# Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa

## Politics and process

*Edited by*
**George Joffé**

ROUTLEDGE

History and Society in the Islamic World

# Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa

## Politics and process

**Edited by George Joffé**

常州大学图书馆
藏书章

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2012
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© 2012 George Joffé for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors: their contributions

The right of the George Joffé to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the author for his individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Trademark notice*: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*
Islamist radicalisation in North Africa: politics and process/edited by George Joffé.
p. cm. – (History and society in the Islamic world)
"Born out of a conference held in June 2009 under the auspices of the Middle East Centre of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies and the Centre of North African Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies, both in the University of Cambridge."
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Africa, North–Politics and government. 2. Islam–Africa, North. 3. Islam and politics–Africa, North. 4. Islamic fundamentalism–Africa, North. 5. Radicalism–Africa, North. I. Joffé, George.
JQ3198.A58I85 2011
320.5′570961–dc22 2011005477

ISBN: 978-0-415-58806-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-80633-3 (ebk)

Typeset in Times
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

# Contributors

**Abdelhakim Aboullouz**: Université Cadi Ayyad, Marrakesh; Centre Marocain de Recherche en Sciences Sociales, Casablanca, Morocco.

**Zine Mohamed Barka**: Department of Political Science, Florida State University, USA; Université de Tlemcen, Algeria.

**Alia Brahimi**: Centre for Global Governance, London School of Economics, London, UK.

**George Joffé**: University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.

**Rachel Linn**: University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.

**Mehdi Mabrouk**: Université de Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia.

**Zahi Mogherbi**: Garyounis University, Benghazi, Libya.

**Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem**: University of Nouakchott, Mauritania.

**Alison Pargeter**: University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.

**Mohamed Tozy**: Université Hassan II, Casablanca, Morocco; IEP, Aix-en-Provence, France.

# Contents

*List of contributors* ix

1 **Introduction: antiphonal responses, social movements and networks** 1
GEORGE JOFFÉ

2 **Islam in Libya** 9
ALIA BRAHIMI

3 **Social change, regime performance and the radicalisation of politics: the case of Libya** 28
ZAHI MOGHERBI

4 **Tunisia: the radicalisation of religious policy** 48
MEHDI MABROUK

5 **Radicalisation in Tunisia** 71
ALISON PARGETER

6 **The causes of radicalisation in Algeria** 95
ZINE MOHAMED BARKA

7 **Trajectories of radicalisation: Algeria 1989–1999** 114
GEORGE JOFFÉ

8 **Morocco's radicalised political movements** 138
RACHEL LINN

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

**9 Salafism in Morocco: religious radicalism and political conformism** 160
ABDELHAKIM ABOULLOUZ, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY MOHAMED TOZY

**10 The paradoxes of Islamic radicalisation in Mauritania** 179
ZEKERIA OULD AHMED SALEM

*Index* 206

# 1 Introduction

## Antiphonal responses, social movements and networks

*George Joffé*

This book was born out of a conference held in June 2009 under the auspices of the Middle East Centre of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies and the Centre of North African Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies, both in the University of Cambridge. It formed part of a project on radicalisation in North Africa, funded by the ESRC which was designed to elucidate the causes of the phenomenon in the region in terms of the role played by the social and political environment there.[1] The contributions in this book are drawn from the conference and seek to provide an overview of radicalisation in North Africa.

The *New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* defines radicalisation as the process of becoming politically radical, whilst a political radical is defined as someone "advocating thorough or far-reaching change" or someone "supporting an extreme section of a party". In either case the process is one of challenging an established order, a hegemonic discourse, and this was the real focus of the project. Extremism, on the other hand, is defined as the condition of "advocating drastic or immoderate measures". The distance between the two concepts seems very small yet, as this book makes clear, it can reflect a crucial divide.

For the purposes of this book, radicalisation is treated as the process of alienation from a hegemonic discourse – usually that associated with the legitimisation of the state but also those of dominant political elites within it – and extremism as the active adoption of an ideology and associated praxis to challenge the state and its elites, usually through violence. When violence is involved, such a confrontation is usually expressed through asymmetric warfare – a condition which often allows the state to characterise such behaviour as aberrant and criminal. Radicalisation itself, however, is concerned with dissent over normative and hegemonic assumptions about the nature of the state and, when it expresses the views of a significant minority – or even a majority – within the society that inhabits the state, it can become the ideological driver of a social movement which is not necessarily violent.[2]

## Movements and networks

It is clear, nonetheless, that the two concepts of radicalisation and extremism do approximate to each other, such that one could be the genesis of the other.

Indeed, this is frequently the dominant normative view such that states feel justified in penalising both in similar terms. Yet it is argued here that there is a useful analytical distinction to be made between the two concepts, not least because radicalisation usually expresses itself not simply at the individual level but, as suggested, through social movements in which the mechanisms through which alienation is articulated resonate to shared interpretive schemata which also become prescriptive in nature. Such frames, which reflect not only the objective factors engendering demands for change but also the shared cultural values that may legitimise them, also inform the mobilising structures of social movements and help to shape the political environment in which the social movement can flourish and, perhaps, transform itself into an organised political vehicle of contention with the state.

Political extremism, on the other hand, tends to be the concern of minorities, often marginalised by social movements as well as the state, and deriving much of its vehemence from the fact of its exclusion from competing political discourses. The exception to this, of course, occurs when the state or its enabling elites repress the slightest sign of opposition or challenge, thus forcing any social movement contending its discourse into a position of either submission or confrontation. As expressed through such a marginal movement, political extremism raises significant questions over its organisational and mobilisational mechanisms.

Indeed, it is usually expressed through a network, not a movement, implying horizontal interlinkages between nodes that represent a very restricted number of people, because of their fear of repression if identified. Usually, too, they operate in clandestinity, through violence, and are directed towards the specific purpose of challenging the state's monopoly of "legitimate violence", indeed, of challenging the state's very existence as well. Membership raises other questions of recruitment and ideological justification, whether through peer pressure, psychological preference or ideological commitment.

On the face of it, however, there would appear to be an obvious correlation, if not interlinking, of the two concepts. But this, in itself, raises a series of further questions, both over the nature of the interlinkage and over the mechanisms by which it occurs, if indeed it does take place. The questions themselves have been transformed by politicians into a series of given assumptions, particularly in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and they have also been reified into visions of existential and systemic threat. Yet those assumptions need to be constantly questioned, for a consideration of the available evidence does not necessarily suggest that they are valid. Are social movements necessarily the progenitors of political extremism, so that both are inevitably associated with political violence and terrorism, or are the two phenomena completely independent, despite their similarities? Or is extremism an antiphonal response to the failure of social movements confronted with the intransigence of the state or its leading political actors? It is not clear that a dispassionate analysis of radicalism and extremism necessarily supports any particular conclusion, as the chapters which follow demonstrate.

## North Africa as a laboratory

The states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania provide a convenient environment in which these possibilities can be further examined. All five countries have experienced significant political violence during the past two decades which has been paralleled by social and political unrest expressed through social movements which framed their contestation of the state through Islamist paradigms. The temporal coincidence of such radicalism and extremism has also been such that it should be possible to determine the linkages between the two phenomena as well. In reality, however, such interlinkages appear to have been far more complex than conventional policy assumptions would predict. This is the arena that the contributors to this book are seeking to address. Many of them come from North Africa itself, thus providing a unique insight to the problems of radicalism in the region.

### *Libya and Tunisia*

Thus, in Libya where the state implicitly lays claim to an hegemonic discourse of political supremacy legitimised by "popular democracy", enshrined in the *Jamahiriyah,* that excludes any other political model, the late 1990s produced movements directly challenging the Qadhafi regime, as Alia Brahimi describes. These movements, often derived from salafi-jihadism and the experiences of Afghanistan, sought to replace the *Jamahiri* model despite its claimed consonance with Islamic principle. They were primarily located in Cyrenaica, a region noted for its hostility towards the tribally based normative political system. They operated in parallel with social movements within Libya derived from the Muslim Brotherhood and from secular paradigms which had long been in contention with the regime, but there were no obvious antiphonal links between the two types of movement in terms of personnel or ideology. Zahi Mogherbi makes it clear that secular paradigms also generate radical responses within the circumstances of contemporary Libya as well.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, social movements rooted in Islamic precepts and challenging the predominantly secular legacy of the political system developed by Habib Bourguiba reached back to the 1970s. They had all formally sought to share the political arena in order to contest the normative discourse of the state that had emerged at independence through established mechanisms of political engagement, despite the state's refusal to concede their right to do so. In the wake of the replacement of Habib Bourguiba by Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali they had even sought, unsuccessfully, to establish themselves as political parties within these mechanisms, despite their marginalisation by the regime. By the start of the 1990s, however, the Ben Ali regime labelled them extremist and forced them underground. Yet, in reality, there was no real evidence that any of them, particularly not the dominant movement, an-Nahda, had espoused extremist objectives.

That is not to say, however, that small extremist movements did not emerge, particularly at the start of the 1990s. They, however, had no obvious links to the social movements that had preceded them. Nor did such movements gain much purchase within the population in the decades that followed, even though violent evidence of them was to emerge in 2002 and between the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. Such extremism seems to have been linked to far wider paradigms, reaching back to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, although the transnational dimension of violence that emerged there in the 1990s and in this decade also seems to have been absent in Tunisia, except for the bombing of the synagogue in Djerba in 2002. Alison Pargeter examines the consequences of official repression in generating such extremist responses whilst Mehdi Mabrouk reflects on salafism, an alternative, formally non-political, Islamist vision which the Tunisian regime had been prepared to tolerate in trying to diffuse Islamist dissent, but which seems to have also promoted the extremism it wished to prevent.

## *Algeria*

It is in Algeria that, superficially, the most obvious pattern of interlinkage appeared to have taken place during the 1990s. The banning of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in 1992, after all, led directly to the appalling violence of the Algerian civil war between 1992 and 1999. There also seems to be little doubt that both the FIS itself and its successors in the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) and the Groupes Islamiques Armés (GIA), or in today's Groupe Salafiste du Predication et du Combat (GSPC), transformed since September 2006 into al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) represent Islamic social movements and their extremist counterparts. That is, after all, the narrative upon which the Algerian government has based its own counter-insurgency strategies and that has been largely accepted in Europe since the start of this decade, as Europe itself securitises its own relationship with its Mediterranean periphery.

Yet it is by no means clear that these assumed linkages operate or that the primary motivation for the decade-long crisis in Algeria was rooted in an Islamic contestation of the state or in a violent confrontation rooted in Islamic precept to replace it. This is not to deny that there was an attempt to challenge the Algerian regime's self-definition at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, nor that the state's repression of such a movement led to an extremely bloody confrontation by groups seeking to replace the state structures upon which it was based or even that such initiatives sought legitimisation through recourse to Islamic paradigms. It is, however, to question whether the movements were interlinked and antiphonal in nature, in that the suppression of the one led to the emergence of the other, and to raise the issue of what the real justifications argued for such movements really were. This is the topic that Mohamed Zine Barka seeks to address.

Behind the formal Islamist framing adopted by the FIS lay a very different narrative, one of the failure of the Algerian revolution to honour the promises made during the revolution itself. In other words, the legitimacy of the social movement from which the FIS emerged was based as much on this sense of a revolution betrayed as it was on the Islamic rhetoric through which it was expressed. And it was to this that the institutions of the Algerian state reacted when, in 1991, it aborted the electoral process which the FIS was poised to win. The FIS itself had always endorsed political engagement and, despite its obvious origins in the longstanding Salafiyyist traditions that had informed the political process throughout the long years of colonialism in North Africa, had also endorsed a democratic tradition that excluded it, as a movement, from endorsing a violent alternative of confronting the state rather than contesting its political behaviour. It is this narrative that George Joffé addresses in investigating the aspirations of the Djaza'iri faction within the FIS leadership, now in exile.

Even the violent movements that did emerge betrayed this political bifurcation, for the AIS really sought to force the Algerian state to reinstate the formal political process that it itself had interrupted. Eventually, when it could not do so, it compounded with the state and withdrew from the contest in October 1997. The tradition of violent confrontation with the state with the explicit intention of destroying it and replacing it with an intolerant alternative based on a very specific interpretation of Islamic constitutional doctrine was reserved for the collection of autonomous groups within the coalition known as the GIA. Yet, even here, it was not always clear to what extent the normative objectives reflected the real objectives of these movements, as criminality partnered religious conviction and as counter-insurgency techniques became interspersed with extremist violence. Nor was there significant interlinkage in terms of chronology, ideology or personnel with the FIS which had preceded them.

This is not to deny, of course, that the rhetoric of such movements did not increasingly reflect Islamist paradigms as time passed. But it does raise the question of the extent to which origins of their political action were solely a product of such ideologies and to what extent such justifications were adopted to legitimise a much more classical kind of struggle against what was perceived as a repressive state, a struggle which would have occurred whether the Islamist trope for political action had emerged or not. Even the activities of the GSPC-AQIM today fall within the same strictures. And it needs to be remembered the extent to which "al-Qa'ida" has become a branding that legitimises political violence in much the same way as occurred with the Marxism-Leninism of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s.

### *Morocco and Mauritania*

In Morocco, the direct causality implied by the conventional assumption that Islamic social movements inevitably generate Islamist violence appears to be even more obscure. One reason for this is the peculiar relationship of the institution at the core of the Moroccan state, the monarchy, to the control of public space. It is of course the case that normative assumptions about the institutions of the state and the relationship of the state to the public arena – in which it exercises its monopoly of legitimate violence – are suffused throughout the Islamic world with presuppositions about the Islamic vision of social and political order at both the normative and the demotic level.

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

However, in Morocco, the engagement of the central institutions of the state in this domain are based on the conscious assumption that such public space is not merely conditioned by Islamic precept but is sacralised by the nature of the institution itself, for the monarchy is also a caliphate and, as such, can claim a peculiar, specific and absolute justification for its right to condition public debate and action, even as it formally encourages political participation. This has meant that it has been particularly difficult for social movements of contestation based on Islamic precept to find a purchase within the Moroccan body politic, as Rachel Linn describes. One consequence of this has been the tendency for challenges to the state, whether secular or religious in inspiration, to have been violent, for contestation of the control of the public space has always been trumped by the monarchy's absolute claim of moral and political right.

Another consequence has been the ability of state to co-opt groups normatively opposed to it or to marginalise those groups which refuse to be co-opted. Thus the violent Shabiba Islamiyya of the 1960s and 1970s was either forced into exile or co-opted to re-emerge as a legitimate political party in the 1990s and during the following decade – the Parti de Justice et du Développement (PJD). On the other hand, a movement that did contest the legitimacy of the king's control of the public space, 'Adl wa Ihsan, and whose leader, Abdeslam Yacine, committed the egregious offence in the 1970s of challenging the king's right to dominate the sacralised public arena in his open letter, "Islam aw Tufan", has always rejected co-option and is denied political legitimacy in consequence.

It is only in the last decade, starting with the violent incidents in Casablanca in May 2003, that the moral and religious status of the Moroccan state has been openly challenged through violence, derived from salafi-jihadi traditions. The subsequent discovery of clandestine networks of violent opposition in Casablanca, Fez and Tangier, the rumours of discrete groups training in the Middle Atlas and the evidence of links abroad, into Europe – the Madrid bombings and the Belliraj conspiracy, often intermixed with criminal networks as well – and elsewhere seem to recall the violent rejection of the Moroccan state in the 1960s and 1970s.

Yet there has been no evidence of a linkage between such political extremism and the social movements that have increasingly become integral features of the formal Moroccan political scene. And, furthermore, these Islamic social movements, one co-opted and the other still outside formal political engagement, have moved further and further away from the Islamic roots and more and more into political engagement revolving around political paradigms involving democracy and human rights.

In other words, here there seems to be a complete split between social movement and political violence. And, furthermore, it seems that the inspiration for the latter is rooted outside the Moroccan political tradition, in the transnational ideology of salafi-jihadism and in the experience of emigration to Europe. Within Morocco itself, as Abdelhakim Aboullouz describes, salafism is now tolerated by the state because of its ostensibly non-political character, despite its potential for transmuting into more political alternatives – a parallel to the situation in Tunisia.

Mauritania represents a unique example of the difficulties facing the integration of Islamic radicalism within the state. As Zekeriya Ould Ahmed Salem demonstrates, Mauritania's long tradition of Islamic learning protected it from the gusts of political Islam drifting across North Africa. In recent years, however, such a movement has developed to challenge the state but it, in turn, has been outflanked by salafi-jihadism. As a result, Islamist radicals have had to rethink their relationship to the Mauritanian state, as the state itself has had to face both radical and extremist challenges.

## Outcomes

The patterns of social movement and political violence outlined above do not, it seems, really justify the conventional assumption of an interrelationship between the two phenomena. Instead each seems to develop out of different factors and experiences, even if they formally share common principles of legitimisation – in fact, of course, they do not for the principles themselves are a matter of interpretation from a common corpus which had originally little to do with their political objectives, even if it did engage with the social environment. And the factors and experiences involved have much more to do with specific contemporary political realities than with doctrinal verities.

In other words, if we wish to securitise the issue – the dominant approach today – we should devote far more attention to understanding the techniques of political violence and asymmetric warfare, whether secular or religious in inspiration, than to addressing its religious provenance. And, if we wish to intellectualise it, a more fruitful field might be to examine the motivations of such movements in principle, whatever their intellectual provenance, rather than looking to the minutiae of religious doctrine. Politics, not religion, explains the relevance of these phenomena today.

In many respects, in short, it might be worth adopting David Rapoport's long view of political violence in his argument of the four waves of terrorism,[3] with Jeremy Kaplan's addition of a fifth based on chiliastic epiphenomenal violence,[4] as a better paradigm for the contemporary world. Beyond this, however, lie other areas that might generate fruitful outcomes. The distinction between the collectivist nature of social movements as compared with the individualist choices involved with political violence or the real motivations for choosing violence over contestation might be one such area, for, in the last analysis, both have much more to do with politics than with Islam and both long predate their alleged association with political Islam itself.

This book was written before the events of 2011, which have changed the face of North Africa, took place or were even anticipated. Nonetheless, the events it describes and analyses are crucial to any attempt to evaluate the significance of what has now occurred. Even though it is primarily concerned with Islamist radicalisation and extremism – and political Islam has been notable during recent events by its absence – there is no doubt that Islamist movements will play a significant role in the political outcomes of recent events. Against that background, its contents will be essential for a proper understanding of the future of North Africa itself.

## Notes

1 "Radicalisation in North Africa", ESCR Reference RES-181–25–0022.
2 Tarrow, *Power in movement*; 10.
3 Rapoport, "The four waves of modern terrorism".
4 Kaplan, "Terrorism's fifth wave: a theory".

## Bibliography

Kaplan, J. (2008), 'Terrorism's fifth wave: a theory. A conundrum and a dilemma', *Perspectives on terrorism*, II (2).

Rapoport, D.C. (2004), 'The four waves of modern terrorism', UCLA, Burkle Center for International Relations, in Cronin, A.K. and Ludes, J.M. (eds), *Attacking terrorism: elements of a grand strategy*, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, Washington; 67–95.

Tarrow, S. (1998), *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics*, Cambridge University Press.

# 2 Islam in Libya

*Alia Brahimi*

According to one commentator, the advent of militant Islamist dissence in Libya during the mid-1980s was surprising to external observers and Libyans alike. ‘Common wisdom’, Yehudit Ronen argued, ‘had presumed that the deeply Islamic-oriented regime of Qadhafi was immune to an Islamist threat, notwithstanding its aggressive presence among Libya’s neighbours’.[1] Yet, if one disputes the premise that Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s regime was ‘deeply Islamic-orientated’, the emergence of a militant Islamist opposition to Qadhafi becomes less surprising – expected, even. Indeed, while Qadhafi asserted that ‘the Libyan revolution alone carries the banner of true Islam’, his pro-democracy opponents charged that he was ‘not a practicing Muslim’,[2] and the extremists which sought to overthrow him during the 1990s described their struggle as ‘a creedal fight between truth and falsehood’.[3]

In constructing the hegemonic political discourse, Qadhafi abandoned Islamic orthodoxy in a way which made challenges to the hegemonic discourse almost inevitably Islam-centric. Qadhafi dispensed with the *ulema* (the traditional clerical establishment) as custodians of religion and the *hadith* (the Prophetic traditions) as a source of law. The authority vacuum resulting from the former policy, coupled with the doctrinal attack embodied by the latter, made an Islamic challenge predictable. As Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori have pointed out, ‘Islamist authority to remake the world derives from a self-confident appropriation of what they believe to be “tradition”’.[4] As such, Qadhafi’s unabashed assault on tradition left him open to a response couched in the Islamist idiom.

This is not to say that the Islamist confrontation in Libya was reducible to irrational and fanatically held religious beliefs. On the contrary, the Qadhafi regime’s heterodox interpretation of Islam was but one symptom of the social and economic failures of the revolution (despite an oil boom), the iron fist of Qadhafi’s rule, the mismanaged confrontation with modernity, and the pursuant crisis of legitimacy. Just as the hegemonic discourse broke down, so did the contract between the state and its subjects. Not only has ‘Libyan political life and political debate … been in a state of suspended animation since soon after the coup of September 1, 1969’,[5] but Qadhafi’s regime was unable to deliver on the economic promises of his grandiose vision. Ultimately, the Islamist rejection of the state's normative power reflected the wider political, social and economic implosion of Qadhafi's revolution.

This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the historical relationship between religion and politics in modern Libya. It will then explore the construction of the hegemonic discourse in Libya since 1969 and Qadhafi's interpretation of Islam, before examining Islamist challenges to it.

## Religion and politics in modern Libya

Religion and politics have been intimately entwined in Libya's modern history, on the landscape of which 'religion and religious sentiment have been unusually significant'.[6] Lisa Anderson points out that the identity provided by Islam has been far more important for Libya than for the other Arab successor states of the Ottoman Empire.[7] Elsewhere in the Muslim world, the strength of European influence had done much to secularise both government and politics.[8] As opposed to Islam, the traditions of both Arab and Libyan nationalism have been considerably weaker, reflecting the special character and timing of the modern Libyan encounter with Europe.[9] Indeed, the political order from which Qadhafi seized the reins had been at the forefront of the resistance to the Italian colonial invaders, just as it had deftly combined religious with political legitimacy.

The Sanusiyyah was a Sufi order founded by the Algerian scholar, Sayyed Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, and based in the east of Libya (Cyrenaica). Al-Sanusi's aim was to restore what he conceived to be the original life of the Prophet. As Evans-Prichard observed, the faith and the morals which the Prophet preached to the Bedouin of his day, and which they accepted, were equally suited to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica who led a life similar to that of the Bedouin of Arabia in the seventh century.[10] Unlike earlier missionaries, however, the reformist al-Sanusi managed to establish himself as head of an organised order and the leader of a national movement. Conditions in Cyrenaica were especially conducive to the growth of a political-religious movement such as the Sanusiyyah became: 'it was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogenous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior'.[11] Starting in 1843, al-Sanusi built on the complex social organisation of the Bedouin tribes to attain a de facto state which provided an elaborate socioeconomic and legal organisation for the tribes and the Sahara trade routes. Its network of lodges (*zawaya*) served as an alternative communicational and administrative structure which rivalled the Ottoman state bureaucracy.[12] This unity became key to mobilisation for the anti-colonial resistance. In turn, that resistance contributed to the consolidation of the Sanusi state.

As the Order spread throughout North and Central Africa, force was not once resorted to in order to back its missionary labours (the Sanusiyyah even turned down requests for help against the British from al-Mehdi in Sudan). However, when the French attacked its Saharan territories and the Italians invaded

Cyrenaica, 'the Order had no choice but to resist'.[13] In fact, Sanusi leaders had always been cognisant of, and preoccupied with, the colonial threat to the region.[14] When that threat materialised in Libya with the Italian military invasion in 1911, the Sanusiyyah fought alongside the Turks until the Ottoman Empire fell in 1913, upon which the Sanusi officially declared their own state. Riven with factionalism among notables, the Tripolitan resistance was next to crumble in 1922, but the resistance in Cyrenaica would continue for another decade. For this reason, 'Libyans experienced anti-imperialism as a Muslim, not an Arab or local, cause.'[15]

The hero of the anti-Italian *jihad* was the Order's military commander, Umar al-Mukhtar. While some Sanusi leaders (including the future King Idris) were willing to negotiate with the Italians, al-Mukhtar and his companions refused to surrender. As Idris fled into exile in Egypt, al-Mukhtar and his men banded together to mount a guerrilla campaign which used hit-and-run tactics and relied upon a well-mobilised population as well as a network of spies within Italian-controlled territory.[16] In response, the Italians deployed uniquely brutal tactics which saw rebels dropped from planes, wells sealed, the construction of a fence along all of Libya's borders with Egypt in order to cut off the supply route and the consignment of 85,000 tribespeople from their homes to concentration camps in the desert (only 35,000 souls were to survive).[17] When al-Mukhtar was eventually captured and hanged in 1931, the fascist government in Italy finally announced the complete conquest of Libya after twenty years of resistance.

Italian dominion came to an end in World War Two, during which the Cyrenaicans fought alongside the Allies. Idris returned to Libya and, under the auspices of the United Nations, unified the country under a single monarchy (full independence was attained in 1951). Not only did independence formally institutionalise the linkage between religion and politics in Libya (since Libyans were to be ruled by a Sufi King), but the process by which it was attained was heavily reliant on religious networks, deeply dependent on faith-based symbols, and effectively rendered the political vocabulary of modern Libya an Islamic one.

## Qadhafi's Islam and the construction of a hegemonic discourse

Under the leadership of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, a group of junior military officers unseated King Idris on 1 September 1969. From the so-called 'Free Officers' who had enacted it to the single party, the Arab Socialist Union, which replaced the monarchy, the *coup d'état* bore the hallmarks of Nasserism.

Idris' failures were said to emanate from the liberal, pro-Western stance of his administration, which permitted, among other things, prostitution, the sale and consumption of alcohol, a secular legal code and the presence of British and Americans military bases on Libyan soil in exchange for subsidies. The moral degeneracy associated with Idris' reign was made more pronounced with the discovery of oil in 1959:

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问： www.ertongbook.com