

INSIDE

EUROPE

AGAIN COMPLETELY REVISED

1938 EDITION

By JOHN GUNTHER

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INSIDE EUROPE

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Note

THIS book is written from a definite point of view. It is that the accidents of personality play a great rôle in history. As Bertrand Russell says, the Russian revolution might not have occurred without Lenin, and modern European development would have been very different if Bismarck had died as a child. The personality of Karl Marx himself has powerfully influenced the economic interpretation of history. Important political, religious, demographic, nationalist, as well as economic factors are not, I believe, neglected in this book. But its main trend is personal.

Fascism, the creation of Mussolini, has produced its first war. Then came Spain. What next?

The fact may be an outrage to reason, but it cannot be denied: unresolved personal conflicts in the lives of various European politicians may contribute to the collapse of our civilization. This is the age of great dictatorial leaders; millions depend for life or death on the will of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin. Never have politics been so vital and dynamic as to-day, and so pervasively obtrusive in nonpolitical affairs. The politicians usurp other fields. What fictional drama can compare with the dramatic reality of Mussolini's career? What books in the realm of art have had the sale or influence of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*? What literary craftsman ever wrote history as Trotsky both wrote and made it? Who is a greater engineer than Stalin?

These men and their lesser contemporaries—*couloir* politicians like Laval, crude and boisterous adventurers of the type of Goering, nationalist officers like General Franco, politician-soldiers like the Polish General Ridz-Smigly, would-be dictators like Dr. Schuschnigg, Balkan kings like Zog and Carol—are playing decisive rôles in the stupendous drama of Europe between wars. It is very difficult to explore usefully the private lives of these men. This is not a peephole book. It contains no gossip for gossip's sake. But it tries to tell the intimate story of these leaders, the personal sources of their power, the reasons for their impact on history. Who are these men who would dominate our lives?

The book begins with Hitler, then makes a tour around him. I have tried to note the impingement of Hitler's Germany on every European

country, and to include an analysis of every important European situation. We visit, in a counterclockwise circle, France, Spain, Italy; make a detour upward to that dominant island, England; proceed through the battered countries of Central Europe and the Balkans; finish the circle around Germany with Poland; visit Scandinavia and the neutral states briefly; inspect what we have seen of Western Europe at Geneva; and emerge finally in the Soviet Union. This arrangement has, I hope, a logic of its own.

J. G.

Introduction to New Edition

WHEN Neville Chamberlain took off at Heston airdrome in the early morning of September 15, 1938, to visit that well known Austrian house-painter, somnambulist, and sub-Napoleon Adolf Hitler, in his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden, Europe knew at last, after almost twenty years of armistice, that the real crisis had come.¹ Previously there had been other crises. When France invaded the Ruhr, when Germany invaded the Rhineland, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, when Hitler invaded Austria, the press of the world pronounced in flaming headlines that the "greatest" event since 1914 had arrived. But these other crises were child'splay compared to the Czechoslovak crisis which Mr. Chamberlain was attempting to overcome. This was the real thing—war or peace—at last. This was the crisis that might end all crises.

Two weeks followed of sound and fury, of agonized suspense and almost intolerable tension. The world listened with ears glued to broadcasts from London and Prague, Berlin and Rome. Europe tottered on the brink, anguished and terror-struck. The monstrous war machines plunged stertorously toward action. A war that almost certainly would destroy what was left of European civilization seemed starkly, unbelievably inevitable. Germany had 1,300,000 men under arms, while a corps of 300,000 workmen toiled frantically at the Rhineland fortifications. The French manned the Maginot line, and called up the reserves. The Czechs somberly mobilized their small, compact, efficient army, and the British fleet went into the North Sea prepared for action. Only Italy and Soviet Russia of the great powers did not mobilize. President Roosevelt worked mightily to avert war. One small incident dramatized the alarm of the world as well as any other: the great German steamship "Europa," jammed with Americans fleeing Europe, turned about in mid-ocean, recalled by radio to home waters. It seemed as if Europe as well as the "Europa" named for Europe was going back, back, back—no one knew whither.

¹ Events leading up to the Chamberlain flight are described fully in "The Fascist Offensive," Chapter VIIa, page 103a, inserted especially in this edition.

And this all happened in a year during which Herr Hitler had promised that the "era of surprises" in German foreign policy was over!

Mr. Masfield, the poet laureate, expressed pungently the relief the world felt when it became known that Chamberlain was going to Hitler:

As Priam to Achilles for his son,
So you, into the night, divinely led,
To ask that young men's bodies, not yet dead,
Be given from the battle not begun.

The controlling, the dominant factor of the crisis was fear, fear of war, fear of air raids in great cities, fear that London and Paris might meet the fate of Guernica and Barcelona, destroyed by German bombs. Fear, funk, fear, paralyzed what the *New Statesman* calls the "demo-plutocracies." Fear, funk, fear, led Britain into such a humiliation as it had hardly known for centuries, and France into the cruelest repudiation of presumably sacrosanct pledges that modern history can record. Fear, funk, fear, accounted for the gross and sickening betrayal of the Czechoslovak nation, its assassination by its "friends."

But who, unless he is willing to fight himself, can justly blame Britain and France for not fighting? Who can deny that Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy *may* have saved ten million lives?

At the date of writing—October 5, 1938—it is all but impossible to tell the complete story in all its intimate details. We must await many documents, many revelations from those, like Dr. Beneš, in high places who cannot now speak, before writing a final account. The British White Paper of September 28, tells a good deal, but surely not all. That remarkable document, for instance, does not even include the Czechoslovak note that with extreme dignity and self-sacrifice agreed to the first partition plan, though it does include the Czechoslovak statement refusing to accept Hitler's second and more formidable attack.

Hitler's speech at Nuremberg on September 9 sounded the final phase of the great struggle. He talked once more about the "shameless ill-treatment, the violence and torture" (this last quite imaginary) undergone by the Sudetens, and said flatly that Germany would not tolerate further oppression. He also asserted that Germany need no longer fear a blockade in the event of war. (Acquisition of Czechoslovak industrial areas and consequent opening up to Germany of the grain of Hungary and the oil of Rumania would, indeed, make Germany very nearly self-sufficient.) The speech was a signal for violent disorder. Fighting took place in the Sudeten areas, and was quickly crushed; Henlein fled to Germany and

organized the Sudeten Free Corps there on German soil, and the Czechs—at long last—declared martial law.

So the situation was worsening. Something must be done quickly. The British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Neville Henderson, apparently found it impossible to talk to Hitler privately while the Nuremberg festival was proceeding. The British had sent several warnings to Germany, but they were unheeded. When, in fact, in August Henderson had appealed to Ribbentrop for moderation, Ribbentrop bluntly replied that British efforts for peace merely served to stiffen the Czechs. Sir John Simon's speech at Lanark, repeating a warning that Britain might find it impossible to remain aloof in the event of war, merely annoyed the Germans. Again a direct warning to Ribbentrop—"regarding the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, particularly if France were compelled to intervene"—brought no reply. Germany thought England was merely bluffing. It was imperative that Hitler himself be seen.

Chamberlain in his House of Commons speech on September 28 said:

"One of the principal difficulties in dealing with a totalitarian government is the lack of any means of establishing contact with the personalities in whose hands lie the final decision.

"I, therefore, resolved to go to Germany myself and interview Herr Hitler and find out in a personal conversation whether there was any hope yet of saving peace.

"I knew very well that in taking such an unprecedented course I was laying myself open to criticism on the ground that I was detracting from the dignity of the British Prime Minister, and to disappointment, even to resentment, if I failed to bring back a satisfactory agreement."

A word for Mr. Chamberlain. He has been bitterly, savagely attacked. But his motive was completely simple and of the best: to avert war. He was not, I think, so much pro-German as pro-Peace, if that is not a contradiction in terms. Such a thorough-going Germanist as Lord Londonderry saw him off at Heston, but he was not completely dominated by German influence. He was convinced that Mussolini and Hitler are permanent realities that had to be dealt with; he thought that a peaceful Europe was only possible by coming to terms with them. It is almost unforgivable that he gave the Czechoslovaks themselves no chance to negotiate; but perhaps circumstances in the form of Herr Hitler and the German air force permitted him no choice. He stood for peace and got it—temporarily at least—only by making someone else pay a terrible

price. But in this course there is apparently no doubt that the great mass of the British people—the French people also—stood behind him.

The spectacular drama of the flight of this 69 year old merchant from the Midlands to see Hitler on his mountain top was only exceeded by the spectacular quality of the "settlement" he made. He found at once that the only solution was the cession of Czechoslovak territory to Germany.² The Germans were willing to risk a world war to get the Sudeten area. He returned to London, where MM. Daladier and Bonnet met him. British and French cabinets wrestled with the details over the weekend of the 18th—very few authentic details were permitted to leak out—and finally accepted Hitler's terms. A horrified world listened to the projected lines of settlement:

1. Czechoslovakia to cede to the Reich outright all territory containing more than 50 percent of Germans. (This territory included the mountainous barrier which was the nation's first and essential defense, as well as its tremendous fortification system and most of the key industries.)
2. Plebiscites in other German districts.
3. Czechoslovakia to give up her French and Russian pacts, and be "neutralized."
4. Britain and France to guarantee Czechoslovakia's new abbreviated frontiers.

At this point many who were stunned by the extremity of these conditions thought that, if Britain and France and possibly Russia should together assert in categorical language that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would mean war, Germany would still recede. *Every* time the Germans have been confronted with a threat of real force, they have receded. But Chamberlain says that Germany was prepared for an invasion even if it meant a world war, and that only his trip to Berchtesgaden prevented strife at once.

When M. Oususky, the Czechoslovak minister in Paris, heard the

² Lord Runciman had come to the same conclusion, though his report exonerated the Czechs of the ridiculous charges of "terrorism," put the responsibility of the final break on Henlein, and asserted that agreement might have been reached on the basis of the Karlsbad demands. (See Chapter VIIa below.) It is obscure when, precisely, Lord Runciman decided that dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was necessary. The whole question of his report demands elucidation. For instance it was dated September 21, six whole days after Chamberlain's first visit to Hitler. Perhaps there was no time, but surely the report, which was to have been the basis for a settlement, should have preceded the negotiations, not followed them.

terms, he burst into tears crying, "Do you want to see a man convicted without a hearing? Here I stand!"

The comment of Léon Blum of France was revelatory: "War has probably been averted, but I feel myself divided between cowardly relief and my sense of shame." A great many people in many countries shared this sentiment.

The terms were presented to Prague. Horror and despair struck Czechoslovakia. On the 20th the Czechs replied with an offer to submit the matter to the Hague Court under terms of the 1925 treaty of conciliation between Germany and Czechoslovakia. This treaty was not, as has been said, a forgotten document disinterred for the occasion; actually in March 1938 General Goering had referred to it as the proper basis for peaceful relations between the two countries! On the 21st Britain and France exerted pressure on Prague in the most urgent manner. If Czechoslovakia did not submit, they said coldly that they would leave it to its fate. If it did not accept partition, the terms of which were close to suicide, the German invasion would take place and the nation would be obliterated. It was a choice between self-amputation and murder. At 2:15 A.M. the French and British ministers were received by Dr. Beneš. In circumstances of unparalleled tragedy and strain the Czech cabinet stayed in session till 9 A.M., accepted the demands, and then resigned. A new cabinet under the one-eyed war hero General Syrový was formed. And Europe relaxed—a little.

The Czech submission was in language that did the nation honor. Without rancor, without reorimination, with dignity and courage, but making it clear that they were submitting to extraordinary pressure, the Czechs gave up a great deal of their country for the sake of European peace:

"The government is determined to maintain peace and order and independence under the new conditions that confront it. The President of the Republic and the government could do nothing but accept the suggestions of the two powers . . . Nothing else remained, because we were alone . . .

"We will defend freedom, self-sufficiency, and independence under the new conditions . . . Farmers, workers, industrialists, employers, soldiers, all remain at your posts and do your duty . . . No violence or demonstrations on the streets . . . Remain firm to your faith in your republic."

Chamberlain said—he could hardly have said less—that the British government "was profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifice which

the Czechoslovak government had agreed to and the immense public spirit it had shown."

Winston Churchill said, "The idea that you can purchase safety by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion."

At the time of the Czech acceptance a vast wave of relief, tinged with some sentiment of dismay, swept most people. War had been averted. The settlement was cruel, but it was not dishonorable. It seemed that self-determination for the Germans was a defensible proposition, even though it was accompanied by threat of force; it seemed that the Czechoslovaks had added a new note to history, a new definition of national honor, by consenting to a sacrifice which might be for the good of Europe as a whole. Chamberlain was praised for his courage, and Beneš for his unselfishness, bigness, and nobility.

But much worse was to come. The first settlement at Berchtesgaden disappeared in an angry eruption of German truculence and power politics.

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On Thursday, September 22, Chamberlain returned to Germany to meet Hitler at Godesberg, a spa on the Rhine. He brought with him Czech acceptance. He thought the crisis was over. Instead he was directly confronted with new demands, and not only new demands, but a time limit, an ultimatum, before which they must be accepted. The new demands were worse than blackmail. They were staggering.

It all must have seemed easy to Hitler. The Czechs had been forced to accept his first demands. This meant in his view that the British and the French could be prevailed upon to exert pressure on them to accept even further demands. He had got something for nothing. Why not grab more? Mr. Chamberlain, in his House of Commons speech, quotes Hitler as saying "that he never for one moment supposed that I (Chamberlain) should be able to come back and say that the principle (self-determination, i.e., territorial dismemberment) had been accepted." What a cat out of what a bag! Hitler never thought that Britain would accept even his *first* demands!

Chamberlain had played some of the worst poker in history. So Hitler raised him.

Chamberlain was thunderstruck. He listened to Hitler on the 22nd, then sulked on his side of the Rhine till evening of the 23rd, just before his departure. Meanwhile notes were exchanged. The new German de-

mands were in text and manner those that a victorious enemy humiliatingly extends to a vanquished foe. And indeed Czechoslovakia *was* a vanquished foe. Hitler asked for practically everything but Liverpool and Milwaukee. The Godesberg ultimatum, expiring October 1 (whereas the Berchtesgaden agreement allowed several months for fixing the new frontiers), extended by at least a thousand square miles the territory Germany was to take; it crippled Czechoslovakia irremediably by cutting the nation virtually in two; it allowed only eight days for the removal of Czechoslovaks who did not want to live in Germany (whereas the Treaty of Versailles had given three *years* to Germans in Czechoslovakia who wished to opt for German citizenship); it made no provision for consideration of minorities in the plebiscite areas; it demanded that the Czechs, in the surrendered territory, give up all rolling stock, munitions, freight installations, utility services, radio services, food-stuffs, cattle, goods, and raw materials. In other words, Czechs or non-Nazi Germans fleeing from the new German areas would have to flee—within eight days—utterly destitute.

Chamberlain says:

“I declared that the language and manner of the document, which I described as an ultimatum rather than a memorandum, would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries and I bitterly reproached the German Chancellor for his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace.”

He then adds:

“In spite of those frank words, this conversation was carried out in more friendly terms than that which preceded it.”

Wonderful giveaway! Talk sharply to Herr Hitler, and he becomes more friendly.

At this time Hitler repeated to Chamberlain that the Germans had no further territorial aims in Europe once the Sudeten area was acquired. Perhaps this is true, but the words of *Mein Kampf*, which Hitler has never repudiated, belie it.

Another point. Why, with the Sudeten Germans in his lap, did Hitler break the crisis open again? He must have known that his second demands entailed some risk. He was risking what he had always asserted to be his object, and *which he had already obtained*—the promise of the incorporation of the Sudetens in the Reich—for a further object. In

other words, his argument on the basis of self-determination was a pretext for something else.

The something else is of course power in Europe. The ultimate object is not merely the Sudeten area, but destruction of democratic Czechoslovakia as a barrier in his path. Power to break the Franco-Soviet pact, power to isolate and impenetrate the Balkan states, power to rule Europe east of the Rhine—that is what Hitler wants. "The master of Bohemia," Bismarck said once, "is the master of the continent." That mastery is Hitler's object. Let us hear no more nonsense about self-determination. Look at the Germans in the South Tyrol. What is Hitler doing for *those* lost Germans?

As to Hitler's promise that he does not wish more territory, one can only say that his lies have been notorious. Like Napoleon, he breaks his word any time that dishonesty is politically convenient. He promised to respect the Treaty of Locarno; and violated it. He promised not to fortify the Rhineland; and fortified it. He promised not to annex Austria; and annexed it. He promised not to invade Czechoslovakia; and invaded it.

As Chamberlain flew back to London from Godesberg, two things continued to happen. One was an indescribably vicious, vulgar, inflammatory, and provocatively untruthful assault by the united (and officially controlled) German press on Czechoslovakia—together with complete suppression of any news that Germany did not like.

The other was the presentation of demands by Poland and Hungary for Czechoslovak territory. The jackals of Warsaw and Budapest rose from their caves and followed the German Lion to the feast. Their whine unpleasantly exacerbated the crisis. Poland certainly had a legitimate claim to Teschen, and Hungary certainly lost too much territory by the Trianon treaty, but minority assertions by either Poland or Hungary have their certain humors, to say the least. Hungary oppressed the Slovaks and Transylvanian Rumanians for generations. Poland is a composite state precisely as is Czechoslovakia, with almost 10,000,000 non-Poles in a total population of 33,000,000. There are 3,500,000 Ukrainians in Poland, who have been thoroughly suppressed, about 3,000,000 Jews, about 1,000,000 Germans (in the Corridor which Hitler gave up), and perhaps 1,000,000 White Russians. Polish anti-Semitism is, next to that of Germany, the worst in Europe.

On Sunday the 25th, Daladier and Bonnet again came to London. The Czechs, convinced now that they must perish fighting, mobilized;

word had gone from Chamberlain to Prague that in view of the Godesberg demands the Czechs had best prepare themselves. The entire nation rose to arms. The French decided that the new German proposals were unacceptable; so did the Czechs. And a highly important Anglo-French communique was issued to the effect that, if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, "the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France." So finally the British, in finally unmistakable terms, did commit themselves to the defense of Czechoslovakia. The French and Belgians mobilized; London got ready for Goering's raiders. Gas masks were distributed, and soldiers dug trenches for shelter in Hyde Park.

The result was what might have been expected. Hitler in his speech at the Sport-Palast the next day receded—not much—but he did recede. He assaulted Dr. Beneš and the Czechoslovaks vigorously, but he did not close the door forever. That night President Roosevelt made his first dramatic appeal for peace, and on Tuesday, September 27, Chamberlain addressed the world by radio in a brief grave speech, saying that he would labor for peace to the end, but that Britain would have to fight if "any nation made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of force."

Chamberlain's most trusted adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, was shuttling by air between London and Berlin. The British fleet prepared for action. Mr. Roosevelt sent a second appeal to Hitler, which like the first was not even printed in Germany and to which the answer was a curt statement that further correspondence would not be useful. Hitler, playing his hand with wonderful skill, let it be known that he *advanced* his ultimatum from October 1 (which first date had been disclosed not by Hitler but by Mussolini) to 2 P.M. on the 28th. Then, on Mussolini's intervention, it was put forward twenty-four hours till the 29th. Time was almost up. Gas masks were fitted in Buckingham Palace.

On the 28th Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons in what was certainly the most momentous session since August, 1914. Chamberlain told as much of the story as he could, and was reaching his peroration with an account of the last desperate maneuvers. Hitler had assured Sir Horace Wilson that his troops would only occupy the Sudeten areas; Chamberlain wrote Hitler once more imploring him not to precipitate a world catastrophe when agreement in principle had already been established; he also revealed that he had urgently written Mussolini asking him to stay Hitler's hand.

Then a messenger arrived in the House of Commons. Chamberlain looked at the piece of paper. He announced:

"I have something further to tell the House. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him in Munich tomorrow morning. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and I have no doubt that M. Daladier will also accept. The House will not need to ask what my answer will be."

Mussolini had made several speeches proclaiming the fixity of the Rome-Berlin axis and denouncing the Czechoslovaks, but he had not been quite so hot for trouble as Hitler. Several passages in the Sportpalast speech were almost hysterical appeals from Hitler to Mussolini to give more concrete affirmation of his support. It has been said that the King of Italy had threatened to abdicate if Italy went to war against France and England; and in any case, with great hostages to fortune in Spain and Ethiopia, the Duce was not prepared for battle. So he welcomed the opportunity to leap into the pit as the last minute mediator.

The four leaders met at Munich on September 29 and whittled out an agreement that was a compromise between the Berchtesgaden and Godesberg proposals, but that more nearly approached those of Godesberg. No Czechoslovak representative was permitted to take part in the deliberations; a Czechoslovak emissary was shown the door. It was agreed that Germany begin occupation of four Sudeten districts on October 1, that the Czechs must not remove any "installations," that an international commission should decide future regions for plebiscites, and that Germany and Italy should join Britain and France in a guaranty of the new frontiers. So in nine hours of talk four men accomplished the dismemberment of a nation.

Chamberlain additionally signed a short bi-lateral pact with Hitler—apparently without consulting the Foreign Office or the Dominions, who ordinarily are informed about any such important diplomatic step—asserting that the Munich agreement was "symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again," and pledging the signatories to "the method of consultation" in dealing with questions concerning the two countries. So Hitler's victory was complete. He had at last what he had always wanted—a friendship pact with England.

On October 1 the German troops duly began their victorious occupa-

tion of Czechoslovakia.³ By October 5 it was clear that they did not intend to stop at the lines originally drawn. On October 6 Dr. Beneš resigned. No man ever had a crueler trial, or sought to render greater service to his country.

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It is too early to write with assurance of results of this extraordinary fortnight, but some conclusions are immediately apparent. For one thing, Germany won a military and political victory even greater than that accomplished by the acquisition of Austria. The way was opened to the grain of Hungary and the oil of Rumania, in other words the way is open for Germany to wage a long war, something hitherto impossible. Germany has the Czechoslovak bastion, and it is difficult to see how any of the Central Europe or Balkan states can stay outside her orbit.

As to the Czechoslovaks, they have little hope of survival unless they come to terms with Germany at once. The fortifications are gone,⁴ the great lignite fields are gone, the spas and tourist centers are gone, most of the intensely developed industrial area is gone. It is doubtful if we shall long continue to see pencils, glassware, metal work, toys, with their familiar legend "Made in Czechoslovakia." The Czechs managed to move the great Skoda munitions works at Pilsen partially, but what remains at Pilsen—including the beer industry—is dependent on the German hinterland now only a few miles away. Strategically the country is in a hopeless position, all but encircled by Germany, and with two other enemies, Poland and Hungary, yapping at the remaining frontiers. The new international guaranty may not be worth the paper it is written on.

France becomes a second-class power. She has not only been disgracefully shown up by defaulting on her pledges, but the whole French scheme of security in Europe is wrecked. The Little Entente must almost certainly collapse, and likewise the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty and probably the Franco-Soviet treaty. If the Fascist powers continue to give aid to rebel Spain, and if it wins, France will have to defend in future three Fascist frontiers. The old skeleton of treaties is broken; nothing remains but British friendship, and that may wane.

As to England, since the rule of law is apparently ended on the Con-

³ When Hitler entered Karlsbad he said astoundingly, "I always knew that some day I would stand here, but I never knew how it would come about."

⁴ With bitter malice toward the French, the Czechs have almost gleefully watched the Germans take the fortifications, which were built by French engineers and which give away the secrets of the French Maginot line.

continent, and the rule of force begins, it must continue to exhaust itself in a prodigious arms program. The agreement means complete reversal of the foreign policy of England, which for at least three hundred years has depended on the balance of power, a theory which in turn depends on the presumption that no single country on the Continent is too powerful. Now Germany rules the roost. Chamberlain has his bilateral pact. It purchases safety—probable safety—for a time. But England is a highly vulnerable isle.

In *Mein Kampf* Hitler states unequivocally that the ultimate enemy of Germany is France. In a speech at Nuremberg in 1936 he said, "If we could command the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, and the limitless plains and fields of the Ukraine, the country (Germany) would swim in plenty." Perhaps Mr. Chamberlain would not be too sorry to see a German-Russian war, if France were not brought in. Germany and Russia might destroy one another. Perhaps this is the new balance of power he is striking for.

There is a chance—just a chance but a chance—that the Munich agreement may bring a European settlement.

Chamberlain's half-brother Austen went to Locarno in 1925, granted Germany concessions, and came back with a peace that lasted twelve years—until Hitler. It is barely possible that Neville, coming home from Munich in 1938, may have achieved a similar breathing spell.

Germany must obviously play its proper rôle in Europe. One cannot go from generation to generation knocking Germans on the head and waiting for them to rise again. The German problem, that of a powerful expansionist nation in the heart of Europe, must be solved somehow if Europe is to survive at all. If Hitler keeps his word this time, if he makes no more adventures, it is possible, just possible, that peace will come.

But it comes after terrible burdens, and at a ghastly cost.

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1938 was overwhelmingly the year of the Fascist offensive, of the rape of Austria and the assault on Czechoslovakia. It was the year when Fascist forwardness, Fascist energy and single-mindedness, apparently conquered the will of the democracies to resist.

I have dealt fully, as far as the moment of writing permits, with both the Austrian conquest and the first stages of the Czechoslovak

assault, in Chapter VIIa which is especially inserted in this edition of this book.

The importance of the Austrian and Czechoslovak events is so subliminal that treatment of anything else seems anticlimactical. Nevertheless to bring "Inside Europe" up to date once more it is necessary to make a brief survey of other events of the year.

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Germany's year was featured domestically by an increasing economic pinch, a feverish extension of armament, and relentless persecution of the Jews. Dr. Schacht resigned as minister of economics, though he retained his post as head of the Reichsbank; Pastor Niemöller, the submarine commander turned preacher who annoyed the Nazis by his outspokenness, was arrested, tried, released, and arrested again. Germany announced its intention to recognize Manchukuo in February, a natural corollary of the anti-Comintern pact.

The acquisition of Austria with its 300,000 Jews gave fresh impetus to new excesses of anti-Semitism. Jews were barred from being real estate agents, travelling salesmen, and accountants; they were forbidden to enter the stock exchange (which suffered a severe slump); they were forbidden to go to their safety deposit vaults without police escort. Landlords were asked to expel Jewish doctors, and it was established that Jews could not live in flats with windows facing main streets. All Jews with property of more than 5000 marks had to declare it, even if it were held abroad. Jewish children were not allowed to go to state schools or universities, and Aryan servants were not permitted to work in Jewish households. One new law forbade Jewish doctors the right to practice, except those who had had war service, in which case they were allowed to serve only Jewish families; another made it an offense for any doctor to receive foreign medical books or periodicals written or published by Jewish concerns, which automatically cuts German medicine off from a vast scientific literature, including, incidentally, the publications of the American Medical Association. Another law obliged every Jew to adopt the name Sarah or Israel, while Jews born hereafter must be restricted to a given list of first names.⁵

In July, on the initiative of President Roosevelt, a world conference

⁵ A shrewd observer has pointed out that Joseph and Paul, indubitably Jewish names, are not on the list, possibly because they belong to Dr. Goebbels. Nor is Mary on the list.