# INSIDE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

edited by
DAVID C. RAPOPORT

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TERRORIST
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Notes on the Contributors

David C. Rapoport, a Professor of Political Science, UCLA, teaches political theory. He developed the concept of praetorianism and his early work was on the theories of corruption and conspiracy. Among his publications are 'A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types', 'Moses: Charisma and Covenant', 'Fear and Trembling: Terror in Three Religious Traditions', *Assassination and Terrorism* and co-editor of *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications.*

Martha Crenshaw is Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, USA. She is the author of *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* and the editor of *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence.* She has written numerous chapters and articles on terrorism, beginning with 'The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism' in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1972.

Ronald D. Crelinsten is Assistant Professor of Criminology at the University of Ottawa (Canada), where he teaches courses on political crime, terrorism, social control, violence and criminologal theory. He has published several books and articles on the subjects of terrorism, hostage-taking and the role of the media in covering terrorist events. His research interests include the impact of terrorism and its control on domestic institutions, case studies of major terrorist groups, incidents or campaigns from a political communication standpoint, images of terrorism in the media from 1966 to 1986, and the development of theoretical models of terrorism and political violence that include both the state and the non-state actor.

David Th. Schiller, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, received his Ph.D. at the Free University of Berlin in 1982 with a thesis on the development of the Palestinian paramilitary nationalism. He is a consultant for the Rand Corporation and other research institutes as well as government and law enforcement agencies. An associate editor with TVI magazine, he has worked and published extensively in the field of European and Middle Eastern terrorism.

Gordon H. McCormick is a senior staff member in the Political Science department of the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. He holds advanced degrees in economics and international politics, receiving his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to joining Rand he served as the Editor of *Orbis* and taught at the School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Pennsylvania.

Zeev Ivianski, formerly lecturer at the Department of General History and Russian Studies of the Hebrew University, is the author of *Individual Terror, Theory and Practice* (1977) and numerous articles including 'Individual Terror: Concept and Typology' (*Contemporary History*, 1977); 'Provocation at the Center: A Study in the History of Counter-Terror' (*Terrorism*, 1980); 'The Blow at the Center: The Concept and its History' (*Proceedings of the Conference on Terrorism*, Tel Aviv, 1979); 'The Moral Issue – Some Aspects of Individual Terror' (*The Morality of Terrorism*, 1982). He has also done extensive work on *1905 – Revolution and Terror* (to appear in 1988 in Hebrew).

Bonnie Cordes is a staff member of the Security and Subnational Conflict Research Program at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. With the Program since 1980, she has participated in several major research projects dealing with international terrorism, the potential for nuclear terrorism, and the computerization of terrorism data bases. She has conducted extensive research on ethnocultural terrorism, specifically the Armenian terrorist movement; and, European terrorism, particularly terrorism in France and Belgium. Her articles on Armenian and French terrorism have appeared in issues of *TVI Journal: Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency*, and she is the author of a number of Rand reports. Currently she is a graduate student at the University of California, Los Angeles, pursuing a doctorate in Political Science.

Mark Juergensmeyer is Professor of Ethics and the Phenomenology of Religions at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, where he is Director of the Office for Programs in Comparative Religion. He is also Coordinator of the Religious Studies Program of the University of California, Berkeley. His books include *Religion as Social Vision* (University of California Press, 1982) and *Fighting with Gandhi* (paperback title: *Fighting Fair*; Harper & Row, 1984). He served as co-director of the Berkeley–Harvard Program in Comparative Ethics, and is currently working on a book on religious violence supported in part by a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies.

Ehud Sprinzak teaches Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is currently a Visiting Research Professor at the American University and a fellow at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management of the University of Maryland at College Park. He earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and his Ph.D. from Yale University. He has written extensively on extremism, violence and terrorism in Israel and abroad. His book *The Emergence of the Radical Right in Israel* will be published shortly by Oxford University Press.

Khachig Tololyan was educated in the Middle East, at Harvard College and Brown University, where he received his Ph.D. in Comparative Literature in 1975. His teaching and publications have been concerned with the modern novel and its relations with history and politics. He is co-editor of the journal *Pynchon Notes*, dedicated to the study of Thomas Pynchon's fiction. He has co-directed the Center for the Humanities at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor and at Johns Hopkins University. He has also lectured widely on exiles and Diaspora situations, focusing on the political organization and culture of the Armenian Diaspora, including Armenian terrorism.

Grant Wardlaw is a Senior Criminologist with the Australian Institute of Criminology in Canberra, Australia. A specialist on terrorism, special warfare, public order, and drug law enforcement, he is the author of *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures* (Cambridge University Press) as well as a number of books, chapters, and journal articles on his areas of research.

Contents

Introduction

David C. Rapoport

In 1969 when I began to prepare a series of lectures for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, entitled *Assassination and Terrorism*,[1] I struggled to find appropriate materials but could only discover a handful of items. Seventeen years later, Amos Lakos published a bibliography on the same subjects which contained 5,622 items in English alone![2] Has any academic enterprise ever grown so much in so short a time?

Although the literature on terrorism is abundant now, it is very unevenly distributed. No subject commands more attention than counter-terrorist policies does and this is no surprise. One would think that this interest should lead inevitably to studies in terrorist organization too. But that does not seem to be the case.

There is no clear explanation for the discrepancy. The most obvious one is the difficulty academics have in observing underground groups. But the materials on terrorist psychology and on terrorist tactics are quite voluminous; and one would have thought that in some respects the same barrier existed there.[3] Indeed, interviews with captured terrorists by academics seem to focus on motivation; virtually no questions are asked about organizational details and issues. It is also clear that public materials like pamphlets and especially terrorist memoirs – terrorists seem almost compelled to write memoirs – which contain much information on these matters have not drawn much attention.[4] Useful but ignored materials are contained in some able studies of particular groups, like J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army*, Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization* and Arturo Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamoros; The Urban Guerrilla*. There is a similar indifference to the accounts of those who have participated in specific campaigns, that is, Roger Trinquer, *Modern Warfare* and Abraham Guillen, *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla*.

Whatever the reason, the plain fact is that we have not used the opportunities available; and a principal aim of this collection is to fill a very small portion of that gap. In making internal conflicts the focus of the volume, especially in its first half, our contributors highlight a feature present in virtually all human organizations. We would not emphasize the obvious so much here if the academic and popular literature did not picture terrorist organizations as composed of persons who agree on all essential matters. Of course, there are organizational patterns peculiar to terrorists deriving from their special purposes and means, and in the latter portion of the volume some contributors explicitly recognize the issue,

though for a variety of reasons they could not give it as much attention as its importance warrants.

Those struggling against the greater society and employing peculiarly repulsive means inevitably stimulate others to ask about their reasons, and therefore motivation and justification, our second theme, has received more attention in the literature than internal conflict has. But psychologists and psychiatrists have dominated this discussion; and they tend to focus on what seems unusual about the terrorist's 'personality' and whether or not we can talk about psychological types. Our contributors have gone about their task in a different way concentrating on the context in which the terrorist operates, namely the role of revolutionary traditions and various cultural milieux in shaping self-perceptions and expectations. This sociological account of motivation and justification responds to Alex Schmidt's invitation to 'repair the greatest deficiency' in terrorist studies, the tendency to perceive the subject in isolation or shorn of its appropriate context.[5] The consequence, whether intended or not, makes the contemporary terrorist a less unique figure than he is usually described as being. Indeed, in many respects several concluding essays argue, he acts out very ancient and sometimes venerated roles.

The most fundamental kind of conflict in any organization is that waged over the organization's purpose. In his fascinating play, 'The Just Assassins', which explores the internal dynamics of a Russian terrorist cell in 1905, Albert Camus personifies that conflict in the struggle of his two principal characters Stephan and Yanek. To Stephan the organization is an instrument of a larger political purpose, the destruction of Russian monarchy; and neither the organization nor its members can have value in themselves. To Yanek the organization represents 'brotherhood', and exhibits the kind of concern and care for each particpant which the Revolution ultimately was supposed to produce everywhere. The difference represented by these two views is the basic theoretical distinction of Martha Crenshaw's 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches' though one must hasten to add that she develops it in directions not visualized by Camus, and goes on to discuss implications of the distinction for counter-terrorist policies.

If we assume that the members of an organization share a reasonably clear political goal (for example, revolution) which they pursue in a calculated fashion by devising the most suitable organizational structure and decreasing organizational strikes when the costs are too high for the rewards gained while increasing activity when circumstances are more favorable, then terrorist behaviour may be best understood by means of the 'instrumental' model which incorporates strategic theory. The terrorist and his adversary act in ways to change each other's behaviour; and if a terrorist group fails, it is because the government has virtually eliminated any possibility that its actions will be rewarded. One might note that this view, which emphasizes the ability to capitalize opportunities available, helps explain why terrorists flourish in relatively

open or democratic societies but seem to have such formidable obstacles in the Marxist and/or authoritarian world.

To the extent that this picture of terrorist activity is appropriate, internal conflicts must appear as disagreements over purpose, strategies, and tactics. Changes in organizational structures and tactics are most likely to reflect new opportunities available (which technology may create) and the ability of terrorists to effect surprise which is the only way they believe they can cope with the government's enormous advantage in coercive capabilities. Classical conceptions of deterrence and denial policies inform responses of government to terrorist problems.

But a quite different picture emerges when Crenshaw's 'organizational' model is appropriate. From this perspective what an organization does stems from its own internal problems or needs and not from the necessity to realize a broader political purpose. Belonging to an underground organization may provide those feelings of worth and love which Yanek found so essential. But there are other rewards too which Crenshaw specifies, opportunities for action, social status (especially when the terrorists are from ethnic communities with a long history of struggle) and material rewards.[6] The will to persist in such a life where rewards are so real may become so strong that the terrorists continue year after year even though the group becomes less and less able to achieve its stated purposes. 'In fact, the organization's leaders may be reluctant to see its purpose accomplished and the organization's utility ended. They are likely to seek incremental gains sufficient to sustain group morale but not to end the members' dependence on the organization.' Sometimes this concern for organizational rewards leads the group to escalate the struggle against government, even when escalation appears to be inappropriate or irrational, from the perspective of the instrumental model.

The remaining essays are case studies of particular groups or special issues. And it should be noted that virtually all the contributors are concerned with the history of their subject, a dimension normally ignored in terrorist studies.

My own essay 'The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs' illustrates Crenshaw's 'instrumental view', for it attempts to explain why terrorists have believed that their political purpose was better served by entering the international arena and what costs those decisions imposed. The memoirs, which represent the history of modern terror, reveal three waves of terrorism, an initial one in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a colonial one from 1921 to the present day, and a contemporary one beginning in the 1960s. Four major variables are decisive in shaping the three different contexts; terrorist commitments to international revolution, the willingness of foreign publics and governments to help, the availability of émigré or diaspora populations, and the political changes in the international system which had occurred prior to the onset of the particular period in question.

While there are some obvious advantages in going abroad, the

disadvantages are significant too, sometimes producing catastrophic consequences. To get the broadest possible foreign support, an organization may have to conceal its true aims, a ploy which disconcerts and divides members. Soliciting foreign support may induce one to ignore more important local bases. Most of all, to depend upon foreign support is to depend upon the undependable, upon more powerful bodies and states whose interests are distinctly different from those of the terrorists.

Today the international activities of contemporary terrorist groups are much more conspicuous than they have ever been, but ironically the most successful exploitation of international forces occurred during the colonial period when terrorists had more secure local bases and a cause which more foreign states could identify with. On the whole, terrorists become international to remedy conspicuous domestic weaknesses, but the decision often seems to compound rather than alleviate those particular inadequacies.

Ronald Crelinsten's study illustrates Crenshaw's second view, the organizational one which explains action directed towards the external world as more likely to be inspired by the need to protect or enhance internal advantages. Crelinsten demonstrates the point by focusing on a single incident, the most dramatic and important episode in the life of the *Front de liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) in 1970 when the Canadian government assumed the War Measure Powers. His extraordinarily detailed sensitive account shows that contrary to popular and academic impressions – one fostered by the terrorists themselves, a trait which Zeev Ivianski's essay sees as a common theme in the history of terrorism – the FLQ was not really an organization at all. It consisted of two cells with different domestic and international concerns, different strategies, and no common leaders. The members of each cell knew each other, shared a common name, maintained a sense of mutual solidarity, and were committed to an independent Quebec. But that was all.

The desire of one cell to gain immediate publicity by kidnapping British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, had the unintended effect of forcing the second cell to abandon its plans to remain underground until it built a coherent organization with an appropriate infrastructure. Instead, the second cell, in order to compete with the other, seized the first available political personality, Quebec Minister Pierre La Porte (competition between elements is a pervasive theme in the history of terrorism, and the logic of this action in particular illustrates a point made by Crenshaw and others that when terrorists compete they become more militant). Negotiations for La Porte's release were dictated by the very different political concerns and intransigence of the second cell which undermined the gains achieved by the first, bringing both to ruin.

Beyond the conflicts which emerge directly out of elements within the group, Crelinsten notes there are tensions between terrorists and their supporters who are not underground; and there are decisions which result from the government's ability to manipulate internal frictions especially through *agents provocateur* who are so prominent in terrorist history,

especially that of the FLQ. The Canadian experience, finally, reminds us, although one wonders why we must be reminded, that internal pressures which keep a terrorist group from pursuing publicly announced purposes in a consistent calculated manner also characterize government counter-terrorist policy.

The subject of David Schiller's essay is the PLO; no contemporary organization, three of our other contributors note, has been so divided, and a large proportion of its terror against *non-Palestinians* is dictated more by the desire to gain internal political leverage than by true strategic considerations. These frictions lead again and again to considerable intra-organizational bloodshed throughout the Middle East and Europe. Although the geographical locus and some peculiar characteristics of the conflict have changed since the Palestinian diaspora began and the PLO formed, Schiller's review of the historical phases of Palestinian resistance in the last 50 years shows that violent internal strife is such a constant feature, it would be a serious error to see this problem primarily as a consequence of PLO leadership or structure.

Schiller points to the relevance of the external environment (the Palestinian community and the Arab world) in explaining these conflicts. Palestinian politics is characterized by hostile rivalries of notables rooted in deeply suspicious clan and confessional groups, a pattern which penetrates PLO organizational dynamics. A second permanent factor since the 1930s has been a dependence on forces outside the Palestinians which has complicated and intensified PLO divisions because foreigners find those divisions so easy to manipulate for their own national purposes. Continual failure, partly due to the extraordinary internal conflicts, leads to the 'repeated emergence of rebels from the lieutenant level of the fedayeens', a process which Schiller details. Each new faction seeks to demonstrate superior militancy (this is, as Crenshaw and Crelinsten suggest, the normal result of terrorist competition) and the completion forces the organization against the will of its major faction into conflict which have resulted in monumental disasters – the civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon. The struggles within the organization prevented some groups, or so those groups claim, from having operating room on the Israeli border, thereby 'forcing' them to go to Europe to hijack Western aircraft. These tactics provided a publicity bonanza, but in the long run they have hurt the Palestinian cause. Most important of all, the militancy mystique made it impossible to seize fleeting opportunities for political settlements.

It would be hard to find a terrorist organization more unlike the PLO than the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) in Peru. Despite great casualties, its cohesion and morale are high and its discipline remains exemplary; there have been no breakaway factions – a commonplace phenomenon in terrorist history. There are few defectors, and the government has had virtually no success in penetrating a large, by terrorist standards, organization. The picture Gordon McCormick draws is incomplete not only because procuring terrorist organizational details is always difficult but also for another quite startling reason. The Shining Path avoids all

publicity though publicity supposedly is the oxygen, to borrow Mrs
Thatcher's metaphor, of terrorist movements. It was six years before its
leader permitted a press interview; it rarely claims credit for attacks and
has produced so far only two short texts! In spite of this distaste for
publicity (or maybe because of it) the organization has been extremely
destructive, carrying out probably 12,000 operations in six years, resulting
in 10,000 deaths. If these statistics are accurate, the Shining Path may well
be the most destructive rebel terrorist group in the contemporary world,
comparable in this respect to the early sacred terror groups.[7]

A most striking feature of this self-proclaimed Maorist movement is the
unusual overwhelming domination of a single person, its founder,
Abimael Guzman. No one in the organizations discussed in this volume
occupies such a significant position, though Grivas, I point out below, the
founder of EOKA in Cyprus, tells us that the organization would have
collapsed without him. Guzman spent at least five years carefully laying
the ideological and organizational groundwork. (The normal time for
putting a terrorist group together is two years.) He apparently has
reserved all significant decisions for himself, even though the movement
operates through the well-known traditional terrorist network of auto-
nomous cells. Unlike the PLO, it has a secure isolated rural base to sustain
its cohesion. It has cut itself off from other groups and has virtually no
competitors; were either condition reversed its unity might be impaired. It
uses a technology which makes it independent of outside influences. For
most groups, several contributors suggest, international activity is a
source of division; and, unlike other Latin American groups, Sendero has
resisted such connections. Clearly, the death of Guzman could destroy
Sendero's linchpin and set in motion a series of decisions which could
disrupt the physical and political conditions of its cohesion.

In the second part of the volume – Motivations and Justifications – Zeev
Ivianski treats the development of the tradition of professional revo-
lutionaries, an unintended legacy of the French Revolution. Successive
generations of reflections upon nineteenth-century experiences by revo-
lutionaries crystallized and refined the idea that the art of insurrection
required carefully designed organizations dominated by a professional
intelligentsia. While revolution was made *for* the People, it could not be
made *by* them. The ambivalence implied by this attitude was especially
significant in the writings of those Russians in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries who tried to make terror the weapon *par excellence* for
the Russian context. Terror was seen as a method to *keep* the masses from
engaging in revolutionary activity, for mass revolutionary action was
bound to produce titanic blood baths! This view seems quite ironic, even
paradoxical, because terror today is justified to the world outside the
organization either as the last resort of the powerless or as the only way to
provoke mass rebellion.

Terror has been described by those employing it as 'propaganda by the
deed' or 'armed propaganda'. But how can we know when a bomb goes
off, who exploded it and why? Messages still must be conveyed and bombs

must be accompanied by words. Bonnie Cordes examines terrorist literature, especially communiqués, which have rarely been studied seriously, and she provides a framework for doing so which opens a window to underground life. Her materials were issued largely by the 'Euro-terrorists' a union, perhaps the first ever, of national groups (Belgian, French, German, and Italian) whose principal immediate objective is the destruction of NATO. In many ways, the most important audiences for these statements are other terrorist groups, sympathizers or potential recruits, and those elements involved in the attacks. Morale, group cohesion and perhaps the recruiting potential depend upon viewing terrorist action in particular ways. Indeed, the impulse to define a new vision derived from the flagging fortunes of several groups and from a sense that terror was becoming aimless or too blatantly served what Crenshaw would call internal organizational needs. Here, as in the cases discussed earlier by Rapoport, the decision to become international is an indication of serious weakness. The tendency of European officials to see the 'Euro-terrorists' as a cohesive body may be just as mistaken as the earlier Canadian view of the FLQ, described by Crelinsten, because the communiqués, Cordes examines, indicate that component elements are still preoccupied with individual concerns.

In recent years theological concepts have been used to justify terrorist activity; and Mark Juergensmeyer, Khachig Tololyan and Ehud Sprinzak focus on this, our final theme in the volume. It should be emphasized, that although this connection between religion and terror seems odd and unusual to us, virtually all instances of terrorist activity, prior to the French Revolution, which were justified had to be justified in religious terms. And it is also true that many terrorist campaigns which have been treated as secular had important religious elements, for example, the Irgun (Israel), EOKA (Cyprus) and the FLN (Algeria).

There is a widespread tendency, Mark Juergensmeyer notes, to explain examples of sacred terror by more familiar political or economic categories. These explanations certainly have value, but they are normally offered by distant observers of the conflict while those engaged in it use a theological picture of the world which we must understand in its own terms. To illustrate his point, Juergensmeyer uses the Sikhs as his principal example, drawing on the speeches of Jamail Singh Bhindranwale, the most prominent of the terrorist leaders, who was killed in 1984 when the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple.

Terrorists need religion because religion can provide a most compelling legitimacy for killing and dying especially in situations when political appeals are ineffective. Religion, moreover, seems to need terror too, for religion deals with the ultimate issues of order and disorder and of good and evil. The symbols, arts, sacred texts, and myths of all religions, therefore, are full of violence; they retain and domesticate memories of desperate past struggles. But the passions represented in those symbols and rituals are not always contained. When are they released?

It seems to occur when the past represented in those sacred forms

provides a paradigm which believers find appropriate for contemporary problems. That is what Ehud Sprinzak suggests, and he goes on to intimate that the character of particular religions shapes their terror patterns. The spectacular victories of the Six Day War, which unexpectedly put all the major Biblical sites in Israeli hands for the first time in 2,000 years, seemed to be a fulfilment of Biblical prophecies and this helped crystallize a messianic movement. The sudden frustration of that movement by the Camp David settlement produced an element which believed that the messianic process could be resumed only if they destroyed the Muslim shrine, the Dome of the Rock, built on the ruins of the Second Temple – Judaism's holiest site. This would occasion the great catastrophe which ancient prophecies foretold would purge and redeem Israel, transforming the nation into a sacred people and kingdom of priests spreading from the Nile to the Euphrates. The plot, which took three years to perfect, was postponed because no rabbi would sanction it. Sprinzak concludes by discussing why the response of messianic movements to setbacks is more likely to be extra-legal and terrorist than those by non-messianic movements to similar circumstances, and how critical the notion of catastrophe is to Jewish messianism.

To understand sacred terror, Juergensmeyer and Sprinzak suggest, one must see how traditional elements of the religous culture are used to explain and to provide models for dealing with present circumstances. Tololyan develops this argument further, illucidating Armenian terror which most people, including the terrorists themselves, mistakenly understand as entirely secular or political – 'a response to the Genocide' of 1915. Tololyan argues that the roots of Armenian activity are, on the contrary, embedded in a very ancient Armenian religious culture which provides paradigms of suffering, daring, rare partial success and heroic death. The willingness to act against very high odds and to accept violent death are pictured as essential elements in the behaviour of those who would live in the most respected or socially approved ways.

Armenian culture is deeply influenced by sets of stories embodying these behavioural models, stories which began in the fifth century and were subsequently re-enacted and added to in other critical periods. Throughout Armenian history, these stories were sustained in learned and popular discourses, in ecclesiastical ritual and, above all, in living songs learned and sung in churches, schools, athletic unions, and youth clubs. Invariably, the terrorist pamplets allude to those original narratives, which are connected to other stories, those concerning Armenian uprisings in the nineteenth century, those about the Genocide, and those relating to the subsequent assassinations of Turkish officials involved in the Genocide. The terrorists thus see themselves as embodying this tradition, and are, of course, often attacked by other Armenians who are outraged by this claim.

It is a mistake to think that Turkey and NATO are *primary* audiences for Armenian terror. The true audience is Armenian diaspora culture which is in danger of assimilation, and whose identity is strengthened by

the spectacle. Hence, the dominant cultural narratives create 'conditions that help to produce terrorism and are in turn reanimated by it. Such terrorism produces new heroes for old stories.'

The interest in the relevance of religion displayed in our last three essays and the concern for discovering the history and comparative anatomy of terrorism which most of the others reflect manifests a belief that the phenomena is much more deeply embedded in our cultural traditions, and, therefore, far less tractable than conventional wisdom acknowledges. A sobering lesson but surely a beneficial one.

The concluding sequel by Grant Wardlaw constitutes a separate section. Its subject is the state's use of terrorist groups as an instrument of foreign policy. It incorporates a number of major theses in the preceding articles and is concerned with both the conditional nature of the co-operation in this use of terror and the misperceptions characterizing Western, especially American, counter-policies.

Although there are times when one can speak of an identity of interest between a state and the terrorist body it aids, most often the identify is tentative and precarious especially when the state utilizes national bodies from other states. To understand the problematic nature of this relationship, one must identify the different ranges of interest which characterize each partner. As each party tries to maximize its independence and minimize its vulnerabilities, tension is produced – tension which limits the kinds of feasible cooperative action and thus the threats for other states. Wardlaw offers general guidelines for understanding the problems (guidelines which were implicit in Schiller, and Rapoport's accounts of the terrorist as an international actor). Confusion about the precise character of a particular relationship can lead to catastrophe; thus, in 1914 it was *not* the assassination of the Archduke, but Austria's *misperception* of Serbia's relationship to the terrorist which occasioned the First World War.

American policy has been imprisoned by a public opinion which the government helped create for domestic political reasons. The public has been encouraged to believe that the terror is more threatening than analysis and experience show it is or can be. At the same time the public is told that governments can eradicate terrorism completely, a notion which anyone familiar with the history of the phenomena (or with the contents of this volume) would deem fatuous. The inevitable consequence of an attempt to base policy on unrealistic assumptions is that government cannot act either consistently or responsibly, and this in turn undermines its own credibility.

Governments are either unwilling to define terrorism or to use definitions consistently to direct policy. Political reasons in the narrowest sense of the term have too much weight in determining whether or not a state appears or continues to appear on the list of sponsors and in determining appropriate counter-measures. A peculiar 'ahistorical view' (fostered partly by academics who should know better) has created the conviction that state sponsored terror is a 'unique feature of the contemporary

international landscape' – a conviction which encourages arbitrariness since we are in effect assuming that there is no useful experience to gauge the phenomena with. But the plain fact is that historical periods without such problems are much rarer than those with them!

Contemporary attempts to deal with state sponsored terror, Wardlaw says, are intensely ideological; Crenshaw might say that they are subject more to organizational than instrumental interests, and we should not forget Crelinsten's observation that Canadian policy *vis-à-vis* the FLQ could be characterized this way too. Though they will never admit it, governments, like the terrorists they face, respond more to the force of domestic opinion than to that of their adversaries. This should not surprise us for we began the volume by seeking patterns common to all groups.

NOTES

1. David C. Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism* (Toronto: CBC, 1971).
2. Amos Lakos, *International Terrorism: A Bibliography* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). The items include unpublished papers and dissertations.
3. The counter-terrorist topic has 1,393 items, terrorist strategy and tactics 852, and terrorist psychology 254. Organizational analysis is not grouped under a separate topic in the text itself, but the index lists nine items, four of which are republications. If the title of the piece contains the word organization or some reasonable facsimile the index will pick it up. If not, it will be under some other topic. Much information on the organizational details of specific movements appears of course in the case studies of particular groups.
   One book which seems to be on the subject exists, Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). Despite its title, it is largely concerned with analyzing statistics pertaining to particular terrorist incidents. Consequently, the propositions generated have very little to do with organization.
4. The *Memoirs of General Grivas*, *General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare*, and Menachem Begin's *The Revolt*, are especially rich. They are discussed in my 'The International World' below, but only with regard to the issue of that essay.
5. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), p.422.
6. Martha Crenshaw, 'An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism', *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1985), p.474.
7. The Thugs were the most proficient terrorists of all time. The British estimated that they murdered 30,000 every year for centuries. Avoiding publicity completely, they killed with the most primitive weapon – a scarf. Likewise the Shining Path, according to McCormick, not only shuns the limelight, but also uses a technology primitive by modern terrorist standards. Despite the conventional wisdom, I suspect that the history of terror would show inverse ratios between the impulse for publicity and the statistics for killing! See my 'Fear and Trembling: Terror in Three Religious Traditions', *American Political Science Review*. 78 (Sept. 1984), 658–77.