

Peace Without Justice

**Hegemonic Instability or International
Criminal Law?**



Sterling Johnson

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STERLING JOHNSON

ASHGATE

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Preface

If the events of September 11 reminded the American people of anything, it is their distaste for foreign policy. After generations of socialization to think about foreign affairs as something to be left to the “experts” in Washington, the horrid attack challenged the leadership role of the self-proclaimed hegemon and re-taught an old lesson. With power comes responsibility.

As the people of the United States attempt to understand the “roots” of what is termed “America’s New War,” U.S. political leaders encouraged the American people to simultaneously remain vigilant and yet, “return to normal.” After the symbolic explosion of flag waving and mercantilist patriotism, political sex scandals, Hollywood gossip, and personal gratification took an hiatus and a national discussion of U.S. foreign policy began. Americans became interested in why the “experts” could not prevent such a crime? Has something gone wrong with American largesse in foreign aid, international peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts? Was this criminal act simply one of terror, a manifestation of what Samuel Huntington calls the “clash of cultures?” Was it a political reaction to the real or perceived failure by U.S. political leaders to promote global political and economic justice?

The non-fit between American and European attitudes on international economics and politics is evident on issue after issue. The U.S. routinely rejects international agreements, seemingly for no other reason than they are international. The list of rejected treaties includes; arms control, the international criminal court, bans on the production of biological weapons, the removal of land mines, the protection of biodiversity and placing limits on carbon dioxide emissions for reducing global warming. While the negation of internationalism may serve the short-range policy interests of the hegemon it threatens to undermine extant international agreements. To demonstrate the degree to which American foreign policy-makers are increasingly alienated from the world one need only examine President Bush’s pre-war foreign policy approval rate among Europeans. According to a Pew Research Center study conducted in the UK, Germany, France and Italy, President Bush understood Europe less than his predecessors. The survey indicated a wide attitudinal gap between Europeans and Americans on foreign policy issues. More than 60 percent of Europeans opposed the Bush policy to abandon the 1972 ABM treaty and establish a missile defense system while more than 80 percent opposed his position on global warming. However, 51 percent of Americans support the Bush policy to abandon the 1972 ABM treaty and develop a missile defense system and 53 percent rejected any criticism of Mr. Bush’s foreign policy as “too aggressive.”¹ Europeans strongly rejected Bush’s withdrawal from the Kyoto global warming treaty which strives to cut emissions of carbon dioxide and other so-called green house gases by a 5.2 percent of 1990 levels by 2012. More than 80 nations have signed the treaty, but only 30 have ratified. Fifteen European nations have signed but only Denmark has ratified. None of the world’s large industrial powers have ratified.

In reaction to the attack for rejecting the Kyoto Treaty, the president announced a series of multi-million dollar research projects and initiatives on reducing the impact of heat trapping gases. He promised that he would help devise an alternative to the Kyoto treaty that would ease global warming without hurting the U.S. and other economies.² Meanwhile, a “return to normal” policy on global warming would best serve the American economic interest. The disproportionate U.S. consumption of the planet’s petroleum reflects the American dependency on petroleum to “fuel economic growth.”

While the U.N. planned the agenda for the Durban Conference on Racism in July of 2001, the Bush administration threatened not to attend if the agenda included any discussion of Zionism or reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. The discussion of U.S. support for Israel challenges an historic U.S. foreign policy commitment and foreign policy dilemma. The slave-trade and reparations are perennial issues of American politics, race and inequality. The president reportedly wanted U.S. officials to attend the conference, but took a hard line on limiting the agenda in order to defend Israel and avoid an examination of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century American slave trade. White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer stated: “The only thing that would stop the U.S. from going and playing an important role in combating racism around the world is if the planners ‘hijack’ their own meeting into anti-Semitism.”³

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights wrote to Secretary of State Powell to underscore the commitment to fighting racism in the U.S. Like former U.S. ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, Mr. Powell was making efforts to build closer ties between the U.S. and Africa.

With many African states demanding the conference issue a strong condemnation of the slave trade and others pushing for reparations negotiations, Powell absented himself from these deliberations maintaining the U.S. policy of “normalcy” in foreign and domestic racial relations. However, Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, by appealing for more time to negotiate the agenda, managed to avert a U.S. boycott of the conference.⁴ After the proceedings had begun the United States sent a low level delegation.

The U.S. walked out of the Conference after failing to agree on the rewording of the summit’s communique which compared Zionism to racism and accused Israel of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. A few moments later Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres, said that his country’s Durban delegation also had been recalled. Mary Robinson stated that: “I truly regret the decision of the United States to leave the conference. Nevertheless I believe the journey we began must continue until the end of the conference with a view to achieving a successful outcome.” South Africa’s minister for the presidency, Esop Prohod observed that “It will be unfortunate if a perception were to develop that the U.S. withdrawal from the conference is merely a red herring demonstrating an unwillingness to confront the real issues posed by racism in the U.S. and globally.”⁵ To the contrary, the administration’s perception is that those who would address such politically and economically sensitive issues, as real, are “terrorists” who “hijacked” the conference.

September 11’s impact on U.S. Middle East policy was reflected in the Bush Administration’s policy statement calling for a viable Palestinian state. National security advisor, Condoleeza Rice, told ABC news that the administration wants a

secure Israel and "the Palestinian people [to] have a state in which they can determine their own future."⁶ Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined a policy involving the rebuilding of the Palestinian economy and called for an end to Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. He also called for Palestinian acceptance of the legitimacy of the Israeli state and Israel's acceptance of a "viable Palestinian state."

Following the attacks of September 11 the U.S. denounced Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria and the Sudan for having or seeking to acquire biological weapons. Presumably to build support for the 1972 U.N. bioweapons treaty, the U.S. "naming and shaming" strategy was intended to justify its withdrawal from negotiations on an anti-cheating protocol during the summer of 2001. Undersecretary of State for arms control, John Bolton urged delegates to a treaty review to adopt proposals which include national laws to criminalize bioweapons activities and strengthen controls on pathogenic materials. He admitted that such a protocol would not have stopped bio terror by groups such as Al-Qaeda and require approval by the Security Council. After having abandoned the earlier verification talks, other states were of course, critical of the hegemon's obvious cynicism. The majority expressed support for continued multilateral negotiations.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta 76,000 people are infected annually with food-borne diseases, resulting in about 5,000 deaths. The number of people killed involving biological weapons, zero. The Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies compiled a data base of terrorist or criminal incidence involving NBC weapons. The data reveals that since 1900 most acts involving biological agents, whether criminal or terrorist, were hoaxes. Of the 47 biological incidents reported worldwide in 2000, 40 were hoaxes. Perhaps these numbers were factors in the administration's decision to withdraw from the July 2001 negotiations of 50 nations to strengthen the 1972 ban on biological weapons. Ratified by 143 countries including the U.S., the treaty was the first to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, but it contains no mechanisms to prevent cheating.

The U.S. pretext for non-participation was that the risk of disclosure of U.S. military and commercial secrets and the costs of an inspection regime outweigh the benefits of the ability to detect violations. While the U.S. spends billions of dollars on biodefense and preparedness, the 2001 draft protocol offers extra protection at a total cost of \$20-25 million a year and guaranteed a maximum of seven routine visits to U.S. facilities per annum. Compare this to the 20,000 much more intrusive company inspections conducted each year by the Food and Drug Administration. The U.S. biotech industry, which accounts for a third of global production, would not be "unfairly burdened" by the new regime and subject to "frivolous changes." The Bush administration pledged to "come up with alternative approaches" to strengthen the 1972 treaty including voluntary codes of conduct for scientists, legal agreements on prosecution and extradition of those developing biological weapons. Again, such an alternative seems unlikely given the administration's opposition to the establishment of an international criminal justice regime. Normalcy in the global production of biological weapons is the message and example of the NBC hegemon.

Since 1993, the U.S. military has prepared to fight two major wars simultaneously. As the Pentagon began converting this dual war fighting doctrine into a strategy to "win decisively" in a single conflict and defend its territory against

new threats, the events of September 11 cost 183 Pentagon lives. Homeland defense became the Pentagon's priority responsibility before the attacks of September 11. The consequent antiterrorism laws blur the distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence gathering; expand governmental electronic surveillance laws, expands the arrest and detention of ethnically profiled suspects and costs a \$20 billion congressional anti-terrorism package.

America's "new war" against international terror will not be won with cruise missiles, B-1 bombers and Special Operations forces. Spending \$200 billion on the F-35 fighter jets offers no solution to political violence in a world where nation-states and non-state actors are increasingly likely to utilize violence to solve their problems. The solution to the U.S. leadership dilemma is not an armaments strategy of a hegemon imposed negative peace. Any solution will also involve helping to build international institutions and a "positive peace" based on an international legal system. Increasingly, the actions of state and individual actors are subject to international legal jurisdiction. In the future, violence perpetrated by national, international or transnational criminal and terror networks will require international cooperation between states, military, police and legal institutions to arrest, try and punish or acquit the accused. Enlisting the cooperation and support of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other regional actors with territorial jurisdiction over transnational actors such as Osama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaeda which are involved in crimes of political terror, mandates U.S. support of the international criminal justice regime.

The U.S. suddenly finds it necessary to enlist the cooperation of other states to create a regime to protect civilians against bio terrorism and money laundering. On September 24, 2001, President Bush published an executive order attacking terrorist finances and calling upon The International Monetary Fund's cooperation in disrupting the financial infrastructure of terrorism. In Ottawa, the IMF's leading ministerial committee agreed to take action to control terrorist money laundering. The international miasma of accounting and legal complexities became immediately apparent. Some of the new security measures required of bankers are difficult to apply and may be ineffective. But, not all terror is financed by criminal ventures. The origin and destination of these legal fiscal transactions are more difficult to track because banking systems are not prepared to trace "clean money." Along with arms dealers, narcotics networks, corporations and individuals, terrorists have exploited supervisory gaps to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars in funds through the global banking system. Fundamental to U.S. interests are the demands adopted at a Washington meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of Seven leading industrialized nations to cut the flow of terrorist funds. The task force called for a series of measures, including stronger government powers to freeze assets, greater reporting of suspect transactions and a blacklist of countries handling terrorist money. Any government failing to meet the FATF implementation date of February 1 could face financial sanctions. The international legal issues surround privacy, institutional discrimination, regulation and sovereignty violation charges are legion and underscore the advantages of a functioning criminal law regime. In exchange for their cooperation, the IMF will supply the technical assistance necessary to help poorer countries develop such programs.

Arresting the development and evolution of regimes in arms control, biological weapons manufacture, biological diversity, global warming, anti-racial discrimination and international criminal justice regimes is indicative of hegemony not leadership.

Americans purport to be a nation of "laws not men." A nation where no individual is above the law. However, the community of nations knows that this is not absolutely true because U.S. foreign policy behavior is often that of a nation whose behavior appears to be above the law of nations. Immediately after the Rome Statute and the ICC came into force on July 1, the U.S. notified the United Nations that it was no longer bound by former President Clinton's signature. U.S. ambassador-at large, Pierre-Richard Prosper stated that the U.S. would not penalize ICC signatory states who "attack, seek to undermine or wage war against the ICC." However he added that the Court should expect no cooperation from the U.S. such as providing witnesses, documents or any other types of information that would help with a prosecution. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch noted that: "The administration is putting itself on the wrong side of history ... Unsigning the treaty will not stop the court, it will only throw the United States into opposition against the most important new institution for enforcing human rights in 50 years."

Having failed in the attempt to strangle a United Nations institution for the protection of human rights at birth, Washington sought to place U.S. peacekeepers beyond the reach of the ICC. Threatening to withdraw U.S. military support and its 27 percent financial contribution for U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the Bush administration coerced the United Nations into a compromise giving U.S. peacekeepers a one-year exemption from prosecution by the ICC. Does this time-out exempt U.S. forces from punishment for the hundreds of civilian "collateral casualties" killed in bombing raids over Afghanistan? Does this time-out provide the Bush Administration a one-year window of opportunity to attack Iraq, Iran or any state or non-state actor as part of an expanding war on terrorism? An EU diplomat stated that: "We get the ICC off the ground. We show the ICC is serious about pursuing heinous crimes. The U.S. is on the spot too. It has been given a time-out. If it thinks it is not accountable after this compromise, it is, in fact, more accountable. The spotlight is how it conducts itself abroad."

The increased international responsibilities attendant the role of the "sole superpower," i.e. economic and military hegemon epitomizes the moral and political dilemmas facing the American people and government. The events of September 11 arrested the American oscillation between isolationism and internationalism and other international ambiguity on issues such as political leadership, economic justice and political democracy. The attacks on New York and Washington sparked new thought about the need for New International Economic Order. The benefits of reducing poverty and antagonism towards the west have become more evident and more attention is being paid to states calling for developmental assistance.

In *Global Search and Seizure: The U.S. National Interest v. International Law* (1994), I attempted to examine this dilemma. Since then an international criminal court has been created. The U.S., last minute signatory to the Rome Treaty, helped to create that court. This work examines U.S. policy toward the creation of the International Criminal Court. Considered are the pre-September 11 political attitudes toward the ICC, federal and state jurisdictional conflict issues, civil

liberties and civil rights issues. Congressional opposition to and rejection of the Rome Treaty is examined. Before September 11, congressional opponents to the ICC offered myriad excuses for negating the Rome Statute. The most legitimate objections were based on constitutional interpretation including: the international law implications for the American trial by jury requirement; the limits on executive authority to establish such a court; and the jurisdictional conflicts between federal and state law on issues such as the death penalty. Pre-September 11 advocates of strict adherence to a constitutional "trial by jury requirement," and opponents of the ICC, now support executive branch establishment of overseas military tribunals for suspected terrorists.

Chapter 1, the dubious promise, examines the pledge made by President Clinton to face the global crisis of human rights violations including: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Also explained are Clinton's call for support of the ICC and the purported reasons behind the U.S. "no" vote. Chapter 2 offers an overview of the history of war crime and punishment and attempts to trace the evolution of such law across time, geography and culture by reviewing the Hindu, Roman, Islamic, European and American codes of military conduct during war. Chapter 3 focuses on international criminal justice and war crimes punishment under the League of Nations system and the enforcement of such law pursuant to the Versailles Treaty. Also examined are the Leipzig trials, the London Charter, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals which followed World War II and the use of Truth Commissions in El Salvador and South Africa. Chapter 4 examines the literature of regime theory and seeks to link this theory with international law by comparing the rule and lawmaking processes of security and economic regimes. The concept and theory of hegemonic instability is also introduced to explain American foreign policy toward extant political, security, economic and legal regimes. Also considered are the exemplary role of the hegemon in maintaining economic and political stability as demonstrated in the cases of the Iroquois League, the Concert of Europe and the international economic regime. Chapter 5 reviews the jurisdictional debates of the ILC and the ICC Preparatory Commission over issues of scope, compliance, considers the debates of the International Preparatory Commission of the Rome Statute surrounding ICC jurisdiction over terrorism, the use of child soldiers, individual and corporate responsibility, conspiracy, compliance, non-retroactivity and the principle of complementary jurisdiction. Also examined is the role of the Security Council and recommended changes to the ICC Statute made by Human Rights Watch. Chapter 6 describes the structure and function of the ICC and revisits specific U.S. objections to the court while considering issues of U.S. financial obligations to the U.N. Chapter 7 focuses on the patterns and processes of U.S. foreign policy with respect to international criminal extradition prosecution. The case of accused Nazi war criminal John Demjanjuk is considered for its domestic and international legal merit. Chapter 8 considers the international politics of the U.S. death penalty by examining the cases of the conflict between federal and state law in the execution of citizens of other nations. Chapter 9 focuses on the international politics of justice as exemplified in the protracted Lockerbie trial. There are myriad clandestine motives and actors involved in seeking the truth and/or justice to this terrorist crime. The stakes, and therefore the role of the implicated nation-states may preclude the truth, process and the outcome of the trial. Chapter

10 explores the reality and the implications of hegemonic behavior and justice via abduction. The cases of Adolph Eichmann, Manuel Noriega and other abducted accused are examined. Chapter 11 delves into the U.S. constitutional issues pertaining to U.S. cooperation to the ICC. The prospects for U.S. participation with the ICC and perceived threats to the supremacy of the Constitution are considered. Arguments concerning U.S. trial by jury requirements, extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights and other jurisprudential and constitutional debates are examined as reasons for rejecting the Rome Statute. Chapter 12 contrasts the Yugoslav and Rwandan criminal tribunals and the relative support provided by the U.S. and the U.N. Chapter 13 returns to the concept of hegemonic instability by comparing the war waging behavior of the U.S. and Iraq. Within all military and hegemonic states exist both state and quasi-state actors which benefit economically from the global chaos and slaughter absent weapon, human rights and criminal law regimes.

As Americans learn another lesson in geography via warfare, new and irritating questions about values, lifestyles and the nation's international economic political responsibilities abound. After Afghanistan is liberated from the Taliban can the U.S. establish regional peace or at least stability? Is the U.S. prepared to play a balanced leadership role in the Middle East. Could there be accusations of war crimes against the U.S. by such states as North Korea, Libya, Vietnam, Panama, El Salvador and Chile? Does the fear of prosecution by "rogue" states and prosecutors mean the creation of a regime absent of and therefore hostile to U.S. interests? What is the real cost of global leadership?

Notes

- 1 Wolfe, Richard, "Bush given thumbs down by Europeans," *The Financial Times*, August 16, 2001 p. 6.
- 2 *The International Herald Tribune*, "Bush Unveils Package of Initiatives on Climate," July 14, 2001 p. 2.
- 3 Wolfe, Richard (2001) "White House threatens to boycott UN racism talks," *The Financial Times*, July 28/29 p. 3, italics mine.
- 4 Hoyos, Carola "Robinson plea for racism agenda," *The Financial Times*, August 10, 2001, p. 6.
- 5 Lamont, James, Edward Alden and Ralph Atkins (2001) "U.S. and Israel quit anti-racism summit," *The Financial Times*, August 15, p. 4.
- 6 Dempsey, Judy (2001) *The Financial Times*, "Sharon comments on EU Hopes," November 10, p. 5.

Acknowledgments

This book is the outgrowth of attempting to help myself and my students of international politics and international law to better understand the legal consequences of atrocities committed in modern political conflict. The creation of an International Criminal Court marks a major step in the evolution of international justice. The failure of the U.S. to join the court is problematic and deserves public discussion. I express gratitude to those who helped me think and write about these issues. I wish to thank Professor John Quigley for his valuable comments on the draft manuscript and Professor Chadwick F. Alger of the Ohio State University for his always kind encouragement. I must also express my appreciation to the Honorable Manfred Lachs of the International Court of Justice for his assistance at the Peace Palace. Thanks to my friend and colleague, John Dinse for sharing his expertise on the Balkans war and his perspective on the region and to Doug Roscoe for his assistance with the Conflict and Peace database. Thanks to graduate students Manav Bahl, Mostafa Sadir, Anthony Dill and Joel Lewis. I am particularly grateful to Political Science department's administrative assistant, Jackie Robert, for her patience, expertise, diligence and assistance in the preparation of the camera ready copy of the manuscript. Thanks to Petra Cootje, Maarten Klinkenberg, James Bergtop, Jaep and Cees Meems. Thanks to my family and friends who make me feel at home in Michigan, Greg Johnson, Jeff Platte, Obie and Ruth Thompson, Robert and Diane Newby, Joyce Baugh, Ed Birks, Martha Logsdon, Delbert Ringquist and Alvin and Janice Fleming, Helen and Grady Dale, Michael Johnson, Elizabeth Hobson and Lawrence Poree. Finally, special thanks to Sonia Hubbard, Valerie Saunders, Ruth Peters, Elizabeth Wickens, Claire Annals, Anne Keirby and the Ashgate editorial staff for their assistance.

List of Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
APROMOSA	Association for the Social Betterment of the Masses
CCA	Correctional Corporations of America
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COPDAB	Conflict and Peace Data Base
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FAR	Federal Army of Rwanda
FTAF	Financial Action Task Force
GAO	General Accounting Office
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GCC	Gulf Coast Council
ICA	International Coffee Agreement
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICPSR	Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
ILA	International Law Association
ILC	International Law Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMT	International Military Tribunal
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IOSCO	International Organization of Securities Commissions
JNA	Jugoslav National Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SFOR	Strategic Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice

UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIKOM	United Nations Kuwait Observer Mission
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>xix</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	<i>xxi</i>
1 The Dubious Promise	1
Explaining the No Decision	6
The No Vote: U.S. Sovereignty Threatened?	11
2 War Crime and Punishment: An Overview	19
3 International Justice and the League of Nations	27
The Treaty of Versailles	28
The London Charter	32
Truth Commissions	38
4 Regime Theory: The Transformation of Sovereignty	43
Security Regimes	43
The Iroquois League	44
The Concert of Europe	47
Economic Regimes	49
Hegemonic Instability	57
5 The Jurisdiction Debates	65
Jurisdiction over Terrorism	66
Jurisdiction over Minors	69
Individual Responsibility	71
Augusto Pinochet	71
Corporate Responsibility	73
Acts of Omission, Negligence and Conspiracy	74
Complementary Jurisdiction	75
The Security Council and the ICC	80
Compliance with ICC Judgements	83
Trigger Mechanisms: Opting-in and Opting-out	83
Non-retroactivity	88

6	The Rome Statute	93
	Drugs, War and the ICC	93
	The Structure of the Court	99
	ICC Jurisdiction	99
	Financing the ICC	104
	Pragmatic Fiscal Considerations	108
7	The U.S. and International Criminal Prosecution	113
	Federal vs State Authority	115
	The Demjanjuk Case	117
8	The Death Penalty and International Law	125
	The Soering Case	125
	The Roach Case	131
	The Santana Case	131
	The Faulder Case	132
	The Perception of U.S. Justice	136
9	Lockerbie: The Politics of International Criminal Justice	143
	Scottish Rules of Evidence	145
	Improperly Obtained Evidence	146
10	Hegemonic Justice: Extradition via Abduction	155
	The Eichmann Case	157
	The Abductions of Yunis and Machain	159
	The Noriega Abduction	161
11	Constitutional Interpretation and International Law	167
	Trial By Jury Requirements	169
	Article III Objections to the ICC	174
	Article III Jurisdiction	176
	Non-Article III Tribunals?	178
12	The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals	183
	The Contrasting Tribunals	183
	State Cooperation	185
	Victim-Witness Protection	186
	The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)	187
	Ethnic Conflict or Land Genocide?	187
	ICTY Trials	190
	Problems Obtaining Evidence: The Blaskic Case	193
	The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	196
	A Shared Complicity?	198
	Ethnic Conflict or Genocide?	200
	The Prospects for Rwandan Justice	203

13	The U.S. and Iraq: Invested in Instability?	215
	Accusations of War Crimes in North Korea	215
	Accusations of War Crimes in Vietnam	217
	Accusations of War Crimes in Iraq	218
	<i>Conclusion</i>	229
	<i>Appendix 1</i>	
	Rome Statute Signatories as of February 1, 2001	233
	<i>Appendix 2</i>	
	Rome Statute Ratifications as of July 1, 2002	237
	<i>Index</i>	239

Chapter 1

The Dubious Promise

Speaking to the survivors of genocide in Rwanda in March 1998, President Clinton acknowledged that the United States and the world had not done enough to respond to the massacres that took hundreds of thousands of lives in 1994. Then, speaking of the future, he said: “We owe to those who died and those who survived our every effort to increase our vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who commit such atrocities in the future ... We must make it clear to all those who would commit such acts in the future that they too must answer for their acts, and they will.” He explained that the problems of *ad hoc* tribunals demonstrates the need for a permanent international court to deal with crimes like Rwandan genocide. He pledged that “the United States will work to see that it is created.”¹

In July 1998, after nearly four years of intense negotiation to establish a permanent international criminal court to try those suspected of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, an international criminal law regime was created. Delegates from 159 countries met in Rome in June 1998 for a five-week U.N. Conference to hammer out the final text of a treaty establishing the international criminal court. Those nations attending can be roughly divided into three groups. The first and largest group is a loose collection of 50 “like-minded” countries that want a strong, independent court capable of prosecuting such crimes anywhere in the world. Included in this group are Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Argentina, Malawi, South Africa, most European countries and many African, Latin American and Asian states. The second group, led by the United States and France and supported by Russia and China purport to want an effective court, but want its powers restricted with respect to national sovereignty. A third, smaller group - whose most outspoken representatives are India, Mexico and Egypt, were reluctant to concede any significant power to the court.² Only seven states, the U.S., China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar and Yemen voted against the ICC Statute.

More than 300 nongovernmental organizations including the “NGO Coalition for an ICC” played a critical role in bringing the court to fruition. The NGOs assisted the Preparatory Commission by publishing expert papers which enhanced the understanding of the issues involved and facilitated informal meetings and discussions. They lobbied states, groups of states and persons key to the ICC’s creation thereby sustaining and strengthening the momentum of the process.³ To ensure the participation of less developed countries, private foundations brought delegations to the Rome Conference from Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania and Yemen.⁴

On April 11, 2002, ten nations (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ireland, Jordan, Mongolia, Niger, Romania and