Liberation Army (USA)
SMOF	Staff Member and Office Files
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (German Social Democrat Party)
Stasi	<i>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit</i> (Ministry for State Security)
StGB	<i>Strafgesetzbuch</i> (German Criminal Code)
StPO	<i>Strafprozessordnung</i> (German Code of Criminal Procedure)
SWAT	Special weapons and tactics
UCIGOS	<i>Ufficio Centrale per le Investigazioni Generali e per le Operazioni Speciali</i> (Central Bureau for General Investigations and Special Operations, specialist antiterrorist unit, staffed by Italian state police officers)
UCLA	University of California, Los Angeles
VPRO	<i>Vrijzinnig Protestantse Radio Omroep</i> (Liberal Protestant Radio Broadcasting Company)

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VVD	<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i> (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)
US	United States
WDR	<i>Westdeutsche Rundfunk</i> (West-German Radio Broadcaster)
WHCF	White House Central Files
WHSF	White House Special Files
WUO	Weather Underground Organization

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